[Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stephen Paul King-2]

Dear Jonathan, Brent and Stathis,

----- Original Message -----
From: "Brent Meeker" <meekerdb@...>
To: <everything-list@...>
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2009 2:02 AM
Subject: Re: Copying?


>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> But the brain changes from moment to moment due to chemical reactions
>> and thermal motion and we still remain the same person. If tolerances
>> were so tight that the no-cloning theorem is relevant then the brain
>> couldn't possibly function.
>>
[SPK]

    It seems as if we need to flesh out exactly what we mean by "still
remain the same person". My own ideas follow the work of V. Pratt and his
work on Chu spaces and their logics. In
http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech wherer he points out that
Decartes' dictum properly stated is "Cognito, ergo eram" I think, therefore
I was. The suggestion by Jonathan is helpful in understanding this, I
believe:

----- Original Message -----
From: "Johnathan Corgan" <jcorgan@...>
To: <everything-list@...>
Sent: Saturday, February 21, 2009 3:46 PM
Subject: Re: Copying?


> It is possible (I think likely) that there is a many-to-one relationship
> between exact quantum states and one "conscious state", or observer
> moment.  To put into Bruno's terminology, the your digital substitution
> level would then be at a higher level than the exact quantum state.

[SPK]

    Ok, that might also help us deal with the "binding problem" where we try
to sort out the issue of the "unity of consciousness".


> If this is the case, then the method X of copying only needs to ensure
> that the resultant quantum state stays within the common higher level
> state to ensure continuity.

[SPK]

    Would this help us explain the "flow" aspect of consciousness, where we
have something like a window in time of a duration of about .25 sec where in
memories can be updated upon the reseit of new data? Think of how while
driving we see what appears to be an animal darting across the road only to
realize a split secont later that it is just a wind blown leaf.


> To use a thermodynamic analogy, which I find increasingly useful to
> visualize these sorts of things, if the above many-to-one hypothesis
> holds true, then multiple "microstates" map to a single "macrostate".
> Continuity of personal identity would allow a change in microstates
> (i.e., quantum states) during copying, as long as the resultant
> microstate still belonged to the same macrostate (observer moment).

[SPK]

    Has any one seen any references to the idea of smearing macrostates over
finite time intervals?


> Of course, what the defining function of membership of quantum states
> within an observer moment that would preserve personal identity is
> unknown.  Still, as long as there is a many-to-one relationship, then
> the no-cloning theorem does not rule out transfer of identity through
> your method X.
>
> Johnathan Corgan

[SPK]

    We still do not have any data on the lower limit of the membership is
needed for this, but can we gloss over it and just jump to a conclusion?

> "Brent Meeker"
> Exactly.  Anything that is going to produce useful information
> processing must ultimately be classical.  Even quantum computers must
> have their results projected out classically.  Tegmark and others have
> shown that brain processes involve actions many orders above Planck's
> constant - so a most quantum effects would produce small random effects.

[SPK]

    That outputs of computations reduce to classical binary I understand and
agree with, but it has been shown that one can not start off with a
classical system and arrive at the results that we have. Feynmann and Svozil
et all have written about how QM system of sufficient size can generate
simulations of classical systems with arbitrary accurasy while the converse,
classical systems generating simulations of QM systems, is restricted to
2bit systems. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018862730956 
http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/~svozil/publ/1999-embed.pdf


    As to the Tegmark papers, they use a model of the brain that is very
different form the real thing! They completely neglect small scale
structures for one thing...

http://prola.aps.org/abstract/PRE/v65/i6/e061901


> Of course if you reject the idea that thinking is information
> processing, then you could attribute it some other aspect of quantum
> state evolution and ride off on Depak Chopra's horse.
>
> Brent

[SPK]

    No, I do not reject that thinking is information processing per say, I
just reject the notion that that is "all" it is. We should not ignore quatum
aspects. Resent research has shown that photosynthesis in plants has a
desitedly quantum aspect
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v431/n7006/full/431256a.html  ; are we
helping ourselves by ruling such out summarily in our thinking about
consciousness?

Onward!

Stephen


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[Stephen Paul King-2]

Hi Brent,
----- Original Message -----
From: "Brent Meeker" <meekerdb@...>
To: <everything-list@...>
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 12:46 PM
Subject: Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker,
Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]


>
> Stephen Paul King wrote:
snip

>> Hi Brent and Quentin,
>>
>>     Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from
>> memory
>> itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to
>> continuity of P.I.?
>>
>> Stephen
> Sure.  But what provides that possibility - the causal (physical)
> continuity of the brain and body.
>
> Brent

    This is why I am very timid about accepting Platonic idealist theories,
for they seemed to inevitably relegate consciousness to some sort of
epiphenomena ridding on top of another epiphenomenon: the material universe.
Frankly, I find that some dualist theories do not have this problem whereas
monist theories have the problem of epiphenomena. OTOH, I do find Bruno's
theory to be very interesting. ;)

    If the material universe is "just as real" as the universe of number or
thought or whatever form the idealist theories propose, we only need to show
how the duals are related and how dynamics can follow. See:
http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech

Onward!

Stephen


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[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 02:21, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi Stathis, Bruno, List,
>
>>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
>>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and  
>>> unnameable.
>>> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
>>> more precise.
>>
>> I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having  
>> all
>> my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
>> magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
>> nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.
>
> You must take into account Bruno's Plotinian interpretation: the One,
> the Intellect, and the Universal Soul. In this sense, you can become
> more "you" in that you penetrate false knowledge "Maya" and realize  
> your
> true nature (the Dao, if you like, roughly the ONE in Plotinus).

I would say the Universal Soul.  To be the ONE? The difficulty is that  
Plotinus is not always clear. Obvioulsy he did not dispose of an  
arithmetical interpretation. Formidably enough he is aware that  
numbers can play a big role there, like most neoplatonists.
The "universal soul" hypostase *is* a first person (or a theory about  
a first person). Some would say it is just an "abstract person". That  
it is just the least common part of all souls, or in the arithmetical  
"toy" theology, that is the common part of all first persons  
corresponding to the ideally correct machines. But (with comp) we can  
make the point that such a person *is* conscious.
A sort of confirmation is given by the thought of some mystic  
(Plotinus, Ibn Arabi, ...), but also from experience reports of those  
who experiments with Salvia Divinorum, which makes possible to have a  
total amnesia (forgetting not just who you are, but that you are, +  
forgetting everything up to the idea of time and space), yet remaining  
conscious, if not being even much more conscious with the feeling that  
memories are making you less conscious, and that a memory-brain is a  
filter on histories. Stable memories differentiate consciousness.

A problem for comp is that, well at least I have thought that comp  
makes the soul (the first person, the third hypostase) conscious only  
through its building or generating time. But the salvia reports and my  
own experiences make me think I could be wrong there.




>
>
> @Bruno:
> What I have come to wonder: you take the Löbian Machine to be the  
> model
> of a person - say, a human. But what if the Löbian Machine is actually
> (and only) the ultimate person - the universal soul, in Plotinus'
> terminology.


OK. It is the ultimate person, but also the initial person.It is a  
baby god. The one who has to fall from truth to be able to go back to  
truth, but then the impossible marriage between just addition and  
multiplication explains (assuming we are digital) why we can lost our  
selves in an infinitely complex labyrinth of realities.





>
>
> This would account for the infinite (continuum!) histories (lived
> through the lives of all beings in the multiverse), the "universal  
> soul"
> forgetting itself in a cosmic play, sort of -  but also for COMP
> immortality - immortal would be the _universal soul_, but not
> necessarily "concrete" persons (as we conceive them, which requires at
> least some continuity of memory etc)


I think you are quite correct. Except I would say "all" first persons  
feel themselves always as being concrete (in all situations, OMs,  
worlds, ...). Even an amnesic person can feel herself concrete, even  
if she forgets the meaning of the word concrete. And see what I said  
to Stathis, the point where I don't follow Parfit: we are never 100%  
concrete. Concreteness is always relative to a probable history. We  
are always "abstract, immaterial" types relatively embedded in  
infinitely many types of histories (computations seen from inside).  
So, like in Hinduism it seems comp gives the two main form of  
immortality: the one when you remember you are the universal soul, and  
the one which makes you live again, and again, and again, from  
mornings to mornings, from lives to lives, exploring the many  
realities. I think this happens when you don't remember you are the  
universal soul. That remembering is somewhat paradoxical, and, to be  
sure hard to extract from the interview of the universal machine.
It is really an amnesia of an amnesia. Perhaps a forgetful functor in  
the category of the models of Lobian machines. I don't *know*!
The incompleteness prevents the consistent machines to ever come back  
on earth with the "last" step of that remembering. It does not prevent  
the machine to commit that last step, only to come back with the  
memory of that step.

Hmmm ... This could look a bit mystical, so I should recall AUDA, for  
the benefit of some others.

====================
AUDA in short.

For the correct machine, the incompleteness makes obligatory to have a  
"theology", in the sense that she can proves her own incompleteness  
theorem and distinguish truth from provability, especially about about  
what is true about her, and what is provable about her.

I associate to each (ideally correct ) machine a theology, consisting  
in 8 hypostases. The simplest way is provided by the arithmetical  
interpretation of Plotinus ( a beautiful sum of 1500 years of rational  
mysticism). The richness comes from the machine discovering its own  
incompleteness, as far as she is honest or correct about herself.  
(meaning "machine says p entails p is true).

Like many Greeks (and non Greeks) there are three gods, or one god  
with three aspects (whatever). Plotinus called them "primary  
Hypostases".  Like Günther reminds you, there are

1)The ONE (the first god)
2)The INTELLIGIBLE (or intellect, the second God)
3)The UNIVERSAL SOUL (the third God)

To call this "primary" hypostases made me called "secondary  
hypostases", the two notion of MATTER that Plotinus derives from the  
primary hypostases.

4)INTELLIGIBLE MATTER
5)SENSIBLE MATTER

And this makes, when translated into arithmetic or into any universal  
machine language eight hypostases. Not five. Indeed, the ONE (of the  
machine M) is interpreted by the TRUTH. With comp, or with PA (as  
lobian machine), we can take TRUTH as being ARITHMETICAL TRUTH, and  
figure it as the set of Gödel numbers of all true arithmetical  
propositions.

1) ONE = TRUTH

The INTELLIGIBLE is interpreted by Gödel Beweisbar predicate. It is  
the beliefs of that ideally correct machine (or PA, ZF, ...). By  
incompleteness, it splits into two parts. What is true about the  
provability, and what is provable (by the machine (PA, ZF, ..) about  
that provability. Solovay theorems, in a nutshell, is that the  
provable part of the INTELLIGIBLE obeys the modal logic G, and the  
true, but not necessarily provable obeys G*. So

2) INTELLIGIBLE (by the machine on earth) = G   and
2bis) INTELLIGIBLE (true, or divine, or in heaven) = G*

3) THE UNIVERSAL SOUL, I define it by the knower, and I define the  
knower by the "well known and debated" Theaetetical trick: to know p  
is defiend by to believe p when p is true. This has already been done  
for the Lobian machine (or PA, ...), independently by many people, and  
it gives an already studied logic known as S4Grz, it can be sen as  
both a temporal logic of an agent building its mind in time, or  
directly as a logic of subjective time. So S4Grz is the logic of the  
new box [•] with  [•]p defined by []p & p.

A normal and sane objection could rise here. Given that the machine is  
correct, is it not obviously true that []p and []p & p are equivalent?
Fundamental answer: if the machine is PA, or any sufficietly simple  
Lobian machine, so that *you* can believe the machine is correct, then  
yes []p and []p & p are "obviously" equivalent. But, by  
incompleteness, such equivalence is not obviously true for the  
machine, indeed such equivalence is true but not provable by the  
machine. For each p (arithmetical proposition) it is true that "PA  
proves p" is equivalent with "(PA proves p) and p", but PA cannot  
prove, for any arithmetical proposition that (PA proves p) <-> ((PA  
proves p) & p). Indeed if PA could prove that PA would prove (PA  
proves false) being equivalent with (PA proves false) and false), that  
PA would prove (not provable false), and PA would prove its own  
consistency (which is impossible by Gödel's theorem). Put it  
differently G* proves []p <-> ([]p & p), but G does not prove it. This  
makes the "soul", obeying a different logic from the intelligible.  
Indeed the intelligible obeys G (and G*), the soul of the ideally  
correct machines obeys S4Grz.
Two remarkable facts: Like truth, by a Tarski (Scott-Montague)  
phenomenon; the box [•] cannot be define in the language of the  
machine. Even for the machine its "first person" is already not a  
machine (not a third person describable reality actually). The second  
remarkable fact is that S4Grz = S4GRz*. The soul does not split into a  
earth part and a heaven part.

4) INTELLIGIBLE MATTER  []p & <>p  (or []p & <>t).

5) SENSIBLE MATTER  []p & <>p & p  (or(( []p & p) & <>t).

I have to go. I will say more on the 4 and 5 tomorrow. You could try  
to see why we need them to have a measure of credibility or  
probability on the consistent extensions (of the ideal machine). Both  
will split into an earth part and a heaven part, so we get the eight  
hypostases. More in the Plotinus paper, see my url.
Of course the main contribution of Gödel was in showing how we can  
translate (PA proves p) into the language of PA. That works for all  
Lobian machines (quasi by definition).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[John Mikes]

Stathis:

two questions.

 

1.

Why are you breaking your head HOW to copy something we don't believe 'exists' at all? If it aint, don't copy it. Copy what? 

 

2. Are you "most of the matter" in your "body"(??) or is there something more to it? This is exactly my point: if SOMEBODY SOMEHOW is indeed copying us, is the physical form the essence of the complexity we ARE?

I may be 'homesick' for the variant of a year ago, when my arthritis dod not ache so much, but is the "ache/not ache" relation what makes me up?

Our figment, the physical world image, serves some explanation about us, but I would not like to be identified with that earlier 'John' - say: 2 year old, or fetus, without mental experiences and capabilities. (This was the question I re-asked a Muslim when she referred to an earlier "me" to get to Heaven, instead of the sick old senile dying folks - what I asked originally.)

 

John Mikes

 

On Sun, Feb 22, 2009 at 5:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:

2009/2/23 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Stathis,
>
> I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort:
>
>>"...What I find incoherent is the idea
> that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but
> nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul
> cannot be duplicated."<
>
> If you accept the topic (to be discussed) of the unidentifiable imaginary
> "soul", than you have to accept that "IT"(???) can be duplicated as well.
> Once we are in Wunderland we are in Wunderland.

I don't believe in the soul so perhaps someone who does can comment
(Tom Caylor?): is it that it can't be copied at all, i.e. not even God
could make a soul-copying teleporter, or is it just that it can't be
copied via physical means?

> And if "you find yourself there" you have no notion of your destoyed
> identity "here" and you  A R E the copied fake (I call it 'fake', because it
> is extracted from your 'here'-relations which constitute the essential
> content of your identity. The "there" YOU is either another one with
> relations to the "there" circumstances or a fake replica of what you were
> 'here' (and have no knowledge (memory) of it. Or is the duplicate homesick?

By that argument you could also say you are a copied fake of the John
of a year ago, since most of the matter in your body has been
replaced.


--

Stathis Papaioannou
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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/2/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a
> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously
> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask,
> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"

The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
experience.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:

>>> From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for
>>> many reasons to the doctor.
>>> The copy will not even behave as you.
>>> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
>>> The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness,
>>> but
>>> yet is not you (and you are dead)
>>
>> This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also
>> valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity
>> is only an illusion.
>
> I don't think so. Unless you assume comp, but then to say the copy is
> not you has no meaning at all.
> This last is not really problematic, it is just equivalent with the
> negation of comp.
> It is brought by non-comp-people who, on the contrary insist a notion
> of continuity which is broken by digital substitution.
> For a computationalist, the "continuity" is given by the comp history,
> and is not broken by teleportation and the like, not even self-
> differentiation through self-duplication.

As I see it, to say that the copy has all your important mental
qualities but still isn't you because it lacks your soul - the
significant thing about the soul here being that it is something over
and above mental qualities - is equivalent to saying you assume comp,
but the copy still isn't you.

>> Actually, I have no objection to this way of
>> speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of
>> continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real
>> continuity.
>
>
> I think we agree. Just note that when I don't write "assuming comp" I
> consider also the case when comp is false. Perhaps I shouldn't.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
>>> And,
>>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
>>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
>>> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
>>> more precise.
>>
>> I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all
>> my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
>> magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
>> nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.
>
> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.

I still don't understand your point. Assume that the copy is
arbitrarily close to the original me in every mental quality: is there
still some sense in which it might not really be me? If you can come
up with an answer, then it could equally well be applied to walking
across the room, which none of us do worrying that we won't survive
the experience.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/2/24 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:
> Stathis:
> two questions.
>
> 1.
> Why are you breaking your head HOW to copy something we don't believe
> 'exists' at all? If it aint, don't copy it. Copy what?

Copy the mind, by whatever process it takes.

> 2. Are you "most of the matter" in your "body"(??) or is there something
> more to it? This is exactly my point: if SOMEBODY SOMEHOW is indeed copying
> us, is the physical form the essence of the complexity we ARE?
> I may be 'homesick' for the variant of a year ago, when my arthritis dod not
> ache so much, but is the "ache/not ache" relation what makes me up?
> Our figment, the physical world image, serves some explanation about us, but
> I would not like to be identified with that earlier 'John' - say: 2 year
> old, or fetus, without mental experiences and capabilities. (This was the
> question I re-asked a Muslim when she referred to an earlier "me" to get to
> Heaven, instead of the sick old senile dying folks - what I asked
> originally.)

If I wish to be a younger me, what I imagine is a younger me with my
present mind, who can go on to have more experiences in which the
present me is in the subjective past. It doesn't do the present me
much good to have a copy around who is exactly the same as the younger
me, since subjectively I cannot look forward to having any of his
experiences.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 13:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:
>
>>>> From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no"  
>>>> for
>>>> many reasons to the doctor.
>>>> The copy will not even behave as you.
>>>> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
>>>> The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness,
>>>> but
>>>> yet is not you (and you are dead)
>>>
>>> This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also
>>> valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of  
>>> identity
>>> is only an illusion.
>>
>> I don't think so. Unless you assume comp, but then to say the copy is
>> not you has no meaning at all.
>> This last is not really problematic, it is just equivalent with the
>> negation of comp.
>> It is brought by non-comp-people who, on the contrary insist a notion
>> of continuity which is broken by digital substitution.
>> For a computationalist, the "continuity" is given by the comp  
>> history,
>> and is not broken by teleportation and the like, not even self-
>> differentiation through self-duplication.
>
> As I see it, to say that the copy has all your important mental
> qualities but still isn't you because it lacks your soul - the
> significant thing about the soul here being that it is something over
> and above mental qualities - is equivalent to saying you assume comp,
> but the copy still isn't you.

If you assume comp, I would say the copy is "you", and got your  
"soul", by definition.
Those who argue that the copy has all your mental attributes but is  
not you are in general arguing against comp.
Sometimes they say that (classical) teleportation will just kill them,  
and that the copy is an impostor.
They argue that, would the "original" not have been destroyed, by  
continuity (or by Nozick closer continuation criteria for personal  
identity) they would have seen the copy being "another people", and so  
retrospectively, they think that when the original is destroyed they  
just die, even if they agree that the copy will believe that she has  
survived.

>
>
>>> Actually, I have no objection to this way of
>>> speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of
>>> continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real
>>> continuity.
>>
>>
>> I think we agree. Just note that when I don't write "assuming comp" I
>> consider also the case when comp is false. Perhaps I shouldn't.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
>>>> And,
>>>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking  
>>>> up
>>>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>>>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and  
>>>> unnameable.
>>>> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
>>>> more precise.
>>>
>>> I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having  
>>> all
>>> my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
>>> magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
>>> nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.
>>
>> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even  
>> in
>> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
>> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
>> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
>> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
>> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
>> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>
> I still don't understand your point. Assume that the copy is
> arbitrarily close to the original me

OK, but this is not the case in the quote. You are back on the case  
where the copy has the same mental attributes (memory, ...). In this  
case I agree with you, when we assume comp.



> in every mental quality: is there
> still some sense in which it might not really be me?


Yes, by assuming that comp is false. See my answer above, relating an  
argument against comp, or against the use of teleportation.




> If you can come
> up with an answer, then it could equally well be applied to walking
> across the room, which none of us do worrying that we won't survive
> the experience.


I agree with you, and that is why I find comp very natural. But we  
cannot prove that comp is right. The argument above (against comp)  
show that the negation of comp is consistent, even if it seems poorly  
rational.

Sorry for confusing things by taking into account non-computationalist  
theory of mind.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential  
>> component of
>> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
>> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
>> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years  
>> at a
>> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not  
>> consciously
>> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
>> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then  
>> ask,
>> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>
> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
> experience.

Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led  
to fusion of first persons.
And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person  
plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in  
"nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is  
the normal candidate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[John Mikes]

Sorry, Stathis:

 

to your #1 reply: are you equating mind and soul? That would solve a lot of problems (without making sense for many).

 

to your #2 reply:

artifact free choice of whatever seems 'best'. You might be yearning for being a much 'better' person in many respects. Makes no sense.

 

John M

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 8:36 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:

2009/2/24 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Stathis:
> two questions.
>
> 1.
> Why are you breaking your head HOW to copy something we don't believe
> 'exists' at all? If it aint, don't copy it. Copy what?

Copy the mind, by whatever process it takes.

> 2. Are you "most of the matter" in your "body"(??) or is there something
> more to it? This is exactly my point: if SOMEBODY SOMEHOW is indeed copying
> us, is the physical form the essence of the complexity we ARE?
> I may be 'homesick' for the variant of a year ago, when my arthritis dod not
> ache so much, but is the "ache/not ache" relation what makes me up?
> Our figment, the physical world image, serves some explanation about us, but
> I would not like to be identified with that earlier 'John' - say: 2 year
> old, or fetus, without mental experiences and capabilities. (This was the
> question I re-asked a Muslim when she referred to an earlier "me" to get to
> Heaven, instead of the sick old senile dying folks - what I asked
> originally.)

If I wish to be a younger me, what I imagine is a younger me with my
present mind, who can go on to have more experiences in which the
present me is in the subjective past. It doesn't do the present me
much good to have a copy around who is exactly the same as the younger
me, since subjectively I cannot look forward to having any of his
experiences.


--

Stathis Papaioannou
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[Günther Greindl]

Hi,

> I would say the Universal Soul.  To be the ONE? The difficulty is that  
> Plotinus is not always clear.

I go now from my reading of mystical texts, not from the arithmetic
interpretation  - and here mystics often report feeling at one with the
universe, everything etc.

I would say that this is the realization that your true nature (to be
more precise than before) is not different than that of the ONE/dao/etc.

> The "universal soul" hypostase *is* a first person (or a theory about  
> a first person). Some would say it is just an "abstract person". That  
> it is just the least common part of all souls, or in the arithmetical  
> "toy" theology, that is the common part of all first persons  

Ok, I think attaining this "minimal person" is also a meditative state,
but the full mystical experience reported in all cultures etc would be
union with the ONE:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophia_perennis

QUOTE:
The Perennial Philosophy is expressed most succinctly in the Sanskrit
formula, tat tvam asi ('That thou art'); the Atman, or immanent eternal
Self, is one with Brahman, the Absolute Principle of all existence; and
the last end of every human being, is to discover the fact for himself,
to find out who he really is.
Aldous Huxley
END QUOTE

> total amnesia (forgetting not just who you are, but that you are, +  
> forgetting everything up to the idea of time and space), yet remaining  
> conscious, if not being even much more conscious with the feeling that  
> memories are making you less conscious, and that a memory-brain is a  
> filter on histories. Stable memories differentiate consciousness

Yes, I agree, I think brains/memories are filters on histories; but the
above description of pure consciousness - what introspective reason
leads you to believe that that is still the experience of a (minimal)
person an not already experience of the "source"? (I like to change
words for the "ONE" so that no connotations become entrenched; after
all, it is "described" as the ineffable)

> A problem for comp is that, well at least I have thought that comp  
> makes the soul (the first person, the third hypostase) conscious only  
> through its building or generating time. But the salvia reports and my  
> own experiences make me think I could be wrong there.

Indeed, a first person, namely, what we call a person (narrative,
history, agency, autonomy etc) requires temporality.


> ====================
> AUDA in short.
>

Ok, you have whetted my appetite, now I will have to read the Plotinus
paper ;-)

Cheers,
Günther

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[Brent Meeker-2]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential
>> component of
>> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
>> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
>> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years
>> at a
>> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not
>> consciously
>> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
>> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then
>> ask,
>> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>
> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
> experience.

Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
to fusion of first persons.
And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
"nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
the normal candidate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the brain.

Brent

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[russell standish-2]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:
> > Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
> > to fusion of first persons.
> > And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
> > plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
> > "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
> > the normal candidate.
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
> >
>
> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
> brain.
>
> Brent
>

Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already
stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer
the Occam catastrophe. The sense of ego would be enough to explain why
you don't merge with Stathis.

Not being a Silvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does the
ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the
ego?  


--

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[Brent Meeker-2]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 6:39 PM, russell standish <lists@...> wrote:

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

> > Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
> > to fusion of first persons.
> > And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
> > plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
> > "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
> > the normal candidate.
> >
> > Bruno
> >

> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>

> >
>
> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
> brain.
>
> Brent
>

Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already
stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer
the Occam catastrophe.

I think I am often *not* self-aware.  But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time.  So an closest continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my unconscious period.

Brent
 

The sense of ego would be enough to explain why
you don't merge with Stathis.

Not being a Silvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does the
ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the
ego?


--

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[russell standish-2]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
>
> I think I am often *not* self-aware.  But aside from that, I have definitely
> been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
> probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time.  So an closest
> continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict
> that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my
> unconscious period.
>

I don't think so. The only way you notice the periods of
unconsciousness is by virtue of the discontinuity between two observer
moments that you recall (as evidenced by a clock or some other
irreversible process). The moments of unconsciousness are not observer
moments.


--

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/2/25 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> to your #1 reply: are you equating mind and soul? That would solve a lot of
> problems (without making sense for many).

Yes. I am hoping someone can explain to me how soul might be something
over and above mind, if that is indeed what people who believe in
souls think.

>> If I wish to be a younger me, what I imagine is a younger me with my
>> present mind, who can go on to have more experiences in which the
>> present me is in the subjective past. It doesn't do the present me
>> much good to have a copy around who is exactly the same as the younger
>> me, since subjectively I cannot look forward to having any of his
>> experiences.

> to your #2 reply:
> artifact free choice of whatever seems 'best'. You might be yearning for
> being a much 'better' person in many respects. Makes no sense.

I don't understand this comment.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 23:44, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi,
>
>> I would say the Universal Soul.  To be the ONE? The difficulty is  
>> that
>> Plotinus is not always clear.
>
> I go now from my reading of mystical texts, not from the arithmetic
> interpretation  - and here mystics often report feeling at one with  
> the
> universe, everything etc.
>
> I would say that this is the realization that your true nature (to be
> more precise than before) is not different than that of the ONE/dao/
> etc.

I am OK with this. But it is "beyond word".
Lao Tse said "the Dao which has a name is not the Dao". Plotinus said  
the ONE is ineffable, ...

>
>
>> The "universal soul" hypostase *is* a first person (or a theory about
>> a first person). Some would say it is just an "abstract person". That
>> it is just the least common part of all souls, or in the arithmetical
>> "toy" theology, that is the common part of all first persons
>
> Ok, I think attaining this "minimal person" is also a meditative  
> state,
> but the full mystical experience reported in all cultures etc would be
> union with the ONE:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophia_perennis
>
> QUOTE:
> The Perennial Philosophy is expressed most succinctly in the Sanskrit
> formula, tat tvam asi ('That thou art'); the Atman, or immanent  
> eternal
> Self, is one with Brahman, the Absolute Principle of all existence;  
> and
> the last end of every human being, is to discover the fact for  
> himself,
> to find out who he really is.
> Aldous Huxley
> END QUOTE

I agree. But up to now I can really talk about this trough both comp  
and the arithmetical self-reference.
This leads to open mathematical problems.

>
>
>> total amnesia (forgetting not just who you are, but that you are, +
>> forgetting everything up to the idea of time and space), yet  
>> remaining
>> conscious, if not being even much more conscious with the feeling  
>> that
>> memories are making you less conscious, and that a memory-brain is a
>> filter on histories. Stable memories differentiate consciousness
>
> Yes, I agree, I think brains/memories are filters on histories; but  
> the
> above description of pure consciousness - what introspective reason
> leads you to believe that that is still the experience of a (minimal)
> person an not already experience of the "source"? (I like to change
> words for the "ONE" so that no connotations become entrenched; after
> all, it is "described" as the ineffable)

OK, but the term "source" has many connotations too. All terms are  
wrong.
With comp "truth" is the less wrong, in the language of a Lobian  
machine working out the "theology" of a simpler machine.
No introspective reason leads me to believe the experience of the  
Universal Soul" is different from the fusion with the One.
It is purely mathematical reason which leads me to make a distinction  
in the mathematical theology.
Any machine *asserting* it has fused with the ONE, is provably wrong.

>
>
>> A problem for comp is that, well at least I have thought that comp
>> makes the soul (the first person, the third hypostase) conscious only
>> through its building or generating time. But the salvia reports and  
>> my
>> own experiences make me think I could be wrong there.
>
> Indeed, a first person, namely, what we call a person (narrative,
> history, agency, autonomy etc) requires temporality.

Yes, it is weird. I am very confused about this.


>
>
>
>> ====================
>> AUDA in short.
>>
>
> Ok, you have whetted my appetite, now I will have to read the Plotinus
> paper ;-)


Plotinus, for me, is mainly a good pedagogical path. It helps also to  
recast the machine interview in the human philosophies.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 02:51, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential
>> component of
>> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
>> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
>> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years
>> at a
>> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not
>> consciously
>> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
>> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then
>> ask,
>> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>
> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
> experience.

Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
to fusion of first persons.
And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
"nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
the normal candidate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me. 

I don't see why. But Brent with amnesia could become Stathis if we put Stathis memories in Brent's brain. That's all. After complete amnesia you are potentially anyone, but there is no reason to become both Stathis and Brent simultaneously, no more that you could feel to be in both Washington and Moscow after a duplication experience.

But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the brain.

I agree. UDA just shows that if you assume comp you have to explain the causal continuity of the brain in term of addition and multiplication of numbers.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com <meekerdb@...>:

> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
> brain.

I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in
fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of
consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are
distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall
with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content
in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable,
and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make
sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively.
In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of
consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not
occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there
is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all
distinct.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote:

>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com  
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>  
>> wrote:
>>> Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
>>> to fusion of first persons.
>>> And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
>>> plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
>>> "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
>>> the normal candidate.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ 
>>> >
>>>
>>
>> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to  
>> imply that
>> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of  
>> nothing our
>> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
>> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't  
>> seem to
>> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity  
>> of the
>> brain.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already
> stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer
> the Occam catastrophe. The sense of ego would be enough to explain why
> you don't merge with Stathis.
>
> Not being a Salvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does  
> the
> ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the
> ego?

It depends of course of what you mean by the "ego". "Ego Death" is a  
well discussed topic in Entheogen Forums, especially on Salvia, but  
also DMT.
If by "ego" you mean the "terrestrial self" I would say yes.

I think we do similar experiences in the "deep sleep" (= the non REM  
sleep), but like with Salvia, it seems we have to forget the main  
point to "come back on Earth". Even the part which we don't forget is  
"ineffable", probably of the type G* minus G, or more accurately Z*  
minus Z, or even more accurately: X1* minus X1 (cf your Nothing book  
page 129)

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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