Altered states of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Apr 2009, at 13:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/4/2 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:
>
>>> I would say that if you are at a fork where one version of you loses
>>> all memories and another does not, then you will find yourself going
>>> down the no memory loss path.
>>
>> At which point? Also, why is it that we din't survive them to the
>> continuation where we don't ever mage very weird (amnesic) dreams.
>> We would not survive salvia at all.
>
> This sounds a bit like the argument which says that if QI is true, we
> could never fall asleep, since we don't experience unconsciousness and
> therefore we would only experience the worlds where we stay awake
> indefinitely.

For being awake you have to be conscious.
For being conscious, you don't have to be awake.

The probability that I go from state A to state B is given by the  
"number" of computations going from A to B.
The problem with amnesic teleportation, that is teleportation with  
partial amnesia in the reconstituted person, is that it introduce a  
fuzziness on the first person uncertainty domain.
What are your prediction in the following experience, where the  
protocol is told to you in advance: you are triplicated in Sidney,  
Beijing and Kigali. But in Sidney you loose your long term memory: you  
remember perfectly the triplication experience, your name, but nothing  
of your life.  In Beijing you lost your short term memory, you  
remember your whole life except the last hour, and thus you forget the  
triplication experience, and thus the protocol. In Kigali you keep  
your whole memory. I suppose that you will never recover the memories  
(this is in the protocol). How do you quantify the first person  
indeterminacy?

Accepting probabilities, what would you consider as being "more  
correct" among

1) S = 1/3, B = 1/3 K = 1/3,
2) S = 0, B = 0, S = 1,
3) S = 0, B = 1/2, K = 1/2,
4) S = 1/2, B = 0, K = 1/2,





> That argument is invalid, unless we are falling asleep
> permanently, i.e. dying. If we fall asleep and wake up again, or
> experience amnesia and recover, then the worlds where that happens are
> *not* excluded by QI. They are simply worlds where you have a gap in
> consciousness, as valid when you are calculating subjective
> probabilities as the (in general far less common) worlds where there
> is no such gap.

I agree with you (except I am agnostic on the existence of gap of  
consciousness). The problem, imo, arise with partial amnesia and  
partial recovery, ... and (I think) who we are ... in the long run. Do  
we need to have an ever developing brain to be (first person) immortal?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Brent,

I read this discussion and 'try' not to get involved (never succeed<G>).

*

Ourselves w/wout our memories? what else? These terms come from the ancient religious fable about a 'soul' - the person in the faith-domain.

Even the old Indians made 'reincarnation' hazy without memories and the only item to be reincarnated was a nebulous 'identity without identity'.

*

In your very logical and 'cool-headed' reply below I cannot help but detect the 'physicist' as first line, going into anything else from there.

"Gap?" "I" and "you"? concepts of materialist physiscs base, which is not proven the fundament of them all, rather a consequence in a certain "mindset" (whatever that may be). We 'feel' something like 'I' and make it the spiritus rector of them all, looking for "where is it"? (one step better: "how does it do it"?) while "it" may be a limited consequence of what we don't understand but use.

"Unconscious memories"? if we ever live in a dynamics of timeless interconnection into the totality (no space either, only in our wish to [co]-ordinate our limited views): rather  'take another  look at - what we call - memory recall and perceive it according to our upest-to-date mindset.

Dynamic relational adjustments incorporated. Or whatever is beyond our limited imagination (solipsist view about the existence especially based on a physically related view). 'Where are they'? in the spaceless realm.

(Dis-)Continuity? absolutely physical.

And a second is not a 'short term' in a timeless view.

- RELATIONS.

 

I can make one statement and that looks to me unbeatable (as well as unprovable): We don't know, but think (feel?) we do.

Have a good springtime

John M

On Thu, Apr 2, 2009 at 2:03 PM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/2 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:
>
>
>>> I would say that if you are at a fork where one version of you loses
>>> all memories and another does not, then you will find yourself going
>>> down the no memory loss path.
>>>
>> At which point? Also, why is it that we din't survive them to the
>> continuation where we don't ever mage very weird (amnesic) dreams.
>> We would not survive salvia at all.
>>
>
> This sounds a bit like the argument which says that if QI is true, we
> could never fall asleep, since we don't experience unconsciousness and
> therefore we would only experience the worlds where we stay awake
> indefinitely. That argument is invalid, unless we are falling asleep
> permanently, i.e. dying. If we fall asleep and wake up again, or
> experience amnesia and recover, then the worlds where that happens are
> *not* excluded by QI. They are simply worlds where you have a gap in
> consciousness, as valid when you are calculating subjective
> probabilities as the (in general far less common) worlds where there
> is no such gap.
>
>
>
But if you're going to derive physics from consciousness you need to
explain what connects across the gap - why is it still "you".  I
appreciate that part of the answer is memories, although Bruno seems to
think they are inessential.  But even if they are part of the answer
there still seems to me to be a problem in that almost all memories are
*not* in consciousness at any one time.  So must we invoke "unconscious
memories" (which are where?) or some other factor that provides the
continuity of self or do we simply assert that you are no one in
particular when you are not remembering anything.  My speculation is
that there there is subconscious "memory" on the very short term,
~second, which provides continuity .  This operates even when you are
asleep so that there is continuity of events in you dreams.  If you
suffer a concussion the continuity is broken and you have gap in  memory
and in consciousness.  This immediate memory provides continuity between
times when you recall long-term memories, which are the ones Quentin is
concerned with.

Brent

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/4 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

>> I have been using the term "memories" to include more than just long
>> term memories. For example, I have a feeling of "being me" which
>> persists from moment to moment. Even though I can't put this feeling
>> into words, I would know immediately if something happens to change
>> it, since then I would no longer "feel myself". While specific to each
>> person, nevertheless this basal feeling would be more generic than the
>> feeling + superimposed complex cognition, since the latter would have
>> higher information content.
>>
>>
>>
> And doesn't this feeling of "being me" requires very short terms
> (~second) memory?  I've called it "immediate memory" to distinguish it
> from the short term memory which seems to be on the order of a few minutes.

Yes, it obviously requires some kind of very short term memory, since
I would be instantly aware if something changed. When I use the term
"memory" in discussions on personal identity I assume that it covers
this sort of memory as well as the memory of who I am and what the
last word I typed was.



--
Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/4 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

> The probability that I go from state A to state B is given by the
> "number" of computations going from A to B.
> The problem with amnesic teleportation, that is teleportation with
> partial amnesia in the reconstituted person, is that it introduce a
> fuzziness on the first person uncertainty domain.
> What are your prediction in the following experience, where the
> protocol is told to you in advance: you are triplicated in Sidney,
> Beijing and Kigali. But in Sidney you loose your long term memory: you
> remember perfectly the triplication experience, your name, but nothing
> of your life.  In Beijing you lost your short term memory, you
> remember your whole life except the last hour, and thus you forget the
> triplication experience, and thus the protocol. In Kigali you keep
> your whole memory. I suppose that you will never recover the memories
> (this is in the protocol). How do you quantify the first person
> indeterminacy?
>
> Accepting probabilities, what would you consider as being "more
> correct" among
>
> 1) S = 1/3, B = 1/3 K = 1/3,
> 2) S = 0, B = 0, [K] = 1,
> 3) S = 0, B = 1/2, K = 1/2,
> 4) S = 1/2, B = 0, K = 1/2,

I would say (3), but I have long been troubled by such questions
because there is no clearly correct answer.

>> That argument is invalid, unless we are falling asleep
>> permanently, i.e. dying. If we fall asleep and wake up again, or
>> experience amnesia and recover, then the worlds where that happens are
>> *not* excluded by QI. They are simply worlds where you have a gap in
>> consciousness, as valid when you are calculating subjective
>> probabilities as the (in general far less common) worlds where there
>> is no such gap.
>
> I agree with you (except I am agnostic on the existence of gap of
> consciousness). The problem, imo, arise with partial amnesia and
> partial recovery, ... and (I think) who we are ... in the long run. Do
> we need to have an ever developing brain to be (first person) immortal?

No, because in ordinary life we gradually forget things the longer ago
they happened, especially if they are felt to be less significant.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Colin Hales-2]

Hi folks,
I am finally getting somewhere. My paper has just been published. :

Hales, C. 'Dual Aspect Science', Journal of Consciousness Studies vol. 16, no. 2-3, 2009. 30-73.

Under dual aspect science exploration and deliverables take on two fundamental forms:

    Laws-of-appearance ( = T, what we do now) 
    Laws-of-structure( = T' what we are recently/partly doing but wasn't organised/recognised).

A physics of P-consciousness becomes empirically tractable under the DAS framework set of  structure (T') descriptions.  The DAS paper resulted from empirical science (observation of scientists) and is a framework which is empirically testable - the procedure is in the paper. No philosophy is required. The observed behaviour of scientists operating under the framework is decisive.

I can deliver a .PDF of the paper to anyone who is interested (off list).

The idea is that science's output (= "laws of nature") actually has two intimately enmeshed 100% mutually consistent but very different forms:
T     (grammars as per usual)
T'   (computational output in a generalised dynamic form of cellular automaton)

The former is a set of forever-uncertain rules about 100% certain (agreed) things.
The latter is a set of 100% certain (chosen/agreed) rules about  forever-uncertain structural primitives.

The two are 'joined' and empirically supported by the one single evidence system - P-consciousness.

This nicely (mirror-) symmetric knowledge framework eliminates a raft of strange behavioural inconsistencies in science (in the behaviour of scientists). DAS finally enables us to formally deal with the underlying structure of things in an empirically viable way. It means that scientists trading in loops, strings, froth, branes etc etc finally have a home. All we have to do is use our theory to make a prediction of the appearance brain material consistent with the delivery of P-consciousness as predicted by the T' aspect structural primitive of choice. T-aspect science cannot possibly do this. In the paper is a large list of the kinds of predictions to expect of your T'-aspect.

I have used my loop structure - cellular automaton. It predicts brains look and operate like they do, although its hard to see at first.  It is to be written up and published ASAP. Maybe others would like to see how they can do the same with other structural primitives.

The abstract is below. I also have a 'DAS how to/reader user guide' which will help you distil the DAS paper - which is a bit of a monster - 43 pages. The computational exploration of loops is, in effect, the actual scientific delivery-form of the 'entropy calculus' I have spoken about from time to time here.

I discuss the nature and forms of TOE in the DAS paper. They have 2 forms as well. Indeed the T'-aspect TOE is literally the rules and initialisation of the 'natural CA'. You can't analytically express it. You have to compute it and slice it to observe it.

Enough for now!

cheers
colin hales

ABSTRACT. Our chronically impoverished explanatory capacity in respect of P-consciousness is highly suggestive of a problem with science itself, rather than its lack of acquisition of some particular knowledge. The hidden assumption built into science is that science itself is a completed human behaviour. Removal of this assumption is achieved through a simple revision to our science model which is constructed, outlined and named ‘dual aspect science’ (DAS). It is constructed with reference to existing science being ‘single aspect science’. DAS is consistent with and predictive of the very explanatory poverty that generated it and is simultaneously a seamless upgrade; no existing law of nature is altered or lost. The framework is completely empirically self-consistent and is validated empirically. DAS  eliminates the behavioural inconsistencies currently inhabiting a world in which single aspect science has been inherited rather than chosen and in which its presuppositions are implemented through habit rather than by scientific examination of options by the scientists actually carrying out science. The proposed DAS framework provides a working vantage point from which an explanation of P-consciousness becomes expected and meaningful. The framework requires that we rediscover what we scientists do and then discover something new about ourselves: that how we have been doing science is not the entire story. Dual aspect science shows us what we have not been doing. 
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/4/4 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:
>
>> The probability that I go from state A to state B is given by the
>> "number" of computations going from A to B.
>> The problem with amnesic teleportation, that is teleportation with
>> partial amnesia in the reconstituted person, is that it introduce a
>> fuzziness on the first person uncertainty domain.
>> What are your prediction in the following experience, where the
>> protocol is told to you in advance: you are triplicated in Sidney,
>> Beijing and Kigali. But in Sidney you loose your long term memory: you
>> remember perfectly the triplication experience, your name, but nothing
>> of your life.  In Beijing you lost your short term memory, you
>> remember your whole life except the last hour, and thus you forget the
>> triplication experience, and thus the protocol. In Kigali you keep
>> your whole memory. I suppose that you will never recover the memories
>> (this is in the protocol). How do you quantify the first person
>> indeterminacy?
>>
>> Accepting probabilities, what would you consider as being "more
>> correct" among
>>
>> 1) S = 1/3, B = 1/3 K = 1/3,
>> 2) S = 0, B = 0, [K] = 1,
>> 3) S = 0, B = 1/2, K = 1/2,
>> 4) S = 1/2, B = 0, K = 1/2,
>
> I would say (3), but I have long been troubled by such questions
> because there is no clearly correct answer.
>
>>> That argument is invalid, unless we are falling asleep
>>> permanently, i.e. dying. If we fall asleep and wake up again, or
>>> experience amnesia and recover, then the worlds where that happens are
>>> *not* excluded by QI. They are simply worlds where you have a gap in
>>> consciousness, as valid when you are calculating subjective
>>> probabilities as the (in general far less common) worlds where there
>>> is no such gap.
>> I agree with you (except I am agnostic on the existence of gap of
>> consciousness). The problem, imo, arise with partial amnesia and
>> partial recovery, ... and (I think) who we are ... in the long run. Do
>> we need to have an ever developing brain to be (first person) immortal?
>
> No, because in ordinary life we gradually forget things the longer ago
> they happened, especially if they are felt to be less significant.
>
>

And complicating things even more we may not be able to remember something on
request but then remember it later.  I've often experienced this kind of
Poincare effect.  There's also some evidence that hypnosis can recover memories
not otherwise available.  So "forgetting" and "remembering" are not simple
contraries.

Brent

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Brent: right on!

 

It all seems to me that we have no fitting meanings (whatver) of memory, identity, forgetting, recalling and the entire vocabulary we apply to things unknown. We only think so.

The fact that Bruno puts equationally expressed formulations (numbers) to it does not make it more meaningful, since he only expresses more formally what we (don't) know.

 

If I undergo total amnesia, do I still stay the same person? I doubt it: that would only mean that we are a composite of atomic figments, as well products indeed of the part we questioned in the previous sentence.

Which begs the follow-up: if I forget (lose) part of my memories (Bruno's Beijing or Sydney version) am I still the myself of Kilgari?

Which goes even further: If I forget only a detail, e.g. the birthday of a friend, does it destroy my total identity? Where is 'a' limit? Are such quantitative distinctions imperative in 'meaning' assignments? Then again, the so called physical part of us, we consider a person who lost a limb THE SAME person. Losing a heart or substantial parts of the brain makes it 'dead'.

I am afraid to support my starting conclusion: We don't know the first thing of the complex we speak about so eloquently and savantly.

 

The bad part is: we believe in our science and do not start thinking "outside" the box, so our ignorance gets more and more firm.

 

A fresh start? After all those millennia of 'wisdom', Nobels et al.?

John M

On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 1:03 AM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/4 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:
>
>> The probability that I go from state A to state B is given by the
>> "number" of computations going from A to B.
>> The problem with amnesic teleportation, that is teleportation with
>> partial amnesia in the reconstituted person, is that it introduce a
>> fuzziness on the first person uncertainty domain.
>> What are your prediction in the following experience, where the
>> protocol is told to you in advance: you are triplicated in Sidney,
>> Beijing and Kigali. But in Sidney you loose your long term memory: you
>> remember perfectly the triplication experience, your name, but nothing
>> of your life.  In Beijing you lost your short term memory, you
>> remember your whole life except the last hour, and thus you forget the
>> triplication experience, and thus the protocol. In Kigali you keep
>> your whole memory. I suppose that you will never recover the memories
>> (this is in the protocol). How do you quantify the first person
>> indeterminacy?
>>
>> Accepting probabilities, what would you consider as being "more
>> correct" among
>>
>> 1) S = 1/3, B = 1/3 K = 1/3,
>> 2) S = 0, B = 0, [K] = 1,
>> 3) S = 0, B = 1/2, K = 1/2,
>> 4) S = 1/2, B = 0, K = 1/2,
>
> I would say (3), but I have long been troubled by such questions
> because there is no clearly correct answer.
>
>>> That argument is invalid, unless we are falling asleep
>>> permanently, i.e. dying. If we fall asleep and wake up again, or
>>> experience amnesia and recover, then the worlds where that happens are
>>> *not* excluded by QI. They are simply worlds where you have a gap in
>>> consciousness, as valid when you are calculating subjective
>>> probabilities as the (in general far less common) worlds where there
>>> is no such gap.
>> I agree with you (except I am agnostic on the existence of gap of
>> consciousness). The problem, imo, arise with partial amnesia and
>> partial recovery, ... and (I think) who we are ... in the long run. Do
>> we need to have an ever developing brain to be (first person) immortal?
>
> No, because in ordinary life we gradually forget things the longer ago
> they happened, especially if they are felt to be less significant.
>
>

And complicating things even more we may not be able to remember something on
request but then remember it later.  I've often experienced this kind of
Poincare effect.  There's also some evidence that hypnosis can recover memories
not otherwise available.  So "forgetting" and "remembering" are not simple
contraries.

Brent

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---