Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)

[Kim Jones-2]

2nd Instalment (continuation) - scroll down if you have read 1st instalment

Trans. Kim Jones (extract only)

1.1 Mechanist Philosophies

1.1.1 Different types of Mechanism

I distinguish the following mechanist hypotheses:

BEHAVIOURIST MECHANISM

Some machines can behave as thinking beings (living, conscious etc.) (BEH-MEC)

STRONG MECHANISM

Some machines can think (living beings, conscious beings, have a private life etc.) (STR-MEC)

INDEXICAL MECHANISM

I am a machine (or - you are a machine, or again - human beings are machines) (IND-MEC)

By replacing "machine" by "digital machine" one obtains the corresponding digital theses.

The behaviourist digital mechanism BEH-DIG-MEC corresponds largely to that of Turing in his 1950 article. In the same way, the strong digital mechanism STR-DIG-MEC corresponds to what is called in the literature the strong artificial intelligence thesis (strong AI).

In this work I am exclusively interested in indexical and digital mechanism (IND-DIG-MEC or just IDM). "Digitality" necessitates Church's Thesis, which is why the digital aspect is explained in its turn in the second part. There, I will show how a procedure, due essentially to Goedel, permits an indexical treatment of machines in general.

Proposition: 

IND-MEC => STR-MEC => BEH-MEC, and

BEH-MEC ≠> STR-MEC ≠> IND-MEC.

(with or without the hypothesis of digitality) 

Reasoning:  One admits that humans know how to think (conscious beings, having private lives etc.) In this case IND-MEC entails STR-MEC and STR-MEC entails BEH-MEC. That BEH-MEC does not entail STR-MEC is supported by Weizenbaum (1976) (see also Gunderson {footnote 1} 1971). STR-MEC does not entail IND-MEC, since the fact that machines are able to think does not entail that they alone are able to think. It is conceivable that machines are able to think without we ourselves being machines. Wang (1974) presents a similar reasoning. Nevertheless, numerous philosophers make implicit use of an opposing opinion: STR-MEC => IND-MEC, see for example Arsac 1987.

{Footnote 1: Gunderson 1971 criticises the Turing Test. The Turing Test is a test for BEH-MEC. Simply put, a machine (hidden) passes the test if it is able to pass itself off as a human being during a "conversation" by means of a computer keyboard terminal.}

1.1.2 Mechanist Philosophy: Historical Summary 

Contemporary digital mechanist philosophy is due in large measure to Descartes and Hobbes {footnote 2} (see Rogow 1986, Bernhardt 1989). Descartes wanted to distinguish Man from the animals. He argues that animals, as much as Man's body (including the brain), are/is a machine. He intended by this a finite assembly of material components that unequivocally determines the behaviour of the whole. Descartes surmises that the soul is not mechanical. In separating the soul from the body in this way, and thus the mind from matter, he is the originator of the dualist position, widely encompassed by the philosophy of mind. One speaks of Cartesian Dualism.

Following are three arguments that Descartes presented in favour of his distinction of Man from the animal-as-machine (note that this distinction entails the negation of IND-MEC.)

{Footnote 2: One can detect some mechanist affirmations or questions among (pre and post-Socratic, though not necessarily materialist) philosophers, from Greek antiquity (cf Timaeus and Plato, see also Odifreddi 1989). Among Chinese philosophers, for example Lao-Tzu, a certain monk is admired for having passed off his "automated" servants as flesh and blood beings. Among Hindu philosophers for example, in the "Questions to the King Milinda", the human body is compared to the chariot, and the human mind is compared to the different parts of the chariot, similar to Hume's (1739) manner of tackling the problem of identity with his boat. The temptation to set up artefacts in the image of Man is also a component of several myths, (for ex. the Golem in Jewish culture, see for ex. Breton 1990). It is no exaggeration to maintain that the very idea of mechanism appears wherever and whenever machines themselves are developed.}

1) Animals are not endowed with reason and cannot engage in linguistic communication

This argument is losing credibility since language and reason seem more accessible to today's machines than for example, emotion which is communally allowed in the case of certain animals (see for ex. Lévy 1987). Here Descartes takes Aristotle's position which asserts that Man is a "reasoning animal".

2) Machines are finite beings. A finite being cannot conceive of the infinite. Now, I am able (said Descartes) to conceive of the infinite. Thus I am not a machine.

 This argument against IND-MEC brings into relief two fundamental questions:

a) Can Man conceive of infinity?

b) Can a machine conceive of infinity?

Question a) differentiates Hobbes' point of view from Descartes'. Hobbes concludes that he cannot in effect conceive of infinity.

3) A machine can only carry out particular tasks, as it turns out, those tasks for which it was constructed. In effect, Descartes is saying:

"Since, in the case that reason is a universal instrument that participates in every sort of encounter, these organs need a certain particular disposition for each and every action; from this comes the idea that it is morally impossible that a machine might possess sufficient diversity such that it might act in every living occurrence in the same way that our reason assists our actions (Descartes, "1953", page 165).

The idea of a universal machine had nevertheless crossed the mind of Raymond Lulle (1302) whom Descartes studied. This same idea will reappear with Leibnitz, culminating in the work of Turing, and this will be explained in the second part.

La Mettrie will rehash Descartes' animal-as-machine for the purpose of extending it to Man (La Mettrie 1748, see also Gunderson 1971).

In parallel with Descartes, Hobbes himself develops the mechanist hypothesis (Rogow 1986). One can date Hobbes' motivation toward mechanism from the time of his discovery of geometry. Having been particularly impressed by the fact that he may have been convinced by a *finite communication* based on logical geometrical reasoning, Hobbes conceives of the mechanistic character of thought. He then reasons that it should be possible to reduce thinking to addition and subtraction. (see Webb 1980). He is thus very close to the *functionalist* position in the philosophy of mind: that the additions and multiplications might be realisable by a *telegraphic network* , a *hydraulic system*, an *electromagnetic device* , or even *a windmill*, a *catapult* or a *calculating device* (ordinateur), to cite Searle's enumeration (Searle 1984). Thought is thereby reduced to operations not necessarily equipment-dependent, and to the constituent matter employed to realise these operations. La Mettrie, in his own way argues in something like the same sense:

"Thus a Soul of mud, discovering in the twinkling of an eye the relations and the consequences of an infinity of ideas difficult to conceive, would be preferable evidently to an ignorant and stupid Soul, which might be made of all the more precious Elements" (La Mettrie 1748).

Similarly, Lafitte engages us on the subject of Babbage, precursor of 19th century information processing, to which we will return in the second part:

"For Babbage, all machines being a composition of different organs linked together in a complex manner, the important thing to fix is less the very form of the organs than the sequencing of their functions, which relates to organic linkages causing the ensemble to function." (Lafitte 1930).

Differing with Descartes, Hobbes concludes that it is not possible that Man - whom he considers as a finite being - might conceive of the infinite. Hobbes' motivation, being finitist and indexical (human thought is mechanisable) is therefore opposed to Descartes' animal-as-machine and is, in this sense much closer to the contemporary motivation in the direction of artificial intelligence. Soon I will return to the relation existing between mechanism and functionalism.

1.1.3 What is a machine?

Given the familiar connotations of the word "machine" - locomotives, electric kettles, automobiles, computers, microscopes, dish-washers, sewing machines, rice-cookers, time-pieces - (the concept of) mechanism may well seem grotesque.

Even if machines are considered to be artefacts of exclusively human construction, in other words artificial, the concept of the machine is difficult to define. Lafitte, in 1911 argues that just such a definition can only be made in vain:

"To claim to be able to define the concept of a machine is to suppose that the science of machines has come about, or that it might one day come about in all it's perfection. Other than what amounts, chimerically-speaking, to assigning limits to the development of mechanical forms, it really is to suppose in the first place an entire and complete knowledge of the character of every individual present and future mechanism, followed by the perfection of a measuring instrument capable of situating each into a definitive category according to the ensemble of characteristics. But, this again implicitly admits to a massive division of sorts, conforming entirely to those contours that we can cleanly envisage, having no link whatsoever with other bodies." (see also further on 2.3)

Similarly, La Mettrie, in "Man as Machine" writes:

"Man is a Machine composed in such a way that it is frankly impossible to initially get a clear idea of it and consequently to arrive at a definition"

What Hobbes and Descartes have in common is that a machine is a locally finite being. Its global behaviour is determined by the behaviour of its elementary constituents, these being finite in number at each instant (call this the "digital aspect"). The number of components can nonetheless grow according to the work performed by the machine.

A philosophy called "Mechanical Philosophy" developed not only under influence of Newton's works but also under those of Boyle (see Broukère 1982), was more materialist and determinist (in the vague contemporary sense) than finitist. Action at a distance which seems to exist between material bodies in Newton's mechanics which in addition worried Hobbes, seemed to exclude any finite component (see Metaxopoulos 1986). Similarly, Searle - who I do not classify as a mechanist philosopher - argues that a machine alone such as (according to him) the human brain, is capable of thought, but he is unclear as to the nature of the identifying factors. The difficulty inherent in defining machines is reflected in the difficult task of circumscribing mechanist philosophy.

Gandy (1980) isolated 4 principles capturing the intuitive idea of a machine (digital or effectively digitisable):

1) Determining Principle: a machine may be described by the givens within a hierachical structure S, equally by a function F such that iteration F(S), F(FSS)), F(F(F(S))),....specifies the evolution of that machine.

2) Limiting Hierachical Principle: a structure S is hierarchised via a finite number of levels.

3) Principle of Unique Reassembly: a structure S can be disassembled into limited parts and reconstituted in a unique way according to those parts, following a guide or plan (which itself must be finite).

4) Locality Principle: the hierarchical structure of a machine admits a topological description such that the state of a part of the machine Fn(S) stemming from its evolution only depends on the state of parts in the immediate vicinity in Fn-1(S) (no "action at a distance").

Gandy and Shepherdson (1988) give a much more precise formulation in terms of groups deemed finite by heredity. Gandy demonstrates (and Shepherdson generalises) the equivalence between this definition and Turing's conceptual definition (with oracle), so that a generalised version of Church's Thesis will permit (in the second part) that we can do without Gandy's explicit principles. I have nonetheless laid bare these principles informally since they fall back on Descartes' and Hobbes' conceptions and illuminate the biological pretext for (digital) mechanism, as well as certain doubts arising from chemistry.

1.1.4 Biological Incentives

These concern indexical mechanism directly since they stem from self-observation, unlike incentives arising from the contemplation of engineering work (see for ex. Lafitte 1930, Vèsale 1543, Ambroselli 1987).

Wanting to show that animals are machines, Descartes runs up against a problem that he can never resolve.

1* Descartes'problem

How could an animal-as-machine be capable of reproduction? How could a machine construct a self-same and identical machine? It would have to contain a complete description or plan of itself, and this seems impossible. {footnote 3}. The fact that cellular division is, broadly speaking, understood to take place at the molecular level (Cairns, Watson and Crick, (see Watson (1965, 1989) for detailed references) constitutes a contemporary biological incentive for mechanism.

(Footnote 3: This argument is used from time to time, as in Cossa in 1955: "Were machines to find themselves - via an impossible form of reasoning - endowed with reproductive power, these irregularities, these defects - although tiny at the start and without functional consequences - would undergo an amplification from generation to generation such that the machine would rapidly cease to work at all."

2* Driesch's problem

Similarly, when Driesch conducted his first experiments in embryology, cellular division seemed to him at this point to be a surprising phenomenon which he would go on to use as a decisive argument in favour of vitalism, arriving at a counter-mechanist {footnote 4} conception of life {footnote 5}. 

(Footnote 4: The difference between the non-mechanist and anti-mechanist view is identical to that of the agnostic to the atheist.)

(Footnote 5: By way of reaction, Helmholtz proposes a mechanist theory of perception - something we will in a certain sense rediscover - and opts for an anti-vitalist pact ( de Broukère 1982) 

By the same token, how might we explain the flexibility exhibited by cells in the analogous phenomenon of cellular regeneration? Think for a moment of the cloning of a frog (see Watson et al 1989 p. 835) or yet, of the stupefying example of the planarian, small flatworm roughly 1cm in length which lives in certain freshwater habitats (see the drawing, following page) which qualifies as a kind of champion of tissue regeneration among animals possessing a central nervous system (Buchsbaum 1938, Buchsbaum et al. 1987). Phenomena of genetic regulation with regard to mechanism are eloquent [elegant?=poss. error:] Kim) (Jacob and Monod 1961, Thomas 1978, Thomas and van Ham 1974).

Here again is what Diderot said in his conversation with d'Alembert, in confronting Cartesian mechanism and the development of the embryo:

"Do you see this egg? With this, one can upend every school of theology and every temple on Earth. What is this egg? Before the germ (of life) is introduced, no more than an insensate mass; and after it's introduction, what is it then? An insensate mass, since the germ itself is but an inert and coarse fluid. How might this mass progress to another form of organisation, toward the sensation of feeling, toward life itself? By warmth. What produces this warmth? Movement. What will be the successive effects of movements? Instead of my response, sit here and together we will follow these movements from moment to moment. Starting with a point that oscillates, a thread that extends and gathers colour, to the flesh which forms; a beak, tiny wing-ends, eyes, feet appear; a yellow-tinged matter that divides and which produces intestines; behold an animal. An animal that moves, becomes agitated, sounds its voice; I hear its squawking through the shell; it grows its downy coat; it sees. The weight of its head, which bobs back and forth, unceasingly brings its beak against the inner rampart of its prison; this now breaks; it leaves, it walks, it flies, it registers irritation, it flees, it returns, it complains, it suffers, it loves, it desires, it experiences joy; it possesses each of your affects; all of your actions, it can perform them all. Can you claim, with Descartes that it is no more than a purely imitative machine? In that case, tiny children laugh at you with derision and the philosophers' rejoinder is that if such is a machine, then you are but another." {footnote 6}

(Footnote 6: We note here the essentially modernist mindset of Diderot who places the animal on the same rung as the human, thus rejecting Descartes' distinction. In general, with the notable exception of La Mettrie, mechanism will face a poor reception. This brings to mind Pascal's argument. This genre of "argument" is not all that far from what Turing called "head in the sand objection" qualifying more as "consolation" than refutation. (Turing 1950)

The contemporary biologist may surmise that - relative to the laws of chemistry - the problem of biological reproduction is solved. The discovery by biochemists and molecular geneticists of the plan or description of the cell and the fashion by which this map is chemically represented, decoded and executed within the organism constitutes cause for the application of the Principle of Unique Reassembly, the Determining Principle and the Limiting Hierachical Principle (this last appearing already with classical genetics, see Cuny 1969). In the same way, the older discovery of the importance of particle exchanges with the surrounding environment or between organisms - as happens during breathing, during digestion, during conception, favours the application of the Locality Principle (Van Helmont, Mendel, Lavoisier, Vesale - to cite the more well known ones; see de Broukère 1982, Ambroselli et al 1987, Vesale 1543).

1.1.5 Doubts Arising from Chemistry

Watson has said "the cell obeys the laws of chemistry", and the preceding incentives perhaps justify a belief in indexical mechanism relative to those laws. If these laws prove themselves to be non-mechanisable, mechanism will thereby find itself weakened, perhaps even refuted but certainly relativised.

This suggestion is all the more well-founded in that the laws of chemistry are captured by quantum mechanics. Despite its name ("mechanics" is here used in the Newtonian sense), philosophers and theologians are attracted to QM and see in the factual descriptions (up to here confirmed) of this theory an empirical justification of the non-mechanist nature of the world and/or of consciousness. {footnote 7}

(Footnote 7: Letovski 1987 takes up a (too?) rare encounter between cognitivists open to computational approaches to consciousness and neuroscientists open to the use of QM to resolve the brain/mind gap.)

Anti-mechanist arguments founded on QM are various. We shall briefly examine several:

a) The oldest argument: QM provides evidence of an intrinsic indeterminism in the world (or more precisely concerning the relations between the observer and the world. Mechanism is determinist. Thus, our relation to the world is not mechanist.

Those who use this argument are tempted to "explain" such a free interpretation by means of this indeterminism. This argument has already been refuted by Carnap or Mackay or Schroedinger. In addition, I will show that mechanism *is not* determinist.

a) The most recent argument: QM makes possible very particular forms of material, for example the quasi-crystals of Penrose and Schectman (see Penrose 1989). Penrose suggests, though without any seeming conviction, that the brain could be a *sort* of quasi-crystal. Similarly, Margenau 1984 and Squires 1990 seek to utilise QM to develop a dualist and non-mechanist theory of the mind (see also Stapp 1993).

The following arguments merit close and detailed examination since the (indexical) mechanist hypothesis considerably clarifies them. To this end, I will make use of a bare minimum of assumed quantum mechanical knowledge to allow the reader to follow the argument.

Newton conceived of matter and light as constituted of particles interacting with one another. Huygens was more prepared to reserve this way of seeing things for matter alone. He develops a successful wave theory of light which takes account of a number of luminous phenomena. Einstein will provide evidence, in his work on the photo-electric effect, of the corpuscular aspect of light, without dethroning the wave theory in the process. He also arrives at the quantum theory of light. De Broglie extends the wave-particle aspect of light to matter.  This permits the taking into account of the behaviour of electrons in Bohr's description of atoms and signals the birth of the quantum theory of matter.

(to be cont.)

K

 

Email:

kimjones@...

Web:

http://web.mac.com/kmjcommp/Plenitude_Music

Phone:

(612) 9389 4239  or  0431 723 001 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Feb 2009, at 04:47, Kim Jones wrote:

 (see Broukère 1982),

It is (see de Brouckère 1982) Note the "c", and the "de".

 Phenomena of genetic regulation with regard to mechanism are eloquent [elegant?=poss. error:] Kim)

It is "eloquent" (indeed). Perhaps it would be clearer to say: "Phenomena of genetic regulation are eloquent with regard to Mechanism".  

Mechanism is "Mechanist Philosophy" and so a capital M is better suited (I am afraid that you are not just translating my 1994 thesis, but you are correcting it ! Well, don't worry, this can be done at a second pass. 

I have no other remark. Excellent job. I guess that now I have not escape but to seriously introduce you to math for respecting the deal. Good move Kim :)

This will be done asap, through little posts. The plan is:  Numbers ==> functions ===> computable functions ===> computations ===> the seventh step (of the UDA).

Best,

Bruno

(Jacob and Monod 1961, Thomas 1978, Thomas and van Ham 1974).

Here again is what Diderot said in his conversation with d'Alembert, in confronting Cartesian mechanism and the development of the embryo:

"Do you see this egg? With this, one can upend every school of theology and every temple on Earth. What is this egg? Before the germ (of life) is introduced, no more than an insensate mass; and after it's introduction, what is it then? An insensate mass, since the germ itself is but an inert and coarse fluid. How might this mass progress to another form of organisation, toward the sensation of feeling, toward life itself? By warmth. What produces this warmth? Movement. What will be the successive effects of movements? Instead of my response, sit here and together we will follow these movements from moment to moment. Starting with a point that oscillates, a thread that extends and gathers colour, to the flesh which forms; a beak, tiny wing-ends, eyes, feet appear; a yellow-tinged matter that divides and which produces intestines; behold an animal. An animal that moves, becomes agitated, sounds its voice; I hear its squawking through the shell; it grows its downy coat; it sees. The weight of its head, which bobs back and forth, unceasingly brings its beak against the inner rampart of its prison; this now breaks; it leaves, it walks, it flies, it registers irritation, it flees, it returns, it complains, it suffers, it loves, it desires, it experiences joy; it possesses each of your affects; all of your actions, it can perform them all. Can you claim, with Descartes that it is no more than a purely imitative machine? In that case, tiny children laugh at you with derision and the philosophers' rejoinder is that if such is a machine, then you are but another." {footnote 6}

(Footnote 6: We note here the essentially modernist mindset of Diderot who places the animal on the same rung as the human, thus rejecting Descartes' distinction. In general, with the notable exception of La Mettrie, mechanism will face a poor reception. This brings to mind Pascal's argument. This genre of "argument" is not all that far from what Turing called "head in the sand objection" qualifying more as "consolation" than refutation. (Turing 1950)

The contemporary biologist may surmise that - relative to the laws of chemistry - the problem of biological reproduction is solved. The discovery by biochemists and molecular geneticists of the plan or description of the cell and the fashion by which this map is chemically represented, decoded and executed within the organism constitutes cause for the application of the Principle of Unique Reassembly, the Determining Principle and the Limiting Hierachical Principle (this last appearing already with classical genetics, see Cuny 1969). In the same way, the older discovery of the importance of particle exchanges with the surrounding environment or between organisms - as happens during breathing, during digestion, during conception, favours the application of the Locality Principle (Van Helmont, Mendel, Lavoisier, Vesale - to cite the more well known ones; see de Broukère 1982, Ambroselli et al 1987, Vesale 1543).

1.1.5 Doubts Arising from Chemistry

Watson has said "the cell obeys the laws of chemistry", and the preceding incentives perhaps justify a belief in indexical mechanism relative to those laws. If these laws prove themselves to be non-mechanisable, mechanism will thereby find itself weakened, perhaps even refuted but certainly relativised.

This suggestion is all the more well-founded in that the laws of chemistry are captured by quantum mechanics. Despite its name ("mechanics" is here used in the Newtonian sense), philosophers and theologians are attracted to QM and see in the factual descriptions (up to here confirmed) of this theory an empirical justification of the non-mechanist nature of the world and/or of consciousness. {footnote 7}

(Footnote 7: Letovski 1987 takes up a (too?) rare encounter between cognitivists open to computational approaches to consciousness and neuroscientists open to the use of QM to resolve the brain/mind gap.)

Anti-mechanist arguments founded on QM are various. We shall briefly examine several:

a) The oldest argument: QM provides evidence of an intrinsic indeterminism in the world (or more precisely concerning the relations between the observer and the world. Mechanism is determinist. Thus, our relation to the world is not mechanist.

Those who use this argument are tempted to "explain" such a free interpretation by means of this indeterminism. This argument has already been refuted by Carnap or Mackay or Schroedinger. In addition, I will show that mechanism *is not* determinist.

a) The most recent argument: QM makes possible very particular forms of material, for example the quasi-crystals of Penrose and Schectman (see Penrose 1989). Penrose suggests, though without any seeming conviction, that the brain could be a *sort* of quasi-crystal. Similarly, Margenau 1984 and Squires 1990 seek to utilise QM to develop a dualist and non-mechanist theory of the mind (see also Stapp 1993).

The following arguments merit close and detailed examination since the (indexical) mechanist hypothesis considerably clarifies them. To this end, I will make use of a bare minimum of assumed quantum mechanical knowledge to allow the reader to follow the argument.

Newton conceived of matter and light as constituted of particles interacting with one another. Huygens was more prepared to reserve this way of seeing things for matter alone. He develops a successful wave theory of light which takes account of a number of luminous phenomena. Einstein will provide evidence, in his work on the photo-electric effect, of the corpuscular aspect of light, without dethroning the wave theory in the process. He also arrives at the quantum theory of light. De Broglie extends the wave-particle aspect of light to matter.  This permits the taking into account of the behaviour of electrons in Bohr's description of atoms and signals the birth of the quantum theory of matter.

(to be cont.)

K

 

Email:

kimjones@...

Web:

http://web.mac.com/kmjcommp/Plenitude_Music

Phone:

(612) 9389 4239  or  0431 723 001 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Kim Jones-2]

Bruno

Thanks for the corrections - not only did I improve my understanding of the thesis in closely translating the language, but had enormous fun! I am up to the diagrammatic part and will stop here for the time being, to catch my breath and also to try and understand the Jaques Mallah thread as best I can. Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist idea. Do you also recommend it? Available from Amazon at a hefty price but might be worth it.

Looking forward to the creative maths assignments - but take your time; we only live once but we live forever

Best

Kim 

  

On 10/02/2009, at 2:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Feb 2009, at 04:47, Kim Jones wrote:

 (see Broukère 1982),

It is (see de Brouckère 1982) Note the "c", and the "de".

 Phenomena of genetic regulation with regard to mechanism are eloquent [elegant?=poss. error:] Kim)

It is "eloquent" (indeed). Perhaps it would be clearer to say: "Phenomena of genetic regulation are eloquent with regard to Mechanism".  

Mechanism is "Mechanist Philosophy" and so a capital M is better suited (I am afraid that you are not just translating my 1994 thesis, but you are correcting it ! Well, don't worry, this can be done at a second pass. 

I have no other remark. Excellent job. I guess that now I have not escape but to seriously introduce you to math for respecting the deal. Good move Kim :)

This will be done asap, through little posts. The plan is:  Numbers ==> functions ===> computable functions ===> computations ===> the seventh step (of the UDA).

Best,

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Kim,

> Thanks for the corrections - not only did I improve my understanding  
> of the thesis in closely translating the language, but had enormous  
> fun! I am up to the diagrammatic part and will stop here for the  
> time being, to catch my breath and also to try and understand the  
> Jaques Mallah thread as best I can.


No problem. Happy that you take fun in the translation.




> Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman  
> et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a  
> relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist  
> idea. Do you also recommend it?


I met Ladyman in Dubrovnic. Very nice guy. But from the Amazon "Look  
inside" I have not found reference on Everett, or Church or anything  
indicating he circled around the mechanist idea. Judge by yourself by  
reading the introduction on the Amazon Look Inside, if you are  
interested go for it, but be careful not running on too many horses.




> Available from Amazon at a hefty price but might be worth it.
>
> Looking forward to the creative maths assignments - but take your  
> time; we only live once but we live forever
>

  I will.

Best

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Günther Greindl]

Kim,

>> Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman  
>> et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a  
>> relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist  
>> idea. Do you also recommend it?

The book does not concern the mechanist thesis, there is only one
reference to Church.

Everett is given a whole section, but Ladyman et al. are agnostic as to
it's application to the macroscopic world (that is, if there are
macroscopic many worlds). But they are not hostile to the interpretation.

The book is good for getting a very informed overview of what current
physics has to say for _metaphysics_ and philosophy of science. The
authors sketch their variant of structural realism - it's good to read
it if you still cling to the concept of "matter".

Cheers,
Günther

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:48, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Kim,
>
>>> Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman
>>> et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a
>>> relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist
>>> idea. Do you also recommend it?
>
> The book does not concern the mechanist thesis, there is only one
> reference to Church.
>
> Everett is given a whole section, but Ladyman et al. are agnostic as  
> to
> it's application to the macroscopic world (that is, if there are
> macroscopic many worlds). But they are not hostile to the  
> interpretation.
>
> The book is good for getting a very informed overview of what current
> physics has to say for _metaphysics_ and philosophy of science. The
> authors sketch their variant of structural realism - it's good to read
> it if you still cling to the concept of "matter".

Indeed, that is the point. And yes there is section on Everett (but  
his name is not in the index).

The authors seems to be unaware that mechanism implies Everett (at  
least) or "worst" (so that mechanism is testable).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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