>
>
> There are a few things that need to be taken into consideration (I'm
> going to speak at this from a proxy based firewall perspective).
>
>
>
> 1. Can you always guarantee without a shadow of a doubt that this
> servers are not running any other services? Can you verify that your
> staff will always do proper due diligence? Unless you can verify from
> now into eternity that the answer is yes it can be locked properly there
> is always a place for a firewall.
>
> 2. Due you have a certified DMZ currently? Do these server currently
> exist being firewall. It has long been a tradition to have web servers
> that are publicly facing to be in a less secure DMZ. This argument
> with new services is just rehashing this argument. How do you maintain
> that the databases are secure to the web servers if you don't have a
> handle on the network getting to your DMZ?
>
> If using a proxy firewall you can inspect the packets and verify that
> the HTTP packets follow the RFC and only allow commands that you want
> through if it's smart enough. If it's HTTPS you could do the same
> thing with the firewall decrypting the packet and re-encrypting on the
> way out - essentially doing man in the middle scanning.
>
> I've read how IPS and IDS are the second coming. Well let's look at how
> harmful HTTPS could be. Since many services going outbound can tunnel
> through HTTPS without a web filtering software that is constantly
> updated users can essentially do any function they please. This will
> bypass any IDS or AV scanning until the software is already loaded on
> the machine since the scanners won't be able to look at encrypted
> packets. So under this scenario as more things move to HTTPS - the
> arguement would be that you would no longer need IDS or AV on these
> networks.
>
> How do you control it then? One is to decrypt the HTTPS onto a trusted
> proxy server which then forwards requests onto the actual webserver.
> This will help mitigate the risks and allow you to see what is going
> on. Whether you consider this a firewall, gateway, or a proxy it does
> fulfill the same role.
>
> You also pointed out one thing else that's important - controlling
> source connection subnets/IPs. Removing this sort of control removes
> any say so that you have in the future.
>
> Since you asked what NACs exist in network or web development - in my
> experience none - the developers normally expect their software to
> work. They don't care what impact it may have and their code may
> unintentionally enable other services on your web services. NAC
> controls and development are two different mind sets but as times goes
> on they are getting closer. Developers however don't normally
> understand networking so they don't care.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 25, 2008 at 7:56 AM, william fitzgerald
> <
wfitzgerald@... <mailto:
wfitzgerald@...>> wrote:
>
> Dear Firewall Experts,
>
> Provocative Question:
> ++++++++++++++++++++
> Are firewalls obsolete in a world involving enterprise Web Service SOA?
>
> What do I mean by the above question: given that Web Services (J2EE and
> so forth) tend to tunnel through http and https (eg. SOAP) what role can
> a traditional network firewall play? If its just a matter of opening
> ports http and https for your dedicated enterprise services then is
> there even a need for a firewall!
>
> I am asking this question not to be flamed but to provoke a discussion
> as to why we still need firewalls.
>
> Assumptions:
> ++++++++++++
> I use the term firewall loosely to mean "network access control". That
> is, its a mechanism to prevent unwanted packets. Therefore, a firewall
> could be iptables (stateful, DPI etc) or even the proxy TCP Wrappers,
> cisco and so forth.
>
> In particular, I have focused on Linux iptables and TCP Wrapper. I
> realize that one can install an xml based firewall to inspect packet
> content in regard to web services.
>
> Scenario Network:
> ++++++++++++++++++
> Internet ---> Firewall ---> Enterprise SOA Server ---> Additional
> firewalls and back-end database servers etc.
>
> Is it a case that in this Enterprise SOA environment the NAC firewall is
> made redundant (as opposed to an xml firewall):
>
> Internet ---> Enterprise SOA Webservice server
>
> Assuming of course the servers are dedicated Web Service servers that
> run no other services such as DHCP, intranet web server, email and so
> forth that need to be protected?
>
> Firewall Justification:
> +++++++++++++++++++++++
>
> I am trying to find publications, white papers, reports etc that state
> the case for the need for firewalls. I need something concrete.
>
> The current information I have found (web service orientated!) tends to
> say firewalls are obsolete when talking about enterprise SOA given that
> once port 80 and 443 is open on the firewall the SOS services are
> exposed and hence protection happens at the application layer of the
> particular service.
>
> However, best practice suggests one should take a more holistic approach
> to security and apply the "belt-and-braces" approach. That is, install
> firewalls, IDS, AV, proper authentication at various OSI stack layers
> etc etc. So we get a layered security affect, thus there must be a
> justification for using a firewall still.
>
> My Opinion:
> +++++++++++
>
> My opinion on what NAC firewalls can offer to web service SOA other than
> simply opening port http and https is as follows:
>
> 1) control access to those ports via ip address ranges (eg.
> customer/business subscribers)
> 2) deep packet inspection to solicit appropriate content incoming and
> outgoing from the SOA enterprise servers.
> 3) ???? what else would be done? please comment.
>
> While I agree that there are xml based firewalls to monitor xml based
> Web Service traffic, I wonder can it perform access controls at the
> lower levels like network based firewalls (for example, block certain IP
> addresses)? My guess is they don't given the operate at the application
> layer.
>
> I also wonder why one would invest in an xml firewall that is dedicated
> to one kind of traffic profiling and not use for example a very
> expensive cisco firewall that can cover a multitude of traffic
> profiling. Presumably these expensive firewalls (or the equivalent
> unexpensive iptables firewall) can inspect the packet for malicious
> content to and from the enterprise servers (I believe we have
> snort-2-iptables to also help here). At any rate, I do not want to start
> a huge debate on the pros and cons of an xml firewall versus a network
> firewall as I am aware dedicated firewalls specialize in various traffic
> profiling. Also its best practice to install a wide range for firewall
> capabilities.
>
> The real issue is the justification of NAC's in an enterprise SOA
> environment. Of course, if this enterprise environment also included the
> company standard services such as email, dns, web server etc I can see
> the major impact of the NAC firewall. But what is the case for dedicated
> enterprise SOA?
>
>
> My shortcomings:
> ++++++++++++++++
> My inexperience in an enterprise network environment of how things are
> really carried out rather than what is done in theory.
>
>
> Summary:
> ++++++++
> What role do NAC's have to play in an environment of enterprise
> application services?
>
> All pointers to documentation and your comments are welcome.
>
> I look forward to your support,
> regards,
> Will.
>
> --
> William M. Fitzgerald,
> PhD Student,
> Telecommunications Software & Systems Group,
> ArcLabs Research and Innovation Centre,
> Waterford Institute of Technology,
> WIT West Campus,
> Carriganore,
> Waterford.
> Office Ph: +353 51 302937
> Mobile Ph: +353 87 9527083
> Web: www.williamfitzgerald.org <
http://www.williamfitzgerald.org>
> www.linkedin.com/in/williamfitzgerald
> <
http://www.linkedin.com/in/williamfitzgerald>
> www.ryze.com/go/wfitzgerald <
http://www.ryze.com/go/wfitzgerald>
>
>
>
>
William M. Fitzgerald,