[KevinTryon: Jacques Mallah]

[Jack Mallah]

--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote:

> >>> 2)  If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1> (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is not.  This is causal differentiation.
> >>
> >> Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content.
> >
> > That actually doesn't matter - causation is
> defined in terms of counterfactuals.  If - then, considering
> what happens at that moment of saving the data.  If x=1 and
> y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is not the same
> causal relationship as if I had copied y to z.
>
> Isn't that making the causal chain essential to the experience; contrary to the idea that the "stream of consciousness" is just the computation?  The causal chain is not part of the computation, A1 and A2 could be implemented by different physics and hence different causation.

--- On Tue, 2/10/09, russell standish <lists@...> wrote:
> But surely the counterfactuals are the same in each case too? In which case it is the same causal relationship. We're talking computations here, each computation will respond identically to the same counterfactual input.

I believe you both are taking what I wrote out of context.  Sorry if I was not clear.

In the above I was talking about the moment at which the data is saved, from either A1 or A2, when making the transition to B in the thought experiment.

BTW, causation (sensitivity to counterfactuals) is part of the criteria for an implementation of a computation.  So in that sense causation is essential to the experience.




     


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[Jack Mallah]

--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:
> I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me.
> However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow.

Exactly.

And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow.

Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight.  And that is the point.




     


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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...>

--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:
> I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me.
> However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow.

Exactly.

And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow.

Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight.  And that is the point.

I don't think so, the point is that there is still someone who will wake up in the bed tomorrow... as long as the measure is not null this is true, and that's what count for the argument to be valid.

So what you are saying is that at some point the measure fall to be strictly null... and that needs an argument from your part.

Also you did not answer the question about the realness feeling of observer B... he has twice less measure according to you, does it feel less alive/real/conscious ?

Regards,
Quentin
 

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
>
> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@... <mailto:jackmallah@...>>
>
>
>     --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux <allcolor@...
>     <mailto:allcolor@...>> wrote:
>      > Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not
>     4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you
>     use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ?
>
>     Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be "a lot more" than
>     the measure of 30 year olds?  I have already explained that the
>     effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by
>     the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation)
>     and the effect of child mortality is small.
>
>
> I don't get it. Why should the "measure" suddenly decrease at 80 (or
> 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ?
>
> Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my
> next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all
> momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current
> moment as memories/previous. Even if being Napoleon at the age of 30
> would have a measure 10^30 higher than any individual measure of momemts
> that has composed me so far... I'm not Napoleon at age 30, my next
> moment will never be Napoleon at age 30 and never will and that changes
> everything. I know that in 1 minute, it will be 1 minute later from now
> whatever the measure of now and in one minute is.
>
> Also Stathis as a point, you said in the A1/A2 (A) vs B case that A as 2
> times the measure of B... But B will be with probabilty 1... does B feel
> less real ? less conscious (that would contradict the assumption B was a
> conscious moment). If the measure doesn't change anything to these
> attributes... then however small this measure is as long as it is not
> striclty null, the experienced moment will be real... as real as the
> real here and now is.

Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
consciousness.  QM  evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the
measure of each subspace.  But there's no perceptible diminishment of
consciousness.  I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a
  computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.

Brent Meeker


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[Saibal Mitra-2]

Welcome back Jack Mallah!

I have a different argument against QTI.

I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended.
Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the
QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream
should have been be infinite.

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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

You were not the simulated one in your dreams, hence you can't say anything about its life expectancy... :)

2009/2/11 Saibal Mitra <smitra@...>

Welcome back Jack Mallah!

I have a different argument against QTI.

I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended.
Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the
QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream
should have been be infinite.

--
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[Jack Mallah]

Hello again, Saibal!

It is good to see that I am not alone here in taking a stand against QS/QI.  What do you think of my paper?  Is it unclear, convincing, unconvincing?

Are there others like us who still post here?

Regards,
Jack




     


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[Jack Mallah]

--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote:
> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness.  QM  evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace.  But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness.  I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.

If that is so then how do you explain the Born rule?




     


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[Jack Mallah]

--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux <allcolor@...> wrote:
> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...>
> > And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow.
> >
> > Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight.  And that is the point.
> >
> I don't think so, the point is that there is still someone who will wake up in the bed tomorrow... as long as the measure is not null this is true, and that's what count for the argument to be valid.

There are some people who will, but relatively few.  That is what counts for QS to be invalid.

> So what you are saying is that at some point the measure fall to be strictly null... and that needs an argument from your part.

No, I never suggested it is zero.  It doesn't have to be.

> Also you did not answer the question about the realness feeling of observer B... he has twice less measure according to you, does it feel less alive/real/conscious ?

I answered that previously.  Measure affects the commonness of an observation, not what it feels like.




     


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[Jesse Mazer]

Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
> consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the
> measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
> consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a
> computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
> in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.

But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example.
Jesse
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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...>

--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux <allcolor@...> wrote:
> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...>

> > And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow.
> >
> > Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight.  And that is the point.
> >
> I don't think so, the point is that there is still someone who will wake up in the bed tomorrow... as long as the measure is not null this is true, and that's what count for the argument to be valid.

There are some people who will, but relatively few.  That is what counts for QS to be invalid.

Well no.. because if the measure is never null there always exists a successor moment however small is measure is, it exists and that's all what is needed. (from a first person perspective, and that's what the argument is about)
 

> So what you are saying is that at some point the measure fall to be strictly null... and that needs an argument from your part.

No, I never suggested it is zero.  It doesn't have to be.

So there exists a successor.
 

> Also you did not answer the question about the realness feeling of observer B... he has twice less measure according to you, does it feel less alive/real/conscious ?

I answered that previously.  Measure affects the commonness of an observation, not what it feels like.

From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter.

Regards,
Quentin
 

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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer <lasermazer@...>

Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
> consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the
> measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
> consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a
> computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
> in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.

But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example.
Jesse

Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI...

 

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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux <allcolor@...>

2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer <lasermazer@...>

Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
> consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the
> measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
> consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a
> computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
> in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.

But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example.
Jesse

Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI...

Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a "next subjective moment"... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority of "universes" I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot "be dead" hence the only moments that count is where I exists however small the measure of that moment is... and if at any momemts there exists a successor where I exists then QI holds.

Regards,
Quentin
 

 

--
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--
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[Brent Meeker-2]

Jack Mallah wrote:

> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote:
>> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
>> consciousness.  QM  evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
>> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces
>> the measure of each subspace.  But there's no perceptible diminishment of
>> consciousness.  I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness
>> is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it
>> doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and
>> reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
>
> If that is so then how do you explain the Born rule?

The Born rule assumes you start with a normalized vector (i.e. ray), so it
calculates predicted probabilities conditional on the state preparation.  After
each measurement, the vector is renormalized because the prediction is always
conditional on the present state.  This is quite different from applying a
probability measure to the evolution of a multiverse in which decoherence
defines many different orthogonal subspaces, each of which gets a small
projection of the state vector of the multiverse.

Brent

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[Jesse Mazer]

> 2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux>
>
>
> Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a "next subjective moment"... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority of "universes" I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot "be dead" hence the only moments that count is where I exists however small the measure of that moment is... and if at any momemts there exists a successor where I exists then QI holds.


But any notion of there being objective truths about what happens from the "1st person perspective", as opposed to just 3rd person truths about what various brains *report* experiencing, gets into philosophical assumptions that really need to made explicit or else people are talking at cross-purposes...this is what I was getting at with my post at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/msg/26b0bf3e1e971381
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[Brent Meeker-2]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
>> I'm with Mike and Brent.
>>
>> Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
>> violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
>> can't go out of the system.
>
> See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and  
> thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the  
> computation differs.

If A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2 and they see something different, i.e. MA1 and
MA2 are distinguishable, then you've violated the hypothesis that the
computations are identical.

Brent


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[Brent Meeker-2]

Jesse Mazer wrote:

>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
>> consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
>> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the
>> measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
>> consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a
>> computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
>> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
>> in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
>
> But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example.
> Jesse

We seem to be in violent agreement.

Brent

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
>
> 2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer <lasermazer@...
> <mailto:lasermazer@...>>
>
>
>
>     Brent Meeker wrote:
>      >
>      > Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the
>     feeling of
>      > consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total
>     probability, which
>      > implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical
>     subspaces reduces the
>      > measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
>      > consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that
>     consciousness is a
>      > computation, since in that case the computation either exists or
>     it doesn't.
>      > Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and
>     reducing it's vector
>      > in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
>
>     But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"?
>     Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given
>     observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant,
>     just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't
>     feel my consciousness diminish, for example.
>     Jesse
>
>
> Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI...

I guess that depends on what you care about.

Brent

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Saibal Mitra wrote:
> Welcome back Jack Mallah!
>
> I have a different argument against QTI.
>
> I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended.
> Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the
> QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream
> should have been be infinite.

Of course maybe in some other branch of the multiverse your dream is continuing.
That's what makes everything-theories difficult to test.

But you raise an interesting point. Everything-theories that suppose
consciousness is constituted by the closest continuations need to solve the
"white rabbit" problem.  But that solution, whatever it is, would equally apply
in dreams.  So why don't dreams have the same physics as waking life?

Brent

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
>> I'm with Mike and Brent.
>>
>> Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
>> violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
>> can't go out of the system.
>
> See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and  
> thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the  
> computation differs. It is like being duplicated in two identical  
> rooms. This change the (local and relative) measure, because if you  
> open the "box" in the room you will find zero or one, but not both.
>
>
>
>>
>> And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical  
>> platonic
>> computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I
>> gather you assume).
>
> Not if you distinguish first person and third person. It is the third  
> person computations which gives the local relative probabilities, but  
> yes the stream of consciousness (first person) is the same. This lead  
> to a vocabulary problem like chosing the word "bifurcation" or  
> "differentiation" for computation which, at some point *becomes*  
> different.
> Consciousness is unique and immaterial. As such it resides in  
> "Platonia". Life, that is embedding in relative computaional histories  
> is what makes consciousness differentiate.
>
>>
>> Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting
>> the same OM.
>
> You are right, but different computations can be understood locally  
> and globally. The "computation of me up to Washington is different of  
> the computation of me up to Moscow, even when I am still in Brussels.  
> It is contained in the Y = II idea.

This idea seems inconsistent with MWI.  In QM the  split is uncaused so it's
hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases the measure of
computations that were identical before the split.

Brent

>Note that the same "vocabulary"  
> problem occurs with Quantum Physics.
>
> Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for  
> computation. But we can already derive what can count as different  
> computations if we want those measure question making sense.

As I understand it your theory of personal identity depends on computations
"going through" a particular state.  Intuitively this implies a state at a
particular moment, but a Y=II representation implies that we are taking into
account not just the present state but some period of history - which would
correspond with the usual idea of a person - something with a history, not just
a state.

Brent

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