Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains

> On 1 April 2012 16:48, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:
>
>> David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a  
>> sort of
>> zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry  
>> and his
>> doctor. If he is prepared to bet on comp. Once he bet on comp, the  
>> nature of
>> the ultimate consituants of what do the computation, relatively to  
>> its usual
>> environments, does not matter.
>
> Yes, once one has bet on comp, the distinction between "software" and
> "hardware" is one of relative level rather than fundamental ontology.
> You appear to confirm my thought that the best evidence that the
> replacement brain implements the right computation is its behaviour,
> and hence that of the recipient.  So Dick can only rely on his
> assessment of Harry's behaviour to give him confidence for his own bet
> on this particular doctor's expertise.

>
> David
>
>> David, acw,
>>
>>
>> On 01 Apr 2012, at 16:36, acw wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement  
>>>> brain
>>>> you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think  
>>>> you
>>>> have sometimes just said that it is artificial.  My recent remarks
>>>> about "game physics" got me thinking about this distinction, if  
>>>> indeed
>>>> there is one.
>>>>
>>>> Suppose Dick's friend Harry, having been previously diagnosed  
>>>> with an
>>>> incurable brain cancer, has had an artificial brain installed. The
>>>> doctor tells Dick that he has replaced Harry's brain with a (very
>>>> sophisticated!) battery-driven clockwork substitute.  Harry tells  
>>>> Dick
>>>> that the replacement has been entirely successful: "After the
>>>> operation I felt a little woozy at first, but I feel great now.  My
>>>> memory is excellent - if anything better than before - and my
>>>> appreciation of the finer things in life is as vivid as ever."  
>>>> Dick
>>>> is a bit sceptical at first (his faith in clockwork has been
>>>> prejudiced by a rather unreliable fake Rolex he bought in Hong  
>>>> Kong)
>>>> but over a period of several months of careful observation he  
>>>> finds he
>>>> can't distinguish any difference whatsoever between Harry's new
>>>> clockwork personality and his former self.  Their friendship is
>>>> undiminished.
>>>>
>>>> This turns out to be just as well, because - horror of horrors -  
>>>> Dick
>>>> is shortly afterwards also diagnosed with a terminal brain  
>>>> condition.
>>>> Should he now be willing to submit to the same procedure as  
>>>> Harry?  He
>>>> is still a little sceptical of clockwork, but the evidence of  
>>>> Harry's
>>>> successful transformation is very difficult to discount, and the
>>>> doctor shows him several other "before and after" videos with  
>>>> equally
>>>> convincing outcomes. The artificial brains may be clockwork, but  
>>>> the
>>>> doctor assures him it is clockwork of unprecedented  sophistication
>>>> and precision, unheard of even in the hallowed halls of Swiss
>>>> horology. Dick has stumbled across the Everything List, and is  
>>>> rather
>>>> persuaded by the computational theory of mind.  Trouble is, the  
>>>> doctor
>>>> is not of this persuasion.  He tells Dick that the goal of the
>>>> operation is only to substitute a clockwork analogue for the
>>>> electro-chemical mechanisms of his organic brain, and that on this
>>>> basis Dick can confidently expect that the same inputs will  
>>>> reliably
>>>> elicit the same responses as before.  Hearing this, Dick is now
>>>> worried that, however successful the replacement of Harry's brain  
>>>> has
>>>> been behaviourally, his friend is now essentially a mindless  
>>>> clockwork
>>>> mechanism.
>>>>
>>>> Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity,  
>>>> should he
>>>> say no to the doctor?  The question that troubles Dick is whether,
>>>> assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely
>>>> behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain  
>>>> being
>>>> organic or clockwork, as an equivalent "avatar" according to the  
>>>> rules
>>>> of the comp game-physics.  If so, Dick should have no reason not to
>>>> accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body  
>>>> as
>>>> enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar
>>>> environments to which he has become so emotionally attached.  
>>>> Time is
>>>> short, and he must act.  What should he do?
>>>>
>>>> David
>>>>
>>>
>>> It seems to me the question is if someone should bet in COMP.
>>
>>
>> David, I agree with acw. If you bet in comp, it does not matter the  
>> computer
>> is run with clockworks, or with the chinese population, abstracting  
>> to the
>> facts that the artificial brains run in "real time", which means  
>> relatively
>> to us and the neighborhood.
>> So the real question, admitting the "truth" of comp, will rely in  
>> the choice
>> of the substitution level.
>> Now, it seems to me Dick should ask Harry and Harry's wife and  
>> friends if
>> everything is fine with him. Then it is will be only a matter of  
>> personal
>> conviction, and bet on the level of substitution. (abstracting from  
>> the fact
>> that the real choice will be between some PC or APPLE, with  
>> different price,
>> and softs, and the applications for the galactic-net, on which you  
>> can
>> download yourself with reasonable self-quantum cryptographical  
>> protection.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> If Dick had trouble assigning consciousness to Harry because Dick  
>>> was a
>>> solipsist then he might have a hard time betting on COMP. Of  
>>> course, your
>>> post does not suggest that Dick had such an opinion, but it is  
>>> just one of
>>> many unfalsifiable viewpoints (since one cannot know of any other
>>> consciousness than their own), but not something which we think is  
>>> likely
>>> (by induction on observed behavior and its similarity to our  
>>> internal
>>> states).
>>>
>>> If Dick thinks mechanism (COMP) is true, that is, the subjective
>>> experience that he has corresponds to the inside view of some  
>>> abstract
>>> structure or process which is implemented in his brain. That is,  
>>> that his
>>> brain does not have any magical properties that make it conscious  
>>> and the
>>> fact that conscious experience that one has appear to place us  
>>> relative to a
>>> physical brain (by induction).
>>>
>>> By induction we can also observe that changing our brain through  
>>> medicine
>>> or drugs or other methods (for example, consider a thought  
>>> experiment about
>>> the nature of consciousness when only small parts change:
>>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ) also changes our conscious  
>>> experience,
>>> but it shouldn't if whatever we change doesn't change our  
>>> functionality.
>>
>>
>> I would say "the functionality of our parts at some level".
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Not accepting that will result in all kinds of strange partial
>>> philosophical zombies, which to many people don't make sense, but  
>>> Dick would
>>> have to decide for himself if they make sense for him or not -  
>>> maybe even
>>> experiment on himself, after all, the COMP doctor is available.
>>
>>
>> The cautious answer. I will try the artificial brain for one week,  
>> and if it
>> does not work well, I will come back to my organic brain, for the  
>> month or
>> two I can live.
>> The result of the transplant: Dick makes a bg smile, and said  
>> "wonderful! it
>> works", then made again a big smile and said again "wonderful! it  
>> works",
>> and so one ...
>> I mean the cautious answer is not really operational. No zombie can  
>> say "Oh,
>> gosh! I have become a zombie!".
>>
>> This illustrates we need indeed some faith, but of course, we need  
>> that with
>> organic bodies. We are just more used to them.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Dick should also consider the UDA and the proof that mechanism is
>>> incompatible with materialism (since Dick assumes the existence of  
>>> mind and
>>> consciousness by default, I'm not considering that option here).
>>>
>>> If Dick thinks COMP is worth betting on, he now only has to worry  
>>> about
>>> one thing: did his doctor choose the right substitution level?
>>
>>
>> Exactly.
>> Note also this. If the clock mechanism simulates the whole brain at  
>> the
>> electro-chemical level, from a fidel copy at that level, then the  
>> clock
>> mechanism will run a brain ... developing cancer.
>> In that case, some higher level might be more sane, or the doctor  
>> has to fix
>> the cancer, in some way, like adding lot of THC routine around the  
>> cancer
>> cells, but then smoking pot or THC injection might be more  
>> efficacious and
>> affordable than an arifticial brain.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> If the substitution level is higher than the correct one, he might  
>>> have
>>> slightly different experiences than before, despite not being able  
>>> to tell
>>> so anymore, or more worrying (or possibly the opposite, as it  
>>> opens some
>>> very interesting possibilities up), such an incorrect bet on the  
>>> level might
>>> change his measure, at worst, making his experience less stable  
>>> (jumpy).
>>
>>
>> There is of course a wide variety of possible experiences for a too  
>> high
>> level. From behaving like an amnesic baby, to a large variety of  
>> anosognosia
>> (like blind and unaware of it, that is: blind + blind-related-notion
>> amnesy).
>> And also, having access to more "normal world". Amnesy by itself  
>> enlarge the
>> spectrum of accessible realities. They are very plausibly jumps,  
>> but with
>> large plateau of normality, normally ...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Behaviorally identical behavior up to some limited range of time  
>>> does not
>>> necessarily mean a correctly guessed substitution level (can you  
>>> show that 2
>>> functions are identical?). What if the level is too low and it  
>>> depends too
>>> much on entangled states (generalized brain idea) to stay stable?
>>
>>
>> If it is too low, but correct, normally this would not change his  
>> behavior,
>> but might restrict his possibilities in the "after-life". very  
>> complex
>> question here. Normally too much low, should not be a problem  
>> (except for
>> the waste of money), unless some low level feature of matter are  
>> used to
>> emulates some classical feature. So "too low" needs clarification,  
>> because
>> it can be interpreted in many ways.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> One could say that the same may be true for his other new digital  
>>> physical
>>> brain, but what if he constantly changes substrates like a proper  
>>> substrate
>>> independent mind would like to (VRs and other environments)? Maybe  
>>> he
>>> shouldn't worry that much anyway, we can't really know if our  
>>> experience is
>>> that continuous either, we have discontinuities when we sleep (as  
>>> well as
>>> more exotic cases).
>>>
>>> It comes down to what Dick finds more plausible or which  
>>> heuristics he is
>>> willing to use in selecting what theory is more likely to be true.  
>>> In a way,
>>> it's a matter of 'theology' or 'religion', as this belief will  
>>> have to be
>>> taken on faith, even if very plausible given our observations.
>>
>>
>> If Harry remains able to be trusted by Dick, Dick should trust Harry.
>>
>> As things are going now, we might not have the choice in the matter  
>> in the
>> future. We have to separate health from the state, like we separate  
>> (or we
>> try) religion and state. A prolife doctor might give you an  
>> artificial brain
>> even without asking you. The comp ethics is that comp is a personal  
>> choice,
>> and eventually, even the choice of level is personal.
>>
>> David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a  
>> sort of
>> zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry  
>> and his
>> doctor. If he is prepared to bet on comp. Once he bet on comp, the  
>> nature of
>> the ultimate consituants of what do the computation, relatively to  
>> its usual
>> environments, does not matter.
>>
>> OK?
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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