Consciousness is information?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2009, at 02:37, Kelly wrote:

>
> On Apr 22, 2:02 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
>> I was with you up to that last sentence.  Forward or backward, we  
>> just
>> experience increasing entropy as increasing time, but that doesn't
>> warrant the conclusion that no process is required and an "instant"
>> within itself has an arrow of time.
>
> It seems to me that each instant DOES contain within itself an arrow
> of time, in the form of memories.  Later instances are related to
> earlier instances by virtue of having memory-information about those
> earlier instances.  That's what ties the various "states" together.
> The nature of the computations that might transition you from instant
> to instant are not relevant.
>
> What matters is where you end up, not how you got there.

What matters is the first person probability you find yourself ending  
up "there". And this will depend on all computations going through  
your current state (or below) and going through the state "up there".

> If a
> transition causes you to assume a state that contains no information
> about earlier events (i.e., no memory of these events), then you have
> lost a crucial part of what makes you who "you" are.
>
> If you save your brain state at time A and then you save state again
> at a subsequent time B, there is a relationship and an objectively
> measureable degree of correlation between the information contained in
> the two saved data sets.
>
> It is, I think, the degree of correlation between states that provides
> the illusion of a "flow" of consciousness.  This has nothing to do
> with the type of computation that could be used to "transition"
> between the two data sets.
>
> Again, it seems to me that the arithmetic logic that Bruno refers to
> just serves to "describe" the relations between datasets.  It doesn't
> "produce" consciousness.
>
> If there are many "algorithms" that could be used to transition from
> state A to state B, it seems to me that all of them would produce the
> same conscious experience.  If you end up at "state B", then it
> doesn't matter how you go there...your "memory" of the experience will
> be identical regardless of what path you took.
>
> And since all states (not just A and B) exist platonically, then every
> possible "process" can be "inferred" to connect them in every possible
> way.  But I don't think this means that the processes are the source
> of consciousness.  They are just descriptions of the ways that states
> could be connected.
>
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2009, at 06:14, Kelly wrote:

>
> On Apr 22, 12:24 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>>> So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
>>> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
>>> described by some set of data.
>>
>> Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to make
>> that person manifest herself in front of you. A bit like a CD, you
>> will need a player to get the music.
>
> It seems to me that consciousness is the self-interpretion of
> information.  David Chalmers has a good line:  "Experience is
> information from the inside; physics is information from the outside."

First person experience and third person experiment. Glad to hear  
Chalmers accept this at last.
In UDA, inside/outside are perfectly well defined in a pure third  
person way: inside (first person) = memories annihilated and  
reconstructed in classical teleportation, outside = the view outside  
the teleporter. In AUDA I use the old classical definition by Plato in  
the Theaetetus.


>
>
> I still don't see what an interpreter adds, except to satisfy the
> intuition that something is "happening" that "produces"
> consciousness.  Which I think is an attempt to reintroduce "time".


I don't think so. The only "time" needed is the discrete order on the  
natural numbers. An interpreter is needed to play the role of the  
person who gives some content to the information handled through his  
local "brain".   (For this I need also addition and multiplication).



>
>
> But I don't see any advantage of this view over the idea that
> conscious states just "exist" as a type of platonic form (as Brent
> mentioned earlier).

The advantage is that we have the tools to derive physics in a way  
which is enough precise for testing the comp hypothesis. Physics has  
became a branch of computer's psychology or theology.



> At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
> conscious of SOMETHING.

To predict something, the difficulty is to relate that consciousness  
to its computational histories. Physics is given by a measure of  
probability on those comp histories.



> And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my
> mental state at that instant.  In the materialist view, my mental
> state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that
> instant.

Which cannot be maintained with the comp hyp. Your consciousness is an  
abstract type related to all computations going through your current  
state.

>
>
> But I say that what this really means is that my mental state is just
> the information represented by the particles of my brain at that
> instant.  And that if you transfer that information to a computer and
> run a simulation that updates that information appropriately, my
> consciousness will continue in that computer simulation, regardless of
> the hardware (digital computer, mechanical computer, massively
> parallel or single processor, etc) or algorithmic details of that
> computer simulation.

OK. But it is a very special form of information. Consciousness is  
really the qualia associated to your belief in some reality. It is a  
bet on self-consistency: it speed up your reaction time relatively to  
your most probable histories.


>
>
> But, what is information?  I think it has nothing to do with physical
> storage or instantiation.  I think it has an existence seperate from
> that.  A platonic existence.  And since the information that
> represents my brain exists platonically, then the information for
> every possible brain (including variations of my brain) should also
> exist platonically.


You make the same error than those who confuse a universal dovetailer  
with a counting algorithm or the babel library. The sequence:

0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... , or 0 1 10 11 100 101 110 111 go through all  
description of all information, but it lacks the infinitely subtle  
redundancy contained in the space of all computations (the universal  
dovetaling). You work in N, succ, you lack addition and  
multiplication, needed for having a notion of interpreter or universal  
machine, the key entity capable of giving content to its information  
structure. This is needed to have a coherent internal interpretation  
of computerland.

>>>
>>
>> Conscious experience is more the content, or the interpretation of
>> that information, made by a person or by a universal machine.
>> If the doctor makes a copy of your brain, and then codes it into a  
>> bit
>> string, and then put the bit string in the fridge, in our probable
>> history, well in that case you will not survive, in our local  
>> probable
>> history.
>
> Given the platonic nature of information, this isn't really a
> concern.  In Platonia, you always have a "next moment".  In fact, you
> experience all possible "next moments".  The "no cul-de-sac" rule
> applies I think.

By definition, indeed, once we want to quantify the first person  
indeterminacy.
"next moment" makes sense only relatively to (universal) machine. It  
is the "next step" relatively to some computation and thus universal  
machine interpreting that "machine".
The cul-de-sac/no-cul-de-sac depends on the points of view adopted by  
the machine itself.

>
>
>
>> If you say yes to a doctor for a digital brain, you will ask for a
>> brain which functions relatively to our probable computational
>> history. No?
>
> I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my
> perceptions of a doctor.  Every possible outcome of the "brain
> replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive.

Not in the relative way. You have to explain why you see apples  
falling from a tree, and not any arbitrary information-theoretical data.


>
> Including outcomes that don't make any sense.


You have to explain why they are *rare*. If not your theory does not  
explain why you put water on the gas and not in the fridge when you  
want a cup of coffee.


>
>
> Additionally, every possible outcome of the operation that the doctor
> can percieve, he will perceive.  Including outcomes that don't make
> any sense.
>
> So it seems to me that a lot of your effort goes into explaining why
> we don't see strange "white rabbit" universes.

Indeed.



> Thus the talk of
> probabilities and measures.  I'm willing to just say that all
> universes are experienced.

That is absolutely true. But we don't live in the absolute (except  
perhaps with salvia :). We live in the relative worlds/states. I  
cannot go to my office by flying through the window. The probability  
that I end up in an hospital is far greater than arriving in piece to  
my job place.



> Strange ones, normal ones, good ones, bad
> ones, ones with unbreakable physical laws, ones with no obvious
> physical laws at all.  It's all a matter of perception, not a matter
> of physical realization.

That is true, but we want to explain "the stable appearance of atoms  
and galaxies", and what happens when we die.

>
>
>
>> Yes there is a world in which you computer will transform itself into
>> a green flying pig. The "scientific", but really everyday life
>> question, is, what is the "probability" this will happen to "me" here
>> and now.
>
> I'm not sure what it means to ask, "what is the probability that my
> computer will turn into a green pig".  One of me will observe
> everything that can be observed in the next instant.  How many things
> is that?  I'm not sure.  More than 10...ha!  Setting aside physical
> limits, maybe infinitely many?  Given that I might also get extra
> sensory capacity in that instant, or extra cognitive capacity, or
> whatever.
>
> So, of course all of that sounds somewhat crazy, but that's where you
> end up when you try to explain consciousness I think.  Any explanation
> that doesn't involve eliminativism is going to be strange I think.

The comp theory explains why we cannot explain consciousness, nor  
truth. But we can bet on computational states, then the thought  
experiments show that physics is derivable from computer science/
number theory in term of probabilities, and we can compare those  
probabilities with the one we extract from the long observation of our  
neighborhoods. Comp is a concrete testable theory, but we have to  
derive the physics from it to do so. There is a gift because it gives  
a complete arithmetical interpretation of an earlier type of theory  
like Plotinus theology, which does not eliminate the person like  
modern materialism, comp lead to a natural distinction between truth  
about us, and provable by us.


>
>
> But, if you are willing to say that consciousness is an illusion, then
> you can just stick with materialism/physicalism and you're fine.

You are right. But consciousness is the only thing I have no doubt  
about. The *only* undoubtable thing. The fixed point of the cartesian  
systematic doubting attitude. A theory which eliminate my first  
person, or my consciousness, although irrefutable by me, is wrong, I  
hope, I hope it to be wrong for you too. (Why would I send a post on  
consciousness to a zombie?)



> In
> that case there's no need to invoke any of this more esoteric stuff
> like platonism.  Right?

Right. Materialism is a trick based on a lie (consciousness, and thus  
pain, suffering are illusions) and an illusion (there is matter). This  
is used to stop fundamental inquiry. It is not a coincidence that  
authoritative theologies insists on materialism so much. Before  
Darwinism God created the man, after Darwinism God created the matter.  
Assuming comp, couple matter-man

Any content of consciousness can be an illusion. Consciousness itself  
cannot, because without consciousness there is no more illusion at all.

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Brent Meeker-2]

Jason Resch wrote:

> Kelly,
>
> Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
> in my mind about computationalism.  I have actually been in somewhat
> of a state of confusion since Bruno's movie graph argument coupled
> with a paper by Max Tegmark.  In Tegmark's paper, he was explaining
> that there is an appeal to many people of associating the time
> dimension with the computational clock, but argued there is no reason
> to do so, time is just another dimension after all, and everything
> being an atemporal platonic/mathematical object any perception of
> change is illusory.  

That's a common model but it's certainly not a settled question in
physics.  Just recently Sean Carroll wrote a paper titled "What if Time
Really Exists?"  http://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3772.   And even in a block
universe model the time dimension is still different from the space
dimensions.

> Later, when Bruno explained his movie graph
> argument, it came to the point where we were asked: Is a recording of
> Alice's brain activity itself conscious?  I first thought obviously
> no, but then realized the contradiction with space-time.  Could the
> block-time view of the universe not be considered a recording?
> Perhaps the difference between a recording (like Tape or CD) and the
> universe (or a computer program/simulation) is that with a physical
> recording it is possible to alter a state at one point in time without
> affecting future/past states.  

This implicitly assumes that you can dispense with the continuum and
treat the process as a succession of discrete states.  I question that.  
It is how we think and how we write and describe computer programs and
we know that if we make the time step small enough in the simulation we
can accurately reproduce processes.  But I think we are fooling
ourselves by taking the description in terms of discrete states to be
sufficient - actually we are relying on the physics of the computer to
join one state to the next.  Bruno proposes to abstract this whole
process up to Platonia where the role of the computer in interpreting
the program is taken over by abstract computations.  But then to avoid
any choice he must allow all possible (countably infinite)  computations
between any two states.  ISTM this implies a strange topology of states
and I'm not clear on how it models consciousness.

> Or maybe consciousness is only created
> from platonic objects / information or relationships that exist within
> them.  The appeal of computationalism for me is that it creates a
> self-interpreting structure, the information or state has meaning only
> because it is part a state machine.  We, being creatures who can only
> experience through time might be fooled into thinking change over time
> is necessary for consciousness, but what if we could make a computer
> that computed over the X-dimension instead of T, what would such a
> computer look like and how would it be logically different from a
> recording (which is static over T), and how is it logically different
> from a computer that computes accross the T dimension?
>  

I don't think it is *logically* different.  Before computers, a
computation was something written out on sheets of paper (I know because
my first summer job in college was calculating coordinates and depths
for a geological research company and my official job title was
"Computer".)  :-)

Brent

> I very much look forward to reading your and others' opinions on this.
>
> Jason
>
> On Thu, Apr 23, 2009 at 11:14 PM, Kelly <harmonk00@...> wrote:
>  
>> On Apr 22, 12:24 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>>    
>>>> So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
>>>> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
>>>> described by some set of data.
>>>>        
>>> Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to make
>>> that person manifest herself in front of you. A bit like a CD, you
>>> will need a player to get the music.
>>>      
>> It seems to me that consciousness is the self-interpretion of
>> information.  David Chalmers has a good line:  "Experience is
>> information from the inside; physics is information from the outside."
>>
>> I still don't see what an interpreter adds, except to satisfy the
>> intuition that something is "happening" that "produces"
>> consciousness.  Which I think is an attempt to reintroduce "time".
>>
>> But I don't see any advantage of this view over the idea that
>> conscious states just "exist" as a type of platonic form (as Brent
>> mentioned earlier).  At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
>> conscious of SOMETHING.  And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my
>> mental state at that instant.  In the materialist view, my mental
>> state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that
>> instant.
>>
>> But I say that what this really means is that my mental state is just
>> the information represented by the particles of my brain at that
>> instant.  And that if you transfer that information to a computer and
>> run a simulation that updates that information appropriately, my
>> consciousness will continue in that computer simulation, regardless of
>> the hardware (digital computer, mechanical computer, massively
>> parallel or single processor, etc) or algorithmic details of that
>> computer simulation.
>>
>> But, what is information?  I think it has nothing to do with physical
>> storage or instantiation.  I think it has an existence seperate from
>> that.  A platonic existence.  And since the information that
>> represents my brain exists platonically, then the information for
>> every possible brain (including variations of my brain) should also
>> exist platonically.
>>
>>
>>    
>>>> Conscious experience is with the information.
>>>>        
>>> Conscious experience is more the content, or the interpretation of
>>> that information, made by a person or by a universal machine.
>>> If the doctor makes a copy of your brain, and then codes it into a bit
>>> string, and then put the bit string in the fridge, in our probable
>>> history, well in that case you will not survive, in our local probable
>>> history.
>>>      
>> Given the platonic nature of information, this isn't really a
>> concern.  In Platonia, you always have a "next moment".  In fact, you
>> experience all possible "next moments".  The "no cul-de-sac" rule
>> applies I think.
>>
>>
>>    
>>> If you say yes to a doctor for a digital brain, you will ask for a
>>> brain which functions relatively to our probable computational
>>> history. No?
>>>      
>> I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my
>> perceptions of a doctor.  Every possible outcome of the "brain
>> replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive.
>> Including outcomes that don't make any sense.
>>
>> Additionally, every possible outcome of the operation that the doctor
>> can percieve, he will perceive.  Including outcomes that don't make
>> any sense.
>>
>> So it seems to me that a lot of your effort goes into explaining why
>> we don't see strange "white rabbit" universes.  Thus the talk of
>> probabilities and measures.  I'm willing to just say that all
>> universes are experienced.  Strange ones, normal ones, good ones, bad
>> ones, ones with unbreakable physical laws, ones with no obvious
>> physical laws at all.  It's all a matter of perception, not a matter
>> of physical realization.
>>
>>
>>    
>>> Yes there is a world in which you computer will transform itself into
>>> a green flying pig. The "scientific", but really everyday life
>>> question, is, what is the "probability" this will happen to "me" here
>>> and now.
>>>      
>> I'm not sure what it means to ask, "what is the probability that my
>> computer will turn into a green pig".  One of me will observe
>> everything that can be observed in the next instant.  How many things
>> is that?  I'm not sure.  More than 10...ha!  Setting aside physical
>> limits, maybe infinitely many?  Given that I might also get extra
>> sensory capacity in that instant, or extra cognitive capacity, or
>> whatever.
>>
>> So, of course all of that sounds somewhat crazy, but that's where you
>> end up when you try to explain consciousness I think.  Any explanation
>> that doesn't involve eliminativism is going to be strange I think.
>>
>> But, if you are willing to say that consciousness is an illusion, then
>> you can just stick with materialism/physicalism and you're fine.  In
>> that case there's no need to invoke any of this more esoteric stuff
>> like platonism.  Right?
>>
>>    
>
> >
>
>  

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

>> Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is
>> not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a
>> conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up
>> forgetting or almost forgetting which is the right one. That is, his
>> certainty of picking the right card could vary between 0.5 and 1.
>> Would you say that only if his certainty is 1 would the conscious
>> process be implemented, and not if it is, say, 0.9?
>>
>>
>
> I said it would be implementing *the same* consciousness if he was
> following the rule.  If not he might be implementing a different
> consciousness by using a different rule.  Of course if it were different
> in only one "moment" that wouldn't really be much of a difference.  I
> don't think it depends on his certainty.  Even more difficult we might
> ask what it means for him to follow the rule - must he do it
> *consciously*; in which case do we have to know whether his brain is
> functioning according to the same rule?
>
> You're asking a lot of questions, Stathis.  :-)  What do you think?

I don't think the rule matters, only the result, which could consist
of a series of disconnected states. The utility of a process is that
it reliably brings about the relevant states; but if they arose
randomly or by a different process that would be just as good. If not,
then you could have an apparently functionally identical machine which
has a different consciousness. One half of your brain might function
by a different process that gives the same neuronal outputs, and you
would have a feeling that something had radically changed, but your
mouth would seemingly of its own accord continue to declare that
everything is just the same. So, I agree with Kelly that the
consciousness consists in the information.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/25 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> This implicitly assumes that you can dispense with the continuum and
> treat the process as a succession of discrete states.  I question that.

So are you saying that, because we are conscious, that is evidence
that reality is at bottom continuous rather than discrete?

> It is how we think and how we write and describe computer programs and
> we know that if we make the time step small enough in the simulation we
> can accurately reproduce processes.  But I think we are fooling
> ourselves by taking the description in terms of discrete states to be
> sufficient - actually we are relying on the physics of the computer to
> join one state to the next.  Bruno proposes to abstract this whole
> process up to Platonia where the role of the computer in interpreting
> the program is taken over by abstract computations.  But then to avoid
> any choice he must allow all possible (countably infinite)  computations
> between any two states.  ISTM this implies a strange topology of states
> and I'm not clear on how it models consciousness.
>
>> Or maybe consciousness is only created
>> from platonic objects / information or relationships that exist within
>> them.  The appeal of computationalism for me is that it creates a
>> self-interpreting structure, the information or state has meaning only
>> because it is part a state machine.  We, being creatures who can only
>> experience through time might be fooled into thinking change over time
>> is necessary for consciousness, but what if we could make a computer
>> that computed over the X-dimension instead of T, what would such a
>> computer look like and how would it be logically different from a
>> recording (which is static over T), and how is it logically different
>> from a computer that computes accross the T dimension?
>>
>
> I don't think it is *logically* different.  Before computers, a
> computation was something written out on sheets of paper (I know because
> my first summer job in college was calculating coordinates and depths
> for a geological research company and my official job title was
> "Computer".)  :-)

Do you think a computation would feel different from the inside
depending on whether it was done with pencil and paper, transistors or
vacuum tubes?


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/4/24 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>  
>>> Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is
>>> not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a
>>> conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up
>>> forgetting or almost forgetting which is the right one. That is, his
>>> certainty of picking the right card could vary between 0.5 and 1.
>>> Would you say that only if his certainty is 1 would the conscious
>>> process be implemented, and not if it is, say, 0.9?
>>>
>>>
>>>      
>> I said it would be implementing *the same* consciousness if he was
>> following the rule.  If not he might be implementing a different
>> consciousness by using a different rule.  Of course if it were different
>> in only one "moment" that wouldn't really be much of a difference.  I
>> don't think it depends on his certainty.  Even more difficult we might
>> ask what it means for him to follow the rule - must he do it
>> *consciously*; in which case do we have to know whether his brain is
>> functioning according to the same rule?
>>
>> You're asking a lot of questions, Stathis.  :-)  What do you think?
>>    
>
> I don't think the rule matters, only the result, which could consist
> of a series of disconnected states. The utility of a process is that
> it reliably brings about the relevant states; but if they arose
> randomly or by a different process that would be just as good.

If two processes always produce the same sequence they are the same
process in the abstract sense.

> If not,
> then you could have an apparently functionally identical machine which
> has a different consciousness. One half of your brain might function
> by a different process that gives the same neuronal outputs, and you
> would have a feeling that something had radically changed, but your
> mouth would seemingly of its own accord continue to declare that
> everything is just the same. So, I agree with Kelly that the
> consciousness consists in the information.
>
>  

But is it the information in consciousness and is it discrete?  If you
include the information that is in the brain, but not in consciousness,
I can buy the concept of relating states by similarity of content.  Or
if you suppose a continuum of states that would provide a sequence. It
is only when you postulate discrete states containing only the contents
of instants of conscious thought, that I find difficulty.

Brent

Brent

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/4/25 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>  
>> This implicitly assumes that you can dispense with the continuum and
>> treat the process as a succession of discrete states.  I question that.
>>    
>
> So are you saying that, because we are conscious, that is evidence
> that reality is at bottom continuous rather than discrete?
>
>  
>> It is how we think and how we write and describe computer programs and
>> we know that if we make the time step small enough in the simulation we
>> can accurately reproduce processes.  But I think we are fooling
>> ourselves by taking the description in terms of discrete states to be
>> sufficient - actually we are relying on the physics of the computer to
>> join one state to the next.  Bruno proposes to abstract this whole
>> process up to Platonia where the role of the computer in interpreting
>> the program is taken over by abstract computations.  But then to avoid
>> any choice he must allow all possible (countably infinite)  computations
>> between any two states.  ISTM this implies a strange topology of states
>> and I'm not clear on how it models consciousness.
>>
>>    
>>> Or maybe consciousness is only created
>>> from platonic objects / information or relationships that exist within
>>> them.  The appeal of computationalism for me is that it creates a
>>> self-interpreting structure, the information or state has meaning only
>>> because it is part a state machine.  We, being creatures who can only
>>> experience through time might be fooled into thinking change over time
>>> is necessary for consciousness, but what if we could make a computer
>>> that computed over the X-dimension instead of T, what would such a
>>> computer look like and how would it be logically different from a
>>> recording (which is static over T), and how is it logically different
>>> from a computer that computes accross the T dimension?
>>>
>>>      
>> I don't think it is *logically* different.  Before computers, a
>> computation was something written out on sheets of paper (I know because
>> my first summer job in college was calculating coordinates and depths
>> for a geological research company and my official job title was
>> "Computer".)  :-)
>>    
>
> Do you think a computation would feel different from the inside
> depending on whether it was done with pencil and paper, transistors or
> vacuum tubes?
>
>
>  

No, I don't think the medium makes a difference.  But interpretation
makes a difference.  Most computations we do, on pencil and paper or
transistors or neurons, have an interpretation in terms of our world.  
Kelly is supposing there is a "self-interpreting structure" I'm not sure
what he means by this, but I imagine something like an elaborate
simulation in which some parts of the computation simulate entities with
values or purposes - on some mapping.  But what about other mappings?

Brent

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/25 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> But is it the information in consciousness and is it discrete?  If you
> include the information that is in the brain, but not in consciousness,
> I can buy the concept of relating states by similarity of content.  Or
> if you suppose a continuum of states that would provide a sequence. It
> is only when you postulate discrete states containing only the contents
> of instants of conscious thought, that I find difficulty.

I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics is
continuous and time is real, it would still be possible to chop up
consciousness into discrete parts (albeit of finite duration) and
there would still be continuity. In fact, I can't imagine how
consciousness could possibly be discontinuous if this was done, for
where would the information that tells you you've been chopped up
reside?


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/4/25 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> No, I don't think the medium makes a difference.  But interpretation
> makes a difference.  Most computations we do, on pencil and paper or
> transistors or neurons, have an interpretation in terms of our world.
> Kelly is supposing there is a "self-interpreting structure" I'm not sure
> what he means by this, but I imagine something like an elaborate
> simulation in which some parts of the computation simulate entities with
> values or purposes - on some mapping.  But what about other mappings?

It's true that in the case of an ordinary computation in a brain or
digital computer the interpretation is fixed since the external world
with which it interacts is fixed. That's why brains and computers are
useful, after all. But if you take the system as a whole, there is no
a priori way to say what the interpretation of one part should be with
respect to another part. So we return to the position whereby a rock
could implement any finite state machine, if you only look at it the
right way.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 24, 2:41 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
> >
> > In the materialist view, my mental state is just the
> > state of the particles of my brain at that instant.
>
> I think we need some definition of "state".

Hmmm.  Well, I think my view of the word is pretty much the dictionary
definition.  Though there are two different meanings in play here.

The physical state:

"the condition of matter with respect to structure, form,
constitution, phase, or the like"

And the mental state:

"a particular condition of mind or feeling"

Though ultimately I'm saying that there is no actual physical world
that exists outside of and independent from our perceptions.  You and
I probably perceive a very similar world, but there other conscious
observers who perceive very different worlds.  But all worlds are
virtual worlds that exist only inside the minds of conscious platonic
observers.  And I base this conclusion on the line of thought laid out
in my previous posts.


> If we discretize your brain, say slice it into Planck
> units of time as Jason suggested, now we need to
> have something to connect one state to another.

Why do we need to have something extra to connect one state to
another?  What does this add, exactly?

I think that these instances of consciousness are like pieces from a
picture puzzle.  But not a jigsaw picture puzzle...instead let's say
that each puzzle piece is perfectly square, and they combine to make
the full picture.

How do you know where each piece fits into the overall picture?  By
the contents of the image fragment that is on each puzzle piece.

So each puzzle piece has, contained within it, the information that
indicates it's position in the larger framework.  The same is true of
instances of consciousness.

Based on how well the edges of their "images" line up, you can get
some idea about the relationship between two instances of
consciousness.


> In idealism, the content of a state consciousness (a Planck slice, not
> of a brain, but of a stream of consciousness) seems to me to be very
> small

Well, I'm not sure how much of the brain's information is needed to
represent a particular state of consciousness.  But I don't think that
it's a crucial question.  My answer is:  more than none of it, but
less-than-or-equal-to all of it.  Somewhere in that range.  Ha!


> You say it is
> connected by the correlation of information content, but is that
> unique?  Is there a best or most probable next state or what?

So I guess I'm taking the position of "extreme platonism" here.  The
result is, I suppose, indistinguishable from that of modal realism.

All possible "next states" exist.  None of them are "best" or "more
probable" than any other.  Every possible future lies ahead of you,
and some version of you will experience each one of them.  There will
be a version of you that never sees anything that strikes you as
unusual and who says "the universe is very normal, and this all makes
perfect sense, and how could it be any other way.  These people who
advocate extreme platonism are crazy, because it doesn't match what I
observe."

But, there will also be a version of you who never has a normal
experience again.  For eternity you will go from strange experience to
strange experience.  And this version will say, "ah, ya, Kelly was
right about that extreme platonism thing."

And there will be all points between the two extremes.

Though, I think that this view does make a testable prediction.  Which
is:  there will be no end to your experiences.  There is no permanent
first person death.

Of course, many realities will be unpleasant enough that this isn't
necessarily a good thing.  All good things lie before you.  But so do
all bad things.  Blerg.


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[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@...> wrote:
> Kelly,
>
> Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
> in my mind about computationalism.

Excellent!

It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
this.

So it makes sense to start with the idea of physicalism and the idea
that the mind is like a very complex computer, since this explains
third person observations of human behavior and ability very well I
think.

BUT, then the question of first person subjective consciousness
arises.  Where does that fit in with physicalism?  So the next step is
to expand to physicalism + full computationalism, where the
computational activities of the brain also explain consciousness, in
addition to behavior and ability.

But then you run into things like Maudlin's Olympia thought
experiement, and Bruno's movie graph examples, and many other strange
scenarios as well.

So the next step is to just get rid of physicalism altogether, as it
has other problems anyway (why something rather than nothing, the
ultimate nature of matter and energy, the origin of the universe, the
strangeness of QM, etc. etc.), and just go with pure computationalism.

But in the thought experiments that led to the jettisoning of
physicalism, the possiblity appears of just associating consciousness
with information, instead of the computations that produce the
information.

So we seem to have two options:  "computation + information" OR
"information".

I can't really see what problem is solved by including computation.
To me, assigning consciousness to platonically existing information
seems to be good enough, with nothing left over for computation to
explain.  So, I go with the "just information" choice.

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[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 24, 11:39 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
> > At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
> > conscious of SOMETHING.
>
> To predict something, the difficulty is to relate that consciousness
> to its computational histories. Physics is given by a measure of
> probability on those comp histories.

The laws of physics would seem to be contingent, not necessary.  In
that I can imagine a universe with an entirely different set of
physical laws.

Further, assuming that computer simulations of brains are possible and
give rise to consciousness, I can imagine that a simulation of such a
brain could be altered in a way that the simulated consciousness
begins to perceive a universe with these alternate physical laws.  Or
even begins to perceive a universe with no consistent coherent
physical laws at all.


> > And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my
> > mental state at that instant.  In the materialist view, my mental
> > state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that
> > instant.
>
> Which cannot be maintained with the comp hyp. Your consciousness is an
> abstract type related to all computations going through your current
> state.

I see what my "current state" does here with respect to
consciousness.  But I don't see what the "computations going through
it" contribute.


> > I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my
> > perceptions of a doctor.  Every possible outcome of the "brain
> > replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive.
>
> Not in the relative way. You have to explain why you see apples
> falling from a tree, and not any arbitrary information-theoretical data.

I explain it by asserting that there are many versions of me, some who
see apples, and some who see arbitrary information-theoretical data.
Everything that can be perceived is perceived.


> > Including outcomes that don't make any sense.
>
> You have to explain why they are *rare*. If not your theory does not
> explain why you put water on the gas and not in the fridge when you
> want a cup of coffee.

I don't say that they are rare, I say they don't make any sense.  A
big difference.

I say that every possible event is perceived to happen, and so nothing
is more or less rare than anything else.  There are only things that
are rare in your experience.  They are not rare in an absolute sense.

Why do I say this?  Because I think that platonism is the best
explanation for conscious experience, and the above view is (I think)
the logical conclusion of that platonic view of reality.


> > Thus the talk of
> > probabilities and measures.  I'm willing to just say that all
> > universes are experienced.
>
> That is absolutely true. But we don't live in the absolute (except
> perhaps with salvia :).

I say that we do live in the absolute.  Not all experiences of the
absolute will be strange.  If all possible experiences exist in the
absolute, then by definition some will be quite ordinary and mundane.
Right?

But, right, salvia gives a taste of how strange experience can be.
And also schizophrenia, dementia, and various other mental conditions
and abnormalities cause by damage to the brain are further examples.

How does your computational theory consciousness explain the
perceptions of these people?


> That is true, but we want to explain "the stable appearance of atoms
> and galaxies", and what happens when we die.

Some observers will see stable atoms and galaxies.  Because that's one
of the possible sets of experience.  Other observers won't see these
things.


> You are right. But consciousness is the only thing I have no doubt
> about. The *only* undoubtable thing. The fixed point of the cartesian
> systematic doubting attitude. A theory which eliminate my first
> person, or my consciousness, although irrefutable by me, is wrong, I
> hope, I hope it to be wrong for you too. (Why would I send a post on
> consciousness to a zombie?)

Right, I'm with you on this.  Consciousness is the one thing that
can't be doubted.  And that's where the trouble starts...







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[Colin Hales-2]

Kelly wrote:

On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@... wrote:
  

Kelly,

Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
in my mind about computationalism.
    

Excellent!

It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
this.

So it makes sense to start with the idea of physicalism and the idea
that the mind is like a very complex computer, since this explains
third person observations of human behavior and ability very well I
think.

BUT, then the question of first person subjective consciousness
arises.  Where does that fit in with physicalism?  So the next step is
to expand to physicalism + full computationalism, where the
computational activities of the brain also explain consciousness, in
addition to behavior and ability.
  

It's really cool to see folks exploring where I have been and seeing the same problems. I might be able to shed a little light on a productive 'next step' for exploration:

Try understanding the difference between a natural world which IS literally a mathematics, not a natural world described BY a mathematics. Note that a Turing machine is an instrument of a 'BY' computationalism, not the natural computation that I am speaking of. If you can get your head around this, then the answers (to a first person perspective) can be found. Stop thinking 'computation OF' and start thinking 'natural computation that IS'. Also very useful is the idea of using the explanation of a capacity to do science (grounded in a first person experience that is, in context, literally scientific observation) ... this is a very testable behaviour and represents the last thing physicists seem to want to explain: themselves. A green field in which it is obvious that cognition is most definitely not computation in the 'computation BY' sense.

Enjoy!

colin hales



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[Brent Meeker-2]

Kelly wrote:

> On Apr 24, 2:41 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
>  
>>> In the materialist view, my mental state is just the
>>> state of the particles of my brain at that instant.
>>>      
>> I think we need some definition of "state".
>>    
>
> Hmmm.  Well, I think my view of the word is pretty much the dictionary
> definition.  Though there are two different meanings in play here.
>
> The physical state:
>
> "the condition of matter with respect to structure, form,
> constitution, phase, or the like"
>
> And the mental state:
>
> "a particular condition of mind or feeling"
>
> Though ultimately I'm saying that there is no actual physical world
> that exists outside of and independent from our perceptions.  You and
> I probably perceive a very similar world, but there other conscious
> observers who perceive very different worlds.  But all worlds are
> virtual worlds that exist only inside the minds of conscious platonic
> observers.  And I base this conclusion on the line of thought laid out
> in my previous posts.
>
>
>  
>> If we discretize your brain, say slice it into Planck
>> units of time as Jason suggested, now we need to
>> have something to connect one state to another.
>>    
>
> Why do we need to have something extra to connect one state to
> another?  What does this add, exactly?
>
> I think that these instances of consciousness are like pieces from a
> picture puzzle.  But not a jigsaw picture puzzle...instead let's say
> that each puzzle piece is perfectly square, and they combine to make
> the full picture.
>
> How do you know where each piece fits into the overall picture?  By
> the contents of the image fragment that is on each puzzle piece.
>
> So each puzzle piece has, contained within it, the information that
> indicates it's position in the larger framework.  The same is true of
> instances of consciousness.
>
> Based on how well the edges of their "images" line up, you can get
> some idea about the relationship between two instances of
> consciousness.
>  

These are "edges" in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary.  
If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking
about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval
that has duration and direction.

>
>  
>> In idealism, the content of a state consciousness (a Planck slice, not
>> of a brain, but of a stream of consciousness) seems to me to be very
>> small
>>    
>
> Well, I'm not sure how much of the brain's information is needed to
> represent a particular state of consciousness.  But I don't think that
> it's a crucial question.  

It's a crucial question if the answer is "more than what is in an
instant of consciousness."

Brent

> My answer is:  more than none of it, but
> less-than-or-equal-to all of it.  Somewhere in that range.  Ha!
>
>
>  
>> You say it is
>> connected by the correlation of information content, but is that
>> unique?  Is there a best or most probable next state or what?
>>    
>
> So I guess I'm taking the position of "extreme platonism" here.  The
> result is, I suppose, indistinguishable from that of modal realism.
>
> All possible "next states" exist.  None of them are "best" or "more
> probable" than any other.  Every possible future lies ahead of you,
> and some version of you will experience each one of them.  There will
> be a version of you that never sees anything that strikes you as
> unusual and who says "the universe is very normal, and this all makes
> perfect sense, and how could it be any other way.  These people who
> advocate extreme platonism are crazy, because it doesn't match what I
> observe."
>
> But, there will also be a version of you who never has a normal
> experience again.  For eternity you will go from strange experience to
> strange experience.  And this version will say, "ah, ya, Kelly was
> right about that extreme platonism thing."
>
> And there will be all points between the two extremes.
>
> Though, I think that this view does make a testable prediction.  Which
> is:  there will be no end to your experiences.  There is no permanent
> first person death.
>
> Of course, many realities will be unpleasant enough that this isn't
> necessarily a good thing.  All good things lie before you.  But so do
> all bad things.  Blerg.
>
>
> >
>
>  

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[Kelly Harmon]

On Apr 26, 1:08 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
> These are "edges" in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary.
> If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking
> about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval
> that has duration and direction.

Uhhhhhhhhh....what???

I think you should re-read my post.  I think you missed something.


> > Well, I'm not sure how much of the brain's information is needed to
> > represent a particular state of consciousness.  But I don't think that
> > it's a crucial question.
>
> It's a crucial question if the answer is "more than what is in an
> instant of consciousness."

Why is it a crucial question in that case?  I don't see what you're
getting at.


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[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Apr 2009, at 21:17, Kelly wrote:

>
> On Apr 24, 2:41 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
>>>
>>> In the materialist view, my mental state is just the
>>> state of the particles of my brain at that instant.
>>
>> I think we need some definition of "state".
>
> Hmmm.  Well, I think my view of the word is pretty much the dictionary
> definition.  Though there are two different meanings in play here.
>
> The physical state:
>
> "the condition of matter with respect to structure, form,
> constitution, phase, or the like"
>
> And the mental state:
>
> "a particular condition of mind or feeling"

... and computational states.

Then assuming comp, you can attribute a mental state to a  
computational state, and then you must attribute an infinity of  
computational states to a mind state.



>
>
> Though ultimately I'm saying that there is no actual physical world
> that exists outside of and independent from our perceptions.  You and
> I probably perceive a very similar world, but there other conscious
> observers who perceive very different worlds.  But all worlds are
> virtual worlds that exist only inside the minds of conscious platonic
> observers.  And I base this conclusion on the line of thought laid out
> in my previous posts.

This is close to the consequence of comp.


>
>
>
>> If we discretize your brain, say slice it into Planck
>> units of time as Jason suggested, now we need to
>> have something to connect one state to another.
>
> Why do we need to have something extra to connect one state to
> another?  What does this add, exactly?

I would say this goes along with the very (mathematical) definition of  
what a computational state is.

>
>
> I think that these instances of consciousness are like pieces from a
> picture puzzle.  But not a jigsaw picture puzzle...instead let's say
> that each puzzle piece is perfectly square, and they combine to make
> the full picture.
>
> How do you know where each piece fits into the overall picture?  By
> the contents of the image fragment that is on each puzzle piece.
>
> So each puzzle piece has, contained within it, the information that
> indicates it's position in the larger framework.  The same is true of
> instances of consciousness.

Nice image. With comp the same image admits an infinity of pieces  
though.

>
>
> Based on how well the edges of their "images" line up, you can get
> some idea about the relationship between two instances of
> consciousness.
>
>
>> In idealism, the content of a state consciousness (a Planck slice,  
>> not
>> of a brain, but of a stream of consciousness) seems to me to be very
>> small
>
> Well, I'm not sure how much of the brain's information is needed to
> represent a particular state of consciousness.  But I don't think that
> it's a crucial question.  My answer is:  more than none of it, but
> less-than-or-equal-to all of it.  Somewhere in that range.  Ha!
>
>
>> You say it is
>> connected by the correlation of information content, but is that
>> unique?  Is there a best or most probable next state or what?
>
> So I guess I'm taking the position of "extreme platonism" here.  The
> result is, I suppose, indistinguishable from that of modal realism.
>
> All possible "next states" exist.  None of them are "best" or "more
> probable" than any other.  Every possible future lies ahead of you,
> and some version of you will experience each one of them.  There will
> be a version of you that never sees anything that strikes you as
> unusual and who says "the universe is very normal, and this all makes
> perfect sense, and how could it be any other way.  These people who
> advocate extreme platonism are crazy, because it doesn't match what I
> observe."
>
> But, there will also be a version of you who never has a normal
> experience again.  For eternity you will go from strange experience to
> strange experience.  And this version will say, "ah, ya, Kelly was
> right about that extreme platonism thing."
>
> And there will be all points between the two extremes.

And thus there is a measure problem. We agree?


>
>
> Though, I think that this view does make a testable prediction.  Which
> is:  there will be no end to your experiences.  There is no permanent
> first person death.

OK, but such first person experience are excluded from the scientific  
thought. We can talk about scientifically. My point is that comp  
entails also verifiable:refutable physical facts.


>
>
> Of course, many realities will be unpleasant enough that this isn't
> necessarily a good thing.  All good things lie before you.  But so do
> all bad things.  Blerg.

Yet, we have partial control, we can do things which change our  
relative measure. It is useful when we want drink coffee, to give an  
example.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Apr 2009, at 21:42, Kelly wrote:

>
> On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@...> wrote:
>> Kelly,
>>
>> Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of  
>> doubt
>> in my mind about computationalism.
>
> Excellent!
>
> It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
> this.
>
> So it makes sense to start with the idea of physicalism and the idea
> that the mind is like a very complex computer, since this explains
> third person observations of human behavior and ability very well I
> think.
>
> BUT, then the question of first person subjective consciousness
> arises.  Where does that fit in with physicalism?  So the next step is
> to expand to physicalism + full computationalism, where the
> computational activities of the brain also explain consciousness, in
> addition to behavior and ability.
>
> But then you run into things like Maudlin's Olympia thought
> experiement, and Bruno's movie graph examples, and many other strange
> scenarios as well.
>
> So the next step is to just get rid of physicalism altogether, as it
> has other problems anyway (why something rather than nothing, the
> ultimate nature of matter and energy, the origin of the universe, the
> strangeness of QM, etc. etc.), and just go with pure computationalism.
>
> But in the thought experiments that led to the jettisoning of
> physicalism, the possiblity appears of just associating consciousness
> with information, instead of the computations that produce the
> information.

Then you loose the measure problem, the physical laws, the partial and  
relative control, the quantum nature of the computations, etc.


>
>
> So we seem to have two options:  "computation + information" OR
> "information".

This is like replacing the universal dovetailing (with its redundancy,  
its very long (deep) histories, its many internal dynamics)



>
>
> I can't really see what problem is solved by including computation.


Do you say "yes" to the digitalist doctor? If yes, you cannot avoid  
"computer science" or "elementary number theory" even just to define  
"information". Why avoiding computer science in a theory which relate  
consciousness (as manifesting relatively to me) to  working computer.


>
> To me, assigning consciousness to platonically existing information
> seems to be good enough, with nothing left over for computation to
> explain.  So, I go with the "just information" choice.

Agains. formally the difference is that your theory accept the natural  
number (the finite information strings) and succession (to get them  
all). But if you add addition and multiplication you get computer  
science + a measure which explains why apples can fall from a tree in  
normal histories, and why white rabbits can be rare.
i could that that if you are platonist, I don't see how you can avoid  
the computations through which informations flux develop themselves,  
when seen from inside.

Perhaps I should just ask what is your theory. Measure of information  
needs already a non trivial math apparatus.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Apr 2009, at 22:52, Kelly wrote:

>
> On Apr 24, 11:39 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>>> At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
>>> conscious of SOMETHING.
>>
>> To predict something, the difficulty is to relate that consciousness
>> to its computational histories. Physics is given by a measure of
>> probability on those comp histories.
>
> The laws of physics would seem to be contingent, not necessary.

On the contrary/ Physical laws appear are necessarily non contingent  
with comp. They are defined through all computations in Platonia.




> In
> that I can imagine a universe with an entirely different set of
> physical laws.


Thre is no universe. You already "belong" to all comp histories going  
through your actual states. of course all states are actual from  
inside, but only "normal states" remains normal, and there are  
physical laws only in normal histories. Physicalness is a product of  
that "normality" conditions on histories.



>
>
> Further, assuming that computer simulations of brains are possible
> and
> give rise to consciousness,


OK. That is comp. My working hypothesis.



> I can imagine that a simulation of such a
> brain could be altered in a way that the simulated consciousness
> begins to perceive a universe with these alternate physical laws.

Only relatively to you. From the first person point of view of the  
inhabitant of your altered simulation, they don't belong to it, but to  
the infinity of simulation in Platonia. If your alteration in such  
that the 1-view of those inhabitant escape from normality, from their  
point ofviex they esacpe your "universe".
With comp there is no identity thesis. There is a 1-1 relation going  
from a machine to a mind, but the inverse is 1-infinity: to each mind  
state there is an infinity of machine realizing it. The first person  
indeterminacy is exploitable to extract the laws of physics.


>  Or
> even begins to perceive a universe with no consistent coherent
> physical laws at all.


The question is; what are their relative probability measure? What can  
I expect.

>
>
>
>>> And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my
>>> mental state at that instant.  In the materialist view, my mental
>>> state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that
>>> instant.
>>
>> Which cannot be maintained with the comp hyp. Your consciousness is  
>> an
>> abstract type related to all computations going through your current
>> state.
>
> I see what my "current state" does here with respect to
> consciousness.  But I don't see what the "computations going through
> it" contribute.

They contribute to the measure which gives sense to the "universal"  
physical laws.

>
>
>
>>> I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my
>>> perceptions of a doctor.  Every possible outcome of the "brain
>>> replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive.
>>
>> Not in the relative way. You have to explain why you see apples
>> falling from a tree, and not any arbitrary information-theoretical  
>> data.
>
> I explain it by asserting that there are many versions of me, some who
> see apples, and some who see arbitrary information-theoretical data.
> Everything that can be perceived is perceived.

Without giving me a measure, it is like your theory predicts  
everything. This is contradicted by the fact. If I want coffee now, I  
know all to well I have to do something for that. Sorry but I cannot  
wait for a white rabbit bringing me my cup of coffee.

>
>
>
>>> Including outcomes that don't make any sense.
>>
>> You have to explain why they are *rare*. If not your theory does not
>> explain why you put water on the gas and not in the fridge when you
>> want a cup of coffee.
>
> I don't say that they are rare, I say they don't make any sense.  A
> big difference.
>

If they make any sense then they does not exist in Platonia, except in  
non standard mathematical representation (due to incompleteness). Then  
they have better to be rare relatively to my current state, or your  
theory is deflationnary: it predicts every-events.



> I say that every possible event is perceived to happen, and so nothing
> is more or less rare than anything else.

It has to be at least in the relative way, if not your theory predicts  
all happenings, even in practice, but the facts contradict this.



>  There are only things that
> are rare in your experience.

This is what comp can explain. This is what the universal dovetailer  
got normal explanations of measure one. The counting algorithm does not.


> They are not rare in an absolute sense.

Probably. I don't know because the proba are always relative with  
comp, but this is an old discussion (cf ASSA/RSSA).



>
>
> Why do I say this?  Because I think that platonism is the best
> explanation for conscious experience, and the above view is (I think)
> the logical conclusion of that platonic view of reality.

I agree with the platonism. And it is because the computations are ion  
platonia that the whole thing works.

>
>
>
>>> Thus the talk of
>>> probabilities and measures.  I'm willing to just say that all
>>> universes are experienced.
>>
>> That is absolutely true. But we don't live in the absolute (except
>> perhaps with salvia :).
>
> I say that we do live in the absolute.  Not all experiences of the
> absolute will be strange.  If all possible experiences exist in the
> absolute, then by definition some will be quite ordinary and mundane.
> Right?

Sure. But only in normal (measure 1) histories they remain normal. If  
you don't address the first person, singular and plural, indeterminacy  
problems, you don't solve the mind body problem, nor the body problem  
(the origin of the appearance of a stable physical universe).






>
>
> But, right, salvia gives a taste of how strange experience can be.
> And also schizophrenia, dementia, and various other mental conditions
> and abnormalities cause by damage to the brain are further examples.
>
> How does your computational theory consciousness explain the
> perceptions of these people?


By the Galois connection between machine and behaviors, or equation  
and surfaces, or theories and models.

If you have a system of equation, and decide to drop out some  
equations, making the system more little, you get more solutions, more  
hypersurfaces realizing the reamining equations. Similarly when you  
drop out axioms from a theory, the theory will have more models.  
Similarly when you "diminish" a brain, you enlarge the possible  
consciousness. The consciousness of the universal person (universal  
consciousness) exists in Platonia. Its "platonic brain" is any little  
theory + induction axioms. It differentiate through the consistent  
extensions, which exist also in Platonia. So many such extension  
exists that a notion of normality and stability is necessarily  
perceived from inside: the physical laws emerge. Making a part of your  
brain sleepy or perturbated can let you experience unusual but real  
reality types.




>
>
>
>> That is true, but we want to explain "the stable appearance of atoms
>> and galaxies", and what happens when we die.
>
> Some observers will see stable atoms and galaxies.  Because that's one
> of the possible sets of experience.  Other observers won't see these
> things.

I can explain to you that almost all observers will observe the same  
physical laws everywhere in Platonia. You are the one saying that  
physics is contingent now.

The nice thing with comp is that physics is necessary, and necessarily  
the same for all observers/universal machines. Only geography and  
history can be (very) different. Practically when we die, things are  
more complex to predict, because you shift  toward less normal world  
and (I think) you can come back to universal consciousness, an amnesic  
state where you forget the more particular differentiated dreams. It  
is an open problem to evaluate the probaility to survive with all your  
memories, like if your normal life continues (it is not null, but at  
each DU-step k it is multiplied by something (much) less than 1/2^k, I  
think.

>
>
>
>> You are right. But consciousness is the only thing I have no doubt
>> about. The *only* undoubtable thing. The fixed point of the cartesian
>> systematic doubting attitude. A theory which eliminate my first
>> person, or my consciousness, although irrefutable by me, is wrong, I
>> hope, I hope it to be wrong for you too. (Why would I send a post on
>> consciousness to a zombie?)
>
> Right, I'm with you on this.  Consciousness is the one thing that
> can't be doubted.  And that's where the trouble starts...

That's where science stars. That is why we have fun discussing  
theories and arguments :)

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Brent Meeker-2]

Kelly wrote:

> On Apr 26, 1:08 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
>  
>> These are "edges" in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary.
>> If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking
>> about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval
>> that has duration and direction.
>>    
>
> Uhhhhhhhhh....what???
>
> I think you should re-read my post.  I think you missed something.
>  

No, I think you're missing my point.  Consider your analogy of fitting
together images to make a complete picture.  You present this as a
spatial representation of the sequential flow of consciousness.  Now
suppose your spatial elements have zero extent - they are "spatial
instants", i.e. points.  What fits them together?

>
>  
>>> Well, I'm not sure how much of the brain's information is needed to
>>> represent a particular state of consciousness.  But I don't think that
>>> it's a crucial question.
>>>      
>> It's a crucial question if the answer is "more than what is in an
>> instant of consciousness."
>>    
>
> Why is it a crucial question in that case?  I don't see what you're
> getting at.

It appears to me that you are implicitly supposing that information in
the brain (say in it's structure) can be associated with an instant of
consciousness and hence allow it's position in the "complete picture" to
be determined.  But it would not be a legitimate move to use information
that was not in the instant itself.  And that's what I find implausible,
that there is significant information content in a conscious interval of
infinitesimal duration.

Brent

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[Jason Resch-2]

On Sat, Apr 25, 2009 at 3:52 PM, Kelly <harmonk00@...> wrote:

>
> I don't say that they are rare, I say they don't make any sense.  A
> big difference.
>
> I say that every possible event is perceived to happen, and so nothing
> is more or less rare than anything else.  There are only things that
> are rare in your experience.  They are not rare in an absolute sense.
>
> Why do I say this?  Because I think that platonism is the best
> explanation for conscious experience, and the above view is (I think)
> the logical conclusion of that platonic view of reality.
>
>

I am not sure that the measure problem can be so easily
abandoned/ignored.  Assuming every Observer Moment had has an equal
measure, then the random/white-noise filled OMs should vastly
outnumber the ordered and sensible OMs.  Though I ever only have one
OM to go by, the fact I was able to maintain a
non-random/non-white-noise filled OMs long enough to compose this post
should serve as some level of evidence that all OMs are not weighted
equally.

Bruno has suggested that computationalism is a candidate for answering
the measure problem in a testable way.  However there may be other
ways to answer it by considering platonic objects, for example
counting the umber of paths to a state, that is how often it reappears
as a substructure of other platonic objects, etc.  Whether or not this
is testable is another question, but whether the ultimate explanation
of consciousness is computation or information, I feel that measure is
important.

Jason

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