> Background apps will have to go through a separate notifications API
> in order to frob the vibrator.
And for those, a UI mechanism for determining which app is causing the
vibration would be useful.
-dev
On 16 April 2012 00:05, Justin Lebar <
justin.lebar@...> wrote:
> > So far the only feedback I have received is that it would be good to
> have a UI mechanism for determine which app is triggering the vibration,
> which sounds like a reasonable idea to me. Thanks!
>
> Only foreground pages / apps can trigger vibrations via the vibrator
> API. So there is no need to expose in the UI which app is responsible
> for a vibration.
>
> Background apps will have to go through a separate notifications API
> in order to frob the vibrator.
>
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 3:55 PM, Lucas Adamski <
ladamski@...>
> wrote:
> > Last call for comments! So far the only feedback I have received is
> that it would be good to have a UI mechanism for determine which app is
> triggering the vibration, which sounds like a reasonable idea to me.
> Thanks!
> > Lucas.
> >
> > On Apr 11, 2012, at 10:36 PM, Lucas Adamski wrote:
> >
> >> Name of API: Vibration
> >> Reference:
http://dev.w3.org/2009/dap/vibration/> >>
> >> Brief purpose of API: Let content activate the vibration motor
> >>
> >> Inherent threats: Obnoxious if mis-used, consume extra battery
> >> Threat severity: low
> >>
> >> == Regular web content (unauthenticated) ==
> >> Use cases for unauthenticated code: Vibrate when hit in a game
> >> Authorization model for uninstalled web content: Explicit
> >> Authorization model for installed web content: Implicit
> >> Potential mitigations: Limit how long vibrations can run
> >>
> >> == Trusted (authenticated by publisher) ==
> >> Use cases for authenticated code:[Same]
> >> Authorization model: Implicit
> >> Potential mitigations:
> >>
> >> == Certified (vouched for by trusted 3rd party) ==
> >> Use cases for certified code:
> >> Authorization model: implicit
> >> Potential mitigations:
> >>
> >> Notes: This API may be implicitly granted. User can deny from
> Permission Manager to over-ride an abusive app.
> >>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > dev-b2g mailing list
> >
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> >
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