On Fri, 2009-03-20 at 21:54 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > If one adheres to the consciousness-as-computation hypothesis, what
> > sort of computations are involved in these cases?
>
> I see the idea of the observer moment as extremely general, covering
> every possible form of consciousness, from animals with simple nervous
> systems to people with hebephrenic schizophrenia to godlike Jupiter
> brains. Brains that correspond to "consensus reality" are simply a
> special case, adapted to a particular environment. If the behaviour of
> a flatworm's nervous system can be emulated on a computer then I see
> no reason why the behaviour of a human brain, whether functioning
> normally or hallucinating, can't also be so emulated.
Sure, I agree.
My poorly articulated question was meant more to address the fact that
fairly small variations in brain chemistry can give rise to vastly
different observer moments (see previous email).
If our consciousness is a result of an invariant computational process
that may be instantiated on a a variety of substrates, such as brains or
computers, what sorts of computational alterations correspond to the
transition between normal experience and hallucinogenic experiences
brought on by altering brain chemistry?
Johnathan Corgan
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
