Consciousness is information?

[Quentin Anciaux-2]

Hi,

2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus <torgny@...>:

>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>>
>>>
>>>> you are human, all right?
>>>>
>>> I look exactly as a human.  When you look at me, you will not be
>>> able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I behave exacly like a
>>> human.
>>>
>> So you believe that human are not zombie, and you agree that you are
>> not human.
>> Where do you come from? Vega? Centaur?
>>
>
> I come from Stockholm, Sweden.  I was constructed by my parents.  In
> reality I think that all humans are zombies, but because I am a polite
> person, I do not tell the other zombies that they are zombies.  I do not
> want to hurt the other zombies by telling them the truth.

If we are zombie... you cannot hurt us, a zombie can't be hurt, a
zombie is a thing, a zombie is totally like a rock from it's inner
live pov. A zombie can't think, a zombie can't "behave like" from its
point of view because a zombie has no point of view.

>>> Yes it is right.  There is no infinity of natural numbers.  But the
>>> natural numbers are UNLIMITED, you can construct as many natural
>>> numbers as you want.  But how many numbers you construct, the number of
>>> numbers will always be finite.  You can never construct an infinite number of
>>> natural numbers.
>>>
>> This is no more ultrafinitism. Just the usal finitism or intuitionism.
>> It seems I recall you have had a stronger view on this point.
>> Ontologically I am neutral on this question. With comp I don't need
>> any actual infinity in the third person ontology. Infinities are not
>> avoidable from inside, at least when the inside view begins some self-
>> reflexion studies.
>>
>
> I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind.  Now I accept
> that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited.  I only deny
> actual infinities.  The set of all natural numbers are always finite,
> but you can always increase the set of all natural number by adding more
> natural numbers to it.

Then it's not the set of *all* natural numbers. You do nothing by
adding a number... you don't create numbers by writing them down, you
don't invent properties about them, it's absurd... especially for a
zombie.

>>> An ordinary computer can never be arithmetically unsound.
>>>
>> ? (this seems to me plainly false, unless you mean "perfect" for
>> "ordinary". But computers can be as unsound as you and me.
>> There is no vaccine against soundness: all computers can be unsound
>> soo or later. there is no perfect computer. Most gods are no immune,
>> you have to postulate the big unnameable One and be very near to It,
>> to have some guaranty ... if any ...
>>
>
> OK, I misunderstood what you meant by "unsound", I thougth you meant
> something like "unlogical".  But now I see that you mean something like
> "irrational".  And I sure am irrational.

You're not, remember you're a zombie hence there is no *you*.

>>
>>> I do not want to be tortured, I behave as if I try to avoid that as
>>> strongly as I can.  Because I behave in this way, I answer "no" to
>>> your question, because that answer will decrease the probability of you
>>> torturing me.
>>>
>> Do you realize that to defend your point you are always in the
>> obligation, when talking about any first person notion, like
>> consciousness, fear, desire, to add "I behave like ....". But if you
>> can do that successfully you will make me doubt that you are a zombie.
>> Or ... do you think a zombie could eventually find a correct theory of
>> consciousness, so that he can correctly fake consciousness, and delude
>> the humans?
>>
>
> An intelligent zombie can correctly fake consciousness, and I am an
> intelligent zombie.

A zombie is not intelligent, a zombie simply isn't. There is no
consciousness in a zombie by definition, so a zombie is not and can't
be anything.

>>>> 3) Do you have any "sort-of" feeling, insight, dreams, impression,
>>>> sensations, subjective or mental life, ... ?
>>>>
>>> I behave as if I have "sort-of" feelings, I behave as if I have
>>> insights, I behave as if I have dreams, I behave as if I have
>>> impressions, I behave as if I have sensations, I behave as if I have a
>>> subjective or mental life, ...
>>>
>> As I said. But if you know that, I mean if you can behave like if you
>> were knowing that, it would mean that such words do have some meaning
>> for you.
>>
>> How can you know that you are not conscious? Why do you behave like if
>> you are conscious, and then "confess" to us that you are not. Why
>> don't you behave like if you were not conscious. Should not a zombie
>> defend the idea that he is conscious, if he behaves like if he was
>> conscious.
>
> If you ask me if I am conscious, I will reply "yes".  But I am so
> intelligent

You're not, you are a zombie. There is no you.

> that I can look at myself from the outside,

You can't, you have no self.

> and then I
> understand why I behave like I do.
> I can see that all my behaviour is

You can't, there is no you and you can't see anything, you are a zombie.

> explained by chemical reactions in my brain, and there is no more than
> that.  So when I talk about myself on the meta level, then I can say
> that I have no consciousness.  But most people are not intelligent
> enough to realize that.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>

Regards,
Quentin

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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[Torgny Tholerus]

Quentin Anciaux skrev:

> Hi,
>
> 2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus <torgny@...>:
>  
>> I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind.  Now I accept
>> that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited.  I only deny
>> actual infinities.  The set of all natural numbers are always finite,
>> but you can always increase the set of all natural number by adding more
>> natural numbers to it.
>>    
> Then it's not the set of *all* natural numbers. You do nothing by
> adding a number... you don't create numbers by writing them down, you
> don't invent properties about them, it's absurd... especially for a
> zombie.
>  

What do you mean by *all*?  How do you define *all*?  Can you give a
definition that is not a circular definition?

--
Torgny

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 May 2009, at 17:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion of an "objective reality" when we know for a fact that all of our knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an "objective reality", at best it is infered.

Yes. Even at the deepest level. Science transforms knowledge into belief by making us aware of the hypothetical nature of our mental construction.

I would say that science is the condition of genuine faith or bets.

Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea where each monad represents a 1-PoV.

Difficult to make sense. Leibniz is a complex and variable author. I have read the Monadology and consult some expert of Leibniz, but it remains hard to figure out how it works.

A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common world of experience". 

Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of synchronization?

    The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self- modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a static consciousness.

I can agree. And you know the way I proceed. I start from elementary arithmetic, the 3-elementary ontology. If only because 99,9% of the humans agree on it, and it is already Turing universal and contains the whole universal deployment. The epistemology is given by adding some induction schema to the machine in there. It is illustrated by the going from Robinson arithmetic to Peano Arithmetic (emulated by Robinson arithmetic). It is enough to generate all "finite piece of histories", and we can get the many 1-pov by the "Theaetetical variant of the logic of provability/consistency ...

So, if you agree that all dynamics are contained in the block-arithmetical truth, consciousness is indeed related to "internal information flux", and so we can say there is no static consciousness, in that sense. But here we mix the 3-description with the 1-description, and from this we cannot conclude that we cannot have a conscious experience of static-ity or static-ness. With comp, just because it remains a lot of work, the question of traveling in many different physical directions is just open (obviously).

    Re the UD Measure problem: The idea i have is that we either have our infinity within each Monad or try to find a way to derive a measure of the infinity without reference to the only source of definiteness that we have available: our conscious experience.

If I interpret favorably what you say, this is the passage from UDA to AUDA, where I substitute "you working on UDA", by "the lobian universal machine working on UDA". 

I don't insist on this because it can be misunderstood. AUDA looks like an elimination of the need to refer to "consciousness", but AUDA without a prior understanding of UDA, would be like a confusion between theology and computer science, comp can only relate them, not identify them it would be an error, explainable in AUDA (!!!!!), to confuse them. Only God confuses them; in  sense, but a creature which confuses them is either a zombie, or a fake zombie, or a person eliminativist.

You can regain consciousness in AUDA, by "defining" consciousness by the "belief (hope, bet, faith) in a reality".  But the bet is unconscious itself, and this is partially why we are bounded, at some level, to confuse this very basic belief with a knowledge. 

Of course it is a knowledge, but only at the G* level, *we* cannot know that, once we bet there is a reality (whatever it is).

All this does not mean that you could not try an alternate theory were the 3-pov emerge from the 1-pov, but with comp, the basic ontology is very simple (numbers, addition and multiplication). And then 1-pov, or OMs, appears very sophisticated. They are given "intuitively" by all possible computations passing to a "current state", together with a topology derivable from the self-reference logic (I think you know that).

Bruno

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 6:23 PM

Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?

On 05 May 2009, at 20:13, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Bruno and Members,

 

    The comment that is made below seems to only involve a single consciousness and an exterior "reality". Could we not recover a very similar situation if we consider the 1-PoV and 3-PoV relation to hold to some degree over a multitude of consciouness (plurality). In the plurality case, the "objective doubtful but sharable possible reality" would be composed of a large intersection of sorts of 3-PoV aspects that can be recognized by or mapped to a statistical or generic notion of a 1-PoV. No?

Yes. May be. Why? You need something like that for the first person plural, but you have to extract it in some precise way for solving the UD measure problem. You could elaborate perhaps.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>>
>>>
>>>> you are human, all right?
>>>>
>>> I look exactly as a human.  When you look at me, you will not be
>>> able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I behave exacly  
>>> like a
>>> human.
>>>
>> So you believe that human are not zombie, and you agree that you are
>> not human.
>> Where do you come from? Vega? Centaur?
>>
>
> I come from Stockholm, Sweden.  I was constructed by my parents.  In
> reality I think that all humans are zombies, but because I am a polite
> person, I do not tell the other zombies that they are zombies.  I do  
> not
> want to hurt the other zombies by telling them the truth.

Truth? you mean your theory. As far as I know, you may be a zombie,  
although I believe that you are conscious and only believe you are a  
zombie.
Or you could suffer from a sort of radical blindsight, making you  
belief you lack consciousness. You should perhaps consult.
And I appreciate very much your attempt to be polite, and your  
willingness to not hurt other ... zombie.

but you should not worry, because if we are zombie, we will only fake  
being hurt, you know.

A french poet said, after he died  (!) :  "friends, pretend only to  
cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer  
mes amis puisque les poêtes font semblant de mourrir").

>
>
>>> Yes it is right.  There is no infinity of natural numbers.  But the
>>> natural numbers are UNLIMITED, you can construct as many natural
>>> numbers as you want.  But how many numbers you construct, the  
>>> number of
>>> numbers will always be finite.  You can never construct an  
>>> infinite number of
>>> natural numbers.
>>>
>> This is no more ultrafinitism. Just the usal finitism or  
>> intuitionism.
>> It seems I recall you have had a stronger view on this point.
>> Ontologically I am neutral on this question. With comp I don't need
>> any actual infinity in the third person ontology. Infinities are not
>> avoidable from inside, at least when the inside view begins some  
>> self-
>> reflexion studies.
>>
>
> I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind.

Excellent. The ability of changing its mind is a wonderful gift.



> Now I accept
> that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited.  I only deny
> actual infinities.

I can deny them ontologically, and with comp, their existence is  
absolutely undecidable. yet they are also unavoidable on the  
epistemological planes, once we search truth.




> The set of all natural numbers are always finite,

Of course, but you mean "constructed natural number". You stay at the  
1-pov. I have no problem for translating.


>
> but you can always increase the set of all natural number by adding  
> more
> natural numbers to it.

Life will be harder.

>
>
>>> An ordinary computer can never be arithmetically unsound.
>>>
>> ? (this seems to me plainly false, unless you mean "perfect" for
>> "ordinary". But computers can be as unsound as you and me.
>> There is no vaccine against soundness: all computers can be unsound
>> soo or later. there is no perfect computer. Most gods are no immune,
>> you have to postulate the big unnameable One and be very near to It,
>> to have some guaranty ... if any ...
>>
>
> OK, I misunderstood what you meant by "unsound", I thougth you meant
> something like "unlogical".  But now I see that you mean something  
> like
> "irrational".  And I sure am irrational.

By unsound I meant that you believe in some false arithmetical  
proposition. But trivially so, and by using intuitionist arithmetic,  
and modal logics, you could make your point.

>
>
>>
>>> I do not want to be tortured, I behave as if I try to avoid that as
>>> strongly as I can.  Because I behave in this way, I answer "no" to
>>> your question, because that answer will decrease the probability  
>>> of you
>>> torturing me.
>>>
>> Do you realize that to defend your point you are always in the
>> obligation, when talking about any first person notion, like
>> consciousness, fear, desire, to add "I behave like ....". But if you
>> can do that successfully you will make me doubt that you are a  
>> zombie.
>> Or ... do you think a zombie could eventually find a correct theory  
>> of
>> consciousness, so that he can correctly fake consciousness, and  
>> delude
>> the humans?
>>
>
> An intelligent zombie can correctly fake consciousness, and I am an
> intelligent zombie.

How could a zombie know that he correctly fake consciousness?

>
>
>>>> 3) Do you have any "sort-of" feeling, insight, dreams, impression,
>>>> sensations, subjective or mental life, ... ?
>>>>
>>> I behave as if I have "sort-of" feelings, I behave as if I have
>>> insights, I behave as if I have dreams, I behave as if I have
>>> impressions, I behave as if I have sensations, I behave as if I  
>>> have a
>>> subjective or mental life, ...
>>>
>> As I said. But if you know that, I mean if you can behave like if you
>> were knowing that, it would mean that such words do have some meaning
>> for you.
>>
>> How can you know that you are not conscious? Why do you behave like  
>> if
>> you are conscious, and then "confess" to us that you are not. Why
>> don't you behave like if you were not conscious. Should not a zombie
>> defend the idea that he is conscious, if he behaves like if he was
>> conscious.
>
> If you ask me if I am conscious, I will reply "yes".

Good. I mean that is what we can expect from a zombie.



>  But I am so
> intelligent that I can look at myself from the outside, and then I
> understand why I behave like I do.


No, you can't. Unless you are so near "god" that you just stop to  
behave at all. No machines can do that. No hypermachines can do. None  
angels, no nameable things. Something similar to that can be done, but  
it transforms you so much that you become another machine. You can't  
be that clever, or you have to really "go outside up to the point of  
not coming back". You are a bit flirting with authoritative arguments.





>  I can see that all my behaviour is
> explained by chemical reactions in my brain,


You have good eyes!



> and there is no more than
> that.


I cannot define what are the natural numbers, but I believe in the  
arithmetical laws, without them, those chemical reactions could not  
execute or run "myself" (assuming comp). I can believe that I am  
illusional on all matters, but then "I am". There is a fixed point  
more solid than your hallucination about brains and molecules, and  
nothing more. There is much more: pain, desire, beliefs, histories,  
will, beauty, terrors, truth, lies, persons, taxes, consciousness and  
coma, lives and abandon, hope and despair. With comp, we can bet some  
"chemistry" can *represent* those things, in a relative way. But to  
identify pain with neural firing, is like to confuse yourself with  
your identity cart number. Comp really show that you are independent  
of any choice of representation, and that "objective local"  
representations is a (infinite) construction of "your" mind,  
distributed in many comp histories.





> So when I talk about myself on the meta level, then I can say
> that I have no consciousness.  But most people are not intelligent
> enough to realize that.

All what you say, is that there is no consciousness in the third  
person description. But we know that. Now, by staying at the third  
person level, with variate and reasonable third person definition of  
first person subjectivity (consciousness, qualia, personal memories,  
diaries) we can already explain that there is one incommunicable first  
person thing on which we (machines) cannot be illusional about.

I have no proof, but I am not a zombie. You may be one, but I have  
some doubt about that, too. But with comp, for any "conscious"  
machine, you can build an equivalent local zombie capable of faking  
the machine, and this for any arbitrary finite piece of time. In the  
limit, it is expoenetially hard to do so. So, my feeling is that the  
probability that you are a zombie is as great as the probability that  
you are a white rabbit.

Consciousness is the undoubtable and incommunicable verity which makes  
the introspective honest machine able to doubt everything else and  
change its mind accordingly through new informations.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[John Mikes]

Bruno,

who was that French poet who made puns after death?

JohnM

On Sun, May 10, 2009 at 3:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>>
>>>
>>>> you are human, all right?
>>>>
>>> I look exactly as a human.  When you look at me, you will not be
>>> able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I behave exacly
>>> like a
>>> human.
>>>
>> So you believe that human are not zombie, and you agree that you are
>> not human.
>> Where do you come from? Vega? Centaur?
>>
>
> I come from Stockholm, Sweden.  I was constructed by my parents.  In
> reality I think that all humans are zombies, but because I am a polite
> person, I do not tell the other zombies that they are zombies.  I do
> not
> want to hurt the other zombies by telling them the truth.

Truth? you mean your theory. As far as I know, you may be a zombie,
although I believe that you are conscious and only believe you are a
zombie.
Or you could suffer from a sort of radical blindsight, making you
belief you lack consciousness. You should perhaps consult.
And I appreciate very much your attempt to be polite, and your
willingness to not hurt other ... zombie.

but you should not worry, because if we are zombie, we will only fake
being hurt, you know.

A french poet said, after he died  (!) :  "friends, pretend only to
cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer
mes amis puisque les poêtes font semblant de mourrir").

truncated

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Torgny,

> I come from Stockholm, Sweden.  I was constructed by my parents.  In
> reality I think that all humans are zombies, but because I am a polite
> person, I do not tell the other zombies that they are zombies.  I do  
> not
> want to hurt the other zombies by telling them the truth.


I guess you know that Sweden is the main country of Snus, that  
delicious oral tobacco product. Now, if there is one thing easy to  
imitate, for a zombie, is the discrete enjoyment of snus. But why  
would ever a zombie discretely fake for itself the pleasure of  
consuming snus. I can understand a young zombie fakes smoking  
cigarette, with the goal of faking faking being an adult, but why  
would an adult zombie ever fake, alone, at home, snusing some tobacco?

Here I use the belgo-african Makla Ifrikia, cheaper and stronger. I t  
helped me to quit smoking (tobacco). I enjoy it, and although I cannot  
prove it to you, I don't fake the enjoyment . Nobody can even see that  
pure first person pleasure. Very useful for consuming tobacco in  
public place, where it is forbidden almost everywhere nowadays.

Surely you are joking, mister zombie,

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,



On 11 May 2009, at 22:49, John Mikes wrote:

>
> who was that French poet who made puns after death?
>
>> ...
> A french poet said, after he died  (!) :  "friends, pretend only to
> cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer
> mes amis puisque les poètes font semblant de mourrir").
>
>

It is Jean Cocteau.

In "Le Testament d'Orphée". A movie, made by Jean Cocteau, where he  
plays the role of the dying poet. I am not entirely sure of the total  
correctness of the quote. It could be "Faites semblant de pleurer mes  
amis puisque les poètes ne font que semblant d'être mort".

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Torgny Tholerus]

Bruno Marchal skrev:

> On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>  
>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>    
>>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>>      
>>>> Yes it is right.  There is no infinity of natural numbers.  But the
>>>> natural numbers are UNLIMITED, you can construct as many natural
>>>> numbers as you want.  But how many numbers you construct, the  
>>>> number of
>>>> numbers will always be finite.  You can never construct an  
>>>> infinite number of
>>>> natural numbers.
>>>>        
>>> This is no more ultrafinitism. Just the usal finitism or  
>>> intuitionism.
>>> It seems I recall you have had a stronger view on this point.
>>> Ontologically I am neutral on this question. With comp I don't need
>>> any actual infinity in the third person ontology. Infinities are not
>>> avoidable from inside, at least when the inside view begins some  
>>> self-reflexion studies.
>>>      
>> I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind.
>>    
> Excellent. The ability of changing its mind is a wonderful gift.
>  

It was the Mathematical Universe that made me change my mind:

Earlier I was convinced that the number of time steps in the universe
was explicitely finite, that time goes in a circle.

But the Mathematical Universe says that all mathematically possible
universes exists.  And it is possible to construct an EXPANDING
universe, where you have a simple rule stating that the status of a
space-time point is a combination of the statuses of the neighboring
space-time points in the previous time point.  In this universe there
will never happen that the same space will be repeated at a later time,
because the space consists of more space points at the later time.  So
in that case the universe is UNLIMITED, it will never stop, but continue
for ever...

--
Torgny Tholerus

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[Stephen Paul King-2]

Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

Hi Bruno,

 

    Interleaving some comments.

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@... ; stephenk1@...

Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2009 1:51 PM

Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?

On 08 May 2009, at 17:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion of an "objective reality" when we know for a fact that all of our knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an "objective reality", at best it is infered.

Yes. Even at the deepest level. Science transforms knowledge into belief by making us aware of the hypothetical nature of our mental construction.

I would say that science is the condition of genuine faith or bets.

[spk]

 

    Falsifiable bets. ;)

Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea where each monad represents a 1-PoV.

Difficult to make sense. Leibniz is a complex and variable author. I have read the Monadology and consult some expert of Leibniz, but it remains hard to figure out how it works.

 

[spk]

 

    Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, "orderings", and not some independent substance or container.

 

A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common world of experience". 

Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of synchronization?

[spk]

 

    No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a "commn world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system. It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities.

    What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre-ordained harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality": "...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, ...., and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence." pg. 317-318

    When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different.  All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a "collective unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc.

    The notion of "synchronization" is a figure of speach, a stand in, for that is called "decoherence" in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a "bottom up" explanation.

   

 

    BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist!

 

 

 

    The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self- modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a static consciousness.

I can agree. And you know the way I proceed. I start from elementary arithmetic, the 3-elementary ontology. If only because 99,9% of the humans agree on it, and it is already Turing universal and contains the whole universal deployment. The epistemology is given by adding some induction schema to the machine in there. It is illustrated by the going from Robinson arithmetic to Peano Arithmetic (emulated by Robinson arithmetic). It is enough to generate all "finite piece of histories", and we can get the many 1-pov by the "Theaetetical variant of the logic of provability/consistency ...

So, if you agree that all dynamics are contained in the block-arithmetical truth, consciousness is indeed related to "internal information flux", and so we can say there is no static consciousness, in that sense. But here we mix the 3-description with the 1-description, and from this we cannot conclude that we cannot have a conscious experience of static-ity or static-ness. With comp, just because it remains a lot of work, the question of traveling in many different physical directions is just open (obviously).

 

[spk]

 

    But here is the problem I have, merely "agreeing" that "all dynamics are contained in the "block-arithmatic truth" will require me to neglect the computational complexity of that "Block Truth".

 

 

    I had a conversation with Julian Barbour about this, trying to get him to aknowledge his own discussion of how computational intensive his own theory was/is,  and he simply refused to see. It is the same problem that Leibniz has with his notion of a "pre-ordained harmony". The computation of all possible combinations of events needed to find the one that is "most optimal" has already be proven to be intractible. Stephen Wolfram wrote of this: "...many physical systems are computationally irreducible, so that their own evolution is effectively the most efficient procedure for determining their future."

 

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html

 

    The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a notion that is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non-static process, such as that implicit in thought, also co-exists. A What requires a To Whom. Being is the Fixed-Point of Becoming.

 

    Re the UD Measure problem: The idea i have is that we either have our infinity within each Monad or try to find a way to derive a measure of the infinity without reference to the only source of definiteness that we have available: our conscious experience.

If I interpret favorably what you say, this is the passage from UDA to AUDA, where I substitute "you working on UDA", by "the lobian universal machine working on UDA". 

I don't insist on this because it can be misunderstood. AUDA looks like an elimination of the need to refer to "consciousness", but AUDA without a prior understanding of UDA, would be like a confusion between theology and computer science, comp can only relate them, not identify them it would be an error, explainable in AUDA (!!!!!), to confuse them. Only God confuses them; in  sense, but a creature which confuses them is either a zombie, or a fake zombie, or a person eliminativist.

You can regain consciousness in AUDA, by "defining" consciousness by the "belief (hope, bet, faith) in a reality".  But the bet is unconscious itself, and this is partially why we are bounded, at some level, to confuse this very basic belief with a knowledge. 

Of course it is a knowledge, but only at the G* level, *we* cannot know that, once we bet there is a reality (whatever it is).

All this does not mean that you could not try an alternate theory were the 3-pov emerge from the 1-pov, but with comp, the basic ontology is very simple (numbers, addition and multiplication). And then 1-pov, or OMs, appears very sophisticated. They are given "intuitively" by all possible computations passing to a "current state", together with a topology derivable from the self-reference logic (I think you know that).

Bruno

[spk]

 

    The problem is that all notions such as "substitute", "misunderstood", "understanding", "emerge", etc. all require some form of non-staticness. Simple existence, "necessary possibility", is not enough. The comp model is wonderfull, but it requires an engine of implementation.

 

Onward!

 

Stephen

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[John Mikes]

Bruno,

merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble

vivant.

I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and connect to assumptions of assumptions,  Torgny the zombie, Stephen Leibnitz' Monads, you numbers, others Q-immortality/suicide and partial teleportation at the level of highest science - and she asked -

(because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - understanding):

"What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?" 

I replied: it's getting late, let's go to sleep.

 

Well??? (I believe this is the most meaningful word in English)

 

John M

 

On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

Hi John,

On 11 May 2009, at 22:49, John Mikes wrote:

>
> who was that French poet who made puns after death?
>

>> ...

> A french poet said, after he died  (!) :  "friends, pretend only to
> cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer

> mes amis puisque les poètes font semblant de mourrir").
>
>

It is Jean Cocteau.

In "Le Testament d'Orphée". A movie, made by Jean Cocteau, where he
plays the role of the dying poet. I am not entirely sure of the total
correctness of the quote. It could be "Faites semblant de pleurer mes
amis puisque les poètes ne font que semblant d'être mort".

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Jason Resch-2]

John,

Great question I am glad you asked it.  I think I was driven to this
list because of big questions, especially those which most people seem
to believe are unanswerable.  Questions such as:  Where did this
universe come from?  Why are we here and why am I me?  Is there a God?
 What is responsible for consciousness?  What is time?  Is there life
after death? Etc.  After much reading and thought I am now mostly
satisfied with the answers I have arrived at, and keeping up with this
list and the issues people raise on various topics helps me to keep
updating my models of reality to hopefully become more correct.  I
think it is good mental exercise to ponder the questions people on
this list raise, and despite all the disagreement, chains of
assumptions, and inability to test many of the conjectures I think
this list is slowly making progress toward truth.

Jason


On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 3:42 PM, John Mikes <jamikes@...> wrote:

> Bruno,
> merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
> vivant.
> I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
> plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
> connect to assumptions of assumptions,  Torgny the zombie, Stephen Leibnitz'
> Monads, you numbers, others Q-immortality/suicide and partial teleportation
> at the level of highest science - and she asked -
> (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - understanding):
> "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?"
> I replied: it's getting late, let's go to sleep.
>
> Well??? (I believe this is the most meaningful word in English)
>
> John M
>
>
> On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:
>>
>> Hi John,
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11 May 2009, at 22:49, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> >
>> > who was that French poet who made puns after death?
>> >
>> >> ...
>> > A french poet said, after he died  (!) :  "friends, pretend only to
>> > cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer
>> > mes amis puisque les poètes font semblant de mourrir").
>> >
>> >
>>
>> It is Jean Cocteau.
>>
>> In "Le Testament d'Orphée". A movie, made by Jean Cocteau, where he
>> plays the role of the dying poet. I am not entirely sure of the total
>> correctness of the quote. It could be "Faites semblant de pleurer mes
>> amis puisque les poètes ne font que semblant d'être mort".
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> >
>

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[John Mikes]

Jason, thanks for your reply.

Those BIG questions? IMO: typical "SO WHAT" ones. AND if we know?

There is one (practical?) point though: knowing some 'right(?)' answer will reduce our danger to succumb to underhanded assumptions that mostly involve pressure to do what otherwise we wouldn't do.

(Like killing the religiously 'infidel', or a gynecologist, and the like. Pay our church-tax and vote as the pastor/political leader said)

And "the truth"? whose?

we live in our 1-pov's mini-solipsism, limited to our own perceived reality plus the genetic- and experience- formed ways to interpret what we got as enrichment in the epistemic cognitive inventory and call it 'truth'.

Any further learned information is stored(?) as interpreted into our own ways. No two persons have identical knowledge, belief, or thinking.

 

John M

On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 10:17 PM, Jason Resch <jasonresch@...> wrote:

John,

Great question I am glad you asked it.  I think I was driven to this
list because of big questions, especially those which most people seem
to believe are unanswerable.  Questions such as:  Where did this
universe come from?  Why are we here and why am I me?  Is there a God?
 What is responsible for consciousness?  What is time?  Is there life
after death? Etc.  After much reading and thought I am now mostly
satisfied with the answers I have arrived at, and keeping up with this
list and the issues people raise on various topics helps me to keep
updating my models of reality to hopefully become more correct.  I
think it is good mental exercise to ponder the questions people on
this list raise, and despite all the disagreement, chains of
assumptions, and inability to test many of the conjectures I think
this list is slowly making progress toward truth.

Jason

On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 3:42 PM, John Mikes <jamikes@...> wrote:
> Bruno,
> merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
> vivant.
> I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
> plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
> connect to assumptions of assumptions,  Torgny the zombie, Stephen Leibnitz'
> Monads, you numbers, others Q-immortality/suicide and partial teleportation
> at the level of highest science - and she asked -
> (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - understanding):
> "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?"
> I replied: it's getting late, let's go to sleep.
>
> Well??? (I believe this is the most meaningful word in English)
>
> John M
>
>
> On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:
>>
>> Hi John,
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11 May 2009, at 22:49, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> >
>> > who was that French poet who made puns after death?
>> >
>> >> ...
>> > A french poet said, after he died  (!) :  "friends, pretend only to
>> > cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer
>> > mes amis puisque les poètes font semblant de mourrir").
>> >
>> >
>>
>> It is Jean Cocteau.
>>
>> In "Le Testament d'Orphée". A movie, made by Jean Cocteau, where he
>> plays the role of the dying poet. I am not entirely sure of the total
>> correctness of the quote. It could be "Faites semblant de pleurer mes
>> amis puisque les poètes ne font que semblant d'être mort".
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> >
>

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Stephen,

On 12 May 2009, at 19:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 

    Falsifiable bets. ;)

Not all. You bet the number zero makes sense, but you can hardly refute this. You bet there is a reality, but you can't falsify this. Falsifiability just accelerate the evolution of theories.

Works by John Case and its students make this a sort of law in theoretical inductive inference: in a sense the Popper falsifiability theory has been falsified :)

I agree it is a fundamental criterion of interestingness. It is not by chance that I worked on showing digital mechanism to be an experimentally refutable theory. 

 

    Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, "orderings", and not some independent substance or container.

That would be too nice to be true. Leibniz would be captured by the 3h and 5th arithmetical "hypostases". I have already tried, but I fail, and I cannot conclude.

 

A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common world of experience". 

Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of synchronization?

[spk]

 

    No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a "commn world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system.

?

It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities.

    What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre-ordained harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality": "...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, ...., and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence." pg. 317-318

    When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different.  All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a "collective unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc.

    The notion of "synchronization" is a figure of speach, a stand in, for that is called "decoherence" in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a "bottom up" explanation.

Remember that with comp we just cannot take physics for granted. It is the whole point.

   

 

    BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist!

Comp is the most finitist theory possible in which you can still give a name to the natural numbers. It is not ultrafinitist in the sense that it shows machines can speed-up relatively to each other by giving name to infinities. But the infinities are epistemological, yet fundamental (physics is also epistemological here!).

 

    But here is the problem I have, merely "agreeing" that "all dynamics are contained in the "block-arithmatic truth" will require me to neglect the computational complexity of that "Block Truth".

It is not so much a question of "agreement" than of "seeing the point". 

I don't see either why accepting that the dynamics are just emerging from some statistical relations between numbers (as treated by numbers) would in any way require you to neglect the computational complexity. On the contrary the realities are explicitly emerging from that complexity, but not ONLY from that complexity, it arises from the topologies of each "self-referencial" modalities and other mathematical constraints. Of course this makes the work technic.

 

    The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a notion that is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non-static process, such as that implicit in thought, also co-exists. A What requires a To Whom. Being is the Fixed-Point of Becoming.

To avoid confusion I would like to insist that what I call "Arithmetical Realism or Platonism" is just the very common belief that the principle of the excluded middle applies on the closed arithmetical sentences. (And I truly need only this on the Sigma_1 sentences, so it works in Intuitionist Mathematics too). 

[spk]

 

    The problem is that all notions such as "substitute", "misunderstood", "understanding", "emerge", etc. all require some form of non-staticness.

I need the Robinson Axioms of Arithmetic for the ontology.

I need the Peano Arithmetic induction axioms and/or infinitely others for the (internal and relative) epistemologies. I treat the case of the ideally self-referentially correct machines.

If you understand UDA, you can understand that, except once for the "yes doctor", I never go out of arithmetic. Indeed, that is what is made explicit in AUDA. The appearance of dynamics in the machines' discourse is given by computations, and they have purely arithmetical representations.

Simple existence, "necessary possibility", is not enough. The comp model is wonderfull, but it requires an engine of implementation.

I give it. Robinson Arithmetic is the engine of implementation. Although I could have taken any first order logical specification of any universal system. I could have taken a Diophantine equation, or a base of combinators, or the game of life of Conway. Physics emerge internally in a way not depending on the ontological basic implementation system, and in a manner enough precise so that we can compare the comp-physics and nature. Quantum physics, up to now, confirms some weird aspect of comp (symmetry, many-worlds below the substitution level, non locality, indeterminacies, non boolean logics fro yes/no experiment, etc.). 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

John,

On 12 May 2009, at 22:42, John Mikes wrote:

(because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - understanding):

"What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?" 

I think there is a difference between speculating on the truth on some theories, and trying just to make as clear as possible those theories so that we can derive some observable consequences, so that we can make a test to luckily be able to abandon an erroneous speculation/theory.

And normally UDA shows that we cannot be consistent and still speculate on primary substance and on mechanism simultaneously, like we tend to do since a long time. And AUDA shows a way to test mechanism indeed.

I don't like too much the word "speculation", because it can be used pejoratively, and people, when attributing it to you, believes that you are making some new extraordinary assumption, when, personally,  I try to show the amazing things arrive already quickly with very simple common assumption believed by almost everybody (that our bodies obeys computable laws).

Comp is a speculation, but it is far less speculative than any non-comp theory, which has to postulate actual infinities in the mind.

Of course on this list we are ambitious in the spectrum of what we want to figure out. It is fundamental research. 

But many are just modestly searching. I guess most knows that theories are just ways to put some light on some part of the unknown, so that we can continue the exploration.

What we hope? No more no less than those who have put Hubble in space. We hope to see big and beautiful things.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Stephen Paul King-2]

Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

Hi Bruno,

 

    I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your writtings and discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas that I have expressed so far, such as those in this exchange, are merely the misgivings and thoughts that I have based on my long study of philosophy, I can claim no certification nor degree. I am merely an amateur.

    I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a property that is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that is its contrary. I can not obtain free energy from any machine and I can not obtain change from any static structure. While it is true that one can agrue that the property of "saltiness" can not be found in the properties of "Clorine" nor "Sodium", this does not invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is a similarity of kind  and mere difference in degree between saltiness and chemical make up. Change and Staticness are categorically different in kind.

 

 

    This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The eliminatists, such as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense of consciousness as a mere epiphenomena or "illusion" tells us nothing about the unavoidability, modulo Salvia for example, of qualia.

   

    By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain. The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question:

 

            Where does the appearence of change obtain from primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence?

   

  Kindest regards,

 

Stephen 

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2009 11:11 AM

Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?

Hi Stephen,

On 12 May 2009, at 19:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 

    Falsifiable bets. ;)

Not all. You bet the number zero makes sense, but you can hardly refute this. You bet there is a reality, but you can't falsify this. Falsifiability just accelerate the evolution of theories.

Works by John Case and its students make this a sort of law in theoretical inductive inference: in a sense the Popper falsifiability theory has been falsified :)

I agree it is a fundamental criterion of interestingness. It is not by chance that I worked on showing digital mechanism to be an experimentally refutable theory. 

 

    Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, "orderings", and not some independent substance or container.

That would be too nice to be true. Leibniz would be captured by the 3h and 5th arithmetical "hypostases". I have already tried, but I fail, and I cannot conclude.

 

A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common world of experience". 

Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of synchronization?

[spk]

 

    No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a "commn world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system.

?

It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities.

    What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre-ordained harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality": "...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, ...., and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence." pg. 317-318

    When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different.  All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a "collective unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc.

    The notion of "synchronization" is a figure of speach, a stand in, for that is called "decoherence" in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a "bottom up" explanation.

Remember that with comp we just cannot take physics for granted. It is the whole point.

   

 

    BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist!

Comp is the most finitist theory possible in which you can still give a name to the natural numbers. It is not ultrafinitist in the sense that it shows machines can speed-up relatively to each other by giving name to infinities. But the infinities are epistemological, yet fundamental (physics is also epistemological here!).

 

    But here is the problem I have, merely "agreeing" that "all dynamics are contained in the "block-arithmatic truth" will require me to neglect the computational complexity of that "Block Truth".

It is not so much a question of "agreement" than of "seeing the point". 

I don't see either why accepting that the dynamics are just emerging from some statistical relations between numbers (as treated by numbers) would in any way require you to neglect the computational complexity. On the contrary the realities are explicitly emerging from that complexity, but not ONLY from that complexity, it arises from the topologies of each "self-referencial" modalities and other mathematical constraints. Of course this makes the work technic.

 

    The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a notion that is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non-static process, such as that implicit in thought, also co-exists. A What requires a To Whom. Being is the Fixed-Point of Becoming.

To avoid confusion I would like to insist that what I call "Arithmetical Realism or Platonism" is just the very common belief that the principle of the excluded middle applies on the closed arithmetical sentences. (And I truly need only this on the Sigma_1 sentences, so it works in Intuitionist Mathematics too). 

[spk]

 

    The problem is that all notions such as "substitute", "misunderstood", "understanding", "emerge", etc. all require some form of non-staticness.

I need the Robinson Axioms of Arithmetic for the ontology.

I need the Peano Arithmetic induction axioms and/or infinitely others for the (internal and relative) epistemologies. I treat the case of the ideally self-referentially correct machines.

If you understand UDA, you can understand that, except once for the "yes doctor", I never go out of arithmetic. Indeed, that is what is made explicit in AUDA. The appearance of dynamics in the machines' discourse is given by computations, and they have purely arithmetical representations.

Simple existence, "necessary possibility", is not enough. The comp model is wonderfull, but it requires an engine of implementation.

I give it. Robinson Arithmetic is the engine of implementation. Although I could have taken any first order logical specification of any universal system. I could have taken a Diophantine equation, or a base of combinators, or the game of life of Conway. Physics emerge internally in a way not depending on the ontological basic implementation system, and in a manner enough precise so that we can compare the comp-physics and nature. Quantum physics, up to now, confirms some weird aspect of comp (symmetry, many-worlds below the substitution level, non locality, indeterminacies, non boolean logics fro yes/no experiment, etc.). 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/5/13 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Bruno,
> merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
> vivant.
> I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
> plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
> connect to assumptions of assumptions,  Torgny the zombie, Stephen Leibnitz'
> Monads, you numbers, others Q-immortality/suicide and partial teleportation
> at the level of highest science - and she asked -
> (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - understanding):
> "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?"
> I replied: it's getting late, let's go to sleep.
>
> Well??? (I believe this is the most meaningful word in English)

Mainly it's just fun; but it's also profoundly important from a
practical point of view if, for example, other people are zombies or
we are all immortal (in a non-living-dead sort of way), no?


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[John Mikes]

Stathis,

I agree halfway with you and expected something (maybe more).

Do you mean "the others" are zombies? not ME (you, etc. 1st pers).

I take it one step further, the "fun" (I agree) includes a satisfaction that "here is a bunch of really smart guys and I can tell them something in their profession they may respond to - even if I am outside of their learned profession" - which is not so 'practical'. Mental narcissism?

*

Somebody made an 'expert' list, collecting opinions for open concepts in  a statistical evaluation of what the majority of "experts" think. Of course I objected: scientific identification is NO democratic voting matter, if 100 so called 'experts' voice an opinion I may still represent the "right" one in a single-vote different position.

 

Thanks for your input

 

John M

On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 10:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:

2009/5/13 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Bruno,
> merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
> vivant.
> I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
> plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
> connect to assumptions of assumptions,  Torgny the zombie, Stephen Leibnitz'
> Monads, you numbers, others Q-immortality/suicide and partial teleportation
> at the level of highest science - and she asked -
> (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - understanding):
> "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?"
> I replied: it's getting late, let's go to sleep.
>
> Well??? (I believe this is the most meaningful word in English)

Mainly it's just fun; but it's also profoundly important from a
practical point of view if, for example, other people are zombies or
we are all immortal (in a non-living-dead sort of way), no?


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Stephen,

On 13 May 2009, at 22:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Bruno,

 

    I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your writtings and discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas that I have expressed so far, such as those in this exchange, are merely the misgivings and thoughts that I have based on my long study of philosophy, I can claim no certification nor degree. I am merely an amateur.

You are welcome.

    I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a property that is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that is its contrary. I can not obtain free energy from any machine and I can not obtain change from any static structure. While it is true that one can agrue that the property of "saltiness" can not be found in the properties of "Clorine" nor "Sodium", this does not invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is a similarity of kind  and mere difference in degree between saltiness and chemical make up. Change and Staticness are categorically different in kind.

You are right, you cannot obtain change from staticness. I don't think I am pretending that.

 

 

    This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The eliminatists, such as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense of consciousness as a mere epiphenomena or "illusion" tells us nothing about the unavoidability, modulo Salvia for example, of qualia.

Eliminativism is dangerous. It is insulting. It is like saying "you are a zombie". Even Thorgny recognize that this is not too kind to tell to others.

   

    By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain. The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question:

 

            Where does the appearence of change obtain from primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence?

Because you can define in arithmetic, using only addition and multiplication symbols, and logic,  the notion of computation, or of pieces of computation, like you can define provability (by PA, by ZF, or by any effective theory) already in the very weak (yet Turing universal) Robinson Arithmetic.

You can entirely define in arithmetic statements of the kind "The machine x on input y has not yet stop after z steps". The notion of "time" used  here through the notion of computational steps can be deined entirely from the notion of natural numbers successor (which can be taken as primitive or defined through addition and multiplication).

If you prefer, I could tell you that in arithmetic we have a very notion of time: the natural number sequence. Then we can define in arithmetic the notion of computation, and the notion of next step for a computation made by such or such machine. And from that, we can explain how the subjective appearance of physical times and spaces occur.

UDA explains why we have to proceed that way, and AUDA explains how we can do, and actually, it has been done concretely. Of course the extraction of physics is technically demanding. I should test on new machine the quantum tautologies (and some people are trying recently to do so, we will see). Up to now quantum mechanics confirms the comp self-referential statistics.

You should keep in mind that, due to incompleteness, from the point of view of the machine, although Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dp, Bp &Dp & p, all define the same extensional provability notion (G* knows that), they differ intensionally for the machine, and, for the machine they obeys quite different logic. The incompleteness nuances forces the arithmetical reality to *appear* very differently "from inside". The Theatetical knower Bp & p, for example, gives a knowledge operator, and can be used to explain why machine can know many things, but also why they can not define knowledge, why the first person knower has really no name, etc. The logic of Bp & Dp & p gives a logic of qualia, or perceptive fields, etc.

Don't hesitate to ask question. Normally UDA is much simpler to understand than AUDA. I will reexplain the step seven to Kim, soon or later.

Bruno

Time is an illusion, but the illusion of time is not an illusion. 

It is a theorem that all self-referentially correct machines are confronted with such an illusion, and they make precise discourses about them. UDA forbids to take such arithmetical machine as mere zombie, or you have to abandon the comp hypothesis.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/5/15 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:
> Stathis,
> I agree halfway with you and expected something (maybe more).
> Do you mean "the others" are zombies? not ME (you, etc. 1st pers).

I don't think others are zombies, but it is interesting nevertheless
to consider the possibility.

> I take it one step further, the "fun" (I agree) includes a satisfaction that
> "here is a bunch of really smart guys and I can tell them something in their
> profession they may respond to - even if I am outside of their learned
> profession" - which is not so 'practical'. Mental narcissism?

Yes, on some mailing lists people try to score "points" and show how
smart they are but on this one, that doesn't seem to happen so much.

> Somebody made an 'expert' list, collecting opinions for open concepts in  a
> statistical evaluation of what the majority of "experts" think. Of course I
> objected: scientific identification is NO democratic voting matter, if 100
> so called 'experts' voice an opinion I may still represent the "right" one
> in a single-vote different position.

That's true, but scientific consensus must count for *something*. If I
have no idea about a subject it is more likely I will get the right
answer from an expert than from a random person. But of course,
experts cannot always be right, and historically many things that
scientists have believed even unanimously have turned out to be wrong.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Jesse Mazer]

Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

Hi Bruno, I meant to reply to this earlier:

---

From: marchal@...
To: everything-list@...
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Sat, 2 May 2009 14:45:13 +0200

On 30 Apr 2009, at 18:29, Jesse Mazer wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer wrote:

But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes doesn't already have a complex causal structure--the causal structure would be in the way different troughs influence each other via the pipe system he describes, noting the motion of the armature. 

>But Maudlin succeed in showing that in its particular running history,  *that* causal structure is physically inert. Or it has mysterious influence not related to the computation. 

Maudlin only showed that *if* you define "causal structure" in terms of counterfactuals, then the machinery that ensures the proper counterfactuals might be physically inert. But if you reread my post at http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@.../msg16244.html you can see that I was trying to come up with a definition of the "causal structure" of a set of events that did *not* depend on counterfactuals...look at these two paragraphs from that post, particular the first sentence of the first paragraph and the last sentence of the second paragraph:

>It seems to me that there might be ways of defining "causal structure" which don't depend on counterfactuals, though. One idea I had is that for any system which changes state in a lawlike way over time, all facts about events in the system's history can be represented as a collection of propositions, and then causal structure might be understood in terms of logical relations between propositions, given knowledge of the laws governing the system. As an example, if the system was a cellular automaton, one might have a collection of propositions like "cell 156 is colored black at time-step 36", and if you know the rules for how the cells are updated on each time-step, then knowing some subsets of propositions would allow you to deduce others (for example, if you have a set of propositions that tell you the states of all the cells surrounding cell 71 at time-step 106, in most cellular automata that would allow you to figure out the state of cell 71 at the subsequent time-step 107). If the laws of physics in our universe are deterministic than you should in principle be able to represent all facts about the state of the universe at all times as a giant (probably infinite) set of propositions as well, and given knowledge of the laws, knowing certain subsets of these propositions would allow you to deduce others.

>"Causal structure" could then be defined in terms of what logical relations hold between the propositions, given knowledge of the laws governing the system. Perhaps in one system you might find a set of four propositions A, B, C, D such that if you know the system's laws, you can see that A&B imply C, and D implies A, but no other proposition or group of propositions in this set of four are sufficient to deduce any of the others in this set. Then in another system you might find a set of four propositions X, Y, Z and W such that W&Z imply Y, and X implies W, but those are the only deductions you can make from within this set. In this case you can say these two different sets of four propositions represent instantiations of the same causal structure, since if you map W to A, Z to B, Y to C, and D to X then you can see an isomorphism in the logical relations. That's obviously a very simple causal structure involving only 4 events, but one might define much more complex causal structures and then check if there was any subset of events in a system's history that matched that structure. And the propositions could be restricted to ones concerning events that actually did occur in the system's history, with no counterfactual propositions about what would have happened if the system's initial state had been different.

For a Turing machine running a particular program the propositions might be things like "at time-step 35 the Turing machine's read/write head moved to memory cell #82" and "at time-step 35 the Turing machine had internal state S3" and "at time-step 35 memory cell #82 held the digit 1". I'm not sure whether the general rules for how the Turing machine's internal state changes from one step to the next should also be included among the propositions, my guess is you'd probably need to do so in order to ensure that different computations had different "causal structures" according to the type of definition above...so, you might have a proposition expressing a rule like "if the Turing machine is in internal state S3 and its read/write head detects the digit 1, it changes the digit in that cell to a 0 and moves 2 cells to the left, also changing its internal state to S5." Then this set of four propositions would be sufficient to deduce some other propositions about the history of this computation, like "at time-step 36 the Turing machine's read/write head moved to memory cell #80" and "at time-step 36 the Turing machine had internal state S5."

So if we define causal structure in terms of relationships between propositions concerning the history of the Turing machine in this way, then look at propositions concerning the history of the Olympia machine described by Maudlin when it was emulating that Turing machine program, it's not clear to me whether it would be possible to map propositions about the original Turing machine to propositions about Olympia in such a way that you'd be able to show their causal structures were isomorphic (I think it is clear that such a mapping would be impossible in the case of your MGA 1 though, so if we identify OMs with causal structures this would suggest that the brain which functioned via random cosmic rays correcting errors would not have the same inner experience as the brain which was functioning correctly and did not require these cosmic rays).

But either way, what is clear is that the presence or absence of inert machinery designed to guarantee the correct counterfactuals would not affect the answer, since we'd only be looking at propositions about events that actually occurred in the course of the Olympia machine's operation. If it turned out there was an isomorphism between these propositions and the propositions about the operation of the original Turing machine, then that would show Maudlin was too quick to dismiss the original Olympia machine (the one lacking the counterfactual machinery) as giving rise to phenomenal experience (even though the armature behaves in a monotonous way, the way the troughs influence each other via pipes might be enough to ensure that the causal structure associated with Olympia's operation does depend on what program is being emulated). If there wasn't such an isomorphism, then there still wouldn't be an isomorphism even with the counterfactual machinery added, so that could make it more clear why the Olympia machine was not really "instantiating" the same computation as the original Turing machine.

>Maudlin shows that you can reduce almost arbitrarily the amount of physical activity for running any computation, and keep their computational genuineness through the use of inert material. So the isomorphism you introduce vanish on the original Olympia (Pre-olympia).

>Olympia *is*  "Pre-Olympia" + Klara (the inert (for the computation PI) machinery needed for the counterfactuals) OK? Olympia run the computation PI.

But what do you mean when you say the isomorphism vanishes? Do you mean that the causal structure of pre-Olympia would *not* be isomorphic to the causal structure of the original Turing machine that pre-Olympia was supposed to imitate (according to the definition of causal structure in terms of logical relations between propositions about the system's state at different moments)? If so, that would mean that regular Olympia (pre-Olympia + Klara) wouldn't have a causal structure isomorphic to the Turing machine either, since I was defining causal structure solely in terms of propositions about events that *do* occur in the system's history, meaning the extra counterfactual conditions provided by Klara are irrelevant to Olympia's causal structure, so Olympia's causal structure would be the same as pre-Olympia's.

If that's the case, why can't we postulate that consciousness supervenes on causal structure, since causal structure is after all part of the physical world? In fact one could say that physics is *only* concerned with "causality" in the sense of lawlike relations between propositions about observations, since the laws of physics tell us nothing about what particles or fields or wavefunctions "really are", only about how they interact with one another and how they can be used to predict the outcomes measurements. So if we say consciousness supervenes on causal structure, then Olympia would not qualify as an instantiation of the observer-moments that the original Turing machine instantiated, in much the same way that a lookup table wouldn't qualify. 

I don't have a problem with the idea that a giant lookup table is just a sort of "zombie", since after all the way you'd create a lookup table for a given algorithmic mind would be to run a huge series of actual simulations of that mind with all possible inputs, creating a huge archive of "recordings" so that later if anyone supplies the lookup table with a given input, the table just looks up the recording of the occasion in which the original simulated mind was supplied with that exact input in the past, and plays it back. Why should merely replaying a recording of something that happened to a simulated observer in the past contribute to the measure of that observer-moment? I don't believe that playing a videotape of me being happy or sad in the past will increase the measure of happy or sad observer-moments involving me, after all. And Olympia seems to be somewhat similar to a lookup table in that the only way to construct "her" would be to have already run the regular Turing machine program that she is supposed to emulate, so that you know in advance the order that the Turing machine's read/write head visits different cells, and then you can rearrange the positions of those cells so Olympia will visit them in the correct order just by going from one cell to the next in line over and over again.

So: why can't the idea of consciousness supervening on causal structure be a possible strategy for avoiding the problem you talk about in step 8 of your UDA argument (if I am understanding it correctly), namely the idea that even if there was a physical universe it wouldn't be able to tell us anything about the measure of different computations? If we talk about the causal structure of a given computation, why can't we look at how frequently sets of physical events with an isomorphic causal structure occur in the physical universe, and derive a measure on physical implementations of computations in this way? Not that I personally would favor this approach to a philosophical "theory of everything", but would you say it isn't even a coherent possibility?

If you take any finite subset of true propositions (P1, P2, P3, ..., PN), then these propositions will be logically interrelated in some particular way--it might be that if you start out taking P2 and P3 as axioms you can deduce P5 from this but you can't deduce P4, for example. I imagine representing each proposition as a dot in a diagram, and then arrows would show which individual dots or collections of dots in this finite set can be used to deduce other dots in the same finite set. This diagram would define a unique "causal structure" for this set of propositions, and then if you have a set of propositions about something different from arithmetic, like the history of a particular Turing machine computation,

>The history of a particular Turing machine computation does belong to arithmetic. Already to Robinson Arithmetic. (Roughly: Peano Arithmetic without the induction axioms). You need just a Sigma_1 complete theory for the ontology. It is enough to (meta)define a richer internal epistemology justifying why, "from inside" things appear (and in some sense are) much richer. This is not obvious and technically relies on Gödel's compeleteness and incompleteness theorem, or Skolem theorem. It is long to explain, yet very short to understand, and utterly clear, if you are aware of Solovay theorem. 

Are you saying that a notion similar to my definition of "causal structure" is already made use of in the areas of mathematics you're talking about, or when you say "the history of a particular Turing machine computation" are you talking about something unrelated to my definition of the computation's causal structure?

I also wonder if anything similar to this notion of causal structure could be found in category theory, since in some layman's summaries I've read that category theory defines mathematics in a purely relational way, where any mathematical object (or proposition?) is defined entirely in its relationships to other objects.

Maybe you could even make a TOE based on the idea that all that really "exists" is this infinite set of propositions about arithmetic, and that this infinite set defines a unique measure on all finite causal structures, based on how easy it is to find multiple "instantiations" of each finite causal structure within the infinite set of true propositions. I don't suppose this has any resemblance to your approach?

>UDA is an argument that if we (human) are machine it has to be that approach.  It is the reversal physics/number theory. Physics is eventually the projection or limit of what the number can see when they look at themselves.

When you say "that approach", are you talking specifically about looking at isomorphisms between 1) logical relations among propositions about arithmetic, and 2) logical relations among propositions about the history of a Turing machine computation? Or were you saying that UDA takes an approach that is similar in some broader fashion?

since I'm suggesting some kind of absolute measure on all causal structures, and if you identify particular causal structures with OMs that would correspond to the ASSA, but you have said that your approach only uses the RSSA.

>There is no absolute measure on all "causal structures" , still less on OM, right! I would ba an ants or a bacteria in two seconds!

I guess it would depend on how the measure was defined. It might not just be in terms of the numerical frequency that a given causal structure appears in the world, but also in terms of things like how many other causal structures "remember" that causal structure in some sense (contain detailed information about it). That could perhaps give a measure which was biased towards more complex causal structures like human minds even though ants are much more common numerically.

Anyway I have no idea how you'd actually "count" the number of appearances of a given causal structure in the infinite set of propositions about arithmetic, so the idea of getting a measure on causal structures this way is very vague...

>Vague? I don't think so. Church thesis makes this purely mathematical. Difficult? Sure. That is why UDA is followed by AUDA where the case of "probability or credibility (whatever) ONE, is made entirely clear and formal. It is already proved that the physical local observations cannot be boolean, and there is already a well defined notion of quantization.

UDA is also completely clear, even if it take some time for some people to grasp some steps. It is normal given that is new and counterintuitive.

Well, I didn't mean to sugest that your ideas are vague, only that my own notions of a connection between causal structure and measure were rather ill-defined...there'd be a lot more math I'd need to learn if I wanted to seriously try to develop these ideas, or to really understand the details of your own ideas. By the way, do you have a bibliography somewhere of books you think someone could use to self-teach themselves enough math to understand the details of your AUDA argument?

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