Nabble - Everything List

Re: The seven step series (november 2009)

2009-11-09T11:43:16Z

Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> Hi,
>
> Let us come back on the "seven step" thread.
>
> Let me recall the initial motivation. The movie graph argument (cf the
> MGA thread) shows that it is senseless to attach consciousness to the
> physical activity of a brain or a computer.
>
> If we keep the computational thesis for the cognitive process, we have
> to associate consciousness to the computation, and not to its physical
> realization. Actually we have to explain what is a "physical
> realization" from the existence of computations.
>
> But then we have to understand better what we mean by computation, in
> the mathematical sense, given that we cannot use any physics, at this
> stage.
>
> Luckily, the notion of computation has been discovered last century by
> mathematicians. They were motivated by the foundation of mathematics
> after the "crisis" of set theory.
>
> So what is a computation? Let us try some definitions.
>
> Attempt 1: A computation is a sequence of computational states.
>
> If we agree with this, it remains to define what is a computational
> states. But the definition above misses something important. I suspect
> everything can be "recoded" as a sequence of computational states, and
> this could be the reason why some are willing to say that rock and
> thinks like that are conscious.
>
> A physicist could say that what is lacking is a genuine causality
> relation which links the states from the sequence of computational
> states. But:
> - in the context of the MGA argument, this should be seen as a red herring
> - the notion of causality is extremely vague, even for a materialist.
>
> So:
>
> Attempt 2: A computation is a sequence of computational states
> obtained sequentially through the activity of some machine.
>
> This is actually a good definition, except that we have to define
> (without using physics) what we mean by activity, and machine. This
> may be problematic because we want to define activity by a sequence of
> state of some machine ... So:

I don't think it's very good since it depends on the notion of
"computational states" to define computation. It is not clear that any
sequence of states cannot be "computational states". It seems to me
that we really take as primitive the concept of a function, something
that is given some information and transforms it into some other
information. That's what we think brains do - and they do a lot of it
which is not conscious. When we have abstracted away what the
information is about, we can regard it just as a string or number and
apply the ideas of Turing, Church, et al to the transformation as a
computation. But we have left behind the idea that the information was
about something or represented something. In the context of a
computation as a consciousness this representation is a relation between
the information being transformed and the world of which one is
conscious. So it seems you have ignored physics rather than explained
it. However, I can accept it as an ansatz in hope that the explanation
will emerge in the end.

>
> Attempt 3: a computation is a sequence of states such that it exists a
> machine going through that sequence of states when computed by ...
>
> Well, we cannot refer to activity or to a physical implementation, so
> what?
>
> Attempt 4
>
> A computation is a sequence of states of some machine when executed by
> some Universal Machine.
>
> That is a progress, in case we succeed in defining "executed by some
> universal machine", without using physics. But now we have the problem
>
> Does a universal machine exist? And what is the mathematical meaning
> of "execution".
>
> But now, Church Thesis (Post, Church, Turing, Markov Thesis) is a
> strengthening of the following weaker thesis: It exists a universal
> machine.
>
> And, all those machines, for Post, Turing, were mathematical
> construction, right at the beginning.
>
> Church thesis is strictly speaking the statement that his formal
> (mathematical) system, known as Lambda Calculus, is universal with
> respect to computability. The basic entity there are the lambda
> expressions (those little cousins of the combinators, for those who
> remembers old threads).
>
> Turing thesis is that the language describing Turing machines is
> universal with respect of that same class, and soon it will be proved
> that they are equivalent indeed, making Church thesis equivalent to
> Turing thesis, (and equivalent to "Post law").
>
> Then Turing proved the existence of the "universal Turing Machine",
> and indeed, since we know now that for each such universal system for
> such system the "understanding of the language" can be encoded in the
> language itself. So there is a universal lambda expression. There is a
> universal Turing Machine. A universal Post production system, or a
> Fortran interpreter (or compiled) in Fortran, or a Lisp intepreter in
> Lisp.
>
> Some may ask "which universal machine?". But the whole point of
> classical computationalism (and UDA) consists in showing that below
> your (our common) substitution level, we have to take account of all
> universal machines. Any universal dovetailer dovetails on all of them.
> So even if only one computation "wins", it has to be justify by a
> (relative) sum on all computations.
>
> I have suggested to take the combinators, without success, so I will
> suggest later to take Robinson Arithmetic, which is Turing Universal,
> as seen as a computer. It is really very elementary arithmetic.
> Very simple cellular automata rules leads to universality, in this
> Church Turing sense, like the "game of life" by Conway. Universality
> is somehow cheap, and it happens that elementary arithmetic (with
> zero, the successor rule, addition and multiplication) is already
> Turing universal.
>
> "being a piece of computations" is equivalent with "being executed by
> the universal dovetailer", and such a proposition can be translated
> into elementary arithmetic. This is equivalent with Gödel's showing
> how to translated statements about propositions, theories, machines,
> into statement about numbers.
>
> But be careful to understand what happen here. It is not that the laws
> of computations or universal machine dream are so easy that we can
> represent them by number relation, the real discovery is that the
> relation among numbers can be very complex.
>
> That is why I insist so much that an understanding already of just
> Church thesis makes you modest, even just about what you can prove
> about numbers.
>
> OK? Any question about the diagonalizations of Cantor and Kleene?
>
> I need this for the understanding of what the phi_i are. A universal
> number will be a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). (with
> "(x,y)" represents a number through a computable bijection).

Could you remind me what the phi_i are? The enumerated partial functions?

Brent

>
> The key point is that the notion of computation can be defined in
> arithmetic. By Church thesis, limiting the computations to those
> definable in arithmetic does not eliminate any computations.
>
> So the computational supervenience thesis is also equivalent with the
> arithmetical supervenience thesis.
>
> Another important mathematical point is that Universality for
> computations entails non universality for provability. That is
> incompleteness. Universal machine have capabilities far beyond what
> they can prove and known. The universal machine can lost itself in his
> own creation. And, ASSUMING Church thesis, the existence of the
> universal machine is a theorem of elementary arithmetic.
>
> It reminds me Aurobindo:
>
>
> /What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?/
>
> /And it is this .../
> /Existence that multiplied itself/
> /For sheer delight of being/
> /And plunged into numberless trillions of forms/
> /So that it might/
> /Find /
> /Itself/
> /Innumerably/
>
>
> Any questions, remarks, comments?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 11 Oct 2009, at 19:53, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Hi John, hi Marty,
>> On 10 Oct 2009, at 21:47, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>>> Bruno, we had similar puzzles in middle school in the 30s.
>>> The barber could not shave himself because he shaved only those who
>>> did not shave themselves (and shaved all). So for (Q #1) in the 1st
>>> vriant
>>> *she(?)* was a female, unless *he(?)* was a beardless male
>>
>>
>> You are right. The barber gender is female. I don't see why you add
>> that he could be a beardless male. It is part of the problem that we
>> are in a tyrannic country where no man can have a beard.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> (and the 'all' refers to only the *bearded* males requiring a shave).
>>> *
>>> Q#2 is beyond me, I do not resort to a QM-pattern like Schrodinger's
>>> cat.
>>> (Sh/H)e is either-or, not both.
>>
>> I am not sure I understand, except that Q#2 remains unanswered, OK. I
>> will first comment Marty's posts.
>>
>>
>> On 11 Oct 2009, at 01:30, m.a. wrote:
>>
>>> *Or the barber is a special exception to the group designated
>>> as "men" and exists on a higher level of being. Therefore he can
>>> shave himself without transgressing the rule as stated in the
>>> premise. Isn't this one of Russell's paradoxes? marty a.*
>>
>> Well, if the barber is not human, there is indeed no problem. But
>> here the fact that it can be a woman, and that usually a barber is a
>> human being, and that the question refer to a gender strongly suggest
>> that the solution "the barber is a woman" is more reasonable that
>> "the barber is an extraterrestrial". I think.
>>
>>> And didn't Russell decide that this type of paradox should be
>>> outlawed from allowable statements within the practice of
>>> logic? m.a.
>>
>> Nice you see the relation with Russel's paradox. This is a very deep
>> paradox which shows we have to handle the notion of sets with some
>> care. Torgny Tholerus already mentionned this, and he defended the
>> idea this is an argument for ultrafinitism, which in my opinion is
>> like throwing the baby (the infinite sets) with the water of the bath.
>>
>> If we dare to consider that the collection of *all* sets is itself a
>> set, we have a nice example of a set which contains itself as an
>> element.
>> This is not problematical in itself, and in some axiomatic set
>> theories, some sets can belong to themselves.
>>
>> What becomes problematical is the idea of defining a set in intension
>> by using *any* criteria.
>> Indeed, let us call *universe*, U, the set of all sets. U belongs-to
>> U. But {1, 2} does not belongs to {1, 2}, so some sets belong to
>> themselves and some sets don't. So it looks like we could define a
>> new set E of which contains all the sets which does not belongs to
>> themselves. For example clearly the set {1, 2} is an element of E,
>> and U is not an element of E.
>> But then we are in trouble. Does E belongs to E?
>> If E belongs to E, then he contradicts the definition of E, which
>> contains only those set which does not belong to themselves. So E has
>> to not belong to E. But then E does verify its own definition, so
>> that he does belong to E. So E belongs to E and E does not belong to
>> E. Damned.
>>
>> Well, this proves that the intuitive idea of set is inconsistent. We
>> do have to make the notion more precise to avoid such kind of
>> reasoning. All the many very different attempts to make the notion of
>> set precise have lead toward interesting mathematics, philosophy and
>> even religion (i think). But this would lead us far away of the
>> topic. We will have opportunity to come back on this. With the most
>> usual axiomatic set theories, the set of all sets is not a set, and
>> the criteria to defined set in intension is usually weakened. So much
>> that some axioms have to be added to get a reasonably rich theory.
>>
>>
>> Question 2.
>>
>>> 2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
>>> universal machine?
>>>
>>
>> Let us write (x y) to say that some relation between x and y exists.
>> In the problem, for example, (x y) means that x shaves y, and x and y
>> are supposed to be humans.
>> In Russel's paradox (x y) means that x belongs to y, that is X
>> contains y as an element, and x and y are supposed to be sets.
>>
>> Argument by diagonalization always proceeds by using the diagonal
>> twice. Which diagonal?
>>
>> 1) the first diagonal:
>>
>> Well (x y) is a couple, and so belongs to the cartesian product of
>> the set (of those x, y) with itself. Put in another way, if you look
>> at all (x y) you get a matrix of pair of things (humans in the
>> problem, sets in the paradox).
>>
>> OK?
>>
>> Well, the (x x) will constituted the diagonal of that matrix. x is
>> supposed to vary in their respective domain (the humans in the
>> village, the set, in the universe of all sets.
>>
>> In the village, this gives something like (Sophie Sophie) (Claude
>> Claude) (Arthur Arthur) etc. As long as there are inhabitants in the
>> village. With the sets, the diagonal is any couple (x x) with x an
>> arbitrary set.
>>
>> The barber, let us call it B, and the paradoxical set E from above
>> are defined in a very similar way, said "by diagonalization", because
>> it involves the diagonal (x, x).
>>
>> The barber is defined by the condition that he shaves all and only
>> the men who does not shave themselves.
>>
>> B shaves x
>> if and only if
>> x is a man and NOT (x x). "NOT (x,x)" means that x does not shave
>> x. OK?
>>
>> E is defined by the condition that it contains all and only the sets
>> which does not contain themselves as element.
>>
>> E contain x as element
>> if and only if
>> NOT(x x)
>>
>> 2) The second diagonal:
>>
>> Consist in looking what happen to the barber B, or the set E, when
>> applied to itself.
>>
>> The second diagonalisation is the question (B B)?, or the question (E E)?
>>
>> (B B)? = Does B shaves B?
>>
>> And then, by definition of the barber B, if it is a man, we get a
>> contradiction. Fortunately no contradiction occurs in case the barber
>> is a woman. If he is a man, he has to shave himself if and only if he
>> does not shave himself. If she is a woman, then she does not shave
>> herself and has no obligation to do given that the barber shaves
>> *only* men, by definition. So here, we have just proved that in that
>> village the barber is a woman. Or, taking Marty's remark into
>> account; we have proved that IF the barber is a human, THEN it is a
>> woman. No contradiction occurs if the barber is a god, an
>> extraterrestrial or a machine, with or without gender. It can be
>> anything not shaving itself, and shaving by definition only the men
>> of the village.
>>
>> (E E)? = Does the set E contains itself as an element?
>>
>> If yes: then it violates its own definition.
>> If no: well, it violates again its definition.
>>
>> With (B B), we "prove a theorem", thanks to the saving condition
>> excluding the possibility that (B B) is true in advance.
>> With (E E) we get a genuine difficulty showing that the naïve idea of
>> sets is inconsistent.
>>
>> And what if we delete the saving condition in the Barber problem,
>> leading us to the "usual" Barber paradox. What if we say, with x
>> varying on all humans (making barber shaving all womans, unless using
>> John's proposal for the notion of "not shaving").
>>
>> First diagonalisation:
>>
>> B shaves x
>> if and only if
>> NOT (x x).
>>
>> Well, second diagonalisation, we get:
>>
>> (B B)
>> if and only if
>> NOT(B B)
>>
>> A contradiction. Is it catastrophical? Not at all, it is a
>> contradiction only assuming such a village exists. So it is only a
>> proof that nowhere in any consistent reality or galaxies,
>> multiverses, whatsoever you will ever find a barber, inhabiting a
>> village and shaving all and only all the inhabitants who don't shave
>> themselves. You will not find it for the same reason you will never
>> find a square with only three sides, (unless dreaming or
>> hallucinating or something?).
>>
>> Do you see the two diagonalisations in Cantor theorem's proof? And in
>> Kleene's proof?
>>
>> We suppose there is a bijection between N and some set of functions.
>> So we suppose there is an indexing of the functions, f_i available.
>> The first diagonalisation is in the definition of g:
>>
>> g(n) = f_n(n) + 1
>>
>>
>> Then, for "good" or "bad" reasons, according of the context, we
>> suppose g belongs to the set of f_n, so that we can apply g on its
>> own index, that is the second diagonalization, and get wonderful
>> variate results according again the context.
>>
>> Actually
>>
>> 1) when f_i are supposed to be a bijection between N and N^N, we get
>> a contradiction. Showing that N^N are not enumerable.
>> 2) when f_i are supposed to be a computable bijection between N and
>> N^N-comp, we get a contradiction. Showing that, although enumerable,
>> 2^N-comp and N^N-comp are not computably enumerable.
>> 3) when f_i are supposed to belong to an universal sequence of
>> N^N-comp, we ... crash the universal machine, and find ourself unable
>> to prevent by any means such crashing without destroying the machine
>> universality. Showing that if we want *all*l total computable
>> functions in the universal sequence N^N-partial-comp, they will be
>> hidden in a non solvable ways (Pi-2 complete) among the partial
>> functions. Partial function are like ignorance tunnels, or abysses,
>> in the reality with which universal machines can be confronted.
>>
>> I will come back on this, and develop, but this could make sense for
>> those who have followed the last posts, in this thread.
>>
>> Precisely N^N-comp is the set of functions from N to N which are
>> computable.
>> N^N-partial-comp is the set of partial functions from N to N which
>> are computable on their domains. Those partial functions are either
>> defined on all N, and called total functions, or they are not defined
>> for some number, and which, strictly speaking are functions from a
>> subset of N to N.
>>
>> Take it easy. I intend to summarize and come back on some crucial
>> points, soon or a bit later.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Fri, Oct 9, 2009 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...
>>> <mailto:marchal@...>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> I am so buzy that I have not the time to give long explanations,
>>> so I
>>> give here a short exercise and a subject of reflexion instead.
>>>
>>> Exercise:
>>>
>>> There is Tyrannic country where by law it was forbidden for any
>>> man to
>>> have a beard.
>>> And there is village, in that country, and it is said that there
>>> is a
>>> barber in that village, who shaves all and only the men who don't
>>> shave themselves.
>>>
>>> Two questions:
>>>
>>> 1) What is the gender of the barber?
>>> 2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
>>> universal machine?
>>>
>>> Have a good day,
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>
>
>
> t?hl=en
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The seven step series (november 2009)

2009-11-09T10:04:01Z

Hi,

Let us come back on the "seven step" thread.

Let me recall the initial motivation. The movie graph argument (cf the MGA thread) shows that it is senseless to attach consciousness to the physical activity of a brain or a computer.

If we keep the computational thesis for the cognitive process, we have to associate consciousness to the computation, and not to its physical realization. Actually we have to explain what is a "physical realization" from the existence of computations.

But then we have to understand better what we mean by computation, in the mathematical sense, given that we cannot use any physics, at this stage.

Luckily, the notion of computation has been discovered last century by mathematicians. They were motivated by the foundation of mathematics after the "crisis" of set theory.

So what is a computation? Let us try some definitions.

Attempt 1: A computation is a sequence of computational states.

If we agree with this, it remains to define what is a computational states. But the definition above misses something important. I suspect everything can be "recoded" as a sequence of computational states, and this could be the reason why some are willing to say that rock and thinks like that are conscious.

A physicist could say that what is lacking is a genuine causality relation which links the states from the sequence of computational states. But:

- in the context of the MGA argument, this should be seen as a red herring

- the notion of causality is extremely vague, even for a materialist.

So:

Attempt 2: A computation is a sequence of computational states obtained sequentially through the activity of some machine.

This is actually a good definition, except that we have to define (without using physics) what we mean by activity, and machine. This may be problematic because we want to define activity by a sequence of state of some machine ... So:

Attempt 3: a computation is a sequence of states such that it exists a machine going through that sequence of states when computed by ...

Well, we cannot refer to activity or to a physical implementation, so what?

Attempt 4

A computation is a sequence of states of some machine when executed by some Universal Machine.

That is a progress, in case we succeed in defining "executed by some universal machine", without using physics. But now we have the problem

Does a universal machine exist? And what is the mathematical meaning of "execution".

But now, Church Thesis (Post, Church, Turing, Markov Thesis) is a strengthening of the following weaker thesis: It exists a universal machine.

And, all those machines, for Post, Turing, were mathematical construction, right at the beginning.

Church thesis is strictly speaking the statement that his formal (mathematical) system, known as Lambda Calculus, is universal with respect to computability. The basic entity there are the lambda expressions (those little cousins of the combinators, for those who remembers old threads).

Turing thesis is that the language describing Turing machines is universal with respect of that same class, and soon it will be proved that they are equivalent indeed, making Church thesis equivalent to Turing thesis, (and equivalent to "Post law").

Then Turing proved the existence of the "universal Turing Machine", and indeed, since we know now that for each such universal system for such system the "understanding of the language" can be encoded in the language itself. So there is a universal lambda expression. There is a universal Turing Machine. A universal Post production system, or a Fortran interpreter (or compiled) in Fortran, or a Lisp intepreter in Lisp.

Some may ask "which universal machine?". But the whole point of classical computationalism (and UDA) consists in showing that below your (our common) substitution level, we have to take account of all universal machines. Any universal dovetailer dovetails on all of them. So even if only one computation "wins", it has to be justify by a (relative) sum on all computations.

I have suggested to take the combinators, without success, so I will suggest later to take Robinson Arithmetic, which is Turing Universal, as seen as a computer. It is really very elementary arithmetic.

Very simple cellular automata rules leads to universality, in this Church Turing sense, like the "game of life" by Conway. Universality is somehow cheap, and it happens that elementary arithmetic (with zero, the successor rule, addition and multiplication) is already Turing universal.

"being a piece of computations" is equivalent with "being executed by the universal dovetailer", and such a proposition can be translated into elementary arithmetic. This is equivalent with Gödel's showing how to translated statements about propositions, theories, machines, into statement about numbers.

But be careful to understand what happen here. It is not that the laws of computations or universal machine dream are so easy that we can represent them by number relation, the real discovery is that the relation among numbers can be very complex.

That is why I insist so much that an understanding already of just Church thesis makes you modest, even just about what you can prove about numbers.

OK? Any question about the diagonalizations of Cantor and Kleene?

I need this for the understanding of what the phi_i are. A universal number will be a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). (with "(x,y)" represents a number through a computable bijection).

The key point is that the notion of computation can be defined in arithmetic. By Church thesis, limiting the computations to those definable in arithmetic does not eliminate any computations.

So the computational supervenience thesis is also equivalent with the arithmetical supervenience thesis.

Another important mathematical point is that Universality for computations entails non universality for provability. That is incompleteness. Universal machine have capabilities far beyond what they can prove and known. The universal machine can lost itself in his own creation. And, ASSUMING Church thesis, the existence of the universal machine is a theorem of elementary arithmetic.

It reminds me Aurobindo:

What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?

And it is this ...

Existence that multiplied itself

For sheer delight of being

And plunged into numberless trillions of forms

So that it might

Find

Itself

Innumerably

Any questions, remarks, comments?

Bruno

On 11 Oct 2009, at 19:53, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi John, hi Marty,
On 10 Oct 2009, at 21:47, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno, we had similar puzzles in middle school in the 30s.

The barber could not shave himself because he shaved only those who did not shave themselves (and shaved all). So for  (Q #1) in the 1st vriant

she(?) was a female, unless he(?) was a beardless male

You are right. The barber gender is female. I don't see why you add that he could be a beardless male. It is part of the problem that we are in a tyrannic country where no man can have a beard.

(and the 'all' refers to only the bearded males requiring a shave).

*

Q#2 is beyond me, I do not resort to a QM-pattern like Schrodinger's cat.

(Sh/H)e is either-or, not both.

I am not sure I understand, except that Q#2 remains unanswered, OK. I will first comment Marty's posts.

On 11 Oct 2009, at 01:30, m.a. wrote:

Or the barber is a special exception to the group designated as "men" and exists on a higher level of being. Therefore he can shave himself without transgressing the rule as stated in the premise. Isn't this one of Russell's paradoxes?       marty a.

Well, if the barber is not human, there is indeed no problem. But here the fact that it can be a woman, and that usually a barber is a human being, and that the question refer to a gender strongly suggest that the solution "the barber is a woman" is more reasonable that "the barber is an extraterrestrial". I think.

And didn't Russell decide that this type of paradox should be outlawed from allowable statements within the practice of logic?      m.a.

Nice you see the relation with Russel's paradox. This is a very deep paradox which shows we have to handle the notion of sets with some care. Torgny Tholerus already mentionned this, and he defended the idea this is an argument for ultrafinitism, which in my opinion is like throwing the baby (the infinite sets) with the water of the bath.

If we dare to consider that the collection of *all* sets is itself a set, we have a nice example of a set which contains itself as an element.
This is not problematical in itself, and in some axiomatic set theories, some sets can belong to themselves.

What becomes problematical is the idea of defining a set in intension by using *any* criteria.
Indeed, let us call *universe*, U, the set of all sets. U belongs-to U. But {1, 2} does not belongs to {1, 2}, so some sets belong to themselves and some sets don't. So it looks like we could define a new set E of which contains all the sets which does not belongs to themselves. For example clearly the set {1, 2} is an element of E, and U is not an element of E.
But then we are in trouble. Does E belongs to E?
If E belongs to E, then he contradicts the definition of E, which contains only those set which does not belong to themselves. So E has to not belong to E. But then E does verify its own definition, so that he does belong to E. So E belongs to E and E does not belong to E. Damned.

Well, this proves that the intuitive idea of set is inconsistent. We do have to make the notion more precise to avoid such kind of reasoning. All the many very different attempts to make the notion of set precise have lead toward interesting mathematics, philosophy and even religion (i think). But this would lead us far away of the topic. We will have opportunity to come back on this. With the most usual axiomatic set theories, the set of all sets is not a set, and the criteria to defined set in intension is usually weakened. So much that some axioms have to be added to get a reasonably rich theory.

Question 2.

2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Let us write (x y) to say that some relation between x and y exists.
In the problem, for example, (x y) means that x shaves y, and x and y are supposed to be humans.
In Russel's paradox (x y) means that x belongs to y, that is X contains y as an element, and x and y are supposed to be sets.

Argument by diagonalization always proceeds by using the diagonal twice. Which diagonal?

1) the first diagonal:

Well (x y) is a couple, and so belongs to the cartesian product of the set (of those x, y) with itself. Put in another way, if you look at all (x y) you get a matrix of pair of things (humans in the problem, sets in the paradox).

OK?

Well, the (x x) will constituted the diagonal of that matrix. x is supposed to vary in their respective domain (the humans in the village, the set, in the universe of all sets.

In the village, this gives something like (Sophie Sophie) (Claude Claude) (Arthur Arthur) etc. As long as there are inhabitants in the village. With the sets, the diagonal is any couple (x x) with x an arbitrary set.

The barber, let us call it B, and the paradoxical set E from above are defined in a very similar way, said "by diagonalization", because it involves the diagonal (x, x).

The barber is defined by the condition that he shaves all and only the men who does not shave themselves.

B shaves x
if and only if
x is a man and NOT (x x). "NOT (x,x)" means that x does not shave x. OK?

E is defined by the condition that it contains all and only the sets which does not contain themselves as element.

E contain x as element
if and only if
NOT(x x)

2) The second diagonal:

Consist in looking what happen to the barber B, or the set E, when applied to itself.

The second diagonalisation is the question (B B)?, or the question (E E)?

(B B)? = Does B shaves B?

And then, by definition of the barber B, if it is a man, we get a contradiction. Fortunately no contradiction occurs in case the barber is a woman. If he is a man, he has to shave himself if and only if he does not shave himself. If she is a woman, then she does not shave herself and has no obligation to do given that the barber shaves *only* men, by definition. So here, we have just proved that in that village the barber is a woman. Or, taking Marty's remark into account; we have proved that IF the barber is a human, THEN it is a woman. No contradiction occurs if the barber is a god, an extraterrestrial or a machine, with or without gender. It can be anything not shaving itself, and shaving by definition only the men of the village.

(E E)? = Does the set E contains itself as an element?

If yes: then it violates its own definition.
If no: well, it violates again its definition.

With (B B), we "prove a theorem", thanks to the saving condition excluding the possibility that (B B) is true in advance.
With (E E) we get a genuine difficulty showing that the naïve idea of sets is inconsistent.

And what if we delete the saving condition in the Barber problem, leading us to the "usual" Barber paradox. What if we say, with x varying on all humans (making barber shaving all womans, unless using John's proposal for the notion of "not shaving").

First diagonalisation:

B shaves x
if and only if
NOT (x x).

Well, second diagonalisation, we get:

(B B)
if and only if
NOT(B B)

A contradiction. Is it catastrophical? Not at all, it is a contradiction only assuming such a village exists. So it is only a proof that nowhere in any consistent reality or galaxies, multiverses, whatsoever you will ever find a barber, inhabiting a village and shaving all and only all the inhabitants who don't shave themselves. You will not find it for the same reason you will never find a square with only three sides, (unless dreaming or hallucinating or something?).

Do you see the two diagonalisations in Cantor theorem's proof? And in Kleene's proof?

We suppose there is a bijection between N and some set of functions. So we suppose there is an indexing of the functions, f_i available. The first diagonalisation is in the definition of g:

g(n) = f_n(n) + 1

Then, for "good" or "bad" reasons, according of the context, we suppose g belongs to the set of f_n, so that we can apply g on its own index, that is the second diagonalization, and get wonderful variate results according again the context.

Actually

1) when f_i are supposed to be a bijection between N and N^N, we get a contradiction. Showing that N^N are not enumerable.
2) when f_i are supposed to be a computable bijection between N and N^N-comp, we get a contradiction. Showing that, although enumerable, 2^N-comp and N^N-comp are not computably enumerable.
3) when f_i are supposed to belong to an universal sequence of N^N-comp, we ... crash the universal machine, and find ourself unable to prevent by any means such crashing without destroying the machine universality. Showing that if we want *all*l total computable functions in the universal sequence N^N-partial-comp, they will be hidden in a non solvable ways (Pi-2 complete) among the partial functions. Partial function are like ignorance tunnels, or abysses, in the reality with which universal machines can be confronted.

I will come back on this, and develop, but this could make sense for those who have followed the last posts, in this thread.

Precisely N^N-comp is the set of functions from N to N which are computable.
N^N-partial-comp is the set of partial functions from N to N which are computable on their domains. Those partial functions are either defined on all N, and called total functions, or they are not defined for some number, and which, strictly speaking are functions from a subset of N to N.

Take it easy. I intend to summarize and come back on some crucial points, soon or a bit later.

Bruno

On Fri, Oct 9, 2009 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

Hi,

I am so buzy that I have not the time to give long explanations, so I
give here a short exercise and a subject of reflexion instead.

Exercise:

There is Tyrannic country where by law it was forbidden for any man to
have a beard.
And there is village, in that country, and it is said that there is a
barber in that village, who shaves all and only the men who don't
shave themselves.

Two questions:

1) What is the gender of the barber?
2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Have a good day,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

2009-11-08T05:09:48Z

I think that's the question Bruno's proof is designed to answer in the negative, a conclusion of which I have difficulty convincing myself. m.a.

----- Original Message -----

From: jamikes@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Saturday, November 07, 2009 11:16 AM

Subject: Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

Marty,

how about my weird question: "and if 1 is wrong and what he 'sees' as OA is only a replica of the OA and is WRONG? Is 'being a replica' a human priviledge?

(Forget it!)

John M

On Fri, Nov 6, 2009 at 7:04 PM, m.a. <marty684@...> wrote:

Bruno,

Good to see you back! I have a question with reference to the experiment described in the first person indeterminacy paper. If, before the teleportation, the omniscient authority tells the subject that he will find a zero in his envelope, both subjects will expect to find a zero after the procedure, no? The subject who finds the 1, must inevitably conclude that he is in fact a duplicate since he trusts the OA implicitly and reasons that if he were the original (real) subject, he would be seeing a zero. Where is the flaw in my logic? marty a.

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Friday, November 06, 2009 11:45 AM

Subject: Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

Hi all,

Welcome to fcy

"Universal Dance Association" is quite cute :) A universal dance could be a Universal Dovetailer if "digital dance" could make sense.

UDA (in this list) is for Universal Dovetailer Argument. You should google on this term, on the net or on the everything-list archive. You may look here also for references:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda

A universal dovetailer is a program which generates and execute all possible programs. It is a mathematical object and its existence follows from the Post-Church-Turing thesis.

The universal dovetailer argument is an argument which shows that the mechanist hypothesis leads to a notion of strong first person indeterminacy, and that eventually the laws of both physics and psychology/theology (quanta and qualia) have to be derived from "pure" number theory/computer science.

If I succeed to explain UDA sufficiently well, I will be able to give some account of AUDA which is far more sophisticated, and useful only to get already quantitative physical information from numbers/computer science (as opposed to UDA which "just" show that physics has to be given by a first person measure on the computations occurring in the universal dovetailing).

----

Elsevier has asked me to write some topics on its SciTopics. You may take a look at

http://www.scitopics.com/The_first_person_computationalist_indeterminacy.html

http://www.scitopics.com/Godel_Mind_and_Machine.html

Comments are welcomed.

I let you know that I will have some more time for now (October was very heavy!). So it is time to ask questions for the thread "the seven step series" (which is about the seventh step of the UDA) before I proceed. I will make a little sum up next week. There has been more than five versions of UDA already send to the list, but I am not sure everyone understand, so please ask questions. All questions are allowed on this non moderate list, so feel free, to ask anything (related) to the everything-like approach in the search of a "TOE" (Theory of everything-including-consciousness-and-person (as opposed to the TOE of the physicians which search to unify only what is observable and third person describable).

Marty, Kim, are you still there? Have you a problem with Cantor diagonal proof of the non enumerability of the set of functions from N to N (N^N)? Or do you prefer I explain this again in the sum up?

On 05 Nov 2009, at 06:03, fcy wrote:

As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.

For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
be what's being discussed here.

Thanks in advance,

fcy

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
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Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

2009-11-07T08:16:49Z

Marty,

how about my weird question: "and if 1 is wrong and what he 'sees' as OA is only a replica of the OA and is WRONG? Is 'being a replica' a human priviledge?

(Forget it!)

John M

On Fri, Nov 6, 2009 at 7:04 PM, m.a. <marty684@...> wrote:

Bruno,

Good to see you back! I have a question with reference to the experiment described in the first person indeterminacy paper. If, before the teleportation, the omniscient authority tells the subject that he will find a zero in his envelope, both subjects will expect to find a zero after the procedure, no? The subject who finds the 1, must inevitably conclude that he is in fact a duplicate since he trusts the OA implicitly and reasons that if he were the original (real) subject, he would be seeing a zero. Where is the flaw in my logic? marty a.

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Friday, November 06, 2009 11:45 AM

Subject: Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

Hi all,

Welcome to fcy

"Universal Dance Association" is quite cute :) A universal dance could be a Universal Dovetailer if "digital dance" could make sense.

UDA (in this list) is for Universal Dovetailer Argument. You should google on this term, on the net or on the everything-list archive. You may look here also for references:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda

A universal dovetailer is a program which generates and execute all possible programs. It is a mathematical object and its existence follows from the Post-Church-Turing thesis.

The universal dovetailer argument is an argument which shows that the mechanist hypothesis leads to a notion of strong first person indeterminacy, and that eventually the laws of both physics and psychology/theology (quanta and qualia) have to be derived from "pure" number theory/computer science.

If I succeed to explain UDA sufficiently well, I will be able to give some account of AUDA which is far more sophisticated, and useful only to get already quantitative physical information from numbers/computer science (as opposed to UDA which "just" show that physics has to be given by a first person measure on the computations occurring in the universal dovetailing).

----

Elsevier has asked me to write some topics on its SciTopics. You may take a look at

http://www.scitopics.com/The_first_person_computationalist_indeterminacy.html

http://www.scitopics.com/Godel_Mind_and_Machine.html

Comments are welcomed.

I let you know that I will have some more time for now (October was very heavy!). So it is time to ask questions for the thread "the seven step series" (which is about the seventh step of the UDA) before I proceed. I will make a little sum up next week. There has been more than five versions of UDA already send to the list, but I am not sure everyone understand, so please ask questions. All questions are allowed on this non moderate list, so feel free, to ask anything (related) to the everything-like approach in the search of a "TOE" (Theory of everything-including-consciousness-and-person (as opposed to the TOE of the physicians which search to unify only what is observable and third person describable).

Marty, Kim, are you still there? Have you a problem with Cantor diagonal proof of the non enumerability of the set of functions from N to N (N^N)? Or do you prefer I explain this again in the sum up?

On 05 Nov 2009, at 06:03, fcy wrote:

As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.

For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
be what's being discussed here.

Thanks in advance,

fcy

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

2009-11-07T04:54:12Z

Sorry, I misunderstood the premise. Thanks for the quick reply. marty a.

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Saturday, November 07, 2009 2:16 AM

Subject: Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

On 07 Nov 2009, at 01:04, m.a. wrote:

Bruno,

Good to see you back! I have a question with reference to the experiment described in the first person indeterminacy paper. If, before the teleportation, the omniscient authority tells the subject that he will find a zero in his envelope, both subjects will expect to find a zero after the procedure, no? The subject who finds the 1, must inevitably conclude that he is in fact a duplicate since he trusts the OA implicitly and reasons that if he were the original (real) subject, he would be seeing a zero. Where is the flaw in my logic? marty a.

The subject of the experience believe in comp, and knows the protocol of the experience. So he knows the "original" will be destroyed or annihilated after the scanning procedure. He know in advance that both subject are duplicate, and so "I am the duplicate" does not make sense.

Even if he decides to trust the OA, and then to abandon comp if he is in front of the "one" in the envelop, he will feel as being the original person (we still assume comp), with the memory that the OA told him that he will find "zero", which will make him rightly say "for me right now the OA was wrong, whatever I am".

The experience here was symmetrical. From the first person perspective it makes no sense at all to say "I am the duplicate". We know, and he knows, and the OA knows, in advance, that they are both "duplicate".

Bruno

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Friday, November 06, 2009 11:45 AM

Subject: Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

Hi all,

Welcome to fcy

"Universal Dance Association" is quite cute :) A universal dance could be a Universal Dovetailer if "digital dance" could make sense.

UDA (in this list) is for Universal Dovetailer Argument. You should google on this term, on the net or on the everything-list archive. You may look here also for references:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda

A universal dovetailer is a program which generates and execute all possible programs. It is a mathematical object and its existence follows from the Post-Church-Turing thesis.

The universal dovetailer argument is an argument which shows that the mechanist hypothesis leads to a notion of strong first person indeterminacy, and that eventually the laws of both physics and psychology/theology (quanta and qualia) have to be derived from "pure" number theory/computer science.

If I succeed to explain UDA sufficiently well, I will be able to give some account of AUDA which is far more sophisticated, and useful only to get already quantitative physical information from numbers/computer science (as opposed to UDA which "just" show that physics has to be given by a first person measure on the computations occurring in the universal dovetailing).

----

Elsevier has asked me to write some topics on its SciTopics. You may take a look at

http://www.scitopics.com/The_first_person_computationalist_indeterminacy.html

http://www.scitopics.com/Godel_Mind_and_Machine.html

Comments are welcomed.

I let you know that I will have some more time for now (October was very heavy!). So it is time to ask questions for the thread "the seven step series" (which is about the seventh step of the UDA) before I proceed. I will make a little sum up next week. There has been more than five versions of UDA already send to the list, but I am not sure everyone understand, so please ask questions. All questions are allowed on this non moderate list, so feel free, to ask anything (related) to the everything-like approach in the search of a "TOE" (Theory of everything-including-consciousness-and-person (as opposed to the TOE of the physicians which search to unify only what is observable and third person describable).

Marty, Kim, are you still there? Have you a problem with Cantor diagonal proof of the non enumerability of the set of functions from N to N (N^N)? Or do you prefer I explain this again in the sum up?

On 05 Nov 2009, at 06:03, fcy wrote:

As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.

For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
be what's being discussed here.

Thanks in advance,

fcy

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

2009-11-06T23:16:21Z

On 07 Nov 2009, at 01:04, m.a. wrote:

Bruno,
Good to see you back! I have a question with reference to the experiment described in the first person indeterminacy paper. If, before the teleportation, the omniscient authority tells the subject that he will find a zero in his envelope, both subjects will expect to find a zero after the procedure, no? The subject who finds the 1, must inevitably conclude that he is in fact a duplicate since he trusts the OA implicitly and reasons that if he were the original (real) subject, he would be seeing a zero. Where is the flaw in my logic? marty a.

The subject of the experience believe in comp, and knows the protocol of the experience. So he knows the "original" will be destroyed or annihilated after the scanning procedure. He know in advance that both subject are duplicate, and so "I am the duplicate" does not make sense.

Even if he decides to trust the OA, and then to abandon comp if he is in front of the "one" in the envelop, he will feel as being the original person (we still assume comp), with the memory that the OA told him that he will find "zero", which will make him rightly say "for me right now the OA was wrong, whatever I am".

The experience here was symmetrical. From the first person perspective it makes no sense at all to say "I am the duplicate". We know, and he knows, and the OA knows, in advance, that they are both "duplicate".

Bruno

----- Original Message -----
From: marchal@...
To: everything-list@...
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2009 11:45 AM
Subject: Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

Hi all,

Welcome to fcy

"Universal Dance Association" is quite cute :) A universal dance could be a Universal Dovetailer if "digital dance" could make sense.

UDA (in this list) is for Universal Dovetailer Argument. You should google on this term, on the net or on the everything-list archive. You may look here also for references:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda

A universal dovetailer is a program which generates and execute all possible programs. It is a mathematical object and its existence follows from the Post-Church-Turing thesis.

The universal dovetailer argument is an argument which shows that the mechanist hypothesis leads to a notion of strong first person indeterminacy, and that eventually the laws of both physics and psychology/theology (quanta and qualia) have to be derived from "pure" number theory/computer science.

If I succeed to explain UDA sufficiently well, I will be able to give some account of AUDA which is far more sophisticated, and useful only to get already quantitative physical information from numbers/computer science (as opposed to UDA which "just" show that physics has to be given by a first person measure on the computations occurring in the universal dovetailing).

----

Elsevier has asked me to write some topics on its SciTopics. You may take a look at

http://www.scitopics.com/The_first_person_computationalist_indeterminacy.html

http://www.scitopics.com/Godel_Mind_and_Machine.html

Comments are welcomed.

I let you know that I will have some more time for now (October was very heavy!). So it is time to ask questions for the thread "the seven step series" (which is about the seventh step of the UDA) before I proceed. I will make a little sum up next week. There has been more than five versions of UDA already send to the list, but I am not sure everyone understand, so please ask questions. All questions are allowed on this non moderate list, so feel free, to ask anything (related) to the everything-like approach in the search of a "TOE" (Theory of everything-including-consciousness-and-person (as opposed to the TOE of the physicians which search to unify only what is observable and third person describable).

Marty, Kim, are you still there? Have you a problem with Cantor diagonal proof of the non enumerability of the set of functions from N to N (N^N)? Or do you prefer I explain this again in the sum up?

On 05 Nov 2009, at 06:03, fcy wrote:

As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.

For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
be what's being discussed here.

Thanks in advance,

fcy

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

2009-11-06T16:04:22Z

Bruno,

Good to see you back! I have a question with reference to the experiment described in the first person indeterminacy paper. If, before the teleportation, the omniscient authority tells the subject that he will find a zero in his envelope, both subjects will expect to find a zero after the procedure, no? The subject who finds the 1, must inevitably conclude that he is in fact a duplicate since he trusts the OA implicitly and reasons that if he were the original (real) subject, he would be seeing a zero. Where is the flaw in my logic? marty a.

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Friday, November 06, 2009 11:45 AM

Subject: Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

Hi all,

Welcome to fcy

"Universal Dance Association" is quite cute :) A universal dance could be a Universal Dovetailer if "digital dance" could make sense.

UDA (in this list) is for Universal Dovetailer Argument. You should google on this term, on the net or on the everything-list archive. You may look here also for references:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda

A universal dovetailer is a program which generates and execute all possible programs. It is a mathematical object and its existence follows from the Post-Church-Turing thesis.

The universal dovetailer argument is an argument which shows that the mechanist hypothesis leads to a notion of strong first person indeterminacy, and that eventually the laws of both physics and psychology/theology (quanta and qualia) have to be derived from "pure" number theory/computer science.

If I succeed to explain UDA sufficiently well, I will be able to give some account of AUDA which is far more sophisticated, and useful only to get already quantitative physical information from numbers/computer science (as opposed to UDA which "just" show that physics has to be given by a first person measure on the computations occurring in the universal dovetailing).

----

Elsevier has asked me to write some topics on its SciTopics. You may take a look at

http://www.scitopics.com/The_first_person_computationalist_indeterminacy.html

http://www.scitopics.com/Godel_Mind_and_Machine.html

Comments are welcomed.

I let you know that I will have some more time for now (October was very heavy!). So it is time to ask questions for the thread "the seven step series" (which is about the seventh step of the UDA) before I proceed. I will make a little sum up next week. There has been more than five versions of UDA already send to the list, but I am not sure everyone understand, so please ask questions. All questions are allowed on this non moderate list, so feel free, to ask anything (related) to the everything-like approach in the search of a "TOE" (Theory of everything-including-consciousness-and-person (as opposed to the TOE of the physicians which search to unify only what is observable and third person describable).

Marty, Kim, are you still there? Have you a problem with Cantor diagonal proof of the non enumerability of the set of functions from N to N (N^N)? Or do you prefer I explain this again in the sum up?

On 05 Nov 2009, at 06:03, fcy wrote:

As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.

For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
be what's being discussed here.

Thanks in advance,

fcy

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Re: request for glossary + announcement that the seventh step series thread will soon be resumed

2009-11-06T08:45:30Z

Hi all,

Welcome to fcy

"Universal Dance Association" is quite cute :) A universal dance could be a Universal Dovetailer if "digital dance" could make sense.

UDA (in this list) is for Universal Dovetailer Argument. You should google on this term, on the net or on the everything-list archive. You may look here also for references:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda

A universal dovetailer is a program which generates and execute all possible programs. It is a mathematical object and its existence follows from the Post-Church-Turing thesis.

The universal dovetailer argument is an argument which shows that the mechanist hypothesis leads to a notion of strong first person indeterminacy, and that eventually the laws of both physics and psychology/theology (quanta and qualia) have to be derived from "pure" number theory/computer science.

If I succeed to explain UDA sufficiently well, I will be able to give some account of AUDA which is far more sophisticated, and useful only to get already quantitative physical information from numbers/computer science (as opposed to UDA which "just" show that physics has to be given by a first person measure on the computations occurring in the universal dovetailing).

----

Elsevier has asked me to write some topics on its SciTopics. You may take a look at

http://www.scitopics.com/The_first_person_computationalist_indeterminacy.html

http://www.scitopics.com/Godel_Mind_and_Machine.html

Comments are welcomed.

I let you know that I will have some more time for now (October was very heavy!). So it is time to ask questions for the thread "the seven step series" (which is about the seventh step of the UDA) before I proceed. I will make a little sum up next week. There has been more than five versions of UDA already send to the list, but I am not sure everyone understand, so please ask questions. All questions are allowed on this non moderate list, so feel free, to ask anything (related) to the everything-like approach in the search of a "TOE" (Theory of everything-including-consciousness-and-person (as opposed to the TOE of the physicians which search to unify only what is observable and third person describable).

Marty, Kim, are you still there? Have you a problem with Cantor diagonal proof of the non enumerability of the set of functions from N to N (N^N)? Or do you prefer I explain this again in the sum up?

On 05 Nov 2009, at 06:03, fcy wrote:

As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.

For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
be what's being discussed here.

Thanks in advance,

fcy

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: request for glossary

2009-11-05T23:26:18Z

Try http://everythingwiki.gcn.cx/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page

It could do with some work, though :).

Cheers

On Wed, Nov 04, 2009 at 09:03:10PM -0800, fcy wrote:

>
> As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
> follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.
>
> For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
> Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
> Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
> be what's being discussed here.
>
> Thanks in advance,
>
> fcy
>
>

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder@...
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Many-Worlds iPhone app!

2009-11-05T00:48:25Z

On 05 Nov 2009, at 04:11, Dr. John Yates wrote:

Bruno wrote

The question is then: where does that continuous information come
from? ...

I could not locate the intriguingly titled "Many-Worlds iPhone appl"
heading in this group, from which it seems to have somehow come, so
I added a copy to the bottom of this post, sorry if this duplicates but
it should interest readers here anyway.

It was a reply to the FOR list (Fabric of Reality list). But it concerns many points discussed on the everything list, so I put it in "cc".

The original "Many-Worlds iphone app" was a sort of advertising for a gadget to manage your quantum alternate future. Here:

Split the universe with this quantum-based iPhone app:

Universe Splitter <http://cheapuniverses.com/universesplitter>

Enjoy!

-- Eric Daniels

Hm, http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0104033 is interesting , though the
copy I looked up at Arxiv does not seem to have Abstract or
Conclusions.Also, interestingly, it still seems to leave many options
open.

I understood it in general terms and was also interested in the
Mandelbrot set approach of Bruno. I have several books of a
techie/coffee table approach at hand on the Mandelbrot set - as most of
us do - and I also looked at the Bruno videos
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTuP02b_a7Y and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lFT4H7E7Ac

I would agree that there Bruno has something to say. However the fact is
also that neither conventional nor quantum computing cover all the real
options available - experimentally my own blog
http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ mentions the fact that nowadays even the
so-called 'Libet half-second' is experimentally naive by the standards
of 2009. I'm thinking that there now needs to be an advance in the
Godel/Chaitin theorem approach to more theorems of a similar kind.

Could and will say more on this if and when we progress on the diagonalization technics.

By the way we are hoping to have a conference in Goa in 2010 at my
Institute for Fundamental Studies (in Goa) which I hope may help to
clarify these matters, some preliminary details on blog
http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ .

Thanks to keep us informed.

Bruno

---------------------------------------------------------------
On 18 Oct 2009, at 01:13, Alan Forrester wrote:

The universes, are just part of a more complex structure as
explained here

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0104033

part of that more complex structure is loads of continuous
information that is not copied and cannot be copied although we can
get access to some information about it because it affects the
probabilities of the things we can observe.

The question is then: where does that continuous information come from?
But it is easy to explain this when we assume the hypothesis that
"we", at some genuine third person description level, are Turing
emulable. In that case we get a continuous explosion of histories
(computations) going through our states already defined in arithmetic.
Our consciousness can stabilize only on the deep histories which are
also stable for a continuum of random fluctuations. Why? Because those
exists as defined by the law of elementary arithmetic, which is indeed
already Turing universal.

If the Mandelbrot set(*) M is Turing universal (or Post creative),
then it constitutes a good third person view of the multiverse. It is
constituted of an infinite but enumerable collection of tiny sub-
Mandelbrot sets, each of which is surrendered by a continuum of
histories (if you agree with the rule Y = II, that is, bifurcations of
the futures are differentiation of the pasts). You can literally see
the "histories" bifurcating infinitely often when converging on the
border of a sub-Mandelbrot set. The results of the bifurcations
organize themselves into converging "polygonal rings" with 2^n sides
(n going to the infinite).

(*) By Mandelbrot set I mean the rational Mandelbrot set: I mean his
intersection with Q X Q (Q = the rational number). See this to have a
look on 4 nices zoom (enlargement) on it. Obviously, no machines can
distinguish a zoom on M from a zoom on M intersected with Q X Q.

Here is just one video with four nice zooms on M (or M intersected
with Q X Q). The third and fifth one illustrates the convergence of
"bifurcating histories" on the border of M.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTuP02b_a7Y

If comp is true, and if M is creative, "you" are there. Each of your
possible states is dense on the border of M. There is always an
infinity of "3-you" between two "3-you". But from your own personal
perspective, it is far more complex, and a priori the M set don't
provide the information, I think you need to introduce the self-
reference logics to pursue the kind of analysis Everett has done on
the universal wave function.
Normally the quantum wave should be justified here, from M + a notion
of internal relative view.

Hmm... This de-zoom (followed by a zoom) illustrates very well too:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lFT4H7E7Ac

The relation with arithmetic is that the question of 'rational
belongness to rational M' is expressible in elementary arithmetic, as
you can guess from the existence of those zooms, if you know how a
computer functions and and what is its relation with arithmetic.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

request for glossary

2009-11-04T21:03:10Z

As a newcomer to this group, there are many things I'm unable to
follow, in detail, due to unfamiliarity with many of the acronyms.

For instance, googling UDA turns up links related to the Ulster
Defense Association, the Universal Dance Association, Urban Design
Associates, and the United Dairymen of Arizona, none of which seem to
be what's being discussed here.

Thanks in advance,

fcy

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To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
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Re: Many-Worlds iPhone app!

2009-11-04T19:11:44Z

Bruno wrote

> The question is then: where does that continuous information come
> from? ...

I could not locate the intriguingly titled "Many-Worlds iPhone appl"
heading in this group, from which it seems to have somehow come, so
I added a copy to the bottom of this post, sorry if this duplicates but
it should interest readers here anyway.

Hm, http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0104033 is interesting , though the
copy I looked up at Arxiv does not seem to have Abstract or
Conclusions.Also, interestingly, it still seems to leave many options
open.

I understood it in general terms and was also interested in the
Mandelbrot set approach of Bruno. I have several books of a
techie/coffee table approach at hand on the Mandelbrot set - as most of
us do - and I also looked at the Bruno videos
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTuP02b_a7Y and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lFT4H7E7Ac

I would agree that there Bruno has something to say. However the fact is
also that neither conventional nor quantum computing cover all the real
options available - experimentally my own blog
http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ mentions the fact that nowadays even the
so-called 'Libet half-second' is experimentally naive by the standards
of 2009. I'm thinking that there now needs to be an advance in the
Godel/Chaitin theorem approach to more theorems of a similar kind.

By the way we are hoping to have a conference in Goa in 2010 at my
Institute for Fundamental Studies (in Goa) which I hope may help to
clarify these matters, some preliminary details on blog
http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ .

uv

---------------------------------------------------------------
On 18 Oct 2009, at 01:13, Alan Forrester wrote:

> The universes, are just part of a more complex structure as
> explained here
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0104033
>
> part of that more complex structure is loads of continuous
> information that is not copied and cannot be copied although we can
> get access to some information about it because it affects the
> probabilities of the things we can observe.

The question is then: where does that continuous information come from?
But it is easy to explain this when we assume the hypothesis that
"we", at some genuine third person description level, are Turing
emulable. In that case we get a continuous explosion of histories
(computations) going through our states already defined in arithmetic.
Our consciousness can stabilize only on the deep histories which are
also stable for a continuum of random fluctuations. Why? Because those
exists as defined by the law of elementary arithmetic, which is indeed
already Turing universal.

If the Mandelbrot set(*) M is Turing universal (or Post creative),
then it constitutes a good third person view of the multiverse. It is
constituted of an infinite but enumerable collection of tiny sub-
Mandelbrot sets, each of which is surrendered by a continuum of
histories (if you agree with the rule Y = II, that is, bifurcations of
the futures are differentiation of the pasts). You can literally see
the "histories" bifurcating infinitely often when converging on the
border of a sub-Mandelbrot set. The results of the bifurcations
organize themselves into converging "polygonal rings" with 2^n sides
(n going to the infinite).

(*) By Mandelbrot set I mean the rational Mandelbrot set: I mean his
intersection with Q X Q (Q = the rational number). See this to have a
look on 4 nices zoom (enlargement) on it. Obviously, no machines can
distinguish a zoom on M from a zoom on M intersected with Q X Q.

Here is just one video with four nice zooms on M (or M intersected
with Q X Q). The third and fifth one illustrates the convergence of
"bifurcating histories" on the border of M.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTuP02b_a7Y

If comp is true, and if M is creative, "you" are there. Each of your
possible states is dense on the border of M. There is always an
infinity of "3-you" between two "3-you". But from your own personal
perspective, it is far more complex, and a priori the M set don't
provide the information, I think you need to introduce the self-
reference logics to pursue the kind of analysis Everett has done on
the universal wave function.
Normally the quantum wave should be justified here, from M + a notion
of internal relative view.

Hmm... This de-zoom (followed by a zoom) illustrates very well too:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lFT4H7E7Ac

The relation with arithmetic is that the question of 'rational
belongness to rational M' is expressible in elementary arithmetic, as
you can guess from the existence of those zooms, if you know how a
computer functions and and what is its relation with arithmetic.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Many-Worlds iPhone app!

2009-11-04T08:48:40Z

On 18 Oct 2009, at 01:13, Alan Forrester wrote:

The universes, are just part of a more complex structure as explained here

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0104033

part of that more complex structure is loads of continuous information that is not copied and cannot be copied although we can get access to some information about it because it affects the probabilities of the things we can observe.

The question is then: where does that continuous information come from?

But it is easy to explain this when we assume the hypothesis that "we", at some genuine third person description level, are Turing emulable. In that case we get a continuous explosion of histories (computations) going through our states already defined in arithmetic. Our consciousness can stabilize only on the deep histories which are also stable for a continuum of random fluctuations. Why? Because those exists as defined by the law of elementary arithmetic, which is indeed already Turing universal.

If the Mandelbrot set(*) M is Turing universal (or Post creative), then it constitutes a good third person view of the multiverse. It is constituted of an infinite but enumerable collection of tiny sub-Mandelbrot sets, each of which is surrendered by a continuum of histories (if you agree with the rule Y = II, that is, bifurcations of the futures are differentiation of the pasts). You can literally see the "histories" bifurcating infinitely often when converging on the border of a sub-Mandelbrot set. The results of the bifurcations organize themselves into converging "polygonal rings" with 2^n sides (n going to the infinite).

(*) By Mandelbrot set I mean the rational Mandelbrot set: I mean his intersection with Q X Q (Q = the rational number). See this to have a look on 4 nices zoom (enlargement) on it. Obviously, no machines can distinguish a zoom on M from a zoom on M intersected with Q X Q.

Here is just one video with four nice zooms on M (or M intersected with Q X Q). The third and fifth one illustrates the convergence of "bifurcating histories" on the border of M.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTuP02b_a7Y

If comp is true, and if M is creative, "you" are there. Each of your possible states is dense on the border of M. There is always an infinity of "3-you" between two "3-you". But from your own personal perspective, it is far more complex, and a priori the M set don't provide the information, I think you need to introduce the self-reference logics to pursue the kind of analysis Everett has done on the universal wave function.

Normally the quantum wave should be justified here, from M + a notion of internal relative view.

Hmm... This de-zoom (followed by a zoom) illustrates very well too:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lFT4H7E7Ac

The relation with arithmetic is that the question of 'rational belongness to rational M' is expressible in elementary arithmetic, as you can guess from the existence of those zooms, if you know how a computer functions and and what is its relation with arithmetic.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: How many universe in the Multiverse?

2009-10-12T07:38:44Z

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0910/0910.1589v1.pdf

2009/10/12 m.a. <marty684@...>

What's the URL?

----- Original Message -----
From: "ronaldheld" <ronaldheld@...>

To: "Everything List" <everything-list@...>

Sent: Monday, October 12, 2009 8:56 AM

Subject: How many universe in the Multiverse?

>
> Arxiv:0910.1589v1
> Any comments?
>
>
>

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: How many universe in the Multiverse?

2009-10-12T07:11:31Z

What's the URL?

----- Original Message -----

From: "ronaldheld" <ronaldheld@...>

To: "Everything List" <everything-list@...>

Sent: Monday, October 12, 2009 8:56 AM

Subject: How many universe in the Multiverse?

>
> Arxiv:0910.1589v1
> Any comments?
>
>
>
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How many universe in the Multiverse?

2009-10-12T05:56:17Z

Arxiv:0910.1589v1
Any comments?

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Re: The seven step series

2009-10-11T10:53:06Z

Hi John, hi Marty,

On 10 Oct 2009, at 21:47, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno, we had similar puzzles in middle school in the 30s.

The barber could not shave himself because he shaved only those who did not shave themselves (and shaved all). So for (Q #1) in the 1st vriant

she(?) was a female, unless he(?) was a beardless male

You are right. The barber gender is female. I don't see why you add that he could be a beardless male. It is part of the problem that we are in a tyrannic country where no man can have a beard.

(and the 'all' refers to only the bearded males requiring a shave).

*

Q#2 is beyond me, I do not resort to a QM-pattern like Schrodinger's cat.

(Sh/H)e is either-or, not both.

I am not sure I understand, except that Q#2 remains unanswered, OK. I will first comment Marty's posts.

On 11 Oct 2009, at 01:30, m.a. wrote:

Or the barber is a special exception to the group designated as "men" and exists on a higher level of being. Therefore he can shave himself without transgressing the rule as stated in the premise. Isn't this one of Russell's paradoxes? marty a.

Well, if the barber is not human, there is indeed no problem. But here the fact that it can be a woman, and that usually a barber is a human being, and that the question refer to a gender strongly suggest that the solution "the barber is a woman" is more reasonable that "the barber is an extraterrestrial". I think.

And didn't Russell decide that this type of paradox should be outlawed from allowable statements within the practice of logic? m.a.

Nice you see the relation with Russel's paradox. This is a very deep paradox which shows we have to handle the notion of sets with some care. Torgny Tholerus already mentionned this, and he defended the idea this is an argument for ultrafinitism, which in my opinion is like throwing the baby (the infinite sets) with the water of the bath.

If we dare to consider that the collection of *all* sets is itself a set, we have a nice example of a set which contains itself as an element.

This is not problematical in itself, and in some axiomatic set theories, some sets can belong to themselves.

What becomes problematical is the idea of defining a set in intension by using *any* criteria.

Indeed, let us call *universe*, U, the set of all sets. U belongs-to U. But {1, 2} does not belongs to {1, 2}, so some sets belong to themselves and some sets don't. So it looks like we could define a new set E of which contains all the sets which does not belongs to themselves. For example clearly the set {1, 2} is an element of E, and U is not an element of E.

But then we are in trouble. Does E belongs to E?

If E belongs to E, then he contradicts the definition of E, which contains only those set which does not belong to themselves. So E has to not belong to E. But then E does verify its own definition, so that he does belong to E. So E belongs to E and E does not belong to E. Damned.

Well, this proves that the intuitive idea of set is inconsistent. We do have to make the notion more precise to avoid such kind of reasoning. All the many very different attempts to make the notion of set precise have lead toward interesting mathematics, philosophy and even religion (i think). But this would lead us far away of the topic. We will have opportunity to come back on this. With the most usual axiomatic set theories, the set of all sets is not a set, and the criteria to defined set in intension is usually weakened. So much that some axioms have to be added to get a reasonably rich theory.

Question 2.

2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Let us write (x y) to say that some relation between x and y exists.

In the problem, for example, (x y) means that x shaves y, and x and y are supposed to be humans.

In Russel's paradox (x y) means that x belongs to y, that is X contains y as an element, and x and y are supposed to be sets.

Argument by diagonalization always proceeds by using the diagonal twice. Which diagonal?

1) the first diagonal:

Well (x y) is a couple, and so belongs to the cartesian product of the set (of those x, y) with itself. Put in another way, if you look at all (x y) you get a matrix of pair of things (humans in the problem, sets in the paradox).

OK?

Well, the (x x) will constituted the diagonal of that matrix. x is supposed to vary in their respective domain (the humans in the village, the set, in the universe of all sets.

In the village, this gives something like (Sophie Sophie) (Claude Claude) (Arthur Arthur) etc. As long as there are inhabitants in the village. With the sets, the diagonal is any couple (x x) with x an arbitrary set.

The barber, let us call it B, and the paradoxical set E from above are defined in a very similar way, said "by diagonalization", because it involves the diagonal (x, x).

The barber is defined by the condition that he shaves all and only the men who does not shave themselves.

B shaves x

if and only if

x is a man and NOT (x x). "NOT (x,x)" means that x does not shave x. OK?

E is defined by the condition that it contains all and only the sets which does not contain themselves as element.

E contain x as element

if and only if

NOT(x x)

2) The second diagonal:

Consist in looking what happen to the barber B, or the set E, when applied to itself.

The second diagonalisation is the question (B B)?, or the question (E E)?

(B B)? = Does B shaves B?

And then, by definition of the barber B, if it is a man, we get a contradiction. Fortunately no contradiction occurs in case the barber is a woman. If he is a man, he has to shave himself if and only if he does not shave himself. If she is a woman, then she does not shave herself and has no obligation to do given that the barber shaves *only* men, by definition. So here, we have just proved that in that village the barber is a woman. Or, taking Marty's remark into account; we have proved that IF the barber is a human, THEN it is a woman. No contradiction occurs if the barber is a god, an extraterrestrial or a machine, with or without gender. It can be anything not shaving itself, and shaving by definition only the men of the village.

(E E)? = Does the set E contains itself as an element?

If yes: then it violates its own definition.

If no: well, it violates again its definition.

With (B B), we "prove a theorem", thanks to the saving condition excluding the possibility that (B B) is true in advance.

With (E E) we get a genuine difficulty showing that the naïve idea of sets is inconsistent.

And what if we delete the saving condition in the Barber problem, leading us to the "usual" Barber paradox. What if we say, with x varying on all humans (making barber shaving all womans, unless using John's proposal for the notion of "not shaving").

First diagonalisation:

B shaves x

if and only if

NOT (x x).

Well, second diagonalisation, we get:

(B B)

if and only if

NOT(B B)

A contradiction. Is it catastrophical? Not at all, it is a contradiction only assuming such a village exists. So it is only a proof that nowhere in any consistent reality or galaxies, multiverses, whatsoever you will ever find a barber, inhabiting a village and shaving all and only all the inhabitants who don't shave themselves. You will not find it for the same reason you will never find a square with only three sides, (unless dreaming or hallucinating or something?).

Do you see the two diagonalisations in Cantor theorem's proof? And in Kleene's proof?

We suppose there is a bijection between N and some set of functions. So we suppose there is an indexing of the functions, f_i available. The first diagonalisation is in the definition of g:

g(n) = f_n(n) + 1

Then, for "good" or "bad" reasons, according of the context, we suppose g belongs to the set of f_n, so that we can apply g on its own index, that is the second diagonalization, and get wonderful variate results according again the context.

Actually

1) when f_i are supposed to be a bijection between N and N^N, we get a contradiction. Showing that N^N are not enumerable.

2) when f_i are supposed to be a computable bijection between N and N^N-comp, we get a contradiction. Showing that, although enumerable, 2^N-comp and N^N-comp are not computably enumerable.

3) when f_i are supposed to belong to an universal sequence of N^N-comp, we ... crash the universal machine, and find ourself unable to prevent by any means such crashing without destroying the machine universality. Showing that if we want *all*l total computable functions in the universal sequence N^N-partial-comp, they will be hidden in a non solvable ways (Pi-2 complete) among the partial functions. Partial function are like ignorance tunnels, or abysses, in the reality with which universal machines can be confronted.

I will come back on this, and develop, but this could make sense for those who have followed the last posts, in this thread.

Precisely N^N-comp is the set of functions from N to N which are computable.

N^N-partial-comp is the set of partial functions from N to N which are computable on their domains. Those partial functions are either defined on all N, and called total functions, or they are not defined for some number, and which, strictly speaking are functions from a subset of N to N.

Take it easy. I intend to summarize and come back on some crucial points, soon or a bit later.

Bruno

On Fri, Oct 9, 2009 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

Hi,

I am so buzy that I have not the time to give long explanations, so I
give here a short exercise and a subject of reflexion instead.

Exercise:

There is Tyrannic country where by law it was forbidden for any man to
have a beard.
And there is village, in that country, and it is said that there is a
barber in that village, who shaves all and only the men who don't
shave themselves.

Two questions:

1) What is the gender of the barber?
2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Have a good day,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: The seven step series

2009-10-11T06:51:24Z

And didn't Russell decide that this type of paradox should be outlawed from allowable statements within the practice of logic? m.a.

----- Original Message -----

From: marty684@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Saturday, October 10, 2009 7:30 PM

Subject: Re: The seven step series

Or the barber is a special exception to the group designated as "men" and exists on a higher level of being. Therefore he can shave himself without transgressing the rule as stated in the premise. Isn't this one of Russell's paradoxes?       marty a.

----- Original Message -----

From: jamikes@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Saturday, October 10, 2009 3:47 PM

Subject: Re: The seven step series

Bruno, we had similar puzzles in middle school in the 30s.

The barber could not shave himself because he shaved only those who did not shave themselves (and shaved all). So for  (Q #1) in the 1st vriant

she(?) was a female, unless he(?) was a beardless male

(and the 'all' refers to only the bearded males requiring a shave).

*

Q#2 is beyond me, I do not resort to a QM-pattern like Schrodinger's cat.

(Sh/H)e is either-or, not both.

John M

On Fri, Oct 9, 2009 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

Hi,

I am so buzy that I have not the time to give long explanations, so I
give here a short exercise and a subject of reflexion instead.

Exercise:

There is Tyrannic country where by law it was forbidden for any man to
have a beard.
And there is village, in that country, and it is said that there is a
barber in that village, who shaves all and only the men who don't
shave themselves.

Two questions:

1) What is the gender of the barber?
2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Have a good day,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: The seven step series

2009-10-10T16:30:15Z

Or the barber is a special exception to the group designated as "men" and exists on a higher level of being. Therefore he can shave himself without transgressing the rule as stated in the premise. Isn't this one of Russell's paradoxes? marty a.

----- Original Message -----

From: jamikes@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Saturday, October 10, 2009 3:47 PM

Subject: Re: The seven step series

Bruno, we had similar puzzles in middle school in the 30s.

The barber could not shave himself because he shaved only those who did not shave themselves (and shaved all). So for (Q #1) in the 1st vriant

she(?) was a female, unless he(?) was a beardless male

(and the 'all' refers to only the bearded males requiring a shave).

*

Q#2 is beyond me, I do not resort to a QM-pattern like Schrodinger's cat.

(Sh/H)e is either-or, not both.

John M

On Fri, Oct 9, 2009 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

Hi,

I am so buzy that I have not the time to give long explanations, so I
give here a short exercise and a subject of reflexion instead.

Exercise:

There is Tyrannic country where by law it was forbidden for any man to
have a beard.
And there is village, in that country, and it is said that there is a
barber in that village, who shaves all and only the men who don't
shave themselves.

Two questions:

1) What is the gender of the barber?
2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Have a good day,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: The seven step series

2009-10-10T12:47:57Z

Bruno, we had similar puzzles in middle school in the 30s.

The barber could not shave himself because he shaved only those who did not shave themselves (and shaved all). So for (Q #1) in the 1st vriant

she(?) was a female, unless he(?) was a beardless male

(and the 'all' refers to only the bearded males requiring a shave).

Q#2 is beyond me, I do not resort to a QM-pattern like Schrodinger's cat.

(Sh/H)e is either-or, not both.

John M

On Fri, Oct 9, 2009 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

Hi,

I am so buzy that I have not the time to give long explanations, so I
give here a short exercise and a subject of reflexion instead.

Exercise:

There is Tyrannic country where by law it was forbidden for any man to
have a beard.
And there is village, in that country, and it is said that there is a
barber in that village, who shaves all and only the men who don't
shave themselves.

Two questions:

1) What is the gender of the barber?
2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Have a good day,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: The seven step series

2009-10-09T09:00:16Z

Hi,

I am so buzy that I have not the time to give long explanations, so I
give here a short exercise and a subject of reflexion instead.

Exercise:

There is Tyrannic country where by law it was forbidden for any man to
have a beard.
And there is village, in that country, and it is said that there is a
barber in that village, who shaves all and only the men who don't
shave themselves.

Two questions:

1) What is the gender of the barber?
2) What the hell has all this to do with diagonalization, ... and
universal machine?

Have a good day,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-08T05:03:17Z

On 08 Oct 2009, at 03:46, David Nyman wrote:

>
> 2009/10/7 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>
>
>> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
>> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
>> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
>> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you
>> feel
>> that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of
>> the 1-
>> I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are
>> doubtable.
>> I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
>> between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?
>
> For me, RITSIAR refers to 1-I.

That is what I thought.

> I think the disagreement over ontology
> has been largely about whether theoretical schemas, based on AR or PM,
> must be treated as RITSIAR in a directly identified 3-I sense. I
> think rather that the union between theoretical entities and 1-RITSIAR
> can only be approached asymptotically.

Agreed.

> This seems to me to stem
> directly from the 1-p "undoubtable" /3-p "doubtable" distinction - the
> gap can never be completely eliminated. This means we should have
> strong reservations about taking any combination of 3-p and 1-p
> "literally" - especially given the very incomplete state of our
> current knowledge; the issues are rather those of explanatory and
> predictive fruitfulness. This seems to me to be quite a different
> issue from the one of distinguishing fiction from fact within a given
> schema, which is a matter of internal reference.

I think so. Note that the "interview of the universal machine" does
already predict a gap between some of the possible point sof view of
the arithmetically correct machines.

This seemss impossible given that it leads to a scientific (pure 3-
communicable) 'theology' who's first fundamental theorem asserts that
'theology' cannot be scientific.

The paradox vanishes when you see that a machine can only study the
(correct) theology of a correct machine, and then just pray she is
herself correct. A correct machine, by Gödel and Tarski, can never
known, nor even express its own correctness. Yet a machine can already
study the complete theology of much simpler machine than herself. And
the machine can prove that the theology is invariant for all
machine ... as far as they remain correct, which, from an indexical
perspective (be it the 1-I or 3-I) is necessarily on the order of
faith or bet.
Yet the theology of machine does contain its physics, and this makes
the machine theology and the whole comp hypothesis refutable
empirically, or confirmable. At that point it is very important to
understand that a empirical confirmation is never a proof.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-07T18:46:52Z

2009/10/7 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel
> that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1-
> I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable.
> I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
> between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?

For me, RITSIAR refers to 1-I. I think the disagreement over ontology
has been largely about whether theoretical schemas, based on AR or PM,
must be treated as RITSIAR in a directly identified 3-I sense. I
think rather that the union between theoretical entities and 1-RITSIAR
can only be approached asymptotically. This seems to me to stem
directly from the 1-p "undoubtable" /3-p "doubtable" distinction - the
gap can never be completely eliminated. This means we should have
strong reservations about taking any combination of 3-p and 1-p
"literally" - especially given the very incomplete state of our
current knowledge; the issues are rather those of explanatory and
predictive fruitfulness. This seems to me to be quite a different
issue from the one of distinguishing fiction from fact within a given
schema, which is a matter of internal reference.

David

>
> John, Stathis, Mirek, Peter,
>
> On 06 Oct 2009, at 13:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote to John,:
>
> >>
> >> "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."
> >>
> >> Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist
> >> ideas are
> >> at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would
> >> say "NO"
> >> to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new
> >> brain
> >> would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but
> >> not
> >> digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha
> >> ha) mind.
> >
> > So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with
> > computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking
> > computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are
> > clear that this is the case.
>
>
>
> John, I appreciate Stathis' answer. The goal has never been to
> convinced anybody that comp is true.
> Actuallyy, I have the feeling that *too much* scientist believes in
> comp, and this without realizing the consequences.
>
> On the contrary, the goal here is to show how much "crazy" comp is,
> once we dare to take it as literally true. Notably to show that comp
> leads to the first person indeterminacies, and eventually to the
> reversal of the current Aristotelian theology (shared by many atheists
> and christians alike) which relies on a 'religious belief/dogma" on
> the primary character of matter.
>
> Actually comp *is*, strictly speaking, unbelievable. With some natural
> definition it can be shown provably unbelievable by (correct) machines
> (assuming their consistency), and that is why I insist that comp is
> directly akin to an act of faith, and that saying yes to the doctor is
> a theological act.
>
> Personally, I doubt comp, but this is a bit diabolical, because
> (correct) machine have to doubt comp for remaining consistent. So my
> doubt confirms comp. Of course a confirmation is not a proof, so I can
> doubt comp and remain consistent!
>
> Mirek, I agree with Stathis about his comment on the papers you
> refered too.
> Note that it is very difficult to define completely what a first
> person is, but, for the matter of reasoning partial definitions can
> work very well, and note that those definitions used in UDA and AUDA
> do refer only to sharable third person notions. (In science we cannot
> invoke as argument first person truth, but of course we can tackle the
> first person notion itself. Through assumptions and definitions, the
> notion of first person is partially amenable to third person notions.
>
> In the UDA the first person discourse are defined by the memory, or
> the personal diary of the one who enter the teleporting (or
> duplicating) devices. So it is the memory of the one who is
> annihilated and reconstituted. The 3 person is just the usual
> discourse of an external (with respect to the teleporting device)
> observer. This works very well for a (artifiicial) machine. It is
> obvious that a program cannot measure the delay where it is not
> executed, for example, so the difference between first and third
> person is made obvious (self-duplication made it even observable in
> some sense).
>
> In the AUDA, it is more difficult, and I have been stuck on this
> during many years. But then I realized that the oldest definition of a
> "knower", the one which define 'knowing' by believing a truth, works
> very well in that context, and so I defined, in arithmetic, the first
> person by the arithmetical knower, following Boolos and Goldblat. To
> know that 1+1=2 is Beweisbar(godel number of '1+1=2') & 1+1 = 2.
>
> Such a definition of knowledge is well debated since a long time by
> philosophers. It appears in very old Indian and Chinese texts, and in
> the Theaetetus of Plato. In fine, you can see that those who object to
> such a definition are those who believe that they can distinguish
> reality and dream, or, in our context, reality and digital simulation
> of it, and this instantaneously. Again, this would contradict comp
> (our working hypothesis). I refer you to the second paper you have
> mentioned as an example.
>
> Another example treated in detail in "conscience et mécanisme" are
> works by Malcolm. In a book on 'dreaming' Malcolm argues that we are
> not conscious during a dream, and in papers he argues against comp.
> The logical structure of the argument are identicals.
>
> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel
> that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1-
> I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable.
> I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
> between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?
>
> Soon, but not so soon, hopefully this or next week, some more
> explanation on diagonalization.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >

Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-07T08:09:19Z

John, Stathis, Mirek, Peter,

On 06 Oct 2009, at 13:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote to John,:

>>
>> "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."
>>
>> Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist
>> ideas are
>> at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would
>> say "NO"
>> to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new
>> brain
>> would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but
>> not
>> digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha
>> ha) mind.
>
> So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with
> computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking
> computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are
> clear that this is the case.

John, I appreciate Stathis' answer. The goal has never been to
convinced anybody that comp is true.
Actuallyy, I have the feeling that *too much* scientist believes in
comp, and this without realizing the consequences.

On the contrary, the goal here is to show how much "crazy" comp is,
once we dare to take it as literally true. Notably to show that comp
leads to the first person indeterminacies, and eventually to the
reversal of the current Aristotelian theology (shared by many atheists
and christians alike) which relies on a 'religious belief/dogma" on
the primary character of matter.

Actually comp *is*, strictly speaking, unbelievable. With some natural
definition it can be shown provably unbelievable by (correct) machines
(assuming their consistency), and that is why I insist that comp is
directly akin to an act of faith, and that saying yes to the doctor is
a theological act.

Personally, I doubt comp, but this is a bit diabolical, because
(correct) machine have to doubt comp for remaining consistent. So my
doubt confirms comp. Of course a confirmation is not a proof, so I can
doubt comp and remain consistent!

Mirek, I agree with Stathis about his comment on the papers you
refered too.
Note that it is very difficult to define completely what a first
person is, but, for the matter of reasoning partial definitions can
work very well, and note that those definitions used in UDA and AUDA
do refer only to sharable third person notions. (In science we cannot
invoke as argument first person truth, but of course we can tackle the
first person notion itself. Through assumptions and definitions, the
notion of first person is partially amenable to third person notions.

In the UDA the first person discourse are defined by the memory, or
the personal diary of the one who enter the teleporting (or
duplicating) devices. So it is the memory of the one who is
annihilated and reconstituted. The 3 person is just the usual
discourse of an external (with respect to the teleporting device)
observer. This works very well for a (artifiicial) machine. It is
obvious that a program cannot measure the delay where it is not
executed, for example, so the difference between first and third
person is made obvious (self-duplication made it even observable in
some sense).

In the AUDA, it is more difficult, and I have been stuck on this
during many years. But then I realized that the oldest definition of a
"knower", the one which define 'knowing' by believing a truth, works
very well in that context, and so I defined, in arithmetic, the first
person by the arithmetical knower, following Boolos and Goldblat. To
know that 1+1=2 is Beweisbar(godel number of '1+1=2') & 1+1 = 2.

Such a definition of knowledge is well debated since a long time by
philosophers. It appears in very old Indian and Chinese texts, and in
the Theaetetus of Plato. In fine, you can see that those who object to
such a definition are those who believe that they can distinguish
reality and dream, or, in our context, reality and digital simulation
of it, and this instantaneously. Again, this would contradict comp
(our working hypothesis). I refer you to the second paper you have
mentioned as an example.

Another example treated in detail in "conscience et mécanisme" are
works by Malcolm. In a book on 'dreaming' Malcolm argues that we are
not conscious during a dream, and in papers he argues against comp.
The logical structure of the argument are identicals.

Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
"ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel
that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1-
I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable.
I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?

Soon, but not so soon, hopefully this or next week, some more
explanation on diagonalization.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-06T04:07:37Z

2009/10/6 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Good morning, Stathis,
> thanks for the friendly early-bird detailed reply - I like almost all of
> it.
> Just to keep the tradition of the list:
>
> "...billions of other people could observe, record and share about you,
> given the opportunity, even if there are individual differences..."
>
> this is like a 'democratic voting' (what I deny) where everybody has
> different interests, yet vote for one (the best liar) - just to have a
> consensus. Those "individual differences" may be devastating beyond the
> boundaries we usually limit our opinios to. Show me ONE instant where the
> personal input of adjustment does not enter - even public - understanding of
> any 'opinion'. And thanks for the 1st par. last sentence's "somehow" - a
> landmark for me<G>.

The billions of observers would agree on such things as your height,
weight, colour of your jacket, frequency spectrum of sound emitted by
your vocal cords, and so on. These things are public and there could
be unanimous agreement on them, even if the observers were aliens who
have never seen a human before. On the other hand, guesses as to your
subjective experience would remain guesses, and moreover would be
guesses based on the possible subjective experience of the individual
observer.

> If the experiment keeps the instantiations so that they
>
> "...remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times..."
>
> then I reject the reality of those experimental conditions. A clone is
> different from it's original even at a most careful identity measure, if not
> otherwise by some different (spatial? etc.) (co)-ordinates for environmental
> impacts.
> Such instrumental differences also arise from (sub?)molecular built of
> structure, the origin of atoms (if I condone such physicalistic figments at
> all).
> I stand corrected: No clone can be "identical", not even at the
> instantiation level. (My fundamental objection to any 'teleportational'
> replication as well).

A digital clone would be exactly identical. We rely on this fact when
we run computer software: the software should behave in exactly the
same way whatever hardware it is running on, given the same inputs. If
the brain is Turing emulable, the same should apply to minds; if not,
then perhaps not.

> "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."
>
> Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist ideas are
> at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would say "NO"
> to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new brain
> would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but not
> digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha ha) mind.

So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with
computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking
computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are
clear that this is the case.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-05T07:49:58Z

Good morning, Stathis,

thanks for the friendly early-bird detailed reply - I like almost all of it.

Just to keep the tradition of the list:

"...billions of other people could observe, record and share about you, given the opportunity, even if there are individual differences..."

this is like a 'democratic voting' (what I deny) where everybody has different interests, yet vote for one (the best liar) - just to have a consensus. Those "individual differences" may be devastating beyond the boundaries we usually limit our opinios to. Show me ONE instant where the personal input of adjustment does not enter - even public - understanding of any 'opinion'. And thanks for the 1st par. last sentence's "somehow" - a landmark for me<G>.
*

If the experiment keeps the instantiations so that they

"...remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times..."

then I reject the reality of those experimental conditions. A clone is different from it's original even at a most careful identity measure, if not otherwise by some different (spatial? etc.) (co)-ordinates for environmental impacts.

Such instrumental differences also arise from (sub?)molecular built of structure, the origin of atoms (if I condone such physicalistic figments at all).

I stand corrected: No clone can be "identical", not even at the instantiation level. (My fundamental objection to any 'teleportational' replication as well).

"We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."

Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist ideas are at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would say "NO" to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new brain would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but not digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha ha) mind.

Have a good week

John Mikes

On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 5:58 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:

2009/10/5 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Excellent points, Stathis.
> What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of a
> knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding about
> it.

This is true, but there is a distinction between the private and the
public. What I am able to observe, record and share about you has a
lot in common with what billions of other people could observe, record
and share about you, given the opportunity, even if there are
individual differences. But what you experience yourself is - somehow
- qualitatively different.

> The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that both
> are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and so
> evolve differently.

I think it is assumed for the purpose of the experiment that the
relevant environments are controlled so that the two instantiations
remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times. Of course, in practice if
you made an exact copy of yourself and released it into the
environment within fractions of a second it will start to
differentiate from you.

> I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not
> 'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our
> 'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are (anybody
> knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought to
> add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the
> "physical".
> (What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know about
> some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by the
> brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow").

We start off assuming a physicalist comp (for want of a better term)
where the mental supervenes on the physical, which is what Bruno is
getting at (as a first step) when he asks if you will say "yes" to the
doctor if offered a new digital brain. But then, following this
assumption to its conclusion, it turns out that physicalist comp is
quite difficult to maintain.

--

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-05T02:58:27Z

2009/10/5 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:
> Excellent points, Stathis.
> What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of a
> knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding about
> it.

This is true, but there is a distinction between the private and the
public. What I am able to observe, record and share about you has a
lot in common with what billions of other people could observe, record
and share about you, given the opportunity, even if there are
individual differences. But what you experience yourself is - somehow
- qualitatively different.

> The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that both
> are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and so
> evolve differently.

I think it is assumed for the purpose of the experiment that the
relevant environments are controlled so that the two instantiations
remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times. Of course, in practice if
you made an exact copy of yourself and released it into the
environment within fractions of a second it will start to
differentiate from you.

> I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not
> 'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our
> 'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are (anybody
> knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought to
> add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the
> "physical".
> (What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know about
> some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by the
> brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow").

We start off assuming a physicalist comp (for want of a better term)
where the mental supervenes on the physical, which is what Bruno is
getting at (as a first step) when he asks if you will say "yes" to the
doctor if offered a new digital brain. But then, following this
assumption to its conclusion, it turns out that physicalist comp is
quite difficult to maintain.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-04T16:09:01Z

Excellent points, Stathis.

What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of a knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding about it.

The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that both are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and so evolve differently.

I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not 'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our 'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are (anybody knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought to add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the "physical".

(What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know about some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by the brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow").

On Sun, Oct 4, 2009 at 12:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:

2009/10/1 Miroslav Dobsicek <m.dobsicek@...>:
>
> In the September'09 issue of The Reasoner
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(9).pdf
>
> Fonseca and Gartner present an argument for a difference between the
> first and third person point of view. In the October issue,
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(10).pdf
>
> the argument is being criticized by Erich Rast. I don't find the
> argument very convincing since their notion of simulation is too vague.
> However, I don't follow the criticism. Could someone help a little bit?

In the articles, there are two persons, P1 and P2, where P2 is an
exact physical clone of P1 created by an external observer P3. P1 has
the self S1, comprising a set of beliefs and attitudes, including the
knowledge k* that this experiment is occurring and the belief bel* "I
am P1". P2 has the self S2, which by definition contains the same set
of beliefs and attitudes, so S1=S2. The first article suggests that
bel* lacks a truth value from the POV of P1 or P2, but does have a
truth value from the POV of P3. This is claimed to be "somewhat
paradoxical", since it means S1=S2 in one case but not in the other.
However, the second article makes the point that knowledge (true
belief) depends on external reality and cannot be relative to a
simulation, and claims that this invalidates the first article's
conclusions that you can never know if you are the clone or the
original and that the identity of the self is relative to the POV.

It appears that "person" in these articles is used to mean physical
instantiation while "self" is used to mean consciousness. I don't see
why it is claimed in the first article that S1=/S2 from P3's POV,
since S refers only to subjective content, and therefore I don't see
the relevance of the second article's assertion that knowledge depends
on external reality. I agree that it is impossible to know if you are
the clone or the original but the claim that identity of the self is
relative to the POV seems to me to be meaningless.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

Re: first-person vs third person view

2009-10-03T21:34:05Z

2009/10/1 Miroslav Dobsicek <m.dobsicek@...>:

>
> In the September'09 issue of The Reasoner
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(9).pdf
>
> Fonseca and Gartner present an argument for a difference between the
> first and third person point of view. In the October issue,
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(10).pdf
>
> the argument is being criticized by Erich Rast. I don't find the
> argument very convincing since their notion of simulation is too vague.
> However, I don't follow the criticism. Could someone help a little bit?

In the articles, there are two persons, P1 and P2, where P2 is an
exact physical clone of P1 created by an external observer P3. P1 has
the self S1, comprising a set of beliefs and attitudes, including the
knowledge k* that this experiment is occurring and the belief bel* "I
am P1". P2 has the self S2, which by definition contains the same set
of beliefs and attitudes, so S1=S2. The first article suggests that
bel* lacks a truth value from the POV of P1 or P2, but does have a
truth value from the POV of P3. This is claimed to be "somewhat
paradoxical", since it means S1=S2 in one case but not in the other.
However, the second article makes the point that knowledge (true
belief) depends on external reality and cannot be relative to a
simulation, and claims that this invalidates the first article's
conclusions that you can never know if you are the clone or the
original and that the identity of the self is relative to the POV.

It appears that "person" in these articles is used to mean physical
instantiation while "self" is used to mean consciousness. I don't see
why it is claimed in the first article that S1=/S2 from P3's POV,
since S refers only to subjective content, and therefore I don't see
the relevance of the second article's assertion that knowledge depends
on external reality. I agree that it is impossible to know if you are
the clone or the original but the claim that identity of the self is
relative to the POV seems to me to be meaningless.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: books on logic/computing

2009-09-30T13:28:33Z

Bruno:
It will take quite a while for Mendelson, so I may ask again when I
am "finished" or want to start something new.
Ronald

On Sep 29, 12:47 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> On 28 Sep 2009, at 21:51, ronaldheld wrote:
>
>
>
> > My book has arrived. Perhaps in several months, I will be able to
> > follow the symbolic arguments better?
>
> Nice. Now I feel some guild because for all books in logic, there
> exists always a better book :)
>
> The books by Torkel Fraenkel are very good. Too, like Carnielli and
> Epstein and the Boolos and Jeffrey series.
>
> As a unique book for a serious study, some remains the best, like
> Mendelson for an introduction to mathematical logic (a branch of math
> which study the formal or symbolical systems) and Hartley Rogers for a
> serious introduction to recursion theory (alias theoretical computer
> science; computability theory, uncomputability theory, ...).
>
> And the book by Boolos (1979, 1993) are basically the best
> introduction to the G and G* logics of self-reference. (The AUDA main
> tools).
>
> Smullyan wrote many chef-d'oeuvre.
>
> The deepest bible of the field is Davis 1965,
>
> DAVIS M. (ed.), 1965, The Undecidable, Raven Press, Hewlett, New York.
>
> with the original papers by Gödel, Turing, Kleene, Church, and the
> most incredible Paper which anticipated everything up to now and
> beyond ... (I could argue).
> It exists in DOVER now!
>
> My october month is a bit charged, and I am slow down. I will come
> back on the diagonalization, and the "mathematical
> definition or approach to the notion of computation, and the relation
> between physics and the (mathematically shaped) border of the
> uncomputable, asap.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> > Ronald
>
> > On Sep 19, 5:38 pm, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@...> wrote:
> >> Thanks, Bruno. Mendelson is on its way to me.
> >> Ronald
>
> >> On Sep 18, 10:10 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>
> >>> Hi Ronald,
>
> >>> Mendelson' book is an excellent book.
>
> >>> The many editions of Boolos and Jeffrey are very good, but the
> >>> mathematical logic part is not really self-contained. I like very
> >>> much
> >>> also the book by Epstein and Carnielli, and Epstein alone wrote nice
> >>> big books on both classical and non classical logics, but I do think
> >>> that Mendelson is one of the best introduction to classical
> >>> mathematical logic. It gives the standard detailed account on
> >>> computability, and on Gödel and Löb theorems.
>
> >>> Note that the understanding of UDA does not rely on mathematical
> >>> logic, just on the notion of universal machine, and Church thesis
> >>> (which I am explaining currently). But the "formal theory" and the
> >>> notion of Löbian Machine, relies on mathematical logic. Those matter
> >>> are not well known beyond the circle of mathematical logicians.
> >>> Gödel's theorem is frequently abused (that does not help).
>
> >>> This makes me think about the book by Torkel Franzèn, which are very
> >>> nice. Excellent complement to Mendelson.
>
> >>> Google on "Torkel Franzèn inexhaustibility" and "Torkel Franzèn
> >>> abuse
> >>> Gödel". You can't miss them.
>
> >>> If and when I try to explain AUDA, I can say more. Mendelson does
> >>> not
> >>> introduce to modal logic, but the little book by Bools 1979 does it
> >>> very well, before using it for the formal self-reference.
>
> >>> So for AUDA, ma suggestion, for serious studies, is:
>
> >>> 1) Mendelson
> >>> 2) Boolos 1979
>
> >>> Bruno
>
> >>> On 18 Sep 2009, at 15:14, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> >>>> Bruno:
> >>>> It sounds as if the way to begin is with the latest Mendelson
> >>>> book.
> >>>> Ronald
>
> >>>> On Sep 18, 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
> >>>>> Hi Ronald,
>
> >>>>> You may ask Günther Greindl, who asked me references for the UDA
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> AUDA, and he put them on the list archive.
>
> >>>>> guenther.grei...@...
>
> >>>>> You can take a look on the references in my theses.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/lillethesis/these/node79.html#SECTIO
> >>>>> ...
> >>>>> ://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/7%20biblio
> >>>>> %20gen...
>
> >>>>> An excellent introduction to mathematical logic is the book by
> >>>>> Eliot
> >>>>> Mendelson. Classical treatises on the self-reference logic are the
> >>>>> book by Boolos 1979 (recently reedited), or the later version:
> >>>>> Boolos
> >>>>> 1993. The book by Smorynski is very good too, but those books
> >>>>> presuppose knowledge of logic (Like explained in Mendelson).
>
> >>>>> Then all books, technical or recreative by Raymond Smullyan, are
> >>>>> introduction to diagonalization, self-reference, Gödel and Tarski
> >>>>> theorem, and they are quite excellent. Notably his little
> >>>>> recreative
> >>>>> (but not so easy apparently) introduction to the modal G system;
> >>>>> "Forever Undecided".
>
> >>>>> Ask if you have a problem to find them, or if you search for other
> >>>>> books. Logicians like to write book, and there are many of them.
> >>>>> Original papers on the UDA and AUDA can be found on my web pages
> >>>>> (http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >>>>> ).
>
> >>>>> Bruno
>
> >>>>> On 10 Sep 2009, at 21:48, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> >>>>>> I thought that I would start a thread to consolidate some of the
> >>>>>> books
> >>>>>> useful in following current and old threads. if people alos
> >>>>>> want to
> >>>>>> post key papers here, I do not see a problem with that.- Hide
> >>>>>> quoted text -
>
> >>>>> - Show quoted text -
>
> >>>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hidequoted text -
>
> >>> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

first-person vs third person view

2009-09-30T08:51:45Z

In the September'09 issue of The Reasoner

http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(9).pdf

Fonseca and Gartner present an argument for a difference between the
first and third person point of view. In the October issue,

http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(10).pdf

the argument is being criticized by Erich Rast. I don't find the
argument very convincing since their notion of simulation is too vague.
However, I don't follow the criticism. Could someone help a little bit?

Cheers,
mirek

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Re: books on logic/computing

2009-09-29T09:47:26Z

On 28 Sep 2009, at 21:51, ronaldheld wrote:

My book has arrived. Perhaps in several months, I will be able to
follow the symbolic arguments better?

Nice. Now I feel some guild because for all books in logic, there exists always a better book :)

The books by Torkel Fraenkel are very good. Too, like Carnielli and Epstein and the Boolos and Jeffrey series.

As a unique book for a serious study, some remains the best, like Mendelson for an introduction to mathematical logic (a branch of math which study the formal or symbolical systems) and Hartley Rogers for a serious introduction to recursion theory (alias theoretical computer science; computability theory, uncomputability theory, ...).

And the book by Boolos (1979, 1993) are basically the best introduction to the G and G* logics of self-reference. (The AUDA main tools).

Smullyan wrote many chef-d'oeuvre.

The deepest bible of the field is Davis 1965,

DAVIS M. (ed.), 1965, The Undecidable, Raven Press, Hewlett, New York.

with the original papers by Gödel, Turing, Kleene, Church, and the most incredible Paper which anticipated everything up to now and beyond ... (I could argue).

It exists in DOVER now!

My october month is a bit charged, and I am slow down. I will come back on the diagonalization, and the "mathematical

definition or approach to the notion of computation, and the relation between physics and the (mathematically shaped) border of the uncomputable, asap.

Best,

Bruno

Ronald

On Sep 19, 5:38 pm, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@...> wrote:
Thanks, Bruno. Mendelson is on its way to me.
Ronald

On Sep 18, 10:10 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

Hi Ronald,

Mendelson' book is an excellent book.

The many editions of Boolos and Jeffrey are very good, but the
mathematical logic part is not really self-contained. I like very much
also the book by Epstein and Carnielli, and Epstein alone wrote nice
big books on both classical and non classical logics, but I do think
that Mendelson is one of the best introduction to classical
mathematical logic. It gives the standard detailed account on
computability, and on Gödel and Löb theorems.

Note that the understanding of UDA does not rely on mathematical
logic, just on the notion of universal machine, and Church thesis
(which I am explaining currently). But the "formal theory" and the
notion of Löbian Machine, relies on mathematical logic. Those matter
are not well known beyond the circle of mathematical logicians.
Gödel's theorem is frequently abused (that does not help).

This makes me think about the book by Torkel Franzèn, which are very
nice. Excellent complement to Mendelson.

Google on "Torkel Franzèn inexhaustibility" and "Torkel Franzèn abuse
Gödel". You can't miss them.

If and when I try to explain AUDA, I can say more. Mendelson does not
introduce to modal logic, but the little book by Bools 1979 does it
very well, before using it for the formal self-reference.

So for AUDA, ma suggestion, for serious studies, is:

1) Mendelson
2) Boolos 1979

Bruno

On 18 Sep 2009, at 15:14, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno:
It sounds as if the way to begin is with the latest Mendelson book.
Ronald

On Sep 18, 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
Hi Ronald,

You may ask Günther Greindl, who asked me references for the UDA and
AUDA, and he put them on the list archive.

guenther.grei...@...

You can take a look on the references in my theses.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/lillethesis/these/node79.html#SECTIO...
://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/7%20biblio%20gen...

An excellent introduction to mathematical logic is the book by Eliot
Mendelson. Classical treatises on the self-reference logic are the
book by Boolos 1979 (recently reedited), or the later version: Boolos
1993. The book by Smorynski is very good too, but those books
presuppose knowledge of logic (Like explained in Mendelson).

Then all books, technical or recreative by Raymond Smullyan, are
introduction to diagonalization, self-reference, Gödel and Tarski
theorem, and they are quite excellent. Notably his little recreative
(but not so easy apparently) introduction to the modal G system;
"Forever Undecided".

Ask if you have a problem to find them, or if you search for other
books. Logicians like to write book, and there are many of them.
Original papers on the UDA and AUDA can be found on my web pages (http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
).

Bruno

On 10 Sep 2009, at 21:48, ronaldheld wrote:

I thought that I would start a thread to consolidate some of the
books
useful in following current and old threads. if people alos want to
post key papers here, I do not see a problem with that.- Hide
quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: books on logic/computing

2009-09-28T12:51:47Z

My book has arrived. Perhaps in several months, I will be able to
follow the symbolic arguments better?
Ronald

On Sep 19, 5:38 pm, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@...> wrote:

> Thanks, Bruno. Mendelson is on its way to me.
> Ronald
>
> On Sep 18, 10:10 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Hi Ronald,
>
> > Mendelson' book is an excellent book.
>
> > The many editions of Boolos and Jeffrey are very good, but the
> > mathematical logic part is not really self-contained. I like very much
> > also the book by Epstein and Carnielli, and Epstein alone wrote nice
> > big books on both classical and non classical logics, but I do think
> > that Mendelson is one of the best introduction to classical
> > mathematical logic. It gives the standard detailed account on
> > computability, and on Gödel and Löb theorems.
>
> > Note that the understanding of UDA does not rely on mathematical
> > logic, just on the notion of universal machine, and Church thesis
> > (which I am explaining currently). But the "formal theory" and the
> > notion of Löbian Machine, relies on mathematical logic. Those matter
> > are not well known beyond the circle of mathematical logicians.
> > Gödel's theorem is frequently abused (that does not help).
>
> > This makes me think about the book by Torkel Franzèn, which are very
> > nice. Excellent complement to Mendelson.
>
> > Google on "Torkel Franzèn inexhaustibility" and "Torkel Franzèn abuse
> > Gödel". You can't miss them.
>
> > If and when I try to explain AUDA, I can say more. Mendelson does not
> > introduce to modal logic, but the little book by Bools 1979 does it
> > very well, before using it for the formal self-reference.
>
> > So for AUDA, ma suggestion, for serious studies, is:
>
> > 1) Mendelson
> > 2) Boolos 1979
>
> > Bruno
>
> > On 18 Sep 2009, at 15:14, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> > > Bruno:
> > > It sounds as if the way to begin is with the latest Mendelson book.
> > > Ronald
>
> > > On Sep 18, 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
> > >> Hi Ronald,
>
> > >> You may ask Günther Greindl, who asked me references for the UDA and
> > >> AUDA, and he put them on the list archive.
>
> > >> guenther.grei...@...
>
> > >> You can take a look on the references in my theses.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/lillethesis/these/node79.html#SECTIO...
> > >> ://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/7%20biblio%20gen...
>
> > >> An excellent introduction to mathematical logic is the book by Eliot
> > >> Mendelson. Classical treatises on the self-reference logic are the
> > >> book by Boolos 1979 (recently reedited), or the later version: Boolos
> > >> 1993. The book by Smorynski is very good too, but those books
> > >> presuppose knowledge of logic (Like explained in Mendelson).
>
> > >> Then all books, technical or recreative by Raymond Smullyan, are
> > >> introduction to diagonalization, self-reference, Gödel and Tarski
> > >> theorem, and they are quite excellent. Notably his little recreative
> > >> (but not so easy apparently) introduction to the modal G system;
> > >> "Forever Undecided".
>
> > >> Ask if you have a problem to find them, or if you search for other
> > >> books. Logicians like to write book, and there are many of them.
> > >> Original papers on the UDA and AUDA can be found on my web pages (http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> > >> ).
>
> > >> Bruno
>
> > >> On 10 Sep 2009, at 21:48, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> > >>> I thought that I would start a thread to consolidate some of the
> > >>> books
> > >>> useful in following current and old threads. if people alos want to
> > >>> post key papers here, I do not see a problem with that.- Hide
> > >>> quoted text -
>
> > >> - Show quoted text -
>
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24T22:53:42Z

On 25 Sep 2009, at 02:07, m.a. wrote:

And HP stands for???

I guess it means Hard Problem (of consciousness).

I prefer to use "mind-body" problem (or hard mind-body problem in some context).

I use also HPC (hard problem of consciousness) to distinguish it from the HPM (hard problem of matter, which is the problem of existence of not of primary matter, the nature of matter, where does it comes from, how to explain matter without postulating it as primitive, etc. Physicists never address this problem explicitly.

Bruno

----- Original Message -----
From: "David Nyman" <david.nyman@...>
To: <everything-list@...>
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: Dreaming On

2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjones@...>:

> Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
> tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
> has no trouble explaining how people play chess.

It hasn't got lost - e.g. two sentences later I said "I have no
quarrel with the third-person
notion of computational realisation per se". Nobody has been
disputing the purely third-person analysis of physical systems in
computational terms. Under your own definition of mathematical
formalism, such an analysis is an interpretation of a fundamental
physical state of affairs that has utility for certain purposes.
Interpretation of the physical state of affairs "people playing chess"
in functional terms might be one of them, although this may still beg
some unresolved questions - e.g. the relevance of consciousness in the
HP sense to people's ability to play chess.

David

> >
>

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24T22:21:57Z

On 24 Sep 2009, at 10:35, Flammarion wrote:

> Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
> ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> truth.

So Platonism is different from AR.
comp (CTM) assumes AR, not platonism.
UDA uses AR, not Platonism. UDA uses only the commitment that the
truth of the arithmetical theorem Ex(x = UD) is independent of me.

>
>> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
>> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the
>> HP,
>> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
>> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
>> don't).
>
> You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
> therefore
> and immaterial UD are RITSIAR. Otherwise you just have a statement
> about
> what a UD would do if one existed.

You never answered my repeated question: is the second "I" of RITSIAR
the 1-I or the 3-I?
The 1-3 distinction is the key of both UDA1-7 and UDA-8 (MGA). The
Hard Consciousness problem, which is really the usual "mind-body"
problem is the 1-person/3-person relation problem. The 1-person is the
subjective private non-communicable experience, but self-duplication
provides a tool to talk about it. Have you ever read the read the paper?

> I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
> that AR needs to be an ontological commitment, not
> just a commitment to mathematical truth. Platonism
> is not an uncontroversial entailment of CTM or CT, hence
> "comp" is not the only premise needed. Hence the need
> to distinguish between comp, which embeds Platonism like
> a Trojan horse, and CTM which doesn't.

Where does comp uses platonism? I use only the idea that the truth of
the propositions having the type "ExP(x)" are independent of me. And
this only at step 8.

>> Could you refer to a contestation of MGA.
>
> Could you explain how it differs from Maudlin?. In SANE04 you say
> "That result has been found independently by me and Tim Maudlin
> (Marchal 1988, Maudlin 1989). Maudlin�s argumentation provides more
> information"

The result is the same, the proof are completely different. Russell
Standish made an interesting critics of Maudlin's proof, which helped
me to realize that MGA is simpler and less prone to possible critics
based on special interpretation of quantum mechanics. The "more
information" was a red herring, despite the intrinsic interest of that
information.

> Yes it is,because following from physical necessity
> is not the same as logical tautology. Logically,
> the governign equation of the universe could
> have been different, so "the governing equation
> of the universe is the SE" contains shannon information
> and so does such a physical universe.

How do you distinguish the Shannon information of the SWE and the
Shannon information of the axioms of elementary arithmetic?

> Exactly. GIT does not suggest there is unproveable
> truth,only truths unproveable with a given system.

I guess GIT = Gödel incompleteness Theorem. I agree with you but
don't see the relevance, given that the information made by internal
observer appears within systems, and is relative.
There is 0 information produced in a self-duplicating systems, yet,
from the points of view of the duplicated system, they get one bit of
information.

> If there is no UD, neither is runnign on it.

If the sqrt(2) does not exist, I am the pope.

>> I have to ask you if you understand the difference between the 1-you
>> and the 3-you?
>
> That there is a difference depends on your metaphsyics.

Are you identifying your consciousness with your body? Well then you
are no more in the CTM frame at all.

> Mathematical existence is a mere metaphor, not RITSIAR.

With your PM axioms, may be. My point is that I refer you to an
argument that CTM + PM leads to an epistemological contradiction.

>> Do you agree that the UD exists in the same sense that the prime
>> numbers exists in arithmetic?
>
> Yes
>
>> I need no more.
>
> No, you need more because merely fictive of formal or metaphorical
> existence is not enough
> to generate my RITSIAR

Then by MGA you have to attribute some telepathy ability to the
neurons. I agree that MGA is quite concise in the sane04 paper.
Consult the list MGA thread. The best version are there.

>> You cannot deny the existence of the UD in arithmetic, like you
>> cannot
>> deny the existence of 13 in arithmetic.
>
> No. Instead I can assert that "in arithmetic" means in a fictive,
> conceptual world, not in a real ontological realm,

Idem.

>> Some physical process can easily be shown to implement mathematical
>> computation, but this does not give a physical definition of
>> computation, physics lack a criteria to say when a computation is not
>> implemented, as the Mallah-Putnam-Chalmers threads illustrated in the
>> list.
>
> How can anyon eelse have such a criterion when
> physics lacks it?

Because physics may be not the fundamental science. In computability
theory such criteria exists. They are non constructive, but this is no
problem with arithmetical realism.

> I haven';t seen a convincing reaosn why I need to make the
> distinction. Since I reject the existing UD, I doesn't matter
> whether I say it isn't generating teh 1-me or the 3-me.

You have never study UDA, have you? The distinction between 1 and 3
person is a key in the first seven step of UDA, and all your remarks
that the UD does not physically exist does not apply there, given that
UDA1-7 presuppose physical machines. UDA-7 assumes the existence of a
physical UD, like the one implemented in 1991 (as described in all
details in "Conscience et Mécanisme").

If you don't understand the 1-3 difference, we are back ten years in
the past of this list. I doubt anyone have still a problem with that
distinction, or with the first person indeterminacy.

>> You have still not explain how a propertyless primary matter
>> can have the property to implement contingent property, which is
>> needed if you want to use PM in the CTM frame.
>
> existence is not a property.

I agree. You don't answer to the question though.

>> I have no clue about what your PM solves, both in the conceptual
>> problem of matter, and in the conceptual problem of consciousness.
>
> Answered many times
> 1) the WR problem

QM solves the 3-WR problem without PM. But I show it does not solve
the 1-WR rabbit problem. Does PM solve the comp (or CTM) 1-white
rabbit problem. (of course not, by MGA: you need to put actual
infinities in PM and in Matter).

> 2) change and time
> 3) attachment point ofr qualia

Could you refer to papers explaining this?

> As I have stated, my objection to the UDA is the ontological non-
> existence
> of the UD

No. MGA has been build to take purposefully that objection into
account. UDA1-7 uses only a physical UD.
You can also forget MGA and use AUDA + occam razor, and see how comp
and the universal self-introspective machine solve the HCP and HMP
problem. HCP = hard consciousness problem. HMP = hard matter problem.
AUDA explains how "metaphorical" universal machine get correctly aware
of matter.
HMP = how to explain matter or matter appearance without postulating
it. Matter, and not Primary Matter which is something nobody has ever
seen (for good reason, given that "seen" is a first person experience).

>> It is a subtle and
>> difficult non trivial point explained in the UDA-8. I am not
>> pretending this is obvious.
>> Your answer "the UD does not exist" just don't work. Because you mean
>> "the UD does not exist physically",
>
> No, I mean it doesn't exist at all as I have said many times

This contradicts your own saying when you agree that seven exists,
albeit non ontologically. Thanks to MGA the argument works even if you
believe that the existence of seven is metaphorical.
I have still no clues about what you don't understand in the proof,
but I realize that you never mention anything in it, except that you
are stuck in step0. But this seems to me due to your own persisting
confusion between Platonism and Arithmetical Realism.

>> and this is irrelevant by MGA
>
> which I don't accept.

There is nothing to accept or not accept. You have to understand or
not understand, or refute, that is to find a flaw. What do you think
is wrong in MGA? And do you understand or not the UDA1-7 for which the
entire "platonism/AR" discussion is not relevant. Do you agree in the
reversal physics/machine-psychology-theology in case a concrete
material physical (perhaps primary material if that makes sense)
running UD exists? Then MGA shows that physical activity, or even more
generally any picking of a universal system (physical or not) is a red
herring. Comp implies the comp-supervenience where consciousness
(first person) is attached to all (immaterial by definition)
computations going through my state of mind.
Physical supervenience: mind is attached to one (physical) computation.
(and then AUDA shows that the comp-supervenience has observable
consequence in the local observable 3-person reality)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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