Consciousness is information?

[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
> We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
> universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B.
> This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of
> view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the
> probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account
> *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into
> account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A
> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ
> below "your" substitution level.

So, going back to some of your other posts about "transmitting" a copy
of a person from Brussels to Moscow.  What is it that is transmitted?
Information, right?  So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
described by some set of data.

It would seem to me that their conscious state at that instant must be
recoverable from that set of data.  The only question is, what
conditions must be met for them to "experience" this state, which is
completely described by the data set?  I don't see any obvious reason
why anything additional is needed.  What does computation really add
to this?

You say that computation is crucial for this "experience" to take
place.  But why would this be so?  Why couldn't we just say that your
various types of mathematical logic can describe various types of
correlations, categories, patterns, and relationships between
informational states, but don't actually contribute anything to
conscious experience?

Conscious experience is with the information.  Not with the
computations that describe the relations between various informational
states.

> But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate
> the probability of personal access to B, you have to take
> into account  *all* computations going from A to B

I don't see how probability enters into it.  A and B are both fully
contained conscious states.  Both will be realized, because both
platonically exist as possible sets of information.  State B may have
a "memory" of State A.  State A may have an "expectation" (or
premonition) of State B.  But that is the only link between the two.
Otherwise the exist independenty.

So Brian Greene had a good passage somewhat addressing this in his
last book.  He's actually talking about the block universe idea, but
still applicable I think:

"In this way of thinking, events, regardless of when they happen from
any particular perspective, just are. They all exist. They eternally
occupy their particular point in spacetime. This is no flow. If you
were having a great time at the stroke of midnight on New Year's Eve,
1999, you still are, since that is just one immutable location in
spacetime.

The flowing sensation from one moment to the next arises from our
conscious recognition of change in our thoughts, feelings, and
perceptions. Each moment in spacetime - each time slice - is like one
of the still frames in a film. It exists whether or not some projector
light illuminates it. To the you who is in any such moment, it is the
now, it is the moment you experience at that moment. And it always
will be. Moreover, within each individual slice, your thoughts and
memories are sufficiently rich to yield a sense that time has
continuously flowed to that moment. This feeling, this sensation that
time is flowing, doesn't require previous moments - previous frames -
to be sequentially illuminated."

On your earlier post:

> The physical has to emerge from the statistical
> probability interference among all computations, going through my
> (current) states that are indiscernible from my point of view.
> Why such interference takes the form of wave interference is still a
> (technical) open problem.

In my view, I just happen to be inhabit a perceptual universe that is
fairly orderly and follows laws of cause and effect.  However, there
are other conscious observers (including other versions of me) who
inhabit perceptual universes that are much more chaotic and
nonsensical.

But everything that can be consciously experienced is experienced,
because there exists information (platonically) that describes a mind
(human, animal, or other) having that experience.

I say that because it seems to me that this information could
(theoretically) be produced by a computer simulation of such a mind,
which would presumably be conscious.  So add platonism to that, and
there you go!




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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/22 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> The question was whether information was enough, or whether something
> else is needed for consciousness.  I think that sequence is needed,
> which we experience as the passage of time.  When you speak of
> computations "going from A to B" do you suppose that this provides the
> sequence?  In other words are the states of consciousness necessarily
> computed in the same order  as they are experienced or is the order
> something intrinsic to the information in the states (i.e. like
> Stathis'es observer moments which can be shuffled into any order without
> changing the experience they instantiate).

Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this
sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A
and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into
the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise
to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right
causal connection. Right?

But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where
the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a
manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard
gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible
punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2
because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right
one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be
sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious
if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just
lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the
computation know about the psychological state of the operator?


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Kelly wrote:

> On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>  
>> We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
>> universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B.
>> This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of
>> view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the
>> probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account
>> *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into
>> account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A
>> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ
>> below "your" substitution level.
>>    
>
> So, going back to some of your other posts about "transmitting" a copy
> of a person from Brussels to Moscow.  What is it that is transmitted?
> Information, right?  So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
> described by some set of data.
>
> It would seem to me that their conscious state at that instant must be
> recoverable from that set of data.  The only question is, what
> conditions must be met for them to "experience" this state, which is
> completely described by the data set?  I don't see any obvious reason
> why anything additional is needed.  What does computation really add
> to this?
>
> You say that computation is crucial for this "experience" to take
> place.  But why would this be so?  Why couldn't we just say that your
> various types of mathematical logic can describe various types of
> correlations, categories, patterns, and relationships between
> informational states, but don't actually contribute anything to
> conscious experience?
>
> Conscious experience is with the information.  Not with the
> computations that describe the relations between various informational
> states.
>
>  
>> But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate
>> the probability of personal access to B, you have to take
>> into account  *all* computations going from A to B
>>    
>
> I don't see how probability enters into it.  A and B are both fully
> contained conscious states.  

Here you are assuming the point in question - whether the states are, by
themselves, conscious.  If they are then it would imply that a record,
written on paper or a CD, of the state information transmitted in
Bruno's thought experiment would also be conscious.  Even further, if
you identify information as a Platonic form, then it doesn't even need a
physical instantiation.  The conscious state will simply exist like the
number two exists.

> Both will be realized, because both
> platonically exist as possible sets of information.  State B may have
> a "memory" of State A.  State A may have an "expectation" (or
> premonition) of State B.  But that is the only link between the two.
> Otherwise the exist independenty.
>
> So Brian Greene had a good passage somewhat addressing this in his
> last book.  He's actually talking about the block universe idea, but
> still applicable I think:
>
> "In this way of thinking, events, regardless of when they happen from
> any particular perspective, just are. They all exist. They eternally
> occupy their particular point in spacetime. This is no flow.

But Greene is assuming a real-line topology, so a sequence of
consciousness is connected.

> If you
> were having a great time at the stroke of midnight on New Year's Eve,
> 1999, you still are, since that is just one immutable location in
> spacetime.
>
> The flowing sensation from one moment to the next arises from our
> conscious recognition of change in our thoughts, feelings, and
> perceptions. Each moment in spacetime - each time slice - is like one
> of the still frames in a film.

Again, that is part of the question.  Is the universe digital.

> It exists whether or not some projector
> light illuminates it. To the you who is in any such moment, it is the
> now, it is the moment you experience at that moment. And it always
> will be. Moreover, within each individual slice, your thoughts and
> memories are sufficiently rich to yield a sense that time has
> continuously flowed to that moment.

This is what I find dubious.  It is certainly true is a sense if an
individual slice is thick enough, but it seems to me to be false in the
limit of thin slices - and if the slice cannot be arbitrarily thin, a
"point in time", then the question remains as to what is the dimension
along which it is thick.

Brent

> This feeling, this sensation that
> time is flowing, doesn't require previous moments - previous frames -
> to be sequentially illuminated."
>
> On your earlier post:
>
>  
>> The physical has to emerge from the statistical
>> probability interference among all computations, going through my
>> (current) states that are indiscernible from my point of view.
>> Why such interference takes the form of wave interference is still a
>> (technical) open problem.
>>    
>
> In my view, I just happen to be inhabit a perceptual universe that is
> fairly orderly and follows laws of cause and effect.  However, there
> are other conscious observers (including other versions of me) who
> inhabit perceptual universes that are much more chaotic and
> nonsensical.
>
> But everything that can be consciously experienced is experienced,
> because there exists information (platonically) that describes a mind
> (human, animal, or other) having that experience.
>
> I say that because it seems to me that this information could
> (theoretically) be produced by a computer simulation of such a mind,
> which would presumably be conscious.  So add platonism to that, and
> there you go!
>
>
>
>
> >
>
>  

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/4/22 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>  
>> The question was whether information was enough, or whether something
>> else is needed for consciousness.  I think that sequence is needed,
>> which we experience as the passage of time.  When you speak of
>> computations "going from A to B" do you suppose that this provides the
>> sequence?  In other words are the states of consciousness necessarily
>> computed in the same order  as they are experienced or is the order
>> something intrinsic to the information in the states (i.e. like
>> Stathis'es observer moments which can be shuffled into any order without
>> changing the experience they instantiate).
>>    
>
> Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
> on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
> and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this
> sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A
> and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into
> the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise
> to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right
> causal connection. Right?
>  

Maybe.  But I'm questioning more than the lack of causal connection.  
I'm questioning the idea that a static thing like a state can be
conscious.  That consciousness goes through a set of states, each one
being an "instant", is an inference we make in analogy with how we would
write a program simulating a mind.  I'm saying I suspect something
essential is missing when we "digitize" it in this way.  Note that this
does not mean I'd say "No" to Burno's doctor - because the doctor is
proposing to replace part of my brain with a mechanism that instantiates
a process - not just discrete states.


Brent

> But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where
> the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a
> manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard
> gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible
> punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2
> because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right
> one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be
> sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious
> if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just
> lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the
> computation know about the psychological state of the operator?
>
>
>  

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Apr 2009, at 08:55, Kelly wrote:

>
> On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>> We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
>> universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into  
>> B.
>> This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of
>> view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the
>> probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account
>> *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into
>> account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A
>> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ
>> below "your" substitution level.
>
> So, going back to some of your other posts about "transmitting" a copy
> of a person from Brussels to Moscow.  What is it that is transmitted?
> Information, right?

OK.


> So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
> described by some set of data.

Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to make  
that person manifest herself in front of you. A bit like a CD, you  
will need a player to get the music. Now, any (immaterial, simple)  
Turing universal system will do, so I take the simplest one, the one  
that we learn at school: elementary arithmetic. (On some other planet  
they learn the combinators at school, and in the long run it could be  
better, but fundamentally it does not matter).


>
>
> It would seem to me that their conscious state at that instant must be
> recoverable from that set of data.  The only question is, what
> conditions must be met for them to "experience" this state, which is
> completely described by the data set?

But from the first person perspective I need, and elementary  
arithmetic provides, an infinity of universal histories going through  
my current states. It is not just "information", it is information  
relative to possible computations.



>  I don't see any obvious reason
> why anything additional is needed.  What does computation really add
> to this?

It adds the relative interpretation of that information. Information,  
which you identify with some bit strings is just a number, it is just  
an encoding of a person, not the person.

Consciousness is the state of mind of a person who believes in a  
reality. This makes sense only relatively to probable universal  
histories.



>
>
> You say that computation is crucial for this "experience" to take
> place.  But why would this be so?  Why couldn't we just say that your
> various types of mathematical logic can describe various types of
> correlations, categories, patterns, and relationships between
> informational states, but don't actually contribute anything to
> conscious experience?

Remember I assume the computationalist hypothesis. This means I will  
accept to be encoded in an information string, but only under the  
promise it will be decoded relatively to probable computational  
histories I can bet on, having an idea of my current first person state.

>
>
> Conscious experience is with the information.

Conscious experience is more the content, or the interpretation of  
that information, made by a person or by a universal machine.
If the doctor makes a copy of your brain, and then codes it into a bit  
string, and then put the bit string in the fridge, in our probable  
history, well in that case you will not survive, in our local probable  
history.


> Not with the
> computations that describe the relations between various informational
> states.

If you say yes to a doctor for a digital brain, you will ask for a  
brain which functions relatively to our probable computational  
history. No?

>
>
>> But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate
>> the probability of personal access to B, you have to take
>> into account  *all* computations going from A to B
>
> I don't see how probability enters into it.  A and B are both fully
> contained conscious states.  Both will be realized, because both
> platonically exist as possible sets of information.  State B may have
> a "memory" of State A.  State A may have an "expectation" (or
> premonition) of State B.  But that is the only link between the two.

The UD generates an infinity of computations going from A to B.  
Probabilities, credibilities, plausibilities, provabilities will all  
emerge unavoidably.


>
> Otherwise the exist independenty.

I don't see any sense in which the term "computational state" makes  
sense independently of a least one computation. But from inside we  
have to take care on the infinity of computation, including those with  
the "dovetailing-on-the-reals" noisy background. (From inside we  
cannot distinguish the many finite initial segment of those reals with  
the reals themselves.)

>
>
> So Brian Greene had a good passage somewhat addressing this in his
> last book.  He's actually talking about the block universe idea, but
> still applicable I think:
>
> "In this way of thinking, events, regardless of when they happen from
> any particular perspective, just are. They all exist. They eternally
> occupy their particular point in spacetime. This is no flow. If you
> were having a great time at the stroke of midnight on New Year's Eve,
> 1999, you still are, since that is just one immutable location in
> spacetime.
>
> The flowing sensation from one moment to the next arises from our
> conscious recognition of change in our thoughts, feelings, and
> perceptions. Each moment in spacetime - each time slice - is like one
> of the still frames in a film. It exists whether or not some projector
> light illuminates it. To the you who is in any such moment, it is the
> now, it is the moment you experience at that moment. And it always
> will be. Moreover, within each individual slice, your thoughts and
> memories are sufficiently rich to yield a sense that time has
> continuously flowed to that moment. This feeling, this sensation that
> time is flowing, doesn't require previous moments - previous frames -
> to be sequentially illuminated."

I totally agree with this picture. Brian Green uses a space time,  
where I use the numbers with they additive and multiplicative  
structure, and my point is that assuming comp, it has to work, and I  
show how space time and energy has to emerge from the inside view of a  
tiny fragment of arithmetic. But both in Green and with comp, the  
information or the points makes sense because they are structured, by  
space-time in Green, and by addition and multiplication in comp. A  
computation is a mathematical object in Plato Heaven, or just in a  
tiny part of the standard model of arithmetic.

>
>
> On your earlier post:
>
>> The physical has to emerge from the statistical
>> probability interference among all computations, going through my
>> (current) states that are indiscernible from my point of view.
>> Why such interference takes the form of wave interference is still a
>> (technical) open problem.
>
> In my view, I just happen to be inhabit a perceptual universe that is
> fairly orderly and follows laws of cause and effect.

You hope this! But with comp this is globally wrong, and only "locally  
apparent". "You" (3-person) are distributed densely on the border of a  
universal dovetailing. What you perceive is the mean on all possible  
"continuations". My point is that it has to be such once we assume  
comp, and that this is empirically verifiable/refutable.
I put  "continuations" in quotes, because it is not necessarily  
related with physical notion of futures. It is more logical consistent  
extensions. It could develop on physical pasts, and elsewhere.




> However, there
> are other conscious observers (including other versions of me) who
> inhabit perceptual universes that are much more chaotic and
> nonsensical.
>
> But everything that can be consciously experienced is experienced,
> because there exists information (platonically) that describes a mind
> (human, animal, or other) having that experience.

Yes there is a world in which you computer will transform itself into  
a green flying pig. The "scientific", but really everyday life  
question, is, what is the "probability" this will happen to "me" here  
and now. If the probability is 99,9 %, I will not find worth to even  
begin writing a post ....
Physics is the science of such prediction, and if comp is true, the  
correct-by-definition prediction have to take account all histories  
and to see those who have measure near 1.



>
>
> I say that because it seems to me that this information could
> (theoretically) be produced by a computer simulation of such a mind,
> which would presumably be conscious.

Yes, because the computer will generate not just the states, but it  
will related them.



> So add platonism to that, and
> there you go!

We agree here. And comp makes arithmetical platonism sufficient. It  
makes highly undecidable if there is anything more. From inside, on  
the contrary, the bigness is not even measurable or nameable. That  
follows from "simple" theoretical computer science.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Apr 2009, at 20:33, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> I understand that the UD computes all different histories so they are
> interleaved.  But each particular computation consists of an ordered  
> set
> of states.  These states can belong to more than one sequence of
> conscious experience.  But the question is whether the order of the
> states in the computation is always the same as their order in any
> sequence of conscious experience in which they appear? For example, if
> there is a computation of states A, B, and C then is that a possible
> sequence in consciousness?  In general there will be another,  
> different
> computation that computes the states in the order A, C, B, so is that
> too a possible sequence in consciousness?  Or is the experienced
> sequence in consciousness the same - determined by some intrinsic to  
> the
> states?

The experienced sequence will be the same, I think. I would even guess  
that it will correspond to the sequence in most singular low grained  
computations going through those states (if our substitution level is  
not too low...) , but things get trickier with A, B, C very close, I  
expect.
Remember that if the Mandelbrot set is creative (in the snes of Post),  
or universal (in the sense of Turing) then all your 3-states of mind  
(future, present, past, and elsewhere) are densely distributed on the  
its border. Subjective time is an internal construct, and with comp,  
physical time is probably a first person plural construct (we share  
our physical histories).

>>
>> I have still a residual doubt that a quantum computer makes sense
>> mathematically, but if that exists, then there exist a reversible
>> universal dovetailing.
>>
>>
>
> I don't understand that remark.  Universal dovetailing is a completely
> abstract mathematical construct. It exists in Platonia.  So how can  
> the
> existence of a reversible (i.e. information preserving) UD depend on
> quantum computers?

Oh? It is just that I can use the quantum UD to provide an example.  
But you are really correct, and if there is any reversible universal  
machine, then I can build a reversible universal dovetailing. I could  
use billiard ball or Wand never effacing machine. The difficulty is  
that I can executed it only from a point in an infinite past.
I have the same difficulty with "running reversibly a program  
computing all decimals of the square root of 2", or even just  
counting . When will I start? I have to consider a non well founded  
set of type ... 6 5 4 3 2 1 0.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

John,

On 21 Apr 2009, at 21:30, John Mikes wrote:

> Bruno,
> you made my day when you wrote:
> "SOMEHOW" - in:
>  "...The machine has to be "runned" or "executed" relatively to a  
> universal machine. You need the Peano or Robinson axiom to define  
> such states and sequences of states.
> You can shuffled them if you want, and somehow the UD does shuffle
> them by its dovetailing procedure, but this will not change the
> arithmetical facts that those states belong or not too such or such
> computational histories...."
> *
> First: my vocablary sais about 'axiom' the reverse of how it is  
> used, it is our artifact invented in order to facilitate the  
> application of our theories IOW: explanations for the phenomena so  
> poorly understood (if anyway). So it is MADE up for exactly the  
> purpose what we evidence by it.
>
> Second: UD "shuffles 'them' by the ominous 'somehow', (no idea: how?)

By dovetailing. I say "somehow", to say literally "in some fashion  
those who knows what the UD is can work by themselves as exercise,  
because I am lazy right now and it will make the post too much longer,  
also".



> but it has to be done for the result we invented as a 'must be'.

Absolutely. And it does it, all by himself in the realm of numbers +  
addition + multiplication.



>
> Third: the 'computational history' snapshots have to come together
> (I am not referring to the sequence, rather to the combination  
> between 'earlier' and 'later'  snapshots into a continuum from a  
> discontinuum. That marvel bugs science for at least 250 years since  
> chemical "thinking" started.
> A sequence of pictures is no history.

We agree on this. See my post to Kelly. From outside, the links are  
given by universal (or not) programs. From inside, it is linked to the  
most probable histories + interference between the undistinguishable  
one. QM without collapse confirms this, admittedly startling, view.

> *
> Then again: you wrote:
>  "...The world you are observing is a sort of mean of all those  
> computations, from your point of view. But the "running of the UD"  
> is just a picturesque way to describe an infinite set of  
> arithmetical relations..."
>
>  I am not sure about the "mean" since we are not capable of even  
> noticing 'all of them', not to evaluate the totality for a 'mean' -  
> in my not arithmetic vocabulary: a median "meaning" of them all  
> (nonsense).

By accepting Church thesis, we accept Gödel's Miracle. We can define,  
inside, the universal-outside. WE cannot compute the correct inside  
mean, but it has to be partially computable for a physical worlds to  
exists. So we can bet on reasonable approximations. The "real" comp  
physics will be unusable in practice, but will explain in theory (and  
thus prevent its elimination) the presence of subject.



> Your words may be a flowery (math that is) expression of 'viewing  
> the totality in its entirety' which is just as impossible (for us,  
> today) as to realize your 'infinite set of arithmetical relations'.  
> If I leave out the 'arithmetical' (or substitute it by my  
> meaningfulness) then we came together in 'viewing the totality' in  
> our indiviual wording-ways.
> "Relations" is the punctum salience, it is a loose enough term to  
> cover whatever is beyond our present comprehension.

No I really use "relation" in the usual math sense. For exemple a  
binary relation on N can be seen as a subset of NXN. It is just an  
association, a set of couples or triples, etc.



> When relations look differently (maybe by just our observation from  
> a different aspect?) we translate it into physical terms like  
> change, movement, reaction, process or else, not realizing that WE  
> look at it from different connotations.

You are far to quick here. But there is something like that.



> Use to that our coordinates (space and time) in the limited view we  
> can muster (I call it: "model") and we arrived at causality of the  
> conventional sciences (and common sense thinking as well).

That is what I hope for.



> Indeed it is our personal (mini)-solipsistic perceived reality of  
> OUR world
> washed into some common pattern (partially!) by comp or math or else.


The advantage of the present approach is that it presupposes only the  
"yes doctor and Church thesis", all the rest emerges from, well not  
OUR (the human) prejudices/dreams, but OUR (the universal machine)  
prejudices/dreams.



> By the maze of such covering umbrella we believe in adjusted thinking.
> *
> Please do not conclude any denial from my part against the 'somehow'  
> topics, the process-function-change manipulations (unknown, as I  
> said),
> it is only reference to my ignorance directed in my agnosticism  
> towards made-up explanations of any cultural era (and changing fast).

No problem,

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 21, 2:33 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
> These states can belong to more than one sequence of
> conscious experience.  But the question is whether the order of the
> states in the computation is always the same as their order in any
> sequence of conscious experience in which they appear? For example, if
> there is a computation of states A, B, and C then is that a possible
> sequence in consciousness?  In general there will be another, different
> computation that computes the states in the order A, C, B, so is that
> too a possible sequence in consciousness?

Hypothetical situation, assuming an objectively existing physical
universe. All of the particles in the universe kick into reverse and
start going backwards. For some reason every particle in the universe
instantaneously reverses course. And also space begins contracting
instead of expanding. Everything in the universe hits a rubberwall and
bounces back 180 degrees.

So now instead of expanding, everything is on an exact "rewind" mode,
and we're headed back to the "Big Bang".

The laws of physics work the same in both directions...if you solve
them forward in time, you can take your answers, reverse the equations
and get your starting values, right?  With the possible exception of
kaon decay, but we'll leave that aside for now.

This is what they always go on about with the "arrow of time". The
laws of physics work the same forwards and backwards in time. It's not
impossible for an egg to "unscramble", it's just very very very very
very unlikely. But if it did so, no laws of physics would be broken.
And, in fact, if you wait long enough, it will eventually happen.

Okay, so everything has reversed direction. The actual reversal
process is, of course, impossible. But after everything reverses,
everything just plays out by the normal laws of physics. Only that one
instant of reversal breaks the laws of physics.

External time is still moving forward, in the same direction as
before. We didn't reverse time. We just reversed the direction of
every particle.

So, now photons and neutrinos no longer shoot away from the sun -
instead now they shoot towards the sun, which when the photons and the
neutrinos and gamma rays hit helium atoms, the helium atoms split back
into individual hydrogen atoms, and absorb some energy in the process.
Again, no physical laws are broken, and time is moving forward.

Now, back on earth, everything is playing out in reverse as well. You
breath in carbon dioxide and absorb heat from your surroundings and
use the heat to break the carbon dioxide into carbon and oxygen. You
exhale the oxygen, and you turn the carbon into sugars, which you
eventually return to your digestive track where it's reconstituted
into food, which you regurgitate onto your fork and place it back onto
your plate.

Okay. So, still no physical laws broken. Entropy is decreasing, but
that's not impossible, just very unlikely under normal conditions.

Now. Your brain is also working backwards. But exactly backwards from
before. Every thought that you had yesterday, you will have again
tomorrow, in reverse. You will unthink it.

My question is, what would you experience in this case? What would it
be like to live in this universe where "external" time is still going
forward, but where all particles are retracing their steps precisely?

The laws of phsyics are still working exactly as before, but because
all particle trajectories were perfectly reversed, everything is
rolling back towards the big bang.

In my opinion, we wouldn't notice any difference. We would not
experience the universe moving in reverse, we would still experience
it moving forward exactly as we do now...we would still see the
universe as expanding even though it was contracting, we would still
see the sun giving off light and energy even though it was absorbing
both. In other words, we would still see a universe with increasing
entropy even though we actually would live in a universe with
decreasing entropy.

And why would that be the case? Because our mental states determine
what is the past for us and what is the future. There is no "external
arrow of time". The arrow of time is internal. The past is the past
because we remember it and because the neurons of our brains tell us
that it has already happened to us. The future is the future because
it's unknown, and because the neurons of our brains tell us that it
will happen to us soon.

If there is an external arrow of time, it is irrelevant, because as
this thought experiment shows it doesn't affect the way we perceive
time. Our internal mental state at any given instant determines what
is the future and what is the past for us.

In fact, you could run the universe forwards and backwards as many
times as you wanted like this. We would never notice anything. We
would always percieve increasing entropy. For us, time would always
move forward, never backwards.

My point being, as always, that our experience of reality is always
entirely dependent on our brain state. We can't know anything about
the universe that is not represented in the information of our brain
state at any given instant.

Forwards or backwards, it's all just particles moving around, assuming
various configurations, some of which give rise to consciousness.

Again, assuming that there actually is an external physical world.  We
could, I think, apply the same idea to running a computer simulation
of a human brain in reverse where instead of computing the next state,
we compute the previous state.


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[Brent Meeker-2]

Kelly wrote:

> On Apr 21, 2:33 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
>  
>> These states can belong to more than one sequence of
>> conscious experience.  But the question is whether the order of the
>> states in the computation is always the same as their order in any
>> sequence of conscious experience in which they appear? For example, if
>> there is a computation of states A, B, and C then is that a possible
>> sequence in consciousness?  In general there will be another, different
>> computation that computes the states in the order A, C, B, so is that
>> too a possible sequence in consciousness?
>>    
>
> Hypothetical situation, assuming an objectively existing physical
> universe. All of the particles in the universe kick into reverse and
> start going backwards. For some reason every particle in the universe
> instantaneously reverses course. And also space begins contracting
> instead of expanding. Everything in the universe hits a rubberwall and
> bounces back 180 degrees.
>
> So now instead of expanding, everything is on an exact "rewind" mode,
> and we're headed back to the "Big Bang".
>
> The laws of physics work the same in both directions...if you solve
> them forward in time, you can take your answers, reverse the equations
> and get your starting values, right?  With the possible exception of
> kaon decay, but we'll leave that aside for now.
>
> This is what they always go on about with the "arrow of time". The
> laws of physics work the same forwards and backwards in time. It's not
> impossible for an egg to "unscramble", it's just very very very very
> very unlikely. But if it did so, no laws of physics would be broken.
> And, in fact, if you wait long enough, it will eventually happen.
>
> Okay, so everything has reversed direction. The actual reversal
> process is, of course, impossible. But after everything reverses,
> everything just plays out by the normal laws of physics. Only that one
> instant of reversal breaks the laws of physics.
>
> External time is still moving forward, in the same direction as
> before. We didn't reverse time. We just reversed the direction of
> every particle.
>
> So, now photons and neutrinos no longer shoot away from the sun -
> instead now they shoot towards the sun, which when the photons and the
> neutrinos and gamma rays hit helium atoms, the helium atoms split back
> into individual hydrogen atoms, and absorb some energy in the process.
> Again, no physical laws are broken, and time is moving forward.
>
> Now, back on earth, everything is playing out in reverse as well. You
> breath in carbon dioxide and absorb heat from your surroundings and
> use the heat to break the carbon dioxide into carbon and oxygen. You
> exhale the oxygen, and you turn the carbon into sugars, which you
> eventually return to your digestive track where it's reconstituted
> into food, which you regurgitate onto your fork and place it back onto
> your plate.
>
> Okay. So, still no physical laws broken. Entropy is decreasing, but
> that's not impossible, just very unlikely under normal conditions.
>
> Now. Your brain is also working backwards. But exactly backwards from
> before. Every thought that you had yesterday, you will have again
> tomorrow, in reverse. You will unthink it.
>
> My question is, what would you experience in this case? What would it
> be like to live in this universe where "external" time is still going
> forward, but where all particles are retracing their steps precisely?
>
> The laws of phsyics are still working exactly as before, but because
> all particle trajectories were perfectly reversed, everything is
> rolling back towards the big bang.
>
> In my opinion, we wouldn't notice any difference. We would not
> experience the universe moving in reverse, we would still experience
> it moving forward exactly as we do now...we would still see the
> universe as expanding even though it was contracting, we would still
> see the sun giving off light and energy even though it was absorbing
> both. In other words, we would still see a universe with increasing
> entropy even though we actually would live in a universe with
> decreasing entropy.
>
> And why would that be the case? Because our mental states determine
> what is the past for us and what is the future. There is no "external
> arrow of time". The arrow of time is internal. The past is the past
> because we remember it and because the neurons of our brains tell us
> that it has already happened to us. The future is the future because
> it's unknown, and because the neurons of our brains tell us that it
> will happen to us soon.
>
> If there is an external arrow of time, it is irrelevant, because as
> this thought experiment shows it doesn't affect the way we perceive
> time. Our internal mental state at any given instant determines what
> is the future and what is the past for us.
>  

I was with you up to that last sentence.  Forward or backward, we just
experience increasing entropy as increasing time, but that doesn't
warrant the conclusion that no process is required and an "instant"
within itself has an arrow of time.

> In fact, you could run the universe forwards and backwards as many
> times as you wanted like this. We would never notice anything. We
> would always percieve increasing entropy. For us, time would always
> move forward, never backwards.
>
> My point being, as always, that our experience of reality is always
> entirely dependent on our brain state. We can't know anything about
> the universe that is not represented in the information of our brain
> state at any given instant.
>
> Forwards or backwards, it's all just particles moving around, assuming
> various configurations, some of which give rise to consciousness.
>
> Again, assuming that there actually is an external physical world.  We
> could, I think, apply the same idea to running a computer simulation
> of a human brain in reverse where instead of computing the next state,
> we compute the previous state.

That was my point in asking Bruno whether there is a universal
reversible computer (Turing machines obviously aren't reversible).  
Since a QM (without collapse) model of the universe is reversible,
absent a reversible computer either the universe could not be computed
or QM is wrong.

Brent

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[Jason Resch-2]

On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 1:55 AM, Kelly <harmonk00@...> wrote:

>
> On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>> We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
>> universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B.
>> This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of
>> view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the
>> probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account
>> *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into
>> account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A
>> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ
>> below "your" substitution level.
>
> So, going back to some of your other posts about "transmitting" a copy
> of a person from Brussels to Moscow.  What is it that is transmitted?
> Information, right?  So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
> described by some set of data.
>
> It would seem to me that their conscious state at that instant must be
> recoverable from that set of data.  The only question is, what
> conditions must be met for them to "experience" this state, which is
> completely described by the data set?  I don't see any obvious reason
> why anything additional is needed.  What does computation really add
> to this?
>

I think I agree with this, that consciousness is created by the
information associated with a brain state, however I think two things
are missing:

The first is that I don't think there is enough information within a
single Plank time or other snapshot of the brain to constitute
consciousness.  As you mention below, under the view of block time,
the brain, and all other things are four-dimensional objects.
Therefore the total information composing a moment of conscious may be
spread across some non-zero segment of time.

The second problem is immediately related to the first.  Lets assume
that there is consciousness within a 10 second time period, so we make
a recording of someone's brain states across 10 seconds and store it
in some suitable binary file.  The question is:  Are there any logical
connections between successive states when stored in this file?  I
would think not.

When the brain state is embedded in block time, the laws of physics
serve as a suitable interpreter which connect the information spread
out over four-dimensions, but without computer software running the
stored brain state, there is no interpreter for the information when
it is just sitting on the disk.  I think this is the reason some of us
feel a need to have information computed as opposed to it simply
existing.

Jason

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/23 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

>> Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
>> on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
>> and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this
>> sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A
>> and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into
>> the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise
>> to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right
>> causal connection. Right?
>>
>
> Maybe.  But I'm questioning more than the lack of causal connection.
> I'm questioning the idea that a static thing like a state can be
> conscious.  That consciousness goes through a set of states, each one
> being an "instant", is an inference we make in analogy with how we would
> write a program simulating a mind.  I'm saying I suspect something
> essential is missing when we "digitize" it in this way.  Note that this
> does not mean I'd say "No" to Burno's doctor - because the doctor is
> proposing to replace part of my brain with a mechanism that instantiates
> a process - not just discrete states.
>
>
> Brent

What is needed for the series of states to qualify as a process? I
assume that a causal connection between the states, as in my example
above, would be enough, since it is what happens in normal brains and
computers. But what would you say about the examples I give below,
where the causal connection is disrupted in various ways: is there a
process or is there just an unfeeling sequence of states?

>> But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where
>> the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a
>> manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard
>> gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible
>> punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2
>> because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right
>> one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be
>> sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious
>> if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just
>> lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the
>> computation know about the psychological state of the operator?

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Apr 2009, at 20:41, Jason Resch wrote:

>
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 1:55 AM, Kelly <harmonk00@...> wrote:
>>
>> On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>>> We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
>>> universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A  
>>> into B.
>>> This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point  
>>> of
>>> view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate  
>>> the
>>> probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account
>>> *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into
>>> account the infinitely many universal number relations  
>>> transforming A
>>> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ
>>> below "your" substitution level.
>>
>> So, going back to some of your other posts about "transmitting" a  
>> copy
>> of a person from Brussels to Moscow.  What is it that is transmitted?
>> Information, right?  So for that to be a plausible scenario we have  
>> to
>> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
>> described by some set of data.
>>
>> It would seem to me that their conscious state at that instant must  
>> be
>> recoverable from that set of data.  The only question is, what
>> conditions must be met for them to "experience" this state, which is
>> completely described by the data set?  I don't see any obvious reason
>> why anything additional is needed.  What does computation really add
>> to this?
>>
>
> I think I agree with this, that consciousness is created by the
> information associated with a brain state, however I think two things
> are missing:
>
> The first is that I don't think there is enough information within a
> single Plank time or other snapshot of the brain to constitute
> consciousness.  As you mention below, under the view of block time,
> the brain, and all other things are four-dimensional objects.
> Therefore the total information composing a moment of conscious may be
> spread across some non-zero segment of time.
>
> The second problem is immediately related to the first.  Lets assume
> that there is consciousness within a 10 second time period, so we make
> a recording of someone's brain states across 10 seconds and store it
> in some suitable binary file.  The question is:  Are there any logical
> connections between successive states when stored in this file?  I
> would think not.
>
> When the brain state is embedded in block time, the laws of physics
> serve as a suitable interpreter which connect the information spread
> out over four-dimensions, but without computer software running the
> stored brain state, there is no interpreter for the information when
> it is just sitting on the disk.  I think this is the reason some of us
> feel a need to have information computed as opposed to it simply
> existing.

I mainly agree. I add that once we assume comp the laws of physics  
themselves are emerging on information processing. That such an  
information processing is purely arithmetico-logical, or combinator-
logical. No need for substances. Consciousness, time, energy and space  
are internal constructs.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/4/23 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>>> Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
>>> on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
>>> and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this
>>> sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A
>>> and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into
>>> the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise
>>> to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right
>>> causal connection. Right?
>>>
>> Maybe.  But I'm questioning more than the lack of causal connection.
>> I'm questioning the idea that a static thing like a state can be
>> conscious.  That consciousness goes through a set of states, each one
>> being an "instant", is an inference we make in analogy with how we would
>> write a program simulating a mind.  I'm saying I suspect something
>> essential is missing when we "digitize" it in this way.  Note that this
>> does not mean I'd say "No" to Burno's doctor - because the doctor is
>> proposing to replace part of my brain with a mechanism that instantiates
>> a process - not just discrete states.
>>
>>
>> Brent
>
> What is needed for the series of states to qualify as a process?

I think that the states, by themselves, cannot qualify.  The has to be something
else, a rule of inference, a causal connection, that joins them into a process.

> I
> assume that a causal connection between the states, as in my example
> above, would be enough, since it is what happens in normal brains and
> computers.

Yes, I certainly agree that it would be sufficient.  But it may be more than is
necessary.  The idea of physical causality isn't that well defined and it hardly
even shows up in fundamental physics except to mean no-action-at-a-distance.

> But what would you say about the examples I give below,
> where the causal connection is disrupted in various ways: is there a
> process or is there just an unfeeling sequence of states?
>
>>> But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where
>>> the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a
>>> manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard
>>> gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible
>>> punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2
>>> because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right
>>> one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be
>>> sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious
>>> if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just
>>> lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the
>>> computation know about the psychological state of the operator?

So you are contemplating a process that consists of a sequence of states and a
rule that connects them thus constituting a process: punch cards (states) and a
machine which physically implements some rule producing a new punch card (state)
from a previous one.  And then you ask whether it is still a process if, instead
of the rule producing the next state it is produced in some other way.  I'd say
so long as the rule is followed (the operator loads the right card knowingly)
it's the same process.  Otherwise it is not the same process (the operator
selects the right card by chance or by a different rule).  If the process is a
conscious one, is the latter still conscious?  I'd say that it is.  If the
selection is by chance it's an instance of a Boltzmann brain.  But I don't worry
about Boltzmann brains; they're to improbable.

Brent

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/4/23 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>>
>>>> Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
>>>> on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
>>>> and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this
>>>> sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A
>>>> and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into
>>>> the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise
>>>> to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right
>>>> causal connection. Right?
>>>>
>>> Maybe.  But I'm questioning more than the lack of causal connection.
>>> I'm questioning the idea that a static thing like a state can be
>>> conscious.  That consciousness goes through a set of states, each one
>>> being an "instant", is an inference we make in analogy with how we would
>>> write a program simulating a mind.  I'm saying I suspect something
>>> essential is missing when we "digitize" it in this way.  Note that this
>>> does not mean I'd say "No" to Burno's doctor - because the doctor is
>>> proposing to replace part of my brain with a mechanism that instantiates
>>> a process - not just discrete states.
>>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>
>> What is needed for the series of states to qualify as a process?
>
> I think that the states, by themselves, cannot qualify.  The has to be something
> else, a rule of inference, a causal connection, that joins them into a process.
>
>> I
>> assume that a causal connection between the states, as in my example
>> above, would be enough, since it is what happens in normal brains and
>> computers.
>
> Yes, I certainly agree that it would be sufficient.  But it may be more than is
> necessary.  The idea of physical causality isn't that well defined and it hardly
> even shows up in fundamental physics except to mean no-action-at-a-distance.
>
>> But what would you say about the examples I give below,
>> where the causal connection is disrupted in various ways: is there a
>> process or is there just an unfeeling sequence of states?
>>
>>>> But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where
>>>> the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a
>>>> manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard
>>>> gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible
>>>> punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2
>>>> because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right
>>>> one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be
>>>> sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious
>>>> if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just
>>>> lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the
>>>> computation know about the psychological state of the operator?
>
> So you are contemplating a process that consists of a sequence of states and a
> rule that connects them thus constituting a process: punch cards (states) and a
> machine which physically implements some rule producing a new punch card (state)
> from a previous one.  And then you ask whether it is still a process if, instead
> of the rule producing the next state it is produced in some other way.  I'd say
> so long as the rule is followed (the operator loads the right card knowingly)
> it's the same process.  Otherwise it is not the same process (the operator
> selects the right card by chance or by a different rule).  If the process is a
> conscious one, is the latter still conscious?  I'd say that it is.  If the
> selection is by chance it's an instance of a Boltzmann brain.  But I don't worry
> about Boltzmann brains; they're to improbable.

Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is
not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a
conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up
forgetting or almost forgetting which is the right one. That is, his
certainty of picking the right card could vary between 0.5 and 1.
Would you say that only if his certainty is 1 would the conscious
process be implemented, and not if it is, say, 0.9?


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/4/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>  
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>    
>>> 2009/4/23 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>>>
>>>      
>>>>> Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
>>>>> on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
>>>>> and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this
>>>>> sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A
>>>>> and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into
>>>>> the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise
>>>>> to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right
>>>>> causal connection. Right?
>>>>>
>>>>>          
>>>> Maybe.  But I'm questioning more than the lack of causal connection.
>>>> I'm questioning the idea that a static thing like a state can be
>>>> conscious.  That consciousness goes through a set of states, each one
>>>> being an "instant", is an inference we make in analogy with how we would
>>>> write a program simulating a mind.  I'm saying I suspect something
>>>> essential is missing when we "digitize" it in this way.  Note that this
>>>> does not mean I'd say "No" to Burno's doctor - because the doctor is
>>>> proposing to replace part of my brain with a mechanism that instantiates
>>>> a process - not just discrete states.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>        
>>> What is needed for the series of states to qualify as a process?
>>>      
>> I think that the states, by themselves, cannot qualify.  The has to be something
>> else, a rule of inference, a causal connection, that joins them into a process.
>>
>>    
>>> I
>>> assume that a causal connection between the states, as in my example
>>> above, would be enough, since it is what happens in normal brains and
>>> computers.
>>>      
>> Yes, I certainly agree that it would be sufficient.  But it may be more than is
>> necessary.  The idea of physical causality isn't that well defined and it hardly
>> even shows up in fundamental physics except to mean no-action-at-a-distance.
>>
>>    
>>> But what would you say about the examples I give below,
>>> where the causal connection is disrupted in various ways: is there a
>>> process or is there just an unfeeling sequence of states?
>>>
>>>      
>>>>> But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where
>>>>> the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a
>>>>> manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard
>>>>> gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible
>>>>> punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2
>>>>> because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right
>>>>> one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be
>>>>> sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious
>>>>> if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just
>>>>> lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the
>>>>> computation know about the psychological state of the operator?
>>>>>          
>> So you are contemplating a process that consists of a sequence of states and a
>> rule that connects them thus constituting a process: punch cards (states) and a
>> machine which physically implements some rule producing a new punch card (state)
>> from a previous one.  And then you ask whether it is still a process if, instead
>> of the rule producing the next state it is produced in some other way.  I'd say
>> so long as the rule is followed (the operator loads the right card knowingly)
>> it's the same process.  Otherwise it is not the same process (the operator
>> selects the right card by chance or by a different rule).  If the process is a
>> conscious one, is the latter still conscious?  I'd say that it is.  If the
>> selection is by chance it's an instance of a Boltzmann brain.  But I don't worry
>> about Boltzmann brains; they're to improbable.
>>    
>
> Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is
> not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a
> conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up
> forgetting or almost forgetting which is the right one. That is, his
> certainty of picking the right card could vary between 0.5 and 1.
> Would you say that only if his certainty is 1 would the conscious
> process be implemented, and not if it is, say, 0.9?
>
>  

I said it would be implementing *the same* consciousness if he was
following the rule.  If not he might be implementing a different
consciousness by using a different rule.  Of course if it were different
in only one "moment" that wouldn't really be much of a difference.  I
don't think it depends on his certainty.  Even more difficult we might
ask what it means for him to follow the rule - must he do it
*consciously*; in which case do we have to know whether his brain is
functioning according to the same rule?

You're asking a lot of questions, Stathis.  :-)  What do you think?

Brent

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[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 22, 2:02 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
> I was with you up to that last sentence.  Forward or backward, we just
> experience increasing entropy as increasing time, but that doesn't
> warrant the conclusion that no process is required and an "instant"
> within itself has an arrow of time.

It seems to me that each instant DOES contain within itself an arrow
of time, in the form of memories.  Later instances are related to
earlier instances by virtue of having memory-information about those
earlier instances.  That's what ties the various "states" together.
The nature of the computations that might transition you from instant
to instant are not relevant.

What matters is where you end up, not how you got there. If a
transition causes you to assume a state that contains no information
about earlier events (i.e., no memory of these events), then you have
lost a crucial part of what makes you who "you" are.

If you save your brain state at time A and then you save state again
at a subsequent time B, there is a relationship and an objectively
measureable degree of correlation between the information contained in
the two saved data sets.

It is, I think, the degree of correlation between states that provides
the illusion of a "flow" of consciousness.  This has nothing to do
with the type of computation that could be used to "transition"
between the two data sets.

Again, it seems to me that the arithmetic logic that Bruno refers to
just serves to "describe" the relations between datasets.  It doesn't
"produce" consciousness.

If there are many "algorithms" that could be used to transition from
state A to state B, it seems to me that all of them would produce the
same conscious experience.  If you end up at "state B", then it
doesn't matter how you go there...your "memory" of the experience will
be identical regardless of what path you took.

And since all states (not just A and B) exist platonically, then every
possible "process" can be "inferred" to connect them in every possible
way.  But I don't think this means that the processes are the source
of consciousness.  They are just descriptions of the ways that states
could be connected.


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[Brent Meeker-2]

Kelly wrote:

> On Apr 22, 2:02 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
>  
>> I was with you up to that last sentence.  Forward or backward, we just
>> experience increasing entropy as increasing time, but that doesn't
>> warrant the conclusion that no process is required and an "instant"
>> within itself has an arrow of time.
>>    
>
> It seems to me that each instant DOES contain within itself an arrow
> of time, in the form of memories.  Later instances are related to
> earlier instances by virtue of having memory-information about those
> earlier instances.  That's what ties the various "states" together.
> The nature of the computations that might transition you from instant
> to instant are not relevant.
>
> What matters is where you end up, not how you got there. If a
> transition causes you to assume a state that contains no information
> about earlier events (i.e., no memory of these events), then you have
> lost a crucial part of what makes you who "you" are.
>
> If you save your brain state at time A and then you save state again
> at a subsequent time B, there is a relationship and an objectively
> measureable degree of correlation between the information contained in
> the two saved data sets.
>
> It is, I think, the degree of correlation between states that provides
> the illusion of a "flow" of consciousness.  This has nothing to do
> with the type of computation that could be used to "transition"
> between the two data sets.
>  

If by "state" you meant something like the state of one's brain or
perhaps including some local chunk of the universe, I'd agree with you.  
But in general an "instant" of *consciousness* does not include any
memory.  My conscious stream of thought only occasionally brings up
unique memories that one could trace back to my earlier thoughts.  In
fact most of my thinking, in the sense of information processing, is
subconscious.  I suppose one could expand the definition of "experience"
to include unconscious experience, although it's hard to say what that
would mean without assuming a physical reality to instantiate it.

> Again, it seems to me that the arithmetic logic that Bruno refers to
> just serves to "describe" the relations between datasets.  It doesn't
> "produce" consciousness.
>
> If there are many "algorithms" that could be used to transition from
> state A to state B, it seems to me that all of them would produce the
> same conscious experience.  If you end up at "state B", then it
> doesn't matter how you go there...your "memory" of the experience will
> be identical regardless of what path you took.
>
> And since all states (not just A and B) exist platonically, then every
> possible "process" can be "inferred" to connect them in every possible
> way.  But I don't think this means that the processes are the source
> of consciousness.  They are just descriptions of the ways that states
> could be connected.

And I assume (and I believe Bruno agreed) that all possible processes,
i.e. computations, also exist Platonically.  This seems to me to
introduce a continuum topology on states.  Between every two states
there are countably many other states.

Brent

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[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 22, 12:24 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>> So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
>> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
>> described by some set of data.
>
> Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to make
> that person manifest herself in front of you. A bit like a CD, you
> will need a player to get the music.

It seems to me that consciousness is the self-interpretion of
information.  David Chalmers has a good line:  "Experience is
information from the inside; physics is information from the outside."

I still don't see what an interpreter adds, except to satisfy the
intuition that something is "happening" that "produces"
consciousness.  Which I think is an attempt to reintroduce "time".

But I don't see any advantage of this view over the idea that
conscious states just "exist" as a type of platonic form (as Brent
mentioned earlier).  At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
conscious of SOMETHING.  And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my
mental state at that instant.  In the materialist view, my mental
state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that
instant.

But I say that what this really means is that my mental state is just
the information represented by the particles of my brain at that
instant.  And that if you transfer that information to a computer and
run a simulation that updates that information appropriately, my
consciousness will continue in that computer simulation, regardless of
the hardware (digital computer, mechanical computer, massively
parallel or single processor, etc) or algorithmic details of that
computer simulation.

But, what is information?  I think it has nothing to do with physical
storage or instantiation.  I think it has an existence seperate from
that.  A platonic existence.  And since the information that
represents my brain exists platonically, then the information for
every possible brain (including variations of my brain) should also
exist platonically.


>> Conscious experience is with the information.
>
> Conscious experience is more the content, or the interpretation of
> that information, made by a person or by a universal machine.
> If the doctor makes a copy of your brain, and then codes it into a bit
> string, and then put the bit string in the fridge, in our probable
> history, well in that case you will not survive, in our local probable
> history.

Given the platonic nature of information, this isn't really a
concern.  In Platonia, you always have a "next moment".  In fact, you
experience all possible "next moments".  The "no cul-de-sac" rule
applies I think.


> If you say yes to a doctor for a digital brain, you will ask for a
> brain which functions relatively to our probable computational
> history. No?

I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my
perceptions of a doctor.  Every possible outcome of the "brain
replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive.
Including outcomes that don't make any sense.

Additionally, every possible outcome of the operation that the doctor
can percieve, he will perceive.  Including outcomes that don't make
any sense.

So it seems to me that a lot of your effort goes into explaining why
we don't see strange "white rabbit" universes.  Thus the talk of
probabilities and measures.  I'm willing to just say that all
universes are experienced.  Strange ones, normal ones, good ones, bad
ones, ones with unbreakable physical laws, ones with no obvious
physical laws at all.  It's all a matter of perception, not a matter
of physical realization.


> Yes there is a world in which you computer will transform itself into
> a green flying pig. The "scientific", but really everyday life
> question, is, what is the "probability" this will happen to "me" here
> and now.

I'm not sure what it means to ask, "what is the probability that my
computer will turn into a green pig".  One of me will observe
everything that can be observed in the next instant.  How many things
is that?  I'm not sure.  More than 10...ha!  Setting aside physical
limits, maybe infinitely many?  Given that I might also get extra
sensory capacity in that instant, or extra cognitive capacity, or
whatever.

So, of course all of that sounds somewhat crazy, but that's where you
end up when you try to explain consciousness I think.  Any explanation
that doesn't involve eliminativism is going to be strange I think.

But, if you are willing to say that consciousness is an illusion, then
you can just stick with materialism/physicalism and you're fine.  In
that case there's no need to invoke any of this more esoteric stuff
like platonism.  Right?

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Kelly wrote:

> On Apr 22, 12:24 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>  
>>> So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
>>> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
>>> described by some set of data.
>>>      
>> Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to make
>> that person manifest herself in front of you. A bit like a CD, you
>> will need a player to get the music.
>>    
>
> It seems to me that consciousness is the self-interpretion of
> information.  David Chalmers has a good line:  "Experience is
> information from the inside; physics is information from the outside."
>
> I still don't see what an interpreter adds, except to satisfy the
> intuition that something is "happening" that "produces"
> consciousness.  Which I think is an attempt to reintroduce "time".
>
> But I don't see any advantage of this view over the idea that
> conscious states just "exist" as a type of platonic form (as Brent
> mentioned earlier).  At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
> conscious of SOMETHING.  And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my
> mental state at that instant.  In the materialist view, my mental
> state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that
> instant.
>
>  

I think we need some definition of "state".  Supposing your brain were a
Newtonian system the state would be the position and velocity of all the
particles.  Physically this leads to the next state by the Newtonian
dynamics.  But those dynamics operate in a continuum.  If we discretize
your brain, say slice it into Planck units of time as Jason suggested,
now we need to have something to connect one state to another.  The
states are no longer part of a continuum.  In a computer "running" your
brain this is provided by the hardware of the computer.  In Bruno's
theory it is provided by a relation in Platonia, i.e. a computational rule.

In idealism, the content of a state consciousness (a Planck slice, not
of a brain, but of a stream of consciousness) seems to me to be very
small and it doesn't so far as I can see have anything analogous to
dynamical equations to connect it to another state.  You say it is
connected by the correlation of information content, but is that
unique?  Is there a best or most probable next state or what?

Brent

> But I say that what this really means is that my mental state is just
> the information represented by the particles of my brain at that
> instant.  And that if you transfer that information to a computer and
> run a simulation that updates that information appropriately, my
> consciousness will continue in that computer simulation, regardless of
> the hardware (digital computer, mechanical computer, massively
> parallel or single processor, etc) or algorithmic details of that
> computer simulation.
>
> But, what is information?  I think it has nothing to do with physical
> storage or instantiation.  I think it has an existence seperate from
> that.  A platonic existence.  And since the information that
> represents my brain exists platonically, then the information for
> every possible brain (including variations of my brain) should also
> exist platonically.
>
>
>  
>>> Conscious experience is with the information.
>>>      
>> Conscious experience is more the content, or the interpretation of
>> that information, made by a person or by a universal machine.
>> If the doctor makes a copy of your brain, and then codes it into a bit
>> string, and then put the bit string in the fridge, in our probable
>> history, well in that case you will not survive, in our local probable
>> history.
>>    
>
> Given the platonic nature of information, this isn't really a
> concern.  In Platonia, you always have a "next moment".  In fact, you
> experience all possible "next moments".  The "no cul-de-sac" rule
> applies I think.
>
>
>  
>> If you say yes to a doctor for a digital brain, you will ask for a
>> brain which functions relatively to our probable computational
>> history. No?
>>    
>
> I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my
> perceptions of a doctor.  Every possible outcome of the "brain
> replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive.
> Including outcomes that don't make any sense.
>
> Additionally, every possible outcome of the operation that the doctor
> can percieve, he will perceive.  Including outcomes that don't make
> any sense.
>
> So it seems to me that a lot of your effort goes into explaining why
> we don't see strange "white rabbit" universes.  Thus the talk of
> probabilities and measures.  I'm willing to just say that all
> universes are experienced.  Strange ones, normal ones, good ones, bad
> ones, ones with unbreakable physical laws, ones with no obvious
> physical laws at all.  It's all a matter of perception, not a matter
> of physical realization.
>
>
>  
>> Yes there is a world in which you computer will transform itself into
>> a green flying pig. The "scientific", but really everyday life
>> question, is, what is the "probability" this will happen to "me" here
>> and now.
>>    
>
> I'm not sure what it means to ask, "what is the probability that my
> computer will turn into a green pig".  One of me will observe
> everything that can be observed in the next instant.  How many things
> is that?  I'm not sure.  More than 10...ha!  Setting aside physical
> limits, maybe infinitely many?  Given that I might also get extra
> sensory capacity in that instant, or extra cognitive capacity, or
> whatever.
>
> So, of course all of that sounds somewhat crazy, but that's where you
> end up when you try to explain consciousness I think.  Any explanation
> that doesn't involve eliminativism is going to be strange I think.
>
> But, if you are willing to say that consciousness is an illusion, then
> you can just stick with materialism/physicalism and you're fine.  In
> that case there's no need to invoke any of this more esoteric stuff
> like platonism.  Right?
>
> >
>
>  

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[Jason Resch-2]

Kelly,

Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
in my mind about computationalism.  I have actually been in somewhat
of a state of confusion since Bruno's movie graph argument coupled
with a paper by Max Tegmark.  In Tegmark's paper, he was explaining
that there is an appeal to many people of associating the time
dimension with the computational clock, but argued there is no reason
to do so, time is just another dimension after all, and everything
being an atemporal platonic/mathematical object any perception of
change is illusory.  Later, when Bruno explained his movie graph
argument, it came to the point where we were asked: Is a recording of
Alice's brain activity itself conscious?  I first thought obviously
no, but then realized the contradiction with space-time.  Could the
block-time view of the universe not be considered a recording?
Perhaps the difference between a recording (like Tape or CD) and the
universe (or a computer program/simulation) is that with a physical
recording it is possible to alter a state at one point in time without
affecting future/past states.  Or maybe consciousness is only created
from platonic objects / information or relationships that exist within
them.  The appeal of computationalism for me is that it creates a
self-interpreting structure, the information or state has meaning only
because it is part a state machine.  We, being creatures who can only
experience through time might be fooled into thinking change over time
is necessary for consciousness, but what if we could make a computer
that computed over the X-dimension instead of T, what would such a
computer look like and how would it be logically different from a
recording (which is static over T), and how is it logically different
from a computer that computes accross the T dimension?

I very much look forward to reading your and others' opinions on this.

Jason

On Thu, Apr 23, 2009 at 11:14 PM, Kelly <harmonk00@...> wrote:

>
> On Apr 22, 12:24 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>>> So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
>>> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
>>> described by some set of data.
>>
>> Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to make
>> that person manifest herself in front of you. A bit like a CD, you
>> will need a player to get the music.
>
> It seems to me that consciousness is the self-interpretion of
> information.  David Chalmers has a good line:  "Experience is
> information from the inside; physics is information from the outside."
>
> I still don't see what an interpreter adds, except to satisfy the
> intuition that something is "happening" that "produces"
> consciousness.  Which I think is an attempt to reintroduce "time".
>
> But I don't see any advantage of this view over the idea that
> conscious states just "exist" as a type of platonic form (as Brent
> mentioned earlier).  At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
> conscious of SOMETHING.  And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my
> mental state at that instant.  In the materialist view, my mental
> state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that
> instant.
>
> But I say that what this really means is that my mental state is just
> the information represented by the particles of my brain at that
> instant.  And that if you transfer that information to a computer and
> run a simulation that updates that information appropriately, my
> consciousness will continue in that computer simulation, regardless of
> the hardware (digital computer, mechanical computer, massively
> parallel or single processor, etc) or algorithmic details of that
> computer simulation.
>
> But, what is information?  I think it has nothing to do with physical
> storage or instantiation.  I think it has an existence seperate from
> that.  A platonic existence.  And since the information that
> represents my brain exists platonically, then the information for
> every possible brain (including variations of my brain) should also
> exist platonically.
>
>
>>> Conscious experience is with the information.
>>
>> Conscious experience is more the content, or the interpretation of
>> that information, made by a person or by a universal machine.
>> If the doctor makes a copy of your brain, and then codes it into a bit
>> string, and then put the bit string in the fridge, in our probable
>> history, well in that case you will not survive, in our local probable
>> history.
>
> Given the platonic nature of information, this isn't really a
> concern.  In Platonia, you always have a "next moment".  In fact, you
> experience all possible "next moments".  The "no cul-de-sac" rule
> applies I think.
>
>
>> If you say yes to a doctor for a digital brain, you will ask for a
>> brain which functions relatively to our probable computational
>> history. No?
>
> I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my
> perceptions of a doctor.  Every possible outcome of the "brain
> replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive.
> Including outcomes that don't make any sense.
>
> Additionally, every possible outcome of the operation that the doctor
> can percieve, he will perceive.  Including outcomes that don't make
> any sense.
>
> So it seems to me that a lot of your effort goes into explaining why
> we don't see strange "white rabbit" universes.  Thus the talk of
> probabilities and measures.  I'm willing to just say that all
> universes are experienced.  Strange ones, normal ones, good ones, bad
> ones, ones with unbreakable physical laws, ones with no obvious
> physical laws at all.  It's all a matter of perception, not a matter
> of physical realization.
>
>
>> Yes there is a world in which you computer will transform itself into
>> a green flying pig. The "scientific", but really everyday life
>> question, is, what is the "probability" this will happen to "me" here
>> and now.
>
> I'm not sure what it means to ask, "what is the probability that my
> computer will turn into a green pig".  One of me will observe
> everything that can be observed in the next instant.  How many things
> is that?  I'm not sure.  More than 10...ha!  Setting aside physical
> limits, maybe infinitely many?  Given that I might also get extra
> sensory capacity in that instant, or extra cognitive capacity, or
> whatever.
>
> So, of course all of that sounds somewhat crazy, but that's where you
> end up when you try to explain consciousness I think.  Any explanation
> that doesn't involve eliminativism is going to be strange I think.
>
> But, if you are willing to say that consciousness is an illusion, then
> you can just stick with materialism/physicalism and you're fine.  In
> that case there's no need to invoke any of this more esoteric stuff
> like platonism.  Right?
>
> >
>

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