« Return to Thread: UD* and consciousness
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:On 22 Feb 2012, at 15:49, Terren Suydam wrote:Hey Bruno,I seem to remember reading a while back that you were saying that the1p consciousness arises necessarily from the many paths in the UD. I'mglad to clear up my misunderstanding.OK. What happens, if there is no flaw in the UDA-MGA, is that your futurescan only be determined by the statistics bearing on all computations goingthrough your state.The 1p nature of that consciousness will rely on the logic of (machine)knowledge (or other modalities), which put some structure on the set ofaccessible computational states.Sorry for being unclear, and for the many misspellings, and othergrammatical tenses atrocities.The problem is also related to the difficulty of the subject, which isnecessarily counter-intuitive (in the comp theory), so that we have sometrouble in using the natural language, which relies on natural "intuitiveprejudices".In fact I can understand why it might look like I was saying that the 1pneeds the many computations. The reality is that one is enough, but theothers computations, 1-p undistinguishable, are there to, and even for aslight interval of consciousness, we must take into account that we are inall of them, for the correct statistics. So the 1p is attached to aninfinity of computation, once you "attach" it to just one computation.
Indeed, it is very counter intuitive and full of subtleties. I have
been lurking for a few years now and I am finding that only by
engaging with you and others on the list do I begin to comprehend the
However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a singlecontinuation given the determinism of the sim. How could acounterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a"concrete" example?You should really find this by yourself, honestly. It is the only way to bereally convinced. Normally this follows from the reasoning.Please ask if you don't find your "error".Oh! I see Quentin found it.Your mistake consists in believing that when you simulate your friend Maryin the deterministic sim, completely closed, as you say, you have succeededto prevent Mary, from her own pov, to "escape" your simulation. Her1-indeterminacy remains unchanged, and bears on the many computations,existing by the + and * laws, or in the UD.The counterfactuals, and the indeterminacy comes from the existence of aninfinity of computations generating Mary's state. Your deterministic sim canbe runned a million times, it will not change Mary's indeterminacy,relatively to the infinities of diverging (infinite) computations goingthrough her 1-state.You might also reason like that. The consciousness of Mary is only inPlatonia. We have abandoned the idea that consciousness is related to anysingular physical activity.
Here was the "aha!" moment. I get it now. Thanks to you and Quentin.
Even though I am well aware of the consequences of MGA, I was focusing
on the "physical activity" of the simulation because "I" was running
The fascinating thing for me is, if instead of a scan of Mary, we run
an AGI that embodies a cognitive architecture that satisfies a theory
of consciousness (the kind of theory that explains why a particular UM
is conscious) so that if we assume the theory, it entails that the AGI
is conscious. The AGI will therefore have 1p indeterminacy even if the
sim is deterministic, for the same reason Mary does, because there are
an infinity of divergent computational paths that go through the AGI's
1p state in any given moment. Trippy!
Her consciousness and other 1p-attributesdepends only on her arithmetical relative state, relatively to the infinityof UMs running her in Platonia. In that sense, all the Mary you interactwith are zombie, but this is just due to the trivial fact that you caninteract only with Mary's body or local 3p description.
This I disagree with (or don't understand) because if we acknowledge
that as you said "even just one emulation can be said involving
consciousness" then interacting with even a "single" Mary is an
interaction with her "soul" in platonia. I think the admission of any
zombie in any context (assuming comp) is a refutation of comp.
Once you grasp thatyou too are in Platonia, there is no more zombie because bodies become onlylocal interface between "soul" in Platonia. But intuition fails us, andthat's why we need the math and the computer science.The indeterminacy might be too big, and the comp counterfactuals might betoo large, but that remains to be proved, and would be a refutation of comp(CTM, mechanism).Let me comment your last paragraphs (the entire post is below for ease)In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD*and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailedby the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak.That's partially correct. But as Quentin said, you have no means to isolateMary in the scenario you want. You propose a logically impossible thoughexperiment. Mary belongs already to an infinity of computations.Even if you run a program dovetailing your friend on the reals, assuming arobust universes you will not change much the measure, because those stateswill not be distinguishable by Mary. You have to bifurcate them enough, if Ican say, and that will be equivalent to an UD.So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is azombie.Let us say that she is as much conscious in one scenario, and the other. Buther consciousness is in Platonia, and the physical embodiments is a complexstructure made by the consciousness and infinities of UMs.The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is toinsist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.So this does not necessarily follow.But with Everett, we might have evidences that the level is determined bythe Heisenberg uncertainty relations.There are higher level, where you can survive, but with consciousnesschanges, though.If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1pindeterminacy.I would say consciousness, with comp, implies 1p indeterminacy. It requiresit logically, in the sense that if you have consciousness then you have the1p indeterminacy. Your Mary enclosed in the deterministic local sim, isdeterministic only for you, she is really, that is her 1-pov, distributed inthe UD*. I use the same reasoning to explain that with comp, we cannotenclose people in simulation. Either the simulation is comp-physicallycorrect, but then it simulates locally what the UD does in the limit, andlike Mary, it makes no sense to say that they are only in the simulation, orthe simulation is not comp-physically correct, and the simulated people willfigure out at some moment.Bruno
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« Return to Thread: UD* and consciousness
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