[Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker-2]

russell standish wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
>  
>> I think I am often *not* self-aware.  But aside from that, I have definitely
>> been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
>> probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time.  So an closest
>> continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict
>> that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my
>> unconscious period.
>>
>>    
>
> I don't think so. The only way you notice the periods of
> unconsciousness is by virtue of the discontinuity between two observer
> moments that you recall (as evidenced by a clock or some other
> irreversible process). The moments of unconsciousness are not observer
> moments.
>
>  

A fair objection (maybe).  But still it seems that I could easily share
an OM with someone else and then end up in an observerer "superposition".

Brent

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com <meekerdb@...>:
>
>  
>> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
>> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
>> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
>> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
>> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
>> brain.
>>    
>
> I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in
> fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of
> consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are
> distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall
> with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content
> in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable,
> and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make
> sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively.
> In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of
> consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not
> occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there
> is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all
> distinct.
>
>
>  

If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream
of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly
it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that
case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1?  Why
wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories?

Brent

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/2/26 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream
> of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly
> it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that
> case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1?  Why
> wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories?

B3 in the example given only has memories of B1. If B3 did have
memories of S1 then there would indeed be fusion of S and B. But I am
thinking in terms of observer moments (or observer minutes in this
case): S1, S2, S3, B1, B2, B3 as essentially self-contained, not
necessarily causally connected, and forming a stream of consciousness
only by virtue of their information content. If they were different,
then of course the streams of consciousness would be difference. The
only change that would leave the two streams of consciousness intact
is if either S2 or B2 were missing.

Incidentally, the observer minutes would have to have the right sort
of information content even if they were causally connected, or they
wouldn't form a stream of consciousness. If I receive a brain injury
which causes complete amnesia for my pat, there is a break in my
stream of consciousness despite the fact that there is a clear causal
connection and physical continuity between my pre- and post-injury
self. Physical continuity and causal connectivity are only useful for
subjective continuity because they generate observer moments with the
right sort of information content.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...

Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.

or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?

I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.

It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity.

Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there, and "I" was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in  salvia reports).

Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them.

Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Feb 2009, at 23:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/23 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:
>> Stathis,
>>
>> I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort:
>>
>>> "...What I find incoherent is the idea
>> that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but
>> nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul
>> cannot be duplicated."<
>>
>> If you accept the topic (to be discussed) of the unidentifiable  
>> imaginary
>> "soul", than you have to accept that "IT"(???) can be duplicated as  
>> well.
>> Once we are in Wunderland we are in Wunderland.
>
> I don't believe in the soul so perhaps someone who does can comment
> (Tom Caylor?): is it that it can't be copied at all, i.e. not even God
> could make a soul-copying teleporter, or is it just that it can't be
> copied via physical means?

Well, I have waited for Tom's answer, but I think I can say something.
Personally I identify "soul" with the first person. Simply. To save  
your soul means to save your subjective life.
And yes, there is a sense such that even God cannot "duplicate a  
soul": the first person is not duplicable. When you are duplicated  
into an exemplar in Washington and an exemplar in Moscow, you, as a  
first person don't feel being duplicated. You feel being completely in  
Washington, or being completely in Moscow. Your doppelganger is, after  
the duplication, just another soul. You just share with the  
doppelganger a personal similar subjective past. I would say the soul  
is unique, only the windows through which that soul can look as been  
duplicated. Of course our language has not been selected for really  
talking on such issues, so we got sometimes false "semantics" problems.

>
>
>> And if "you find yourself there" you have no notion of your destoyed
>> identity "here" and you  A R E the copied fake (I call it 'fake',  
>> because it
>> is extracted from your 'here'-relations which constitute the  
>> essential
>> content of your identity. The "there" YOU is either another one with
>> relations to the "there" circumstances or a fake replica of what  
>> you were
>> 'here' (and have no knowledge (memory) of it. Or is the duplicate  
>> homesick?
>
> By that argument you could also say you are a copied fake of the John
> of a year ago, since most of the matter in your body has been
> replaced.

OK.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Feb 2009, at 07:35, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Stephen Paul King wrote:
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>>    A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological
>> criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and,  
>> by your
>> statement below, used by a predominance of members of this list is  
>> one that
>> treats conscious self-awareness as an epiphenomena arrising from a  
>> Classical
>> system and that it is, at least tacitly, assumed that quantum  
>> effects have
>> no supervenience upon any notion of Consciousness?
>>    While I welcome the rejection of notion of "Souls" which are in
>> principle non-verifiable, could we be endulging in meaningless  
>> chatter about
>> computerizing consciousness if we do not first determen that  
>> consciousness
>> is a purely classical epiphenomena? After all we are repeatedly  
>> told that it
>> is the classical view of the Universe and all within it is a theory  
>> long ago
>> refuted.
>>
> There's no inconsistency between the universe being quantum  
> mechanical,
> while human thought processes are essentially classical.  The  
> classical
> world emerges from the quantum in the limit of large action.

I find this most plausible. And I think that this does not contradict  
the fact that comp makes the quantum itself emerging from all  
computations, which are generally definable in pure classical  
arithmetic, combinators, etc.
There should be a back and forth between bits and qubits.  
(Assuming ...).

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Brent Meeker-2]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marchal@... <mailto:marchal@...>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
>>     the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
>>     new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
>>     movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
>>     idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
>>     other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>>     because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>>     everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
>>     the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>>
>>     Bruno
>>
>>
>>     http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>     <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>
>>
>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...
>
>
> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not
> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.

Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was
destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
would agree with us.

>
>
>
>
>
>> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me"
>> (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>
>
> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories,
> which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of
> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.

But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
not conscious memories.  So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution;
but that too is a form of memory.

>>
>>
>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in
>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
>> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>
>
>
> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here
> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself.
> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique
> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>
> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there, and
> "I" was me.

Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can
compare the memories?

>To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
> is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless
> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in
>  salvia reports).
>
> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I
> think, that we can still survive without them.

I'm doubtful.  I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of
how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful
fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.

>
> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

Dead.

Brent

>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >

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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

Hi,

2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...

Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.

From my current point of view... Well I would be dead... the "me/I" which is writing this.
 

or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?

I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.

There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.
 

It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity.

Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.

 

In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there, and "I" was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in  salvia reports).

You know it was you because you did wake up as you... you didn't know inside the dream... note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming, I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.
 

Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them.

I think not.
 

Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

You will be dead.
 

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Regards,
Quentin
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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[Günther Greindl]

Hi,

> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here
> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself.
> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique
> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)

> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I
> think, that we can still survive without them.
>
> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

We should be careful here: the "mystic I" survives, but I don't think
that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal
identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.

In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic
survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.

Best Wishes,
Günther

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.

I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories.

By loosing memory "I" would be wounded, not dead.

If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.

No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed with you, but I have lost any certainties here.

You know it was you because you did wake up as you...

How could I know that?

you didn't know inside the dream...

This is Maury's conception of dream. I doubt it a lot, and consider it refuted by the work of Laberge and Dement (and Hearne) on lucid dreaming.

note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming,

OK, here I disagree rather strongly.

I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.

Personal identity is indeed related to recollection of some memory, even in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.

 

Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them.

I think not.
 

Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

You will be dead.

Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead?

Best regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...  
>>> <mailto:marchal@...>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you  
>>> even in
>>>    the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case  
>>> he got
>>>    new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in  
>>> the
>>>    movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads  
>>> to the
>>>    idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being  
>>> the
>>>    other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>>>    because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>>>    everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is  
>>> needed for
>>>    the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>>>
>>>    Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>    http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>    <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>>
>>>
>>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...
>>
>>
>> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
>> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
>> not
>> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
>> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
>> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.
>
> Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was
> destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
> of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
> different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
> would agree with us.

I am not sure.

>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me"
>>> (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>>
>>
>> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
>> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
>> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
>> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with  
>> memories,
>> which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of
>> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
>> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.
>
> But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
> not conscious memories.  So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution;
> but that too is a form of memory.
>
>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
>>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in
>>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
>>> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>>
>>
>>
>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>> Here
>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>> itself.
>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>> unique
>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>>
>> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there,  
>> and
>> "I" was me.
>
> Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can
> compare the memories?

That would be a reason to doubt I was me.

>
>
>> To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
>> is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
>> unless
>> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
>> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
>> recently, in
>> salvia reports).
>>
>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>> means, I
>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>
> I'm doubtful.  I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of
> how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful
> fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.

I think "I" is a logical construction (we will come back on this).  
Memories have a big values, but "I" don't put it in my identity, nor  
would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this  
could be personal stuff.



>
>
>>
>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>
> Dead.

I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done  
last year or a minute ago, or a second ago?
Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made?

We are in the subtle à-la "The prestige" water ...

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi,
>
>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>> Here
>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>> itself.
>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>> unique
>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>
> I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)
>
>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>> means, I
>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>>
>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>
> We should be careful here: the "mystic I" survives, but I don't think
> that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal
> identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.
>
> In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic
> survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.

I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a  
different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing.
If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. Yet I am  
still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison.

Have a good day,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Brent Meeker-2]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...  
>>>> <mailto:marchal@...>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you  
>>>> even in
>>>>    the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case  
>>>> he got
>>>>    new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in  
>>>> the
>>>>    movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads  
>>>> to the
>>>>    idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being  
>>>> the
>>>>    other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>>>>    because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>>>>    everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is  
>>>> needed for
>>>>    the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>>>>
>>>>    Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>    <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...
>>>
>>> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
>>> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
>>> not
>>> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
>>> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
>>> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.
>> Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was
>> destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
>> of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
>> different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
>> would agree with us.
>
> I am not sure.
>>>
>>>> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me"
>>>> (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>>>
>>> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
>>> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
>>> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
>>> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with  
>>> memories,
>>> which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of
>>> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
>>> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.
>> But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
>> not conscious memories.  So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution;
>> but that too is a form of memory.
>>
>>
>>>>
>>>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
>>>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in
>>>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
>>>> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>>>
>>>
>>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>>> Here
>>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>>> itself.
>>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>>> unique
>>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>>>
>>> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there,  
>>> and
>>> "I" was me.
>> Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can
>> compare the memories?
>
> That would be a reason to doubt I was me.

When you were dreaming you might have dreamed you were somebody else.
  Once when I took some medication, which didn't seem to have any
psychotropic effects when I was awake, I found that my dreams seemed
to be someone else's dreams.  That is they had people in them which my
dream self seemed to know and they knew "me", but which in waking life
I either had never met or didn't recall.  Additionally the
circumstances and events, while being realistic, were completely
foreign to me - I drove a different car, wore different clothes, lived
in a different place,...

>
>
>>
>>> To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
>>> is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
>>> unless
>>> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
>>> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
>>> recently, in
>>> salvia reports).
>>>
>>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>>> means, I
>>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>> I'm doubtful.  I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of
>> how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful
>> fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.
>
> I think "I" is a logical construction (we will come back on this).  
> Memories have a big values, but "I" don't put it in my identity, nor  
> would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this  
> could be personal stuff.
>
>
>
>>
>>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>> Dead.
>
> I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done  
> last year or a minute ago, or a second ago?
> Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made?

I'd say it's a matter of degree, not a dichotomy.  Bruno Marchal is a
character in the story of the world.  The Bruno of a minute ago is
almost the same as Bruno now, but very different from the 5yr old Bruno.

Brent

>
> We are in the subtle à-la "The prestige" water ...
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>>> Here
>>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>>> itself.
>>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>>> unique
>>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>> I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)
>>
>>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>>> means, I
>>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>>>
>>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>> We should be careful here: the "mystic I" survives, but I don't think
>> that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal
>> identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.
>>
>> In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic
>> survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.
>
> I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a  
> different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing.
> If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity.

It was only *complete amnesia* that was equated with death.

>Yet I am  
> still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison.

Consciousness, or self-awareness?

Brent

>
> Have a good day,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:

> Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I
> will be dead too? Less dead?

This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.

I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories.

By loosing memory "I" would be wounded, not dead.

By loosing your memory, the resulting 'I' is no more the previous 'I' and in this settings it makes no sense to talk about 'I', the subject is not the same.
 

If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.

No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed with you, but I have lost any certainties here.

What is you ? By what you say, I'm as you as you are... But I can assure you, I'm not you, and if tomorrow you wake up without your memories but mine instead you'll be me not you anymore (and If you have my memories you'll be rightly believe so).

 

You know it was you because you did wake up as you...

How could I know that?

Because now you remember it and you are fully self aware and know who you are.
 

you didn't know inside the dream...

This is Maury's conception of dream. I doubt it a lot, and consider it refuted by the work of Laberge and Dement (and Hearne) on lucid dreaming.

Well... I had once what is call a "lucid" dream... but I knew I was somehow "conscious" only when I was able to recollect it (when I woke up)... I don't know if I could ascribe meaning to say I was really conscious during the dream.
 

note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming,

OK, here I disagree rather strongly.

What could prove that wrong ?
 

I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.

Personal identity is indeed related to recollection of some memory, even in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.

Well I don't differentiate forgetting everything and dying... result is the same.
 

 

Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them.

I think not.
 

Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

You will be dead.

Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead?

Best regards,

Bruno

Well a backup of one minute ago is nearer to your you now... And in a sense I could say you survive 'at least a very actual near you did'.

My current 'I' is the past of an "infinity" of futur 'I' where all these 'I' having as past my current 'I' have all the right to say they were me... But one of these 'I' which was differentiated of the others 'I' cannot claim that the others 'I's are valid continuation... They are not.

What I care to continue is 'I', meaning my knowledge, my memories, my name, what I've done, who I did know... If it dissappears then it's plain death.

Regards,
Quentin

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:
>
>> Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I
>> will be dead too? Less dead?
>
> This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
> personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
> if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
> exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
> would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
> every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
> loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
> taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
> to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
> dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
> If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
> don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
> anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
> that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
> if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
> consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.
>
>

But isnt' there a range here.  I would certainly feel less anxious
about dying if there were a backup of me made an hour ago than if it
were made months or years ago or if there were no backup at all. On
the other hand, an hour of memory loss from taking midazolam may be
less worrisome simply because we, as a culture, have a lot of
experience with loss of consciousness and memory from anesthesia, etc.

Brent


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[Brent Meeker-2]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
>
> 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <marchal@... <mailto:marchal@...>>
>
>
>     On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>     There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.
>
>     I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to
>     surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal
>     memories.
>     By loosing memory "I" would be wounded, not dead.
>
>
> By loosing your memory, the resulting 'I' is no more the previous 'I'
> and in this settings it makes no sense to talk about 'I', the subject is
> not the same.
>  
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>     If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my
>>     memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next
>>     moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.
>
>     No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed
>     with you, but I have lost any certainties here.
>
>
> What is you ? By what you say, I'm as you as you are... But I can assure
> you, I'm not you, and if tomorrow you wake up without your memories but
> mine instead you'll be me not you anymore (and If you have my memories
> you'll be rightly believe so).

I don't think it's as sharply defined as that.  Besides conscious
memory there is also "muscle memory" and values and other character
traits.  So there must be degrees of "being Bruno".  Memories aren't
everything, anymore than bodies.

Brent


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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/2/27 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <marchal@... <mailto:marchal@...>>

>
>
>     On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>     There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.
>
>     I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to
>     surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal
>     memories.
>     By loosing memory "I" would be wounded, not dead.
>
>
> By loosing your memory, the resulting 'I' is no more the previous 'I'
> and in this settings it makes no sense to talk about 'I', the subject is
> not the same.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>     If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my
>>     memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next
>>     moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.
>
>     No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed
>     with you, but I have lost any certainties here.
>
>
> What is you ? By what you say, I'm as you as you are... But I can assure
> you, I'm not you, and if tomorrow you wake up without your memories but
> mine instead you'll be me not you anymore (and If you have my memories
> you'll be rightly believe so).

I don't think it's as sharply defined as that.  Besides conscious
memory there is also "muscle memory" and values and other character
traits.  

Yes but if All of Bruno memories are erased and replaced by All of my memories... the "muscle memories" are part of it and any other kind of "memories". And in this sense this person is no more Bruno but Me and the previous Bruno simply cease to exist.

 

So there must be degrees of "being Bruno".  

Sure, the Bruno of 5 years old is Bruno... but Bruno at 5 years old.

 

Memories aren't
everything, anymore than bodies.

Brent

Well this is what form personhood.

Regards,
Quentin

 

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 10:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:
>
>> Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one  
>> minute ago? I
>> will be dead too? Less dead?
>
> This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
> personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
> if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
> exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
> would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
> every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
> loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
> taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
> to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
> dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
> If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
> don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
> anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
> that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
> if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
> consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.
>

Correct, but only at the G* level. Assuming comp this seems to me  
valid. (but you can't *known* that comp is correct, beware the trap).
Death and suffering of others still matters, which makes me doubt this  
is a serious problem for the psychological criterion of personal  
identity. Eventually it is only a problem of right, or a tree of  
sequences of problems of right.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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