Emulation and Stuff

[david.nyman]

Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on
the list.  So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
stimulating some feedback on this issue .  Anyway, here's what I think
I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
inaccuracies):

1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer, based on a tape
(memory device) of potentially infinite length, that has been shown to
be capable of emulating any type of digital computer, and hence any
other TM.  The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
sufficient time.  In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to put
it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under emulation.

2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.

3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.  Bruno has shown (at
least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
computation, essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
perspective of numbers and their relations.  This is not universally
accepted, but more on this in the next section.  Suffice it to say
that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
numbers all the way down.

4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter, but at the
cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.
Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know; but even
those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
this.  The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically, and
'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
model of stuff and its relations.  But it does entail that no digital
emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
down.

5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
(contingent) model of reality - but of course I don't insist on this.
Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
ontologies.  And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
that you didn't have before.  A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount of
whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
structure it happens to be computing.

Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral.  This
is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices.  I know that Colin isn't
precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.

Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
*specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
concept of 'emulation' in each case?

David

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[Brent Meeker-2]

David Nyman wrote:

> Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
> again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
> of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on
> the list.  So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
> stimulating some feedback on this issue .  Anyway, here's what I think
> I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
> inaccuracies):
>
> 1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer, based on a tape
> (memory device) of potentially infinite length, that has been shown to
> be capable of emulating any type of digital computer, and hence any
> other TM.  The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
> precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
> sufficient time.  In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
> conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to put
> it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under emulation.
>
> 2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
> form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
> capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
> What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
> the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
> transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
> entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
> here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
> could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.
>
> 3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.  Bruno has shown (at
> least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
> computation, essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
> same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
> perspective of numbers and their relations.  This is not universally
> accepted, but more on this in the next section.  Suffice it to say
> that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
> appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
> 'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
> also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
> numbers all the way down.
>
> 4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter, but at the
> cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.
> Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know; but even
> those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
> finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
> basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
> this.  The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
> physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically, and
> 'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
> model of stuff and its relations.  But it does entail that no digital
> emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
> be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
> down.
>  

A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.  
Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which
Turing machines can't produce.  Again it may just be a matter of
"sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
"everything-happens" assumes real numbers.

> 5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
> (contingent) model of reality - but of course I don't insist on this.
> Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
> emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
> whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
> ontologies.  And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
> getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
> digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
> that you didn't have before.  A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount of
> whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
> TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
> structure it happens to be computing.
>  

I can look at it either way.  A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models.  But also
a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as good
as the consciousness it models.

Brent

> Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
> But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
> stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
> Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral.  This
> is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
> merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices.  I know that Colin isn't
> precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
> for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
> for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
> extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.
>
> Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
> distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
> *specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
> concept of 'emulation' in each case?
>
> David
>
> >
>
>  

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[david.nyman]

2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.
> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
> only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which
> Turing machines can't produce.  Again it may just be a matter of
> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.

But the possibility of 'mathematical ontology' would remain a
possibility for physics, even if it turned out that we needed an
alternative to the digital TM as the 'computational substrate'?

> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models

And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
bricks.  By contrast, in terms of numerical ontology, a sufficiently
complete 'model' would actually *constitute* the stuff it emulated
(i.e. indicating the quite different force of 'emulation' in this
case).  Yes?

> But also a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as good
> as the consciousness it models.

If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree.  But as
before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency.  If we accept
for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
great for stuffy brain building.  But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?
And if that is so, then a stuffy brain running a computation is
likewise just a stuffy brain running a computation: equally WYSIWYG.
The only way you invoke consciousness in either case is by the
straight a priori assumption: stuffy computation => consciousness.
But according to lazy Olympia, going about computation in such a
stuffy way reduces this assumption to an absurdity.

Of course, in terms of numerical ontology, the assumption that
computation => consciousness is equally a priori, but at least it's
not absurd.  In this case, brains, TMs - and bricks - share a
computational ontology, so we can get building.

Reconsidering my recent statements in the light of this, I suspect I'm
trying to eat my cake and have it (an old tendency) - but this might
be OK.  It still seems to me that the a priori ontological assumption
of choice is some fundamental conjunction of self-access +
self-relativisation: i.e.the One, I guess.  Stuff and consciousness -
which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
reality to be settled empirically.

David

> Brent
>> Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
>> But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
>> stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
>> Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral.  This
>> is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
>> merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices.  I know that Colin isn't
>> precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
>> for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
>> for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
>> extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.
>>
>> Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
>> distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
>> *specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
>> concept of 'emulation' in each case?
>>
>> David
>>
>> >
>>
>>
>
>
> >
>

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[Brent Meeker-2]

David Nyman wrote:

> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>> A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.
>> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
>> only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which
>> Turing machines can't produce.  Again it may just be a matter of
>> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
>> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.
>
> But the possibility of 'mathematical ontology' would remain a
> possibility for physics, even if it turned out that we needed an
> alternative to the digital TM as the 'computational substrate'?

Yes, but some of the arguments like the MGA wouldn't work and the UD wouldn't work.

>
>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>
> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
> bricks.  

No, I really mean "as good as".  In other words if we can model every detail of stuffy
existence numerically, then we can suppose that we *are* the numerical model.  We're not
the numerical model that we run, but we're the numerical model in God's computer.

>By contrast, in terms of numerical ontology, a sufficiently
> complete 'model' would actually *constitute* the stuff it emulated
> (i.e. indicating the quite different force of 'emulation' in this
> case).  Yes?
>
>> But also a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as good
>> as the consciousness it models.
>
> If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree.  But as
> before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
> what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
> hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency.  If we accept
> for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
> then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
> bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
> great for stuffy brain building.  But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
> computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?
> And if that is so, then a stuffy brain running a computation is
> likewise just a stuffy brain running a computation: equally WYSIWYG.
> The only way you invoke consciousness in either case is by the
> straight a priori assumption: stuffy computation => consciousness.
> But according to lazy Olympia, going about computation in such a
> stuffy way reduces this assumption to an absurdity.

Except the lazy Olympia and MGA arguments don't go thru for continua.  Of course one could
still approximate a brain by artificial digital neurons, but the continuous nature of
their causal connections may be important.

>
> Of course, in terms of numerical ontology, the assumption that
> computation => consciousness is equally a priori, but at least it's
> not absurd.  In this case, brains, TMs - and bricks - share a
> computational ontology, so we can get building.

Aren't you're just assuming consciousness cannot be what brains do.  It seems that we
assume stuff(i.e. physics) computes it's own evolution.  But if stuff=>computation and
computation=>consciousness it seems stuff=>consciousness.

Brent

>
> Reconsidering my recent statements in the light of this, I suspect I'm
> trying to eat my cake and have it (an old tendency) - but this might
> be OK.  It still seems to me that the a priori ontological assumption
> of choice is some fundamental conjunction of self-access +
> self-relativisation: i.e.the One, I guess.  Stuff and consciousness -
> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
> reality to be settled empirically.
>
> David
>
>> Brent
>>> Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
>>> But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
>>> stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
>>> Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral.  This
>>> is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
>>> merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices.  I know that Colin isn't
>>> precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
>>> for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
>>> for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
>>> extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.
>>>
>>> Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
>>> distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
>>> *specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
>>> concept of 'emulation' in each case?
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> >
>

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi David,

This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart. 

Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you have no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?

On 13 Aug 2009, at 23:01, David Nyman wrote:

Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on
the list.  So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
stimulating some feedback on this issue .  Anyway, here's what I think
I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
inaccuracies):

1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer,

No, Turing tried to capture the notion of a human computer, working with a pencil and paper.

He tried to define mathematically what is human computable, and he is, with Post, and some other are the discoverer of a purely mathematical notion of computation, and this before the appearance of concrete computers. Computers have appeared after. Turing has played a role in that later appearance.  A platonist could say those concrete beings are just pale approximation of the real thing. Later this statement will be made precise, but with the step 8, we just cannot invoke any physical things or physical reality.

To be sure, the fact that computer have been discovered in math, before "in nature" is not an argument, yet it helps a lot to see that, especially for the grasp of the comp supervenience thesis. And that is the reason why I explain that absolutely fundamental mathematical discovery. Computation has nothing to do with physics at the start.

Note that I abstract myself from the pioneer building of a computer by Babbage.

based on a tape
(memory device) of potentially infinite length,

The human computer can use as many papers, or even the wall of its cavern, or of its living room, ... He is a finite being embedded in a non finite available memory-time space.

that has been shown to
be capable of emulating any type of digital computer,

This has not been shown. But this follows from Church Thesis. 

and hence any
other TM.  

What Turing has shown, is that there is a universal Turing machine, capable of simulating all Turing machines. Then that Universal machine can be shown to emulate all existing universal machine, and by Church Thesis: all universal (and particular) machines.

The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
sufficient time.  

OK. But there is an intensional Church thesis, which can be deduced from Church thesis, saying that not only two universal systems can compute the same functions, but they can compute them in the same way (same algorithm). 

In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to put
it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under emulation.

... at some level. OK.

2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.

Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical. The reversal is done at that step. I guess you are right that it could be a better idea to do the step 8 before, but it is more difficult for most. Any way, computational supervenience is defined after step 8.

Then we will discover that "Colin is right" no piece of matter should be Turing emulable. The mathematics of physics will have to escape the turing emulable. The apparent turing emulability of the world around us, is a threat to indexical comp (the idea that "I am machine").

Of course I disagree with Colin's reasoning where he deduce the non Turing emulability of nature from the non emulability of mind. UDA deduces the non Turing-emulability of matter from the non Turing-emulability of the mind. And the proof is constructive. It redefines precisely what "matter" consists in.

3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.

Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and rather subtle, no doubt. 

But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me that. 

 Bruno has shown (at
least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
computation,

The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my state of mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of computations going through that state, and that my next state, from my first person point of view is indeterminate on the set of all those computations.

essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
perspective of numbers and their relations.  

True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not necessarily computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.

This is not universally
accepted, but more on this in the next section.  

This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is understood quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.

Suffice it to say
that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
numbers all the way down.

No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to say that it's got to be number all the way up. It makes the comp immaterial appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing emulable, a priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of UDA1-6 in the step-7.

4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,

We can't by step 8; but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more make sense at all. The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a infinite sum of infinite computations including infinities of white rabbits-computations. The apparent computability of the physical laws *is* a problem for the indexical computationalist. 

but at the
cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.

Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can save computation for both mind and body. Colin is correct for saying bodies cannot be computable, but this follows from the mind being "computable", in the "yes doctor" sense, not from the scientist mind being non computable.

Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;

Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of understanding or not (or to find a mistake).

but even
those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
this.  

That is comp, before UDA, before the necessary reversal. 

The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically,

Comp-stuffiness *is* a priori not algorithmic. 

and
'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
model of stuff and its relations.  

UDA entails there is no stuff at all. No stuff capable of justifying in any way the observation of stuff.

But it does entail that no digital
emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
down.

Well, with comp+physicalism. But this is inconsistent, at the epistemological level.

5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
(contingent) model of reality -

Hmm... The "numerical model", but non-computational model,  is necessary by reasoning. The contingent realities are well explained, and the stuffy model is not contingent but impossible.

but of course I don't insist on this.
Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
ontologies.  

But "stuffy" or just primitively physical, after UDA has no more any meaning.

And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
that you didn't have before.  A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount of
whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
structure it happens to be computing.

Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral.  This
is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices.  I know that Colin isn't
precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.

Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
*specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
concept of 'emulation' in each case?

You don't yet have grasped the UDA yet. It makes the stuffy things not just useless for having computations and relative emulation, but it makes, it is the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant for physical objects too.  

There is just no stuff available. Even if we introduce it, it makes no change in consciousness, and can't have any relation with what we observe in nature. We will come back on this.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 01:05, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
>> again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
>> of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability -  
>> on
>> the list.  So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
>> stimulating some feedback on this issue .  Anyway, here's what I  
>> think
>> I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
>> inaccuracies):
>>
>> 1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer, based on a tape
>> (memory device) of potentially infinite length, that has been shown  
>> to
>> be capable of emulating any type of digital computer, and hence any
>> other TM.  The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
>> precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
>> sufficient time.  In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
>> conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to put
>> it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under  
>> emulation.
>>
>> 2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
>> form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
>> capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
>> What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
>> the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
>> transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
>> entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
>> here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of  
>> physics
>> could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.
>>
>> 3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.  Bruno has shown  
>> (at
>> least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
>> computation, essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
>> same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
>> perspective of numbers and their relations.  This is not universally
>> accepted, but more on this in the next section.  Suffice it to say
>> that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
>> appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
>> 'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
>> also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
>> numbers all the way down.
>>
>> 4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter, but at the
>> cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.
>> Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know; but even
>> those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that  
>> happens
>> finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
>> basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
>> this.  The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
>> physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically, and
>> 'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics  
>> as a
>> model of stuff and its relations.  But it does entail that no digital
>> emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
>> be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
>> down.
>>
>
> A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.
> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers.

The appearance of the continuum is a consequence of comp. If digital  
or constructive physics is possible, then by UDA comp if false. Of  
course digital physics entails trivially comp. So digital physics is  
inconsistent (with or without comp).



> It can
> only be approximated digitally.

Yes. Comp explains this, I mean the "can only", in the best case.  
Today there are still too much non computable white rabbits. So,  
strictly speaking, it is an open problem.




> QM supposes true randomness, which
> Turing machines can't produce.

Well, here too comp explains the randomnes, by the (hopefully plural)  
first person indeterminacy. QM randomness is just the randomness due  
to our self-multiplication (or differentiation) in the many-dreams.




>  Again it may just be a matter of
> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.

Comp forces this to be true.

>
>> 5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
>> (contingent) model of reality - but of course I don't insist on this.
>> Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
>> emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
>> whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
>> ontologies.  And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
>> getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
>> digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
>> that you didn't have before.  A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount  
>> of
>> whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
>> TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
>> structure it happens to be computing.
>>
>
> I can look at it either way.  A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models.  But  
> also
> a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as  
> good
> as the consciousness it models.

The stuffy model works for consciousness only if  consciousness is a  
actually infinite stuffy thing itself, making indexical comp false.

But you told us that you still don't follow step-8, so I am not  
astonished by this reply. More explanations will be given.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:

>
> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>> A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.
>> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
>> only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which
>> Turing machines can't produce.  Again it may just be a matter of
>> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
>> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.
>
> But the possibility of 'mathematical ontology' would remain a
> possibility for physics, even if it turned out that we needed an
> alternative to the digital TM as the 'computational substrate'?

Not at all. With comp, the basic "level" has to be any universal  
system. (N,+,*) of combinators or JAVA, whatever. Quantum like stuffy  
bricks have to emerge from the inside first person indeterminacy. The  
proble of comp is that such a stuff is a priori not digitally  
emulable. The quantum computer is a threat to comp! That is why I have  
developed AUDA, it shows that universal machine have a highly non  
trivial epistemology and physics, so that hope remains to save comp by  
providing the comp explanation of the origin of the apparent quantum  
waves.


>
>
>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>
> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
> bricks.

You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing  
machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified  
from number and logic alone.



> By contrast, in terms of numerical ontology, a sufficiently
> complete 'model' would actually *constitute* the stuff it emulated
> (i.e. indicating the quite different force of 'emulation' in this
> case).  Yes?

Only for the mind. Matter escapes computation, once we assume that  
"we" are machine.

I think that you fail to take into account simultaneously UDA1-6,  
UDA-7, and UDA-8. I know it is not easy.

>
>
>> But also a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy  
>> model is as good
>> as the consciousness it models.
>
> If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree.  But as
> before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
> what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
> hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency.  If we accept
> for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
> then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
> bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
> great for stuffy brain building.  But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
> computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?

You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can run  
a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that computation,  
it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and relative  
computations as well, and from the perspective of that consciousness,  
it entails that if the person (with consciousness) decide to look at  
his stuffy neighborhood, below its comp-substitution, he will discover  
the trace of that, a priori non turing emulable, infinities of  
computations.


>
> And if that is so, then a stuffy brain running a computation is
> likewise just a stuffy brain running a computation: equally WYSIWYG.
> The only way you invoke consciousness in either case is by the
> straight a priori assumption: stuffy computation => consciousness.
> But according to lazy Olympia, going about computation in such a
> stuffy way reduces this assumption to an absurdity.

OK. And then UDA1-7 shows that any possible observable "stuffy" thing  
is given by a probability/credibility measure on an infinity of  
computations.

>
>
> Of course, in terms of numerical ontology, the assumption that
> computation => consciousness is equally a priori, but at least it's
> not absurd.  In this case, brains, TMs - and bricks - share a
> computational ontology, so we can get building.

Hmm... Not really. The bricks become a priori beyond the computable.  
Immaterial, like number relation, but non computable, like a  
probability on a infinite, even continuous, realities made of infinite  
computations.


>
>
> Reconsidering my recent statements in the light of this, I suspect I'm
> trying to eat my cake and have it (an old tendency) - but this might
> be OK.  It still seems to me that the a priori ontological assumption
> of choice is some fundamental conjunction of self-access +
> self-relativisation: i.e.the One, I guess.

Here we are back on our little theological divergence. I may insist  
you take a look on the Plotinus paper. The ONE is really arithmetical  
truth before any notion of self is yet defined. Once a notion of self  
appears, truth degenerate into provable provability and true  
provability (G and G*, the eterrestrial intellect and the divine  
intellect), which will degenerate into the universal self/soul (the  
God of the eastern). And this one, due to tension with the intellect,  
will fall, and that fall generate the non Turing emulable stuffy  
matter. Then the soul will try to go back to the ONE. Except that this  
temporal image is a bit a simplification. In a sense the fall and the  
coming back are the same arithmetical process. "The ONE see the  
falling souls, and the souls see their rise to the ONE. Same  
arithmetical truth, but from different points of view.



> Stuff and consciousness -
> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
> reality to be settled empirically.

With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we discover a  
computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say yes  
to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:

>
>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>
>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>> bricks.
>
> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
> from number and logic alone.
>

Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.

>
>> Stuff and consciousness -
>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>> reality to be settled empirically.
>
> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we discover a
> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say yes
> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.

I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
our consciousness is too.

Regards,
Quentin


> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>



--
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[Bruno Marchal]

Rex, I have seen your post and I will take the time needed to answer  
it cautiously.

Quentin, your post is simpler to answer, so I do it no, but then I  
have to do some works.


On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:
>>
>>
>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>>
>>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model -  
>>> but
>>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>>> bricks.
>>
>> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
>> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
>> from number and logic alone.
>>
>
> Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
> quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
> will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
> I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.

Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the  
physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite  
computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which  
is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem  
(*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
hypostases).

>
>
>
>>
>>> Stuff and consciousness -
>>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into  
>>> this.
>>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions  
>>> till
>>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will  
>>> play
>>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>>> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>>> reality to be settled empirically.
>>
>> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we  
>> discover a
>> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say  
>> yes
>> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
>
> I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
> our consciousness is too.

You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is  
Turing emulable   (obvious).
But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical  
reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)

 From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality  
is NOT turing emulable.

This entails that: Reality is NOT turing emulable. With or without comp.

The prospect that reality is described by a quantum computation is not  
yet ruled out, because the non computable part of reality could still  
be only the first person indeterminacy. The non computable feature  
would be the "geographic" one, like finding oneself in Washington  
instead of Moscow after a self-duplication experiment.


Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:

>
> Rex, I have seen your post and I will take the time needed to answer
> it cautiously.
>
> Quentin, your post is simpler to answer, so I do it no, but then I
> have to do some works.
>
>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>>>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>>>
>>>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model -
>>>> but
>>>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>>>> bricks.
>>>
>>> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
>>> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
>>> from number and logic alone.
>>>
>>
>> Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
>> quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
>> will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
>> I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.
>http://cpc.cx/lP
>
> Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
> physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
> computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
> is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
> (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
> hypostases).
>

I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.

>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> Stuff and consciousness -
>>>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into
>>>> this.
>>>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>>>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions
>>>> till
>>>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will
>>>> play
>>>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>>>> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>>>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>>>> reality to be settled empirically.
>>>
>>> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we
>>> discover a
>>> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say
>>> yes
>>> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
>>
>> I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
>> our consciousness is too.
>
> You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is
> Turing emulable   (obvious).
> But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
> reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)
>
>  From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality
> is NOT turing emulable.
>

Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
fact there is a computable theory of reality). So your objections is
correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
contradiction.

So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
(not COMP), or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
already disproven to disprove the theory.

> This entails that: Reality is NOT turing emulable. With or without comp.
>
> The prospect that reality is described by a quantum computation is not
> yet ruled out, because the non computable part of reality could still
> be only the first person indeterminacy. The non computable feature
> would be the "geographic" one, like finding oneself in Washington
> instead of Moscow after a self-duplication experiment.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>

Regards,
Quentin

--
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[Flammarion]

On 14 Aug, 02:18, David Nyman <david.ny...@...> wrote:
> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meeke...@...>:

> If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree.  But as
> before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
> what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
> hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency.  If we accept
> for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
> then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
> bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
> great for stuffy brain building.  But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
> computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?

The standard response is that cogitation is one of a special subset
of tasks where the gap between simualtion and realisation vanishes.
Simulated flying isn't flying, but simuilated chess *is* chess.

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[Flammarion]

On 14 Aug, 04:34, Brent Meeker <meeke...@...> wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:

> > And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
> > you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
> > bricks.
>
> No, I really mean "as good as".  In other words if we can model every detail of stuffy
> existence numerically, then we can suppose that we *are* the numerical model.

To suppose that we are in a model running on a stuffy computer
violates
occam's razor. To suppose that we are in a model made out of free-
standing maths
requires an assumption of Platonism

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[Flammarion]

On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can run
> a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that computation,
> it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and relative
> computations as well,

There's your Platonism. If nothing immaterial exists (NB "nothing",
I don't make exceptions for just a few pixies or juse a few numbers)
there is nothiign for a cosnc. to attach itself to except a propbably
small, probabuily singular set of stuiffy brains and computers.

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.
> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
> only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which
> Turing machines can't produce.

As Bruno said, a branching algorithm can produce true randomness from
the perspective of the embedded observer.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[david.nyman]

 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:

> Hi David,
> This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart.
> Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you have
> no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?

Don't worry Bruno, nothing pleases me more than discovering precisely
in what ways I am wrong!  Having said this, I think you sometimes get
into a bit of trouble following me because of the way I structure my
arguments (my fault I'm sure).  When I say something like "if we
assume x, then y follows" it doesn't mean that I'm saying that I
*believe* x or y; I'm just attempting to establish a position in order
to compare it with what I'm going to say next.  Sorry if this is
already obvious to you, but I'll try to point to examples where
relevant.

> 1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer,
>
> No, Turing tried to capture the notion of a human computer, working with a
> pencil and paper.
> He tried to define mathematically what is human computable, and he is, with
> Post, and some other are the discoverer of a purely mathematical notion of
> computation, and this before the appearance of concrete computers. Computers
> have appeared after. Turing has played a role in that later appearance.  A
> platonist could say those concrete beings are just pale approximation of the
> real thing. Later this statement will be made precise, but with the step 8,
> we just cannot invoke any physical things or physical reality.
> To be sure, the fact that computer have been discovered in math, before "in
> nature" is not an argument, yet it helps a lot to see that, especially for
> the grasp of the comp supervenience thesis. And that is the reason why I
> explain that absolutely fundamental mathematical discovery. Computation has
> nothing to do with physics at the start.
> Note that I abstract myself from the pioneer building of a computer by
> Babbage.

Thanks for this amplification.

> This has not been shown. But this follows from Church Thesis.

Thanks, I wasn't sure about this.

> and hence any
> other TM.
>
> What Turing has shown, is that there is a universal Turing machine, capable
> of simulating all Turing machines. Then that Universal machine can be shown
> to emulate all existing universal machine, and by Church Thesis: all
> universal (and particular) machines.

OK

> The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
> precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
> sufficient time.
>
> OK. But there is an intensional Church thesis, which can be deduced from
> Church thesis, saying that not only two universal systems can compute the
> same functions, but they can compute them in the same way (same algorithm).

OK

> 2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
> form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
> capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
> What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
> the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
> transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
> entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
> here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
> could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.
>
> Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical. The reversal is done at
> that step. I guess you are right that it could be a better idea to do the
> step 8 before, but it is more difficult for most. Any way, computational
> supervenience is defined after step 8.

Now when you say "Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical" we
might have an example of 'taking things out of sequence'.  In this
section I hadn't yet made the assumption of UDA-8.  I was just setting
out what I understand with respect to the ordinary sense of the
physical as being mathematically describable in some way.

> Then we will discover that "Colin is right" no piece of matter should be Turing emulable     > The mathematics of physics will have to escape the turing emulable. The apparent turing  > emulability of the world around us, is a threat to indexical comp (the idea that "I am         > machine"). Of course I disagree with Colin's reasoning where he deduce the non Turing    > emulability of nature from the non emulability of mind. UDA deduces the non Turing-         > emulability of matter from the non Turing-emulability of the mind. And the proof is             > constructive. It redefines precisely what "matter" consists in.

Ah!  So by 'the non Turing-emulability of matter' I take you to refer
to the example of Olympia: i.e. the argument that shows that
computation can't depend on the physicality of a TM.  So it follows
that neither mind nor matter are 'emulable' by - in the strong sense
of being constituted by - a *physical* TM.  Rather, the reverse is
true - both (including the now 'apparently physical TM') are
constituted by infinities of computations in a highly-specific
relation: i.e. the UD.

On the basis of the above, I can perhaps see why you say "The apparent
turing emulability of the world around us, is a threat to indexical
comp (the idea that "I am machine")", if one were to take
'emulability' in the strong sense above, since we would now seem to
have a contradiction of some sort.  But - and I stress I mean outside
of the UDA framework - I have been accustomed to understand
'emulation' in the sense of a mathematical model of the evolution of
physical systems, not an ontological reversal with what-is-emulated -
hence this post.  Why would the 'Turing emulability' of nature in this
weaker sense constitute a threat to comp?

> 3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.
>
> Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and rather
> subtle, no doubt.
> But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me that.

I think the ordinary English usage of 'controversial' is that there is
considerable disagreement - of which this list demonstrates ample
proof!  It doesn't imply that it is wrong.  But I didn't mean to
offend.

> Bruno has shown (at
> least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
> computation,
>
> The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my state of
> mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of computations
> going through that state, and that my next state, from my first person point
> of view is indeterminate on the set of all those computations.

Yes, I'll avoid saying "a computation".

> essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
> same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
> perspective of numbers and their relations.
>
> True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as
> computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not necessarily
> computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.
>
> This is not universally
> accepted, but more on this in the next section.
>
> This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is understood
> quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.

When I make a gesture to one side of the argument (i.e. the simple
fact that they don't - in fact - accept it) the other side objects!
But I understand your frustration.

> Suffice it to say
> that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
> appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
> 'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
> also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
> numbers all the way down.
>
> No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to say that
> it's got to be number all the way up.

Yes, I nearly said 'all the way up'.

>  It makes the comp immaterial
> appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing emulable, a
> priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of UDA1-6 in the
> step-7.

Ah, this is a key point, I suspect.  Now, in my pre-UDA ("beam me up
Scotty") way of thinking about it, I saw that teleportation could be
coherent only if consciousness was seen in terms of a movable
viewpoint within some larger context, not as consisting in a
'thing-in-itself' - hence the a priori 1-person indeterminacy.
Consequently this also implied that the brain - matter itself - must
be seen somehow in this way too, but I was unable to say how.  Anyway,
now I see the Star Trek part as UDA1-6.  UDA-7 introduces the UD
itself, and from this, that "comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a
infinite sum of infinite computations including infinities of white
rabbits-computations".

UDA-8 crucially shows - finally - that the computations cannot
themselves supervene on stuffy matter - i.e. the 'stuffy TM' one
previously assumed they were running on.  So the overall picture
derived from this is that both the first person and the appearance of
matter are complex - and, in any specific instance, a priori
indeterminate - emergents from this infinite blizzard of computation;
hence 'individual instances' of minds and bodies can't be regarded as
'isolated computations'.  Is this is what you mean when you say that
matter is "non turing emulable, a priori"?

> 4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,
>
> We can't by step 8;

Surely we can if we're willing to drop the computational theory of
mind?  Note that I say this later on (another sequencing problem).

>  but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more make
> sense at all.

Yes, but my point was that one isn't forced to accept the UDA, as long
as one is equally willing to give up the computational theory of mind.
 Faced with the UDA, I suspect many non-specialists might well see
that as preferable to relinquishing their grasp on stuffy matter.  I'm
not making claims about the correctness of positions here, I'm just
contrasting them.

 The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a infinite sum of
> infinite computations including infinities of white rabbits-computations.
> The apparent computability of the physical laws *is* a problem for the
> indexical computationalist.
>
> but at the
> cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.
>
> Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can save
> computation for both mind and body.

Yes, but I agree with you that this doesn't work.

> Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;
>
> Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of
> understanding or not (or to find a mistake).

Whoa!  It's a fact that not everyone agrees.  This is obviously true,
because when I don't say this, the ones that don't, start disagreeing!
 Your point is that disagreement isn't refutation (or even
understanding).

> but even
> those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
> finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
> basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
> this.
>
> That is comp, before UDA, before the necessary reversal.

The reversal is necessary only to save the computational theory of mind, surely?

> The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
> physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically,
>
> Comp-stuffiness *is* a priori not algorithmic.

Yes, but I was referring here to matter in the stuffy sense, precisely
to *contrast* it with the comp sense.  IOW mathematics is still
"unreasonably effective" even if it turns out that comp doesn't go
through as a TOE.

> and
> 'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
> model of stuff and its relations.
>
> UDA entails there is no stuff at all. No stuff capable of justifying in any
> way the observation of stuff.

Yes, of course, I know this!  This is what makes me think you have a
problem with the way I present the argument in stages.  I was trying
to characterise the stuffy model in its own terms (with the caveat
that IMO this entails abandoning the comp theory of mind), as well as
comp (however inadequately) also in its own terms.  I just get
confused when you interpolate comp objections when I'm not saying
anything about comp.

> But it does entail that no digital
> emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
> be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
> down.
>
> Well, with comp+physicalism. But this is inconsistent, at the
> epistemological level.

Yes, but there's no reason to claim that comp is necessarily the
*only* theory of mind. Physicalism itself isn't necessarily
inconsistent at the epistemological level, but it does need a
different theory of mind - IMO.

> Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
> emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
> whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
> ontologies.
>
> But "stuffy" or just primitively physical, after UDA has no more any
> meaning.

Again, surely only on the basis that a stuffy theory still hangs on to
comp as a theory of mind?  Can't we escape the UDA in this way, even
in principle?

> Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
> distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
> *specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
> concept of 'emulation' in each case?
>
> You don't yet have grasped the UDA yet. It makes
> the stuffy things not just
> useless for having computations and relative emulation, but it makes, it is
> the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant for physical
> objects too.

Well, I'm always willing to stand corrected, but I had hoped in my
post on Olympia to show you finally that I had indeed grasped
*exactly* this point. My questions in this post about emulation were
really directed to clarifying the stuffy-ontology position, as a
result of the debate with Colin: i.e. what does emulation mean in a
stuffy context?  The common sense view is that - if stuff is primitive
- emulation can only be a 3-description.  However, if numbers are
primitive, then in principle mathematical structures - in very special
relation, as you argue - actually *constitute* reality, not just
describe it.

I think what muddies the waters all the time is the physicalist
assumption that 'immaterial computation' can still be claimed account
for the mind on the basis of a stuffy ontology.  Without this, we
would have more or less the simple dichotomy I propose: i.e.
stuffy-ontology => stuffy stuff + stuffy mind; or comp-ontology =>
comp stuff + comp mind.  Each side could then argue against the
other's position, but at least without laying claim to each other's
'stuff'!

> There is just no stuff available. Even if we introduce it, it makes no
> change in consciousness, and can't have any relation with what we observe in
> nature

On the basis of the comp theory of mind-body: yes, definitely, no question.

David

 We will come back on this.
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> >
>

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Hi David,
>
> This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart.
> Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you
> have no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?
>
>
> On 13 Aug 2009, at 23:01, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
>> again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
>> of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on
>> the list.  So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
>> stimulating some feedback on this issue .  Anyway, here's what I think
>> I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
>> inaccuracies):
>>
>> 1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer,
>
> No, Turing tried to capture the notion of a human computer, working with
> a pencil and paper.
> He tried to define mathematically what is human computable, and he is,
> with Post, and some other are the discoverer of a purely mathematical
> notion of computation, and this before the appearance of concrete
> computers. Computers have appeared after. Turing has played a role in
> that later appearance.  

You are of course right about Turing.  He was thinking of human computation.  But he was
preceded by some real computers, notably those of Charles Babbage.

As an aside, when I was in college I worked during summers for a geophysical research
company in Texas.   I calculated subsurface distances from sonic echo records.  My
official job title was "Computer".

>A platonist could say those concrete beings are
> just pale approximation of the real thing. Later this statement will be
> made precise, but with the step 8, we just cannot invoke any physical
> things or physical reality.
> To be sure, the fact that computer have been discovered in math, before
> "in nature" is not an argument, yet it helps a lot to see that,
> especially for the grasp of the comp supervenience thesis. And that is
> the reason why I explain that absolutely fundamental mathematical
> discovery. Computation has nothing to do with physics at the start.
> Note that I abstract myself from the pioneer building of a computer by
> Babbage.
>
>
>
>> based on a tape
>> (memory device) of potentially infinite length,
>
>
> The human computer can use as many papers, or even the wall of its
> cavern, or of its living room, ... He is a finite being embedded in a
> non finite available memory-time space.
>
>
>
>> that has been shown to
>> be capable of emulating any type of digital computer,
>
>
> This has not been shown. But this follows from Church Thesis.
>
>
>
>> and hence any
>> other TM.  
>
>
> What Turing has shown, is that there is a universal Turing machine,
> capable of simulating all Turing machines. Then that Universal machine
> can be shown to emulate all existing universal machine, and by Church
> Thesis: all universal (and particular) machines.
>
>
>
>
>> The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
>> precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
>> sufficient time.  
>
>
> OK. But there is an intensional Church thesis, which can be deduced from
> Church thesis, saying that not only two universal systems can compute
> the same functions, but they can compute them in the same way (same
> algorithm).
>
>
>
>> In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
>> conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to put
>> it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under emulation.
>
> ... at some level. OK.
>
>
>>
>>
>> 2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
>> form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
>> capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
>> What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
>> the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
>> transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
>> entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
>> here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
>> could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.
>
> Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical. The reversal is done
> at that step. I guess you are right that it could be a better idea to do
> the step 8 before, but it is more difficult for most. Any way,
> computational supervenience is defined after step 8.
> Then we will discover that "Colin is right" no piece of matter should be
> Turing emulable. The mathematics of physics will have to escape the
> turing emulable. The apparent turing emulability of the world around us,
> is a threat to indexical comp (the idea that "I am machine").
> Of course I disagree with Colin's reasoning where he deduce the non
> Turing emulability of nature from the non emulability of mind. UDA
> deduces the non Turing-emulability of matter from the non
> Turing-emulability of the mind. And the proof is constructive. It
> redefines precisely what "matter" consists in.
>
>
>>
>>
>> 3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.
>
> Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and rather
> subtle, no doubt.
> But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me that.
>
>
>
>>  Bruno has shown (at
>> least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
>> computation,
>
> The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my state of
> mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of
> computations going through that state, and that my next state, from my
> first person point of view is indeterminate on the set of all those
> computations.

But don't you start with the hypothesis that saying yes to the doctor continues your mind?
  Are you contemplating that the brain may do something that is not computable or only
that the world is not computable?

>
>
>
>> essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
>> same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
>> perspective of numbers and their relations.  
>
> True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as
> computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not
> necessarily computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.
>
>
>> This is not universally
>> accepted, but more on this in the next section.  
>
> This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is
> understood quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.
>
>
>> Suffice it to say
>> that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
>> appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
>> 'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
>> also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
>> numbers all the way down.
>
>
> No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to say
> that it's got to be number all the way up. It makes the comp immaterial
> appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing
> emulable, a priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of
> UDA1-6 in the step-7.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> 4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,
>
> We can't by step 8; but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more
> make sense at all. The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a infinite
> sum of infinite computations including infinities of white
> rabbits-computations. The apparent computability of the physical laws
> *is* a problem for the indexical computationalist.
>
>
>> but at the
>> cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.
>
> Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can save
> computation for both mind and body.

I don't care where stuffy matter comes from, but whatever the TOE is, I want it to recover
stuffy matter because that allows it to connect to all the science we have based on stuffy
matter.

Brent

>Colin is correct for saying bodies
> cannot be computable, but this follows from the mind being "computable",
> in the "yes doctor" sense, not from the scientist mind being non computable.
>
>
>
>>
>> Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;
>
> Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of
> understanding or not (or to find a mistake).
>
>
>> but even
>> those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
>> finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
>> basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
>> this.  
>
> That is comp, /before/ UDA, before the necessary reversal.
>
>
>
>> The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
>> physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically,
>
> Comp-stuffiness *is* a priori not algorithmic.
>
>
>> and
>> 'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
>> model of stuff and its relations.  
>
> UDA entails there is no stuff at all. No stuff capable of justifying in
> any way the observation of stuff.
>
>
>> But it does entail that no digital
>> emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
>> be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
>> down.
>
> Well, with comp+physicalism. But this is inconsistent, at the
> epistemological level.
>
>
>>
>>
>> 5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
>> (contingent) model of reality -
>
> Hmm... The "numerical model", but non-computational model,  is necessary
> by reasoning. The contingent realities are well explained, and the
> stuffy model is not contingent but impossible.
>
>
>
>
>> but of course I don't insist on this.
>> Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
>> emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
>> whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
>> ontologies.  
>
> But "stuffy" or just primitively physical, after UDA has no more any
> meaning.
>
>
>
>
>> And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
>> getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
>> digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
>> that you didn't have before.  A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount of
>> whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
>> TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
>> structure it happens to be computing.
>>
>> Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
>> But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
>> stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
>> Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral.  This
>> is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
>> merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices.  I know that Colin isn't
>> precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
>> for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
>> for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
>> extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.
>>
>> Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
>> distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
>> *specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
>> concept of 'emulation' in each case?
>
>
>
> You don't yet have grasped the UDA yet. It makes the stuffy things not
> just useless for having computations and relative emulation, but it
> makes, it is the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant*
> for physical objects too*.  
> There is just no stuff available. Even if we introduce it, it makes no
> change in consciousness, and can't have any relation with what we
> observe in nature. We will come back on this.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 18:05, David Nyman wrote:

 I have been accustomed to understand
'emulation' in the sense of a mathematical model of the evolution of
physical systems, not an ontological reversal with what-is-emulated -
hence this post.  Why would the 'Turing emulability' of nature in this
weaker sense constitute a threat to comp?

In that case I think the word simulation is more appropriate. Emulation strictly works for digital phenomena.

Emulation can be exact, simulation a priori never is.

3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.

Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and rather

subtle, no doubt.

But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me that.

I think the ordinary English usage of 'controversial' is that there is
considerable disagreement - of which this list demonstrates ample
proof!  It doesn't imply that it is wrong.  But I didn't mean to
offend.

You think about Peter Jones? I don't think we can call that a disagreement.

I think many understand UDA1-7, and many probably are interrogative on UDA-8, and the notion of comp supervenience. Some can be skeptical, but that is a sane attitude in front of a "reversal" proposition. I would not call that disagreement. May be we are trapped by different connotation due to english/french slight nuance.

 Bruno has shown (at

least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a

computation,

The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my state of

mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of computations

going through that state, and that my next state, from my first person point

of view is indeterminate on the set of all those computations.

Yes, I'll avoid saying "a computation".

essentially everything else must also be regarded in the

same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the

perspective of numbers and their relations.

True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as

computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not necessarily

computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.

This is not universally

accepted, but more on this in the next section.

This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is understood

quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.

When I make a gesture to one side of the argument (i.e. the simple
fact that they don't - in fact - accept it) the other side objects!
But I understand your frustration.

But who does not accept what? You worry me. Scientists don't play the game of accepting or not accepting proposition. They understand, they refute, or they criticize, the axioms, or the validity of a reasoning.

Suffice it to say

that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the

appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere

'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course

also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be

numbers all the way down.

No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to say that

it's got to be number all the way up.

Yes, I nearly said 'all the way up'.

It makes the comp immaterial

appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing emulable, a

priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of UDA1-6 in the

step-7.

Ah, this is a key point, I suspect.  Now, in my pre-UDA ("beam me up
Scotty") way of thinking about it, I saw that teleportation could be
coherent only if consciousness was seen in terms of a movable
viewpoint within some larger context, not as consisting in a
'thing-in-itself' - hence the a priori 1-person indeterminacy.
Consequently this also implied that the brain - matter itself - must
be seen somehow in this way too, but I was unable to say how.  Anyway,
now I see the Star Trek part as UDA1-6.  UDA-7 introduces the UD
itself, and from this, that "comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a
infinite sum of infinite computations including infinities of white
rabbits-computations".

It is more the comp stuffy matter appearances which has to be made by ...

OK.

UDA-8 crucially shows - finally - that the computations cannot
themselves supervene on stuffy matter - i.e. the 'stuffy TM' one
previously assumed they were running on.

I am not sure I understand. What UDA-8 shows is that consciousness is not related to the physical activity of some machine. Consciousness is related to the truth of some arithmetical relations which defines the computations going through the relevant states at the right level and below.

Computation can supervene on the comp-stuffy matter. Without this no first plural person, nor personal computer.

Hmm.. My be I see what you say, cautious with the wording, or I miss something ...

 So the overall picture
derived from this is that both the first person and the appearance of
matter are complex - and, in any specific instance, a priori
indeterminate - emergents from this infinite blizzard of computation;

Well, it is the problem of matter to which comp force to reduce the mind-body problem. But that blizzard is a well structured part of the arithmetical reality, so it is a mathematical problem. AUDA provides already information on the solution.

hence 'individual instances' of minds and bodies can't be regarded as
'isolated computations'.  Is this is what you mean when you say that
matter is "non turing emulable, a priori"?

A priori, to predict with 100% accuracy the result that "I" will observe when doing an experience in physics, I will have to run the entire UD*, which is an infinite task. Empirically we can bet on very long computations with many high level stable emerging pattern which makes most of them easily simulable, but those are the hard to justify with comp, they have to be relatively multiplied to "save the internal appearance".

4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,

We can't by step 8;

Surely we can if we're willing to drop the computational theory of
mind?  Note that I say this later on (another sequencing problem).

OK, sorry.

but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more make

sense at all.

Yes, but my point was that one isn't forced to accept the UDA, as long
as one is equally willing to give up the computational theory of mind.
Faced with the UDA, I suspect many non-specialists might well see
that as preferable to relinquishing their grasp on stuffy matter.  I'm
not making claims about the correctness of positions here, I'm just
contrasting them.

No problem, you are right. To abandon 1500 years of Aristotelian theology will take time, especially for the atheist which have to understand they were doing theology without saying. 

But you can' disagree with such type of work, because it is mainly question made precise. A statement of a problem. Now this problem was under the rug, since long, and many materialist thought that mechanism, per se, solve the problem.  But comp, per computer science, can only make the problem precise, mathematical.

The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a infinite sum of

infinite computations including infinities of white rabbits-computations.

The apparent computability of the physical laws *is* a problem for the

indexical computationalist.

but at the

cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.

Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can save

computation for both mind and body.

Yes, but I agree with you that this doesn't work.

Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;

Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of

understanding or not (or to find a mistake).

Whoa!  It's a fact that not everyone agrees.  This is obviously true,
because when I don't say this, the ones that don't, start disagreeing!
Your point is that disagreement isn't refutation (or even
understanding).

In science, we can always succeed in agreeing  on what we disagree, and then it means we propose different theories. Before that it is the hard work to understand the theory.

but even

those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens

finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal

basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model

this.

That is comp, before UDA, before the necessary reversal.

The reversal is necessary only to save the computational theory of mind, surely?

Yes. But it is also welcome to give a rationale spectrum of where the laws of physics come from.

The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of

physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically,

Comp-stuffiness *is* a priori not algorithmic.

Yes, but I was referring here to matter in the stuffy sense, precisely
to *contrast* it with the comp sense.  IOW mathematics is still
"unreasonably effective" even if it turns out that comp doesn't go
through as a TOE.

Hmm... If comp is true, then elementary arithmetic goes through as a TOE. 

Comp is an axiom of a sort of "theology", a belief in a form or relative incarnation (yes doctor). Then that theology entails that we don't need more than elementary arithmetic, for the ontology, and arithmetic+induction, for an epistemology, at least for having the big shape. Comp entails that the question of the ontic existence of anything more than what we can defined in arithmetic is absolutely undecidable. We cannot know the cardinal of the universe, in a sense. But from inside, there is not one drop of Cantor paradise, which can't help us. There is a sort of Skolem phenomenon.

and

'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a

model of stuff and its relations.

UDA entails there is no stuff at all. No stuff capable of justifying in any

way the observation of stuff.

Yes, of course, I know this!  This is what makes me think you have a
problem with the way I present the argument in stages.  I was trying
to characterise the stuffy model in its own terms (with the caveat
that IMO this entails abandoning the comp theory of mind),

OK, my fault. I read too quickly. 

as well as
comp (however inadequately) also in its own terms.  I just get
confused when you interpolate comp objections when I'm not saying
anything about comp.

But it does entail that no digital

emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -

be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way

down.

Well, with comp+physicalism. But this is inconsistent, at the

epistemological level.

Yes, but there's no reason to claim that comp is necessarily the
*only* theory of mind.

Of course. But apart from its many weakenings (for which AUDA continue to work) I don't have heard about other "rationalist" approach. 

I tried to build one, a very long time ago, when I was still believing in the quantum wave collapse. 

Physicalism itself isn't necessarily
inconsistent at the epistemological level, but it does need a
different theory of mind - IMO.

I am not even sure of that, but I have no proof, yet. :-)

Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the

emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of

whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy

ontologies.

But "stuffy" or just primitively physical, after UDA has no more any

meaning.

Again, surely only on the basis that a stuffy theory still hangs on to
comp as a theory of mind?  Can't we escape the UDA in this way, even
in principle?

To escape UDA, you have to invent a substantial matter, a substantial mind, and glue them in a way that makes them unduplicable. Using infinities does not help, you have to use genuine complex infinities which prevents your mind to slip in the mathematical world, where infinities can self-multiply. To identify yourself to your quantum state, could seem a good idea, because by the non cloning theorem, your necessarily unknown state (by comp) cannot be cloned, but this does not work because you remain "preparable" in many similar states, and the UD will do this all the times. 

To escape UDA, I am afraid that you will have to diagonalize it, but it is closed for the diagnalization, so perhaps with strong oracles, I don't know. 

Only the ONE could perhaps escape UDA, that is comp's consequences. AUDA points toward the idea that comp makes just the argument against physicalism simpler, but that physicalism could be inconsistent by itself. But I really don't know anything for sure. It is very complex.

Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the

distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with

*specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the

concept of 'emulation' in each case?

You don't yet have grasped the UDA yet. It makes

the stuffy things not just

useless for having computations and relative emulation, but it makes, it is

the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant for physical

objects too.

Well, I'm always willing to stand corrected, but I had hoped in my
post on Olympia to show you finally that I had indeed grasped
*exactly* this point. My questions in this post about emulation were
really directed to clarifying the stuffy-ontology position, as a
result of the debate with Colin: i.e. what does emulation mean in a
stuffy context?  

OK sorry. 

The common sense view is that - if stuff is primitive
- emulation can only be a 3-description.  However, if numbers are
primitive, then in principle mathematical structures - in very special
relation, as you argue - actually *constitute* reality, not just
describe it.

Yes. But in the sense that you are relatively immaterial, when your wife offers you two new bodies for your birthday. Despite this is present in the material frame, "you" somehow is already immaterial. You own your bodies. This immaterial being is a reality.

I expect many realties of that kind, be it person, people, game, galaxies, photons, etc. 

The common sense believes in particles, and everything is made of those particles, and their laws are the fundamental laws. Comp is threatening only the last point, the fundamental aspect of such laws, they have to justified once comp is assumed.

I think what muddies the waters all the time is the physicalist
assumption that 'immaterial computation' can still be claimed account
for the mind on the basis of a stuffy ontology.  Without this, we
would have more or less the simple dichotomy I propose: i.e.
stuffy-ontology => stuffy stuff + stuffy mind;

That's OK. If "stuffy" in "stuffy-mind" is enough sophisticated in its non-comp aspect, then you can save physicalism. This is somehow what Penrose tried.

or comp-ontology =>
comp stuff + comp mind.  

More or less OK. stuff, mind, etc. become arithmetical reality as seen from inside from some angle.

Each side could then argue against the
other's position, but at least without laying claim to each other's
'stuff'!

There is just no stuff available. Even if we introduce it, it makes no

change in consciousness, and can't have any relation with what we observe in

nature

On the basis of the comp theory of mind-body: yes, definitely, no question.

OK. thanks for that precision. I remain open to the idea that someone find that there is something wrong in the reasoning given the difficulty of the subject.

We will come back on this.

OK,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 18:55, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the  
>> cart.
>> Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope  
>> you
>> have no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?
>>
>>
>> On 13 Aug 2009, at 23:01, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have -  
>>> yet
>>> again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
>>> of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability  
>>> - on
>>> the list.  So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
>>> stimulating some feedback on this issue .  Anyway, here's what I  
>>> think
>>> I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
>>> inaccuracies):
>>>
>>> 1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer,
>>
>> No, Turing tried to capture the notion of a human computer, working  
>> with
>> a pencil and paper.
>> He tried to define mathematically what is human computable, and he  
>> is,
>> with Post, and some other are the discoverer of a purely mathematical
>> notion of computation, and this before the appearance of concrete
>> computers. Computers have appeared after. Turing has played a role in
>> that later appearance.
>
> You are of course right about Turing.  He was thinking of human  
> computation.  But he was
> preceded by some real computers, notably those of Charles Babbage.

I love Babbage.


>
> As an aside, when I was in college I worked during summers for a  
> geophysical research
> company in Texas.   I calculated subsurface distances from sonic  
> echo records.  My
> official job title was "Computer".


It is still an open problem for me if, for the english speaker,  
computer really means automatically universal computer, or does it  
means also some non universal device. In french we have the term  
"ordinateur", but it has the connotation of big monumental machine.  
People said "PC" today. The universal thing can take many shapes and  
have many names.

>
>
>> A platonist could say those concrete beings are
>> just pale approximation of the real thing. Later this statement  
>> will be
>> made precise, but with the step 8, we just cannot invoke any physical
>> things or physical reality.
>> To be sure, the fact that computer have been discovered in math,  
>> before
>> "in nature" is not an argument, yet it helps a lot to see that,
>> especially for the grasp of the comp supervenience thesis. And that  
>> is
>> the reason why I explain that absolutely fundamental mathematical
>> discovery. Computation has nothing to do with physics at the start.
>> Note that I abstract myself from the pioneer building of a computer  
>> by
>> Babbage.
>>
>>
>>
>>> based on a tape
>>> (memory device) of potentially infinite length,
>>
>>
>> The human computer can use as many papers, or even the wall of its
>> cavern, or of its living room, ... He is a finite being embedded in a
>> non finite available memory-time space.
>>
>>
>>
>>> that has been shown to
>>> be capable of emulating any type of digital computer,
>>
>>
>> This has not been shown. But this follows from Church Thesis.
>>
>>
>>
>>> and hence any
>>> other TM.
>>
>>
>> What Turing has shown, is that there is a universal Turing machine,
>> capable of simulating all Turing machines. Then that Universal  
>> machine
>> can be shown to emulate all existing universal machine, and by Church
>> Thesis: all universal (and particular) machines.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
>>> precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
>>> sufficient time.
>>
>>
>> OK. But there is an intensional Church thesis, which can be deduced  
>> from
>> Church thesis, saying that not only two universal systems can compute
>> the same functions, but they can compute them in the same way (same
>> algorithm).
>>
>>
>>
>>> In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
>>> conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to  
>>> put
>>> it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under  
>>> emulation.
>>
>> ... at some level. OK.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
>>> form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
>>> capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
>>> What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
>>> the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
>>> transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
>>> entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else:  
>>> help
>>> here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of  
>>> physics
>>> could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.
>>
>> Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical. The reversal is  
>> done
>> at that step. I guess you are right that it could be a better idea  
>> to do
>> the step 8 before, but it is more difficult for most. Any way,
>> computational supervenience is defined after step 8.
>> Then we will discover that "Colin is right" no piece of matter  
>> should be
>> Turing emulable. The mathematics of physics will have to escape the
>> turing emulable. The apparent turing emulability of the world  
>> around us,
>> is a threat to indexical comp (the idea that "I am machine").
>> Of course I disagree with Colin's reasoning where he deduce the non
>> Turing emulability of nature from the non emulability of mind. UDA
>> deduces the non Turing-emulability of matter from the non
>> Turing-emulability of the mind. And the proof is constructive. It
>> redefines precisely what "matter" consists in.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.
>>
>> Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and  
>> rather
>> subtle, no doubt.
>> But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me  
>> that.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Bruno has shown (at
>>> least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded  
>>> as a
>>> computation,
>>
>> The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my  
>> state of
>> mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of
>> computations going through that state, and that my next state, from  
>> my
>> first person point of view is indeterminate on the set of all those
>> computations.
>
> But don't you start with the hypothesis that saying yes to the  
> doctor continues your mind?

Yes.


>  Are you contemplating that the brain may do something that is not  
> computable or only
> that the world is not computable?

Both. Below my substitution level. My histories does not care.

>
>>
>>
>>
>>> essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
>>> same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
>>> perspective of numbers and their relations.
>>
>> True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as
>> computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not
>> necessarily computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.
>>
>>
>>> This is not universally
>>> accepted, but more on this in the next section.
>>
>> This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is
>> understood quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.
>>
>>
>>> Suffice it to say
>>> that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
>>> appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
>>> 'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
>>> also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
>>> numbers all the way down.
>>
>>
>> No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to  
>> say
>> that it's got to be number all the way up. It makes the comp  
>> immaterial
>> appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing
>> emulable, a priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of
>> UDA1-6 in the step-7.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,
>>
>> We can't by step 8; but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more
>> make sense at all. The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a  
>> infinite
>> sum of infinite computations including infinities of white
>> rabbits-computations. The apparent computability of the physical laws
>> *is* a problem for the indexical computationalist.
>>
>>
>>> but at the
>>> cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and  
>>> body.
>>
>> Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can  
>> save
>> computation for both mind and body.
>
> I don't care where stuffy matter comes from, but whatever the TOE  
> is, I want it to recover
> stuffy matter because that allows it to connect to all the science  
> we have based on stuffy
> matter.

I am sure it will, or comp will appear to be false, and then UDA gives  
a tool to measure the degree of non-computationalism. Don't worry, we  
have to be very near the big one to escape the stuffy world.

Look at this in this way: may be it is because I like the stuffy stuff  
so much that I want to assoir it on something more solid than  
observations and guesses.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[russell standish-2]

On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 10:03:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Look at this in this way: may be it is because I like the stuffy stuff  
> so much that I want to assoir it on something more solid than  

                         ^^ seat? - "base" perhaps.

> observations and guesses.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
>

--

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>:

Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the

physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite

computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which

is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem

(*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-

hypostases).

I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.

A quantum computation does not violate Church-turing thesis, because it cannot compute more than a classical machine.

But, a quantum computation covers simultaneously big numbers of classical computations.

The problem of comp today, is that a priori, the "comp computation", seems to cover much more classical histories than we can with quantum computers.

According to what we can say today from the 3th, 4th, and 5th hypostases, (which describe matter) the math are still to hard to say if we the comp-computations, as seen from insides covers less, or more, or the same, histories with the right relative proportions.

You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is

Turing emulable   (obvious).

But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical

reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)

 From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality

is NOT turing emulable.

Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
fact there is a computable theory of reality).

I am not sure I understand.

UDA is a reasoning showing that comp => reality is not computable  (roughly speaking).

UDA is valid, or not valid. But that's another discussion.

So if someone rational believes in a computable reality, it has to abandon comp.

(if p -> q, then ~q -> ~p).

But now, with comp, it should be obvious that reality is not computable, if only because, roughly speaking reality is arithmetical truth, which indeed vastly extends the realm of the computable.

So, with comp, it became astonishing that the physical reality, which is a sort of universal border of the ignorance of all universal machine, looks so much computational.

Thus QM, with its local and sharable indeterminacies is a relief for the one who hope comp to be true (like the day before saying yes to a doctor).

So your objections is
correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
contradiction.

comp => Reality is not computable    (UDA)

thus

Reality is Computable = > ~comp    (contraposition)

But 

Reality is Computable = > Comp   (to emulate me, emulate Reality if necessary)

So Reality is computable => (comp and ~comp)   a contradiction.

So reality is not computable.  In all circumstance.

So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
(not COMP),

UDA is not a proposition. It is the UD Argument. It is a reasoning. It cannot be true or false. It has to be valid or non valid.

If it non valid, then the first line of the reasoning is already unjustified, and the conclusion does not follow.

or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
already disproven to disprove the theory.

If the UDA reasoning is valid, then with or without comp, there can be no computable theory of 'reality', in general. And about 'physical reality' it is an open problem. OK?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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