[Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Bruno,

>> My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to
>> numbers in the first place
>
> But that would violate the comp assumption.

No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of
non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number.

>> - that is why the aliens could destroy the
>> machine (it follows from 3-det that something _had_ to happen to
>> prevent
>> successor states which wouldn't correspond to numbers).
>
>
> But machines are secondary. The "physical machines" are pattern
> emerging in the mind of persons themselves emerging from the relation
> between numbers. I don't see how aliens could manage a machine not to
> have successors.

The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors
(the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is
consistent).


> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor
> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be other
> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's state, a
> continuum of successor states exists.

This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine
states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is not
at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?

After all, there are halting computations.

Cheers,
Günther

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

>> With COMP it is not so clear.
>
> explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt; the
> "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
> instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.

Please bear in mind that I have not yet studied the AUDA in detail. How
does Dt suppress cul-de-sac?


Cheers,
Günther

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote:





> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have  
> successors
> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic  
> is
> consistent).

Hmmm.... (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build  
to much scenario from you say here).

Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is  
essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; "did you see  
that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more  
complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only  
to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but  
we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if  
there exists any, from that theory of mind.

But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we  
continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer  
science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or  
combinators ...). here there are the "bombs" (creative bomb) of Post  
Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of "universal machine",  
and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability  
predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable  
properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay.  
Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian  
Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its  
correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine.

The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the  
very rare "absolute" notion. It makes "computable" an absolute notion.
Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content,  
in the digital realm, of Church Thesis.
Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of  
provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth  
concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory  
or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with  
chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano  
Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible  
cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster  
portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture;  
like us, obviously today at least.

>
>
>
>> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor
>> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be  
>> other
>> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's  
>> state, a
>> continuum of successor states exists.
>
> This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine
> states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is  
> not
> at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?
>
> After all, there are halting computations.

By step seven.
A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes  
it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which  
univerrsal machine we are, nor really which universal machine supports  
us. The UD generates your state S again, and again, and again an  
infinity of time (UD-step time) in many similar and less similar  
computational histories. The first person expectations have to be  
defined (by UDA(1-6) on *all* computational histories. If only due to  
those stupid histories dovetailing on the reals while generating your  
state S, makes the cardinal of the set of all (infinite) computational  
histories going through that state S a continuum.

That the "UDA" informal view.

In AUDA, the first person view is given by the conjunction of  
provability with truth. We lose kripke accessibility, but we get a  
richer topology, close to histories with continuous angles in between;  
but it is heavily technical. Each hypostases has its own mathematics.

Surely more later,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:09, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>>> With COMP it is not so clear.
>>
>> explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt;  
>> the
>> "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
>> instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.
>
> Please bear in mind that I have not yet studied the AUDA in detail.  
> How
> does Dt suppress cul-de-sac?

By Kripke semantics. A Kripke frame is given by a set of "worlds",  
together with an accessibility relation between those worlds.
For a mathematical logician a kripke frame is just a set with a binary  
relation. By definition a world is just an element of that set, and  
the accessibility relation is just that binary relation.

Those Kripke frames are used to provide a mathematical tools to reason  
on formal modal logical systems.  They provide models of modal theory,  
that is mathematical structure which satisfy, in a mathematical sense,  
the theorems of the modal logical system.

The idea is that a modal theorem in a modal system should be a formula  
true in a ll the worlds of some frame. the hope, indeed realized for  
many theories including G (but not G*), is that there is a binary  
relation on a type of frame which characterized all and only all the  
theorem of the modal system.

We do logic here, meaning we dispose of a set of propositional  
variables p, q, r, ...
A frame become a model when you assign on each world a function from  
{p, q, r, ...} to {0, 1} (a valuation). If v() = 1 in world alpha, we  
say that p is true at world alpha. You make each world obeying  
classical logic (for exemple if p is true in alpha, and if q is true  
in alpha, you make (p & q) true in alpha, etc.

The key of Kripke semantics is that Bp iis true alpha if and only if p  
is true in all worlds beta which are accessible (cf the binary  
relation of the frame) from alpha.

Now, what does mean to say that Dp is true in alpha? We have no  
choice, given that Dp is really an abbreviation of ~B~p, which means  
that it is false (in alpha) that B~p, which means that it is false (by  
Kripke key point) that ~p is true in all worlds accessible from alpha,  
which means (using "false -> false" is a tautology) there is a world,  
with p true, accessible from alpha.

So if Dp, or even just Dt is true in alpha, then there is necessarily  
a world beta, with p true, or even just t, accessible from alpha.  
alpha cannot be a culd-de-sac.

You can note that in cul-de-sac, Dt is false, so Bf is true. Bf is  
true because trivially if a world beta is accessible from alpha then f  
(false) is true in beta. This is trivially true because the  
proposition "beta is accessible from alpha" is never met, so the  
condition is always false, and the propositions have the shape f -> f  
(a tautology).

To sum up: the Kripke semantics of Bf is "I am dead" or "I am in a cul-
de-sac world".
The Kripke semantics of Dt is "I am alive" or "I am in world able to  
access some other world".

World, or moment, or whatever. It is said that Artemov would have  
interpret jokingly Dt as "I am in country which provides visa".

Günther, I will be frank, this is just elementary modal logic, and  
even advanced modal logic is considered "easy" compared to the  
provability logic. Solovay theorem made one precise modal logic, G, an  
incredible tools for simplifying the provability logic field. The  
modal logic G is to provability logic, what tensor calculus is to  
general relativity theory. G is just one modal logic among an ocean of  
possible modal logics.
Somehow modal logic is the abstract theory of the multimultiverses.

It is just a wonderful result that the formula of Löb, B(Bp->p)->Bp,  
the only axiom of G, (really), formalizes completely the whole field  
(at the propositional level). It gives, with the intensional variants,  
the whole propositional theology of the honest or correct, or sound,  
universal machine. (Universal machine believing some effective  
induction principle, they are automatically Löbian).

It is an ideal case, of course, in our lives we are far from lobian.  
But it is what we need, by UDA, to get the correct, assuming comp, big  
picture, including physics, first and third and first plural physics.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Bruno, - again the bartender...

*

Initial remark:

I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are

in my opinion thought - conditions to make one's theory workable and so they are  conditioned by the circumstances.

*

What I try to add is the 'mind-body' problem. While I have no definition for "mind", we 'all' think to know what it means: a non-material mentality which encompasses the tool's (brain(function)) genetic built differences - i.e. enhanced  or reduced ease of connectivity-building in select topical domains - plus the sum of previous experience helping one's personal interpretation (and maybe more) including one's faith in a "soul" as well, while the 'body' is the formulation of a figment in the 'physical world' upon phenomena that are (mis/poorly) understood when received and both are parts of the complexity of us.

I cannot figure a 'separation' of substantial parts of a complexity without destruction of the complexity in its entirety, so a "transport" can be only the entire complexity - or none.

Aristotle had it easy with his simple cognitive level of the 'physical world' so there was an easy possibility of thinking separately about the physical body and the rest of it not fitting into such.

 

In brief: I se no 'mind-body' problem, only when we try the ancient (I may say: obsolete) ways of separating the 'physical world figment' from the total (complexity).

*

((you promised an explanatory post to my askings - I am in a hurry to write down these remarks, because MAYBE after your explanations these would not make sense<G>))

 

John M

On Sun, Mar 8, 2009 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote:

> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
> successors
> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
> is
> consistent).

Hmmm.... (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build
to much scenario from you say here).

Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is
essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; "did you see
that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more
complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only
to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but
we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if
there exists any, from that theory of mind.

But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we
continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer
science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or
combinators ...). here there are the "bombs" (creative bomb) of Post
Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of "universal machine",
and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability
predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable
properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay.
Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian
Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its
correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine.

The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the
very rare "absolute" notion. It makes "computable" an absolute notion.
Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content,
in the digital realm, of Church Thesis.
Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of
provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth
concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory
or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with
chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano
Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible
cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster
portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture;
like us, obviously today at least.
>
>
>
>> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor
>> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be
>> other
>> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's
>> state, a
>> continuum of successor states exists.
>
> This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine
> states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is
> not
> at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?
>
> After all, there are halting computations.

By step seven.
A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes
it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which
univerrsal machine we are, nor really which universal machine supports
us. The UD generates your state S again, and again, and again an
infinity of time (UD-step time) in many similar and less similar
computational histories. The first person expectations have to be
defined (by UDA(1-6) on *all* computational histories. If only due to
those stupid histories dovetailing on the reals while generating your
state S, makes the cardinal of the set of all (infinite) computational
histories going through that state S a continuum.

That the "UDA" informal view.

In AUDA, the first person view is given by the conjunction of
provability with truth. We lose kripke accessibility, but we get a
richer topology, close to histories with continuous angles in between;
but it is heavily technical. Each hypostases has its own mathematics.

Surely more later,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

>> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have  
>> successors
>> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
>> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic  
>> is
>> consistent).
>
> Hmmm.... (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build  
> to much scenario from you say here).

Ok:

if you make OM's correspond to numbers, then QI holds if for all OM's
(encoded by some n) there are some (at least one) f(n) so that it is a
continuation.

If the aliens destroy all the reconstitution machines (and the person
beaming over does not find the beaming to have failed), this would mean
that there exists a number n (=OM) for which there is no f(n) which
encodes a continuation.


So there can't both be a continuation OM (f(n) for n) _and_ aliens
destroying _all_ the machines in the multiverse - which would say there
is _no_ such f(n), for some given n (the teleportation n).

Maybe the confusion arises because we are talking on 2 levels: the
platonic view (numbers) and the inside view (OMs). What is determined in
the one (platonic relations) decides what is possible in the OMs.


Cheers,
Günther




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Mar 2009, at 02:25, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>>> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
>>> successors
>>> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded  
>>> in
>>> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
>>> is
>>> consistent).
>>
>> Hmmm.... (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build
>> to much scenario from you say here).
>
> Ok:
>
> if you make OM's correspond to numbers, then QI holds if for all OM's
> (encoded by some n) there are some (at least one) f(n) so that it is a
> continuation.

Only 3-OM correspond to (relative) number. I prefer to call them  
"states" or "worlds".
1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,  
themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of  
computations going trough their corresponding states.
Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is  
already a continuum of stories/computations.


>
>
> If the aliens destroy all the reconstitution machines (and the person
> beaming over does not find the beaming to have failed), this would  
> mean
> that there exists a number n (=OM) for which there is no f(n) which
> encodes a continuation.



The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By  
step 8, they have to shut down elementary arithmetic. If they can do  
that from inside elementary arithmetic, it means elementary arithmetic  
is inconsistent. Robinson arithmetic would be inconsistent.

>
>
>
> So there can't both be a continuation OM (f(n) for n) _and_ aliens
> destroying _all_ the machines in the multiverse - which would say  
> there
> is _no_ such f(n), for some given n (the teleportation n).
>
> Maybe the confusion arises because we are talking on 2 levels: the
> platonic view (numbers) and the inside view (OMs). What is  
> determined in
> the one (platonic relations) decides what is possible in the OMs.

The 3-OM are determined in the little arithmetical Platonia. The 1-OM  
of the humans lives in the first person plenitude, which escapes  
provably (assuming the humans to be machine) the humans mathematics.
But the 1-OM of a simpler (than us) Lobian machine, like "Peano  
Arithmetic" is still tractable by a much richer Lobian machine like  
"Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory".

I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the  
seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by  
a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to  
empirical QM, we have good "objective" (sharable) reason we share most  
of those histories.

Best regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,  
> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of  
> computations going trough their corresponding states.
> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is  
> already a continuum of stories/computations.

I'm fine up to here.

> The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By  

No, they need not - see below.

> I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the  
> seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by  
> a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to  

I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need
correspond to a continuation of an OM.

You agree that some "continuations" can actually be a non-continuation,
don't you? For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you
which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are "continuations"
of your state which code your termination.

I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations
need correspond to OMs. For instance, in step 1 we say "yes doctor", but
we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving with
some cogwheels -> "no doctor" ;-)

So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_
(2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the
teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds).

How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is
conscious qua computation? (then I would agree -> QI; but I don't share
that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA)

Best Wishes,
Günther

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Gunther wrote:

 

"...assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? "

brings up in my mind: thinking in comp (at least: in numbers) translates 'conscious' into 'computed' ??????

(That would imply an elevation from the binary embryonic contraption as our "computer" into more sophisticated systems, if I dare say: 'analogue'?)

 - - -proposal for vocabulary - - -

 

John M

 

 

On Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Günther Greindl <guenther.greindl@...> wrote:

Hi Bruno,

> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,
> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
> computations going trough their corresponding states.
> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
> already a continuum of stories/computations.

I'm fine up to here.

> The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By

No, they need not - see below.

> I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the
> seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by
> a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to

I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need
correspond to a continuation of an OM.

You agree that some "continuations" can actually be a non-continuation,
don't you? For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you
which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are "continuations"
of your state which code your termination.

I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations
need correspond to OMs. For instance, in step 1 we say "yes doctor", but
we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving with
some cogwheels -> "no doctor" ;-)

So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_
(2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the
teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds).

How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is
conscious qua computation? (then I would agree -> QI; but I don't share
that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA)

Best Wishes,
Günther

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Günther,

>> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,
>> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
>> computations going trough their corresponding states.
>> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
>> already a continuum of stories/computations.
>
> I'm fine up to here.
>
>> The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By
>
> No, they need not - see below.
>
>> I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the
>> seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined  
>> by
>> a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to
>
> I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need
> correspond to a continuation of an OM.

I am not saying this, but only that  to compute my "next 1-OM", I have  
to take into account the infinity of computations going through all 3-
OM corresponding to this 1-OMs.




>
>
> You agree that some "continuations" can actually be a non-
> continuation,
> don't you?


Yes.



> For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you
> which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are "continuations"
> of your state which code your termination.

I am a universal machine. No state of myself codes my termination. But  
I can be supported by a stopping computation. At the same time I am  
supported by an infinity of non stopping computations.



>
>
> I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations
> need correspond to OMs.

All computational continuations are needed for the measure  
corresponding to the 1-indeterminacy. Even more so the more my  
substitution level is low. The indeterminacy itself bears on those  
where I continue, and indeed this corresponds to some subset of "all  
computations", but that subset has still the cardinality of the  
continuum (by "simple counting").
This is a rough reasoning, only the interview of the machine can  
provide the math for treating the "equivalence class aspect" of the  
computations. I argue informally.



> For instance, in step 1 we say "yes doctor", but
> we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving  
> with
> some cogwheels -> "no doctor" ;-)


Indeed :)


>
>
> So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_
> (2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the
> teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds).


But it is just plainly consistent that the annihilation *could* be not  
successful, and given that all consistent computations (computation in  
which *I* remain consistent are defined intrinsically in the  
arithmetical relation, I don't see how such consistent computations  
can be eliminated.
It is a sort of practical problem with comp: you have no way to  
guaranty a self-annihilation (unless you can change the laws of  
arithmetic of course).


>
>
> How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is
> conscious qua computation?

No. "I" am conscious, only in the computation which supports me. Of  
course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In case  
you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a  
state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality is a  
"past event".



> (then I would agree -> QI; but I don't share
> that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA)


I have no idea which criteria you could use to be certain that all  
your continuations will stop. If this could be true, your histories  
(going through you actual state) would be enumerable, and in a sense  
you would be already dead. Such computations are of negligible  
measure. This is a part of comp which leads to verifiable physical  
facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100%  
correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then  
comp is false!
Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death),  
our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even  
without amnesia (or Mitra's backtracking), but I believe the amnesic  
continuation to be more "normal" than the other, but this of course is  
hard to compute and in fine depend of what you will mean by "you",  
something comp makes only "you" capable of defining or identifying  
yourself with).

I don't like this idea, and I really wish someone find an error, but I  
can't. In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your  
"brain" dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable  
brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your  
universal computation. Even your current computer is immortal, from  
its own pov (rather poor today). All universal machine have  
2^aleph_zero continuations resilient in arithmetic, and you can feel  
yourself alive in all those who doesn't stop. In the long run amnesia  
makes its office (but this I just hope!).

You can program a universal machine to stop, relatively to another  
universal machine. But you can't program a universal machine to stop,  
from its personal view, relatively to all others universal machine,  
and the 1-OM  are determined by that late condition. I will have the  
opportunity to go through the UDA (seventh step) again with Kim. I  
suggest you polish your argument against comp-immortality until then,  
perhaps.

Best wishes,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.

 > course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In case
 > you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
 > state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality is a
 > "past event".


I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this before,
Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I agree with you that you can't have a universal machine stopping
relatively to all others from it's POV; but I don't see why we can't
think of it having total amnesia. So, for the time being, let us take
surviving as meaning to keep (at least large parts) of one's memory.

> facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100%  
> correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then  
> comp is false!

Could you elaborate? I don't see why LG should be bad news for comp?
You mean because LG proposes a fundamental spacetime quantization?
I don't see how it would falsify comp?

And why the finitely describable Big Bang? It seems you have a problem
when there are some finite limits (outside of the effective computation
of mind). Is this because you need the continuum in the AUDA to get
Quantum logic or something like that?

> Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death),  
> our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even  
> without amnesia

Why do you believe that latter?

> In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your  
> "brain" dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable  
> brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your  

What continuations are possible in arithmetic? I would like to warn
against the approach of taking conceivability/ "humand mind" logical
possibility as a criterion (as you seem to suggest with saying that "the
transporter failed" is a consistent extension). The criterion for
continuation must be arithmetic possibility, and here, I don't see any
formal or even informal way to get to "worlds" in the anthropocentric sense.

> opportunity to go through the UDA (seventh step) again with Kim. I  
> suggest you polish your argument against comp-immortality until then,  
> perhaps.

Will do :-) But I think beforehand we should clear up any mutual
misunderstandings; you have obviously been thinking about these things
for a long time, and you have made connections/inferences which may not
be as obvious as you think.

BTW: thanks for your modal logic post (the Dt explanation), here again
the above mentioned issue crops up: while the modal logic may be
elemental, your interpretation of them is certainly not.

Often it is the interpretation that does all the work (consider for
instance Einstein's SR: the mathematics was there before, he "just"
suggested a new interpretation by adding postulates (Principle of
Relativity for electrodynamics, c as constant speed of light)).

These interpretation issues are often played down, but they are in fact
essential.

Cheers,
Günther


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Günther,

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
>
>> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In  
>> case
>> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
>> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality  
>> is a
>> "past event".
>
>
> I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this  
> before,
> Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very  
logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of  
declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",  
because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary  
knowers.



>
>
> I agree with you that you can't have a universal machine stopping
> relatively to all others from it's POV; but I don't see why we can't
> think of it having total amnesia. So, for the time being, let us take
> surviving as meaning to keep (at least large parts) of one's memory.


All right. Comp leads also to that form of immortality, at least for  
awhile (if I can say).
The problem of death is intrinsically difficult, because you will  
survive with amnesia or not according of the level of substitution,  
which we cannot know, but only bet on (or perhaps even choose in some  
circumstances?). Total amnesia seems to lead to the remembering of you  
being the universal person, plausibly Plotinus "Soul-Universe", or the  
arithmetical S4Grz (the third hypostase).
Total amnesia is complete fusing. We "remember" we are all the same  
person. We can lost that memory only by differentiating oneself again.

>
>
>> facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100%
>> correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then
>> comp is false!
>
> Could you elaborate? I don't see why LG should be bad news for comp?
> You mean because LG proposes a fundamental spacetime quantization?
> I don't see how it would falsify comp?

It is obviously an open problem. But taking literally the UDA, and  
making abstraction of some still possible (logically) conspiration of  
the numbers, it seems clear that comp predict that an electron, for  
going from A to B, with respect to you, will be supported by a  
continuum of computational histories. I have no clue how to select a  
finite or countable infinity of subcomputations. But if that is the  
case, the UDA shows that such a conclusion (like LG) has to be derived  
from arithmetic. Otherwise, it would be treachery.



>
>
> And why the finitely describable Big Bang? It seems you have a problem
> when there are some finite limits (outside of the effective  
> computation
> of mind). Is this because you need the continuum in the AUDA to get
> Quantum logic or something like that?


Not at all. That would be treachery too. If the continuum was not  
possibly emerging from AUDA, I would take this as an evidence that  
comp is false. The reason comes really from computer science and the  
(enumerable) redundancy of the computational states, and the non  
enumerable redundancy of the "1-pov" infinite stories.



>
>
>> Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death),
>> our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even
>> without amnesia
>
> Why do you believe that latter?


Consider someone who dies, relatively to you. Well, La Palisse was  
found of "tautology": after he died, someone said" 5 minutes avant sa  
mort, Monsieur de La Paice vivait encore". "Fives minutes before he  
died, Sir de La Palice was still alive". Now, from the point of view  
of the dying person, the UD generates 2^aleph_zero histories going  
through that state "where he is is still alive", and which are below  
its computational relevant substitution level. Even with just QM, you  
can see stories which will "repair anything wrong with whatever needed  
to generate a short consistent computation. At his substitution level  
he is finite, and finite machine can always be fixed, and that is all  
the soul need to survive an instant. But this is true for all  
instants, by exactly the repetition of the argument. Perhaps some Gods  
can be mortal, but no souls, as supported by finite entities. That  
would be like my mechanics: "no, you car is definitely broken". It is  
a lie, or a simplification, what it means is "it would be more  
expensive to fix it than to buy a new one". In the ud, the first  
person has unbound-able resources.

I think, and Quentin disagrees, that, would I be dying, I would feel  
myself surviving more probably in the "amnesic stories", probably  
because I tend to believe (those days) that, if comp is true, my  
substitution level could probably be rather high. So I would survive  
in those "normal world" with a "lesser brain". But if Quentin is right  
and all my memory are necessary for being me, I will survive in those  
consistent dreams where my brain has been repaired by friendly white  
rabbits.
Suggest me your substitution level (you could bet on) and specify me  
the corresponding most probable universal implementation, and from  
this I can "program" a generator of consistent extensions.
This could seem far stretched, but recall that the universal  
dovetailing is far stretched itself. And from inside we see only the  
projection of it, but of it all.


Now in auda, it is even more simple than in uda, because the soul is  
defined by the knower, which modality is defined in arithmetic by the  
proposition explicitly provable *and* true. Bp & p. So Bp -> p, and Bp  
-> Dp (exercice), so we have Dt, and DDt, DDDt, ... in all worlds/
states. Somehow the soul is immortal quasi by definition. It is the  
root of the never ending self-extension. The builder of time and  
space, not yet matter, because it is logically before observation,  
comprehension, and reflexion. matter arrives when Dp is added (p  
Sigma_1).

>
>
>> In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your
>> "brain" dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable
>> brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your
>
> What continuations are possible in arithmetic? I would like to warn
> against the approach of taking conceivability/ "humand mind" logical
> possibility as a criterion (as you seem to suggest with saying that  
> "the
> transporter failed" is a consistent extension). The criterion for
> continuation must be arithmetic possibility,

In uda, the accessible, by the UD,  states, and their points of view  
on their statistics, bearing on the conputations going through them.

In auda, this will depend from the eigth hyspostases. But it is always  
an interplay of provability, consistency, and truth (Bp, Dp, and p).



> and here, I don't see any
> formal or even informal way to get to "worlds" in the  
> anthropocentric sense.

It is the place where indeed many can confuse the map and the  
territory, or accuse me of doing so. The key advantage of comp, is  
that when you say yes to the doctor, you do indeed identify your self  
with a local relative map of you. Then, in uda we reason informally,  
hopefully rigorously, in term of intuitive description of  
computational histories. In auda, we do it formally, by interviewing  
an ideally correct universal self-referring machine with elementary  
betting abilities, and a world is just a consistent extensions, but  
the geometry of the relation between worlds if dependent from the  
chosen point of view. Auda gives 8 (16, 32, ...) very different view  
of the same arithmetic. Only one of them gives physics, another gives  
physical sensibility, etc.

>
>
>> opportunity to go through the UDA (seventh step) again with Kim. I
>> suggest you polish your argument against comp-immortality until then,
>> perhaps.
>
> Will do :-) But I think beforehand we should clear up any mutual
> misunderstandings; you have obviously been thinking about these things
> for a long time, and you have made connections/inferences which may  
> not
> be as obvious as you think.
>
> BTW: thanks for your modal logic post (the Dt explanation), here again
> the above mentioned issue crops up: while the modal logic may be
> elemental, your interpretation of them is certainly not.

By Solovay theorem, G and G* gives the "intelligible world" of the  
machine. Or its propositional skeleton. The interpretation are  
mathematical structures, and I am interested in what the machine  
proves, and bet,  about them. The interpretations somehow are the  
consistent extensions themselves (I use in the background the  
COMPLeteness (not INCOMPLeteness) theorem of Gödel, and a more recent  
theorem by Orey which shows that Loebianne machine prove the  
completeness theorem.

The comp hyp is the link between you and machine, and Solovay theorem  
is the link between machine and the logic G and G*.

As far as we are self-referentially correct, Solovay theorem applies  
to us. If you bet on your correct level of substitution you are self-
referentially correct, for example.

The completeness theorem say that a theory is consistent (does not  
prove the false, = Dt) if and only if the theory has a model. That is  
there is a mathematical world which satisfies (in a mathematical  
sense) the theory. So Dt is really "I believe in a reality, or in a  
world, state, etc."

>
>
> Often it is the interpretation that does all the work (consider for
> instance Einstein's SR: the mathematics was there before, he "just"
> suggested a new interpretation by adding postulates (Principle of
> Relativity for electrodynamics, c as constant speed of light)).
>
> These interpretation issues are often played down, but they are in  
> fact
> essential.

Take quantum mechanics, like Everett and Dewitt, I don't believe in  
human interpretations, I believe in the interpretation, or the  
corresponding discourses, made by the "relatively statistically  
relevant" entities described by the theory.

With comp, you have to proceed in that way, too. You can do it  
mathematically with respect to the correct level of self-description.  
What is impossible in practice, is to guaranty any precise chosen  
level, you have to bet, pray, ... on something. This I never hide.

Like consistency, the truth of comp guaranties the consistency of the  
falsity of comp. It is really a "theology", but a mathematical one.

It is even possible that the level is a matter of personal  
convenience. You could fuse by amnesia, and then come back in this or  
that reality to finish this or that job, like if you could chose  
between Mitra's backtracking and Anciaux's wish to  keep its books,  
CDs, hard and wet disk full of all its memories.

Dying? The Loebian machine is confronted to a gigantic arithmetical  
Bardo Thodol, yet with infinitely many shortcuts. The arithmetical and  
analytical hierarchies provide good approximation, for the correct  
Lobian machine. The full first person of the lobian machine is not a  
machine, its vastly more deep, powerful ... unnameable also (like the  
knower is already not definable by the machine).

It is new, and relates three non obvious fields, don't worry. I'm  
sorry I can't help more quickly. Logic is the most subtle branch of  
math, and is not well taught, when it is. Hope this helped a bit. I  
will go through this very slowly with Kim, so in the worst case, just  
be patient, but don't hesitate to ask questions. If you study logic  
(the Mendelson book, or Boolos, or Smoryinski) don't hesitate to ask  
question.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Quentin Anciaux-2]

Hi Bruno,

2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

Hi Günther,

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
>
>> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In
>> case
>> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
>> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality
>> is a
>> "past event".
>
>
> I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this
> before,
> Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very
logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of
declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",
because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary
knowers.

Well I agree that in total amnesia thought experiment... well the amnesia is not total... the subject still knows his former language and other knowledge... except all knowledges/memories about *who* he was is lost. And in this sense IF in one minute I lose these memories about my current ME, then my current ME is dead for all practical purpose. And IF mwi and/or comp is true then there must exists a moment which is a successor of current ME without the current ME memories being lost... so I should end up in this state and not in the state where my identity was erased because like I can't be where I'm dead... I can't be where I'm not. The 'I' which is referred is the one with memories, the one without cannot meaningfully say he is a successor of me now, except if he sees like in real world "total" amnesia case that his body was mine and causally connected to mine. But in comp sense this is not meaningful... If my mind can be copied and transferred in a "metal" body, this metal body is not causally connected to my biological body... but that mind is a continuation of current me.

So in this sense, if you say that it is possible that all successor moment to a moment could lead to a "total" amnesia, then QI is false... or tautologically true because it means you are everyone (ie: no one). But for all practical purpose current ME would be dead.

I'll continue to read the rest of the mail.

Regards,
Quentin

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Mar 2009, at 13:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Bruno,

2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

Hi Günther,

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
>
>> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In
>> case
>> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
>> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality
>> is a
>> "past event".
>
>
> I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this
> before,
> Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very
logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of
declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",
because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary
knowers.

Well I agree that in total amnesia thought experiment... well the amnesia is not total... the subject still knows his former language and other knowledge... except all knowledges/memories about *who* he was is lost. And in this sense IF in one minute I lose these memories about my current ME, then my current ME is dead for all practical purpose. And IF mwi and/or comp is true then there must exists a moment which is a successor of current ME without the current ME memories being lost... so I should end up in this state and not in the state where my identity was erased because like I can't be where I'm dead... I can't be where I'm not. The 'I' which is referred is the one with memories, the one without cannot meaningfully say he is a successor of me now, except if he sees like in real world "total" amnesia case that his body was mine and causally connected to mine. But in comp sense this is not meaningful... If my mind can be copied and transferred in a "metal" body, this metal body is not causally connected to my biological body... but that mind is a continuation of current me.

So in this sense, if you say that it is possible that all successor moment to a moment could lead to a "total" amnesia, then QI is false... or tautologically true because it means you are everyone (ie: no one). But for all practical purpose current ME would be dead.

Hmmm...

I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability "now", that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24 december 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March 2009) and reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March 2009, say)? The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20 Augustus 2009 you (the you in Washington) suffered a  "total amnesia".  And then, "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through adequate medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of yous did move from W or M).

Note that with high concentrated extract of Salvia Divinorum, people can "suffer" (or "enjoy") a total amnesia, where you forget not just your name and memories of life, but you forget even what is a person, what is space, what is time.  Yet you remain conscious. Life appears as a dream, that you recall vaguely, and then forget, and then you forget you did that dream. Yet "you" come back. (See the reports, I don't encourage its consumption, but anyone interested by consciousness can be interested by such reports).

I'll continue to read the rest of the mail.

OK.

Regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Bruno:

before youcontinue reading (what you forgot in total amnesia<G> ) a question:

 

You wrote among others:

"...Note that with high concentrated extract of Salvia Divinorum, people can "suffer" (or "enjoy") a total amnesia, where you forget not just your name and memories of life, but you forget even what is a person, what is space, what is time.  Yet you remain conscious...."

 

How do you define "conscious"  for a state without ANY memory working in your mindset?  How can you 'understand' anything (to become 'aware' of?) -

 

You may experience a connectionless and meaningless wirwar emerging in (literally) senseless randomity - not even recognizing that it is a 'view', a 'sound', or 'idea' until you 'deveop' SOME connections (right or wrong).

Then you have a 'perceived (solipsist) world to be 'aware of'.

 

Now in that you can continue reading. But what will you read?...

 

Regards (hopefully with retained memory, so I still remember you...)

 

John M

On Tue, Mar 17, 2009 at 2:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 16 Mar 2009, at 13:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Bruno,

2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

Hi Günther,

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
>
>> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In
>> case
>> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
>> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality
>> is a
>> "past event".
>
>
> I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this
> before,
> Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very
logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of
declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",
because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary
knowers.

Well I agree that in total amnesia thought experiment... well the amnesia is not total... the subject still knows his former language and other knowledge... except all knowledges/memories about *who* he was is lost. And in this sense IF in one minute I lose these memories about my current ME, then my current ME is dead for all practical purpose. And IF mwi and/or comp is true then there must exists a moment which is a successor of current ME without the current ME memories being lost... so I should end up in this state and not in the state where my identity was erased because like I can't be where I'm dead... I can't be where I'm not. The 'I' which is referred is the one with memories, the one without cannot meaningfully say he is a successor of me now, except if he sees like in real world "total" amnesia case that his body was mine and causally connected to mine. But in comp sense this is not meaningful... If my mind can be copied and transferred in a "metal" body, this metal body is not causally connected to my biological body... but that mind is a continuation of current me.

So in this sense, if you say that it is possible that all successor moment to a moment could lead to a "total" amnesia, then QI is false... or tautologically true because it means you are everyone (ie: no one). But for all practical purpose current ME would be dead.

Hmmm...

I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability "now", that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24 december 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March 2009) and reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March 2009, say)? The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20 Augustus 2009 you (the you in Washington) suffered a  "total amnesia".  And then, "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through adequate medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of yous did move from W or M).

Note that with high concentrated extract of Salvia Divinorum, people can "suffer" (or "enjoy") a total amnesia, where you forget not just your name and memories of life, but you forget even what is a person, what is space, what is time.  Yet you remain conscious. Life appears as a dream, that you recall vaguely, and then forget, and then you forget you did that dream. Yet "you" come back. (See the reports, I don't encourage its consumption, but anyone interested by consciousness can be interested by such reports).

I'll continue to read the rest of the mail.

OK.

Regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Mar 2009, at 19:29, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno:

before youcontinue reading (what you forgot in total amnesia<G> ) a question:

 

You wrote among others:

"...Note that with high concentrated extract of Salvia Divinorum, people can "suffer" (or "enjoy") a total amnesia, where you forget not just your name and memories of life, but you forget even what is a person, what is space, what is time.  Yet you remain conscious...."

 

How do you define "conscious"  for a state without ANY memory working in your mindset? 

I cannot define "conscious" for a state with memory. How could I ever be able to define "conscious" for a state without any memory?

But I am also not really saying "without any memory", I said "without any memory of ...", and then a list with "my usual memories, person, space, time. But in that experience you feel like you recover your real identity, or older memories, and it happens that that identity has nothing to do with memory, except you remember that, or perhaps better you just feel very familar with the state. A big déjà-vu. Some describes this as a new quale. I can hardly describe the "feeling", like you can hardly describe the feeling of seeing blue to a blind.

This is true in fine and precision for all consciousness experience, and that is why we have poets and artists.

How can you 'understand' anything (to become 'aware' of?) -

I don't even really try to understand. I just live it. When I try to understand I use a theory and logic, etc. When I live, I eat, or I sleep, and in this case I smoke a psycho-active product (like alcohol or tea, except salvia seems more safe, even if it seems more impressive than the experience with tea).

 

You may experience a connectionless and meaningless wirwar emerging in (literally) senseless randomity - not even recognizing that it is a 'view', a 'sound', or 'idea' until you 'deveop' SOME connections (right or wrong).

I certainly develop connexion; like with the "Lady Salvia". The salvia experience is like dream, except it is of a different nature, but it has repeatable patterns, including connecting and disconnecting many things. Then you learn by discussing with others. It provides some new angle on consciousness.

Then you have a 'perceived (solipsist) world to be 'aware of'.

This is already interpretating too much. I don't interpret. It is raw experiences. I discuss with other people of their raw experiences, and we learn in the traditional non-solipsist way. Of course, with consciousness, each of us is its own only guinea pig).

 

Now in that you can continue reading. But what will you read?...

With comp I have a subtheory which predicts that some perturbation of the brain (or computer) can  lower down your brain capacity of filtering of consciousness. I am still not sure. I have made dreams which confirms feeling of "higher order" form of consciousness, but typically my brain was more active (REM state).  I am not reading something. Just taking the opportunity that a product, which in my opinion is very safe (certainly much safer than alcohol, tobacco), can lead you easily to a, rather fascinating, "altered state of consciousness"  to learn, perhaps something on "consciousness", perhaps something on realities.

 

Regards (hopefully with retained memory, so I still remember you...)

Memory is very important. But even just to manage them well, we have to forget things. We forget things all the time. The relation of consciousness and memory is a fascinating question, and the experience of salvia, has already shaken some certainties I still had (without knowing). It has certainly renewed my interest in the fuse thought experiment, a bit like the movie "the prestige". Forgetting is the path to abstraction; which is useful in the comprehension search.

I have also discovered that plant helps also headache, also on other people, especially the real "migraine". I will not try to make a list of benefits of that plant, it would be like a propaganda. It is a lovely magic plant which seems to have something to say :)

Best regards,

Bruno

 

John M

On Tue, Mar 17, 2009 at 2:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 16 Mar 2009, at 13:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Bruno,

2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

Hi Günther,

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
>
>> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In
>> case
>> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
>> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality
>> is a
>> "past event".
>
>
> I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this
> before,
> Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very
logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of
declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",
because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary
knowers.

Well I agree that in total amnesia thought experiment... well the amnesia is not total... the subject still knows his former language and other knowledge... except all knowledges/memories about *who* he was is lost. And in this sense IF in one minute I lose these memories about my current ME, then my current ME is dead for all practical purpose. And IF mwi and/or comp is true then there must exists a moment which is a successor of current ME without the current ME memories being lost... so I should end up in this state and not in the state where my identity was erased because like I can't be where I'm dead... I can't be where I'm not. The 'I' which is referred is the one with memories, the one without cannot meaningfully say he is a successor of me now, except if he sees like in real world "total" amnesia case that his body was mine and causally connected to mine. But in comp sense this is not meaningful... If my mind can be copied and transferred in a "metal" body, this metal body is not causally connected to my biological body... but that mind is a continuation of current me.

So in this sense, if you say that it is possible that all successor moment to a moment could lead to a "total" amnesia, then QI is false... or tautologically true because it means you are everyone (ie: no one). But for all practical purpose current ME would be dead.

Hmmm...

I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability "now", that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24 december 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March 2009) and reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March 2009, say)? The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20 Augustus 2009 you (the you in Washington) suffered a  "total amnesia".  And then, "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through adequate medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of yous did move from W or M).

Note that with high concentrated extract of Salvia Divinorum, people can "suffer" (or "enjoy") a total amnesia, where you forget not just your name and memories of life, but you forget even what is a person, what is space, what is time.  Yet you remain conscious. Life appears as a dream, that you recall vaguely, and then forget, and then you forget you did that dream. Yet "you" come back. (See the reports, I don't encourage its consumption, but anyone interested by consciousness can be interested by such reports).

I'll continue to read the rest of the mail.

OK.

Regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno, thanks for a detailed reply.

 

If you re-read your words in my first quote (or in J.Corgan's quote) your words ("How could I ever be able to define "conscious" for a state without any memory?") sound unfounded, unless you emphasize the "define" in it. My question also referred to its 'existence' rather than a fitting definition. Similarly I cannot figure what you meant (below):

 

Bruno: "... you recover your real identity, ..." - after your memory got lost. What is your identity without your memories? What do you recover? Or is the 'lost' only hiding and available? The skull and neurons are figments of the physical world, the genetic neuronal 'functions' work also only on memory-induced topical items. (Which I did not adjust with the memory-process idea I mention below).

I don't agree that e.g. a newborn with just marginal in-tomb collected 'memory' IS the same person that it will soon turn into (cf. Prof. Singer,  Princeton) after getting more experience (by some(?) kind of memory).  

 

Johnathan Corgan separates himself from the LSD-like halucinogenal consciousness and asks, what math Platonists may apply for such altered computations by a different kind Ccness. I separated myself (on other lists, now all discussiong Ccness and related ideas) from results obtained on psych "patients" because I am curious about the 'normal'  (i.e. average and un-impeded) human mentality rather than the sickness induced exceptions/distortions.

 

I consider "a person" as a total complexity (as we say: mind-body+ unit) in its entire experience (memory-capability) and if a teleporation is said to take only part of such with it, I write it off as a different person from the (orig).  person. (Besides my aversion towards thought-experiments).

 

I wonder if we dream under REM? I placed dreaming into the last period of waking up. REM is the deepest closure from the aware Ccness. I think. (Stathis?) Is there a way to remember REM period ideas?

 

Bruno: "...I don't interpret...."

I think you do, do you do it consciously or not. Without interpretation you cannot arrive at your usable terms. Raw data are - in human logical thinking - meaningless and contentless as far as one wants to use them in conscious(?) thinking.

You may have refered to the level of interpretation as adjusting into your prior mindset, or just store as (roughly interpreted) glimps. Discussing with others? food for your 1st pers. interpretation from the same of others.

(Remember: I don't condone 3rd pers. straight entry into one's mentality).

 

"...Memory is very important..."

Yes, but what is it? (If it is an "it", at all, not a process) I disagree with the neurologists that molecular changes in brain-tissue (neurons, glia and maybe other proteins) "STORE" the experience as memory and can be recalled(!!) when needed. I dropped my 1st objection: nature has so many code-possibilities that in the quadrillion+ of conformational groups in all that stuff EVERYTHING can be codedly stored, but then, when needed, you require a similarly flexible and mutiple code for the recall  to find it. In other words: you have to recall it in order to recall it. For the finding 'coding' recall you require a similar ordering system to do that and so on, so the idea cannot be started except from the ready (and already found) memory you are looking for.

 

Now the process? If one allows the 'thought' (mentality, mind-stuff, you name it) to be above space and time (although capable of considering them) you may recall a memory (!?) by "going back in time" and take another look. That may account for some flexibility in memory-recall, (vs. an inflexible molecular/chip change). It also can serve repetitive learning by easing connectivity in the multiple usage.  - Just an idea.

 

Thanks again for your input

 

John

 

 

 

On Wed, Mar 18, 2009 at 5:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 17 Mar 2009, at 19:29, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno:

before youcontinue reading (what you forgot in total amnesia<G> ) a question:

 

You wrote among others:

"...Note that with high concentrated extract of Salvia Divinorum, people can "suffer" (or "enjoy") a total amnesia, where you forget not just your name and memories of life, but you forget even what is a person, what is space, what is time.  Yet you remain conscious...."

 

How do you define "conscious"  for a state without ANY memory working in your mindset? 

I cannot define "conscious" for a state with memory. How could I ever be able to define "conscious" for a state without any memory?

But I am also not really saying "without any memory", I said "without any memory of ...", and then a list with "my usual memories, person, space, time. But in that experience you feel like you recover your real identity, or older memories, and it happens that that identity has nothing to do with memory, except you remember that, or perhaps better you just feel very familar with the state. A big déjà-vu. Some describes this as a new quale. I can hardly describe the "feeling", like you can hardly describe the feeling of seeing blue to a blind.

This is true in fine and precision for all consciousness experience, and that is why we have poets and artists.

How can you 'understand' anything (to become 'aware' of?) -

I don't even really try to understand. I just live it. When I try to understand I use a theory and logic, etc. When I live, I eat, or I sleep, and in this case I smoke a psycho-active product (like alcohol or tea, except salvia seems more safe, even if it seems more impressive than the experience with tea).

 

You may experience a connectionless and meaningless wirwar emerging in (literally) senseless randomity - not even recognizing that it is a 'view', a 'sound', or 'idea' until you 'deveop' SOME connections (right or wrong).

I certainly develop connexion; like with the "Lady Salvia". The salvia experience is like dream, except it is of a different nature, but it has repeatable patterns, including connecting and disconnecting many things. Then you learn by discussing with others. It provides some new angle on consciousness.

Then you have a 'perceived (solipsist) world to be 'aware of'.

This is already interpretating too much. I don't interpret. It is raw experiences. I discuss with other people of their raw experiences, and we learn in the traditional non-solipsist way. Of course, with consciousness, each of us is its own only guinea pig).

 

Now in that you can continue reading. But what will you read?...

With comp I have a subtheory which predicts that some perturbation of the brain (or computer) can  lower down your brain capacity of filtering of consciousness. I am still not sure. I have made dreams which confirms feeling of "higher order" form of consciousness, but typically my brain was more active (REM state).  I am not reading something. Just taking the opportunity that a product, which in my opinion is very safe (certainly much safer than alcohol, tobacco), can lead you easily to a, rather fascinating, "altered state of consciousness"  to learn, perhaps something on "consciousness", perhaps something on realities.

 

Regards (hopefully with retained memory, so I still remember you...)

Memory is very important. But even just to manage them well, we have to forget things. We forget things all the time. The relation of consciousness and memory is a fascinating question, and the experience of salvia, has already shaken some certainties I still had (without knowing). It has certainly renewed my interest in the fuse thought experiment, a bit like the movie "the prestige". Forgetting is the path to abstraction; which is useful in the comprehension search.

I have also discovered that plant helps also headache, also on other people, especially the real "migraine". I will not try to make a list of benefits of that plant, it would be like a propaganda. It is a lovely magic plant which seems to have something to say :)

Best regards,

Bruno

 

John M

On Tue, Mar 17, 2009 at 2:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 16 Mar 2009, at 13:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Bruno,

2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

Hi Günther,

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
>
>> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In
>> case
>> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
>> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality
>> is a
>> "past event".
>
>
> I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this
> before,
> Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very
logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of
declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",
because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary
knowers.

Well I agree that in total amnesia thought experiment... well the amnesia is not total... the subject still knows his former language and other knowledge... except all knowledges/memories about *who* he was is lost. And in this sense IF in one minute I lose these memories about my current ME, then my current ME is dead for all practical purpose. And IF mwi and/or comp is true then there must exists a moment which is a successor of current ME without the current ME memories being lost... so I should end up in this state and not in the state where my identity was erased because like I can't be where I'm dead... I can't be where I'm not. The 'I' which is referred is the one with memories, the one without cannot meaningfully say he is a successor of me now, except if he sees like in real world "total" amnesia case that his body was mine and causally connected to mine. But in comp sense this is not meaningful... If my mind can be copied and transferred in a "metal" body, this metal body is not causally connected to my biological body... but that mind is a continuation of current me.

So in this sense, if you say that it is possible that all successor moment to a moment could lead to a "total" amnesia, then QI is false... or tautologically true because it means you are everyone (ie: no one). But for all practical purpose current ME would be dead.

Hmmm...

I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability "now", that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24 december 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March 2009) and reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March 2009, say)? The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20 Augustus 2009 you (the you in Washington) suffered a  "total amnesia".  And then, "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through adequate medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of yous did move from W or M).

Note that with high concentrated extract of Salvia Divinorum, people can "suffer" (or "enjoy") a total amnesia, where you forget not just your name and memories of life, but you forget even what is a person, what is space, what is time.  Yet you remain conscious. Life appears as a dream, that you recall vaguely, and then forget, and then you forget you did that dream. Yet "you" come back. (See the reports, I don't encourage its consumption, but anyone interested by consciousness can be interested by such reports).

I'll continue to read the rest of the mail.

OK.

Regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi,

Charles Goodwin sent this very interesting information on the FOR-list, which shows that Fred Hoyle did foreseen Quantum Suicide in 1964:

<<

http://www.secamlocal.ex.ac.uk/people/staff/mrwatkin/hoyle.htm - especially
the last bit, where we get Hoyle's description of what is effectively a
quantum suicide experiment, published in 1964!

>>

Actually I think that Fred Hoyle is close to the comp or arithmetical immortality, by its pigeon holes analogy, except for its use of the consciousness spot which is not needed: each comp states defines its own spot relatively to the (infinitely many) universal machines or numbers.

The text by Fred Hoyle is quite amazing. Those who have still in mind the last conversation we had on the everything list in the thread "Personal identity and ethics" can see that Fred Hoyle, when talking on "the same consciousness" for all sequence of pigeon holes,  is close to the two shapes of immortality consistent with the computationalist hypothesis: the one with amnesia, the one without.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---