Re: UD* and consciousness

On 22 Feb 2012, at 15:49, Terren Suydam wrote:

OK. What happens, if there is no flaw in the UDA-MGA, is that your  
futures can only be determined by the statistics bearing on all  
computations going through your state.

The 1p nature of that consciousness will rely on the logic of  
(machine) knowledge (or other modalities), which put some structure on  
the set of accessible computational states.

Sorry for being unclear,  and for the many misspellings, and other  
grammatical tenses atrocities.

The problem is also related to the difficulty of the subject, which is  
necessarily counter-intuitive (in the comp theory), so that we have  
some trouble in using the natural language, which relies on natural  
"intuitive prejudices".

In fact I can understand why it might look like I was saying that the  
1p needs the many computations. The reality is that one is enough, but  
the others computations, 1-p undistinguishable, are there to, and even  
for a slight interval of consciousness, we must take into account that  
we are in all of them, for the correct statistics. So the 1p is  
attached to an infinity of computation, once you "attach" it to just  
one computation.


>
> However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single
> continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a
> counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a
> "concrete" example?

You should really find this by yourself, honestly. It is the only way  
to be really convinced. Normally this follows from the reasoning.
Please ask if you don't find your "error".
Oh! I see Quentin found it.

Your mistake consists in believing that when you simulate your friend  
Mary in the deterministic sim, completely closed, as you say, you have  
succeeded to prevent Mary, from her own pov, to "escape"  your  
simulation. Her 1-indeterminacy remains unchanged, and bears on the  
many computations, existing by the + and * laws, or in the UD.

The counterfactuals, and the indeterminacy comes from the existence of  
an infinity of computations generating Mary's state. Your  
deterministic sim can be runned a million times, it will not change  
Mary's indeterminacy, relatively to the infinities of diverging  
(infinite) computations going through her 1-state.

You might also reason like that. The consciousness of Mary is only in  
Platonia. We have abandoned the idea that consciousness is related to  
any singular physical activity. Her consciousness and other 1p-
attributes depends only on her arithmetical relative state, relatively  
to the infinity of UMs running her in Platonia. In that sense, all the  
Mary you interact with are zombie, but this is just due to the trivial  
fact that you can interact only with Mary's body or local 3p  
description. Once you grasp that you too are in Platonia, there is no  
more zombie because bodies become only local interface between "soul"  
in Platonia. But intuition fails us, and that's why we need the math  
and the computer science.

The indeterminacy might be too big, and the comp counterfactuals might  
be too large, but that remains to be proved, and would be a refutation  
of comp (CTM, mechanism).

Let me comment your last paragraphs (the entire post is below for ease)

> In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD*
> and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed
> by the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak.


That's partially correct. But as Quentin said, you have no means to  
isolate Mary in the scenario you want. You propose a logically  
impossible though experiment. Mary belongs already to an infinity of  
computations.
Even if you run a program dovetailing your friend on the reals,  
assuming a robust universes you will not change much the measure,  
because those states will not be distinguishable by Mary. You have to  
bifurcate them enough, if I can say, and that will be equivalent to an  
UD.

> So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a
> zombie.

Let us say that she is as much conscious in one scenario, and the  
other. But her consciousness is in Platonia, and the physical  
embodiments is a complex structure made by the consciousness and  
infinities of UMs.


> The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
> insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.

So this does not necessarily follow.
But with Everett, we might have evidences that the level is determined  
by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations.
There are higher level, where you can survive, but with consciousness  
changes, though.


>
> If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p  
> indeterminacy.

I would say consciousness, with comp, implies 1p indeterminacy. It  
requires it logically, in the sense that if you have consciousness  
then you have the 1p indeterminacy. Your Mary enclosed in the  
deterministic local sim, is deterministic only for you, she is really,  
that is her 1-pov, distributed in the UD*. I use the same reasoning to  
explain that with comp, we cannot enclose people in simulation. Either  
the simulation is comp-physically correct, but then it simulates  
locally what the UD does in the limit, and like Mary, it makes no  
sense to say that they are only in the simulation, or the simulation  
is not comp-physically correct, and the simulated people will figure  
out at some moment.

Bruno



---------
Terren's original post (21 Feb 2012):



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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