On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 4:01 PM, meekerdb <meekerdb@...> wrote:
> On 2/21/2012 12:34 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is
>> the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness
>> itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through
>> the current computational state is what I'm questioning.
> Yes, I think that's a dubious proposition. Although brains no doubt have
> some degree of inherent quantum randomness it's clear that intelligent
> behavior need not depend on that.
> But I'm not sure your thought experiment proves its point. It's about
> simulated Mary. Suppose consciousness depended on quantum entanglements of
> brain structures with the environment (and they must in order for the brain
> to quasi-classical). Then in your simulation Mary would be a zombie
> (because your computation is purely classical and you're not simulating the
> quantum entanglements). But an actual macroscopic device substituted for
> part of real Mary's brain would be quantum entangled with the environment
> even if were at the neuron level. So consciousness would, ex hypothesi,
> still occur - although it might be different in some way.
Why must consciousness depend on quantum entanglements for the brain
to be quasi-classical?