Re: UD* and consciousness

On 21 Feb 2012, at 21:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdb <meekerdb@...> wrote:

On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a

zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to

insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.

If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p

indeterminacy.

But is it really either-or?  Isn't it likely there are different kinds and

degrees of consciousness.  I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about

this.  On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious,

but then he says it depends on the program they are executing.

Brent

I'm not too keen on 'partial zombies'. Partial zombies admit full

zombies, as far as I'm concerned.

The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is

the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness

itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through

the current computational state is what I'm questioning.

But this is not assumed. Even just one emulation can be said involving consciousness. The first person indeterminacy is just a consequence, and the thought experiment just show that MATTER, not consciousness, requires them to stabilize under the substitution level. So consciousness does not depend on the first person indeterminacy, but it comes from the "usual" comp-attribution of mind to computations, and is used only to determine my most probable next first states on which the 1-indeterminacy bears on , like in the WM duplication. OK?

Bruno

PS I hope you will get this answer, because it looks like my server has some trouble in sending mail. More comments later.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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