Re: language, cloning and thought experiments

[Jack Mallah]

--- On Tue, 2/24/09, Wei Dai <weidai@...> wrote:
> Jack, welcome back.

Hi Wei.

Now that the interesting Consciousness Online web conference is over, it's time to get back to the this.
http://consciousnessonline.wordpress.com/

BTW, I have to say that the qualia issue remains mysterious to me.  It's hard to see how e.g. color qualia can arise, whether by math or not.  So the dualism idea is not as easy to dismiss as we tend to think.  OTOH I still think dualism is not plausible - it would be quite a coincidence for nonmaterial/nonmathematical properties to exist that happen to be exactly like the properties that material/mathematical creatures tend to believe they have.  So what are qualia?

> The ASSA/RSSA and QTI debates can be rephrased as whether U should equal M*Q, or just Q, but that is an "ought" question.

No.  First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility function is or should be.  The real question is whether the measure, M, is conserved or whether it decreases.  It's just that a lot of people don't understand what that means.

The next point is that while U=M*Q is perfectly well defined, U=Q is not, and I don't know what you mean by it.

OK, you might ask "huh?" when I say that.  What I mean is that M*Q is just a caricature of a utility function but should obviously be generalized to the case of multiple types of observations by using Sum_i M_i Q_i.

There is no corresponding generalization for Q.  You could use Sum_i Q_i, but in that case the sum is just a constant that does not depend on the physical situation (which determines the measure distribution over observation types, M_i; and in the the MWI the M_i will all be nonzero) and in that case no decision you could make would matter at all, so that can't be what you mean.

Probably what you have in mind is some kind of Q_average, where the average is over observations by the same person, but personal identity is not well-defined.

--- On Wed, 2/25/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:
> If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is created elsewhere in the morning. The unfair trade is the same, except that there is an extra version of you A' which disappears overnight. Now why should the *addition* of another version make you nervous when you wouldn't have been nervous otherwise?

It's not the addition of the other copy that's the problem; it's the loss of it.  Losing people is bad.

> That Riker's measure increased is not the important thing here: it is that the two Rikers differentiated. Killing one of them after they had differentiated would be wrong, but killing one of them before they had differentiated would be OK.

That would be equivalent to U = Sum_i Q_i in which no changes in the wavefunction matter at all, since M_i > 0 for all i no matter what.  I don't think you thought that one through.




     


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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/3/6 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...> wrote:

>> If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is created elsewhere in the morning. The unfair trade is the same, except that there is an extra version of you A' which disappears overnight. Now why should the *addition* of another version make you nervous when you wouldn't have been nervous otherwise?
>
> It's not the addition of the other copy that's the problem; it's the loss of it.  Losing people is bad.

How would the addition then loss of the extra copy be bad for the
original, or for that matter for the disappearing extra copy, given
that neither copy has any greater claim to being resurrected in the
morning as B?

>> That Riker's measure increased is not the important thing here: it is that the two Rikers differentiated. Killing one of them after they had differentiated would be wrong, but killing one of them before they had differentiated would be OK.
>
> That would be equivalent to U = Sum_i Q_i in which no changes in the wavefunction matter at all, since M_i > 0 for all i no matter what.  I don't think you thought that one through.

I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.
It would be easy money and I'd feel exactly the same afterwards, just
$5 richer. On the other hand, if pressing the button decreased the
measure of those versions of me having good experiences by 1% relative
to the versions of me having bad experiences, then I wouldn't press
it, and certainly not repeatedly.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[rmiller-2]

At 07:31 AM 3/6/2009, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

2009/3/6 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...> wrote:

>> If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is created elsewhere in the morning. The unfair trade is the same, except that there is an extra version of you A' which disappears overnight. Now why should the *addition* of another version make you nervous when you wouldn't have been nervous otherwise?
>
> It's not the addition of the other copy that's the problem; it's the loss of it. Â Losing people is bad.

How would the addition then loss of the extra copy be bad for the
original, or for that matter for the disappearing extra copy, given
that neither copy has any greater claim to being resurrected in the
morning as B?

>> That Riker's measure increased is not the important thing here: it is that the two Rikers differentiated. Killing one of them after they had differentiated would be wrong, but killing one of them before they had differentiated would be OK.
>
> That would be equivalent to U = Sum_i Q_i in which no changes in the wavefunction matter at all, since M_i > 0 for all i no matter what. Â I don't think you thought that one through.

I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.
It would be easy money and I'd feel exactly the same afterwards, just
$5 richer. On the other hand, if pressing the button decreased the
measure of those versions of me having good experiences by 1% relative
to the versions of me having bad experiences, then I wouldn't press
it, and certainly not repeatedly.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

I've been following this discussion and have a comment re absolute measure in the multiverse.  The assumption is the same one David Deutsch has expressed: other than the interference observed in the Young's experiment, there can be no contact between the multiverses. 

However, suppose our consciousness was essentially a topological object---a fibre bundle through a manifold of similar universes?  The universes where things are remarkably different would be ignored by the observer in favor of the probabilistic "picture of reality" associated with the median experience bundle.  Focusing on the "volume section" of such a distribution might be the function of an entity such as Hilgard's hidden observer << http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Hilgard>>.

In this model, the platform for consciousness is simply a manifold formed by equivalent behavioral elements across the multiverse (no pun intended.)  Eliminating them one by one would result in a commensurate decrease in overall consciousness. 

Richard Miller

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/3/6 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...> wrote:
>
>>> If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is created elsewhere in the morning. The unfair trade is the same, except that there is an extra version of you A' which disappears overnight. Now why should the *addition* of another version make you nervous when you wouldn't have been nervous otherwise?
>> It's not the addition of the other copy that's the problem; it's the loss of it.  Losing people is bad.
>
> How would the addition then loss of the extra copy be bad for the
> original, or for that matter for the disappearing extra copy, given
> that neither copy has any greater claim to being resurrected in the
> morning as B?
>
>>> That Riker's measure increased is not the important thing here: it is that the two Rikers differentiated. Killing one of them after they had differentiated would be wrong, but killing one of them before they had differentiated would be OK.
>> That would be equivalent to U = Sum_i Q_i in which no changes in the wavefunction matter at all, since M_i > 0 for all i no matter what.  I don't think you thought that one through.
>
> I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
> every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
> the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.

Which "I"?  Aren't you concerned that you would press the button - and vanish?

Brent

> It would be easy money and I'd feel exactly the same afterwards, just
> $5 richer. On the other hand, if pressing the button decreased the
> measure of those versions of me having good experiences by 1% relative
> to the versions of me having bad experiences, then I wouldn't press
> it, and certainly not repeatedly.
>
>


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[Günther Greindl]

> Which "I"?  Aren't you concerned that you would press the button - and vanish?
> Brent


The psychological continuer - the one who remembers having pressed the
button but with +5 dollars on his account.

@Stathis: would you really do this (press the button, also in the
absoute measure scenario)? After all, in lots of universes
family/friends will have found you vanished/whatever happens to you in
the magic button measure decreasing case, causing them to suffer.

I do think that also in RSSA, one should care about all successors.

Think Egan's Law(*), also in Ethics: it all adds up to normality.


Cheers,
Günther

(*) Egan, Greg. Quarantine.

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Kim, hi John, hi People,

Kim provided me with an excellent answer to my preceding post (out-of-
line though). And John told me he was impatient to see "my definition"  
of the natural numbers (and some other numbers) in term of sets. So I  
make a try. Nothing is important here for the sequel, but it can help  
too.

This is in line with our future goal to figure out what a computation  
is, and what is the difference between a computation and a description  
of a computation. This plays a probably subtle role in the seventh  
step of UDA, and also in the eight step. So just another example of a  
well standard set theoretic representation of the natural numbers (and  
the transfinite ordinals which extends them) can be useful, if only as  
a reservoir of examples of structures later.

John has perhaps believed I was trying to define the numbers, (by  
which I always mean "natural numbers", that is 0, 1, 2, 3, ...), but I  
don't try to do that. I try just to help people with different view of  
those numbers with an emphasis on what they are, as opposed to how to  
represent them.

I have already mentioned the notation I, II, III, IIII, ...

We could capture this number's representation by axioms (and implicit  
rule), like

Axiom 1: I is a number
Axiom 2: if x is a number, then xI is a number.

So I is a number (by axiom 1), so II is a number (by axiom 2), so III  
is a number (by axiom 3), so IIII is a number (by axiom 3).

Is IIIIIIIIIIII.... a number? To avoid it we should need a rule saying  
that we can apply axiom 2 only a finite number of time. But "finite  
number" is what we were trying to define, so, well, we can't define  
them, and I will rely on your intuition.

* * *

So, let me give you a nice representation of the natural numbers in  
terms of sets. This material will not been used in the sequel, so take  
it easy. it is a glimpse of "beyond infinity". This is due mainly to  
to von Neumann. He showed that we can generate "the universe of  
numbers" (actually of ordinals) from "nothing", or from an empty  
universe, by using two powerful principles: the principle of set  
comprehension, and the principle of set reflexion. I have tested  
successfully this idea with young people.

The generation of the universe of numbers proceed in stages, beginning  
with an empty universe. At each state we try 1) to comprehend the  
whole universe, and 2) (it is the rule of the game) to put what we  
have comprehend in the universe. 1) and 2) are the comprehension rule  
and the reflexion rule.

Well, we still need a notation to describe the result of the  
comprehension. On a board a use circles or ellipses, but here I will  
use the more standard accolades. For example I comprehend John and  
Kim, means I conceive the set {John, Kim}.

Let us go: (please do it yourself alongside, with {} a circle, { { } }  
a circle with a little circle inside, it is easier to read, more cute,  
and you will see the growing fractal:


Day 0: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe is  
empty. Nothing. My comprehension of the universe at this stage is  
represented by the empty set { }. It is my model of the universe at  
that stage. And, well I will define or represent the number 0 by { }.  
It is my conception of the universe at the middle of the day 0. We  
have 0 = { }
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put { }  
in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 1: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains  
{ }. It contains 0. My comprehension of the universe at this stage is  
represented by the set containing the empty set {{ }}. And, well I  
will define or represent the number 1 by {{ }}.  It is my  
comprehension of the universe at the middle of the day 1. We have 1 =  
{{ }}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put  
{{ }} in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 2: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains  
{ } and {{ }}. It contains 0, and 1. My comprehension of the universe  
at this stage is represented by the set containing {{ }, {{ }}}. And,  
well I will define or represent the number 2 by {{ }, {{ }}}.  It is  
my comprehension of the universe at the middle of the day 2. We have 2  
= {0, 1}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put {{ }  
{{ }}} in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 3: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains  
{ } and {{ }} and {{ } {{ }}}. It contains 0, and 1, and 2. My  
comprehension of the universe at this stage is represented by the set  
{{ },  {{ }},  {{ } {{ }}}}. And, well I will define or represent the  
number 3 by {{ },  {{ }},  {{ } {{ }}}.  It is my comprehension of the  
universe at the middle of the day 3. We have 3 = {0, 1, 2}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put  
{{ },  {{ }},  {{ } {{ }}}} in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 4: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains  
{ } and {{ }} and {{ }, {{ }}} and {{ } , {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}. It  
contains 0, and 1, and 2, and 3. My comprehension of the universe at  
this stage is represented by the set {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}},  
{{ } , {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}}. And, well I will define or represent  
the number 4 by {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}, {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },  
{{ }}}}}.  It is my comprehension of the universe at the middle of the  
day 4. We have 4 = {0, 1, 2, 3}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put  
{{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}, {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}} in the  
universe, and then I go to bed.

Well, at this stage, or a bit later, some people tell me already "OK,  
we have understood, we got the idea". But "to understand" is the  
english for the latin "comprehendere" (comprendre, in french). It  
seems that now, your conception of the universe is

{   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },  
{{ }}}}     ... }

This is day omega. Omega is the first infinite number. It is an Other  
number (note). not a natural number. It is the unavoidable infinite  
number IIIIIII.....   omega = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. It is the well known  
set of all natural numbers.
OK, but if I "comprehend it" I have to put it in the universe by the  
reflexion rule. So at the middle of the day omega+1, my conception of  
the universe:

{   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },  
{{ }}}}     ...  {   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  
{{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ... }}

omega+1 is {0, 1, 2, 3, ... omega}

Ok, but if I comprehend it, I have to put it in the universe, so I get

{   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },  
{{ }}}}     ...  {   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  
{{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ... } {   { },    {{ }},    {{ },  
{{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ...  {   { },    
{{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ... }}}

omega+2

get it? after some infinite time again the universe looks like

{0, 1, 2, ... omega, omega+1, omega+2, omega+3, omega+4, omega+5, ...}

This is omega+omega,
and thus this continues

omega+omega+1, omega+omega+2, omega+omega+3, omega+omega+4, omega+omega
+5, ...

Which leads to omega+omega+omega
omega+omega+omega+1
omega+omega+omega+2
omega+omega+omega+3
...
which leads to
omega+omega+omega+omega
omega+omega+omega+omega+1
omega+omega+omega+omega+2
omega+omega+omega+omega+3
...
which leads to
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+1
...
which leads to
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
...
which leads to

omega*omega
omega*omega+1
omega*omega+2
...
omega*omega+omega

and you can guess (making giant steps):

omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega^omega

and speeding
omega^omega^omega
...
omega^omega^omega^omega

leading to
omega^omega^omega^omega^...

which is named epsilon zero. It is a star in logic, by playing some  
role in proof theory. Epsilon zero is still a very little ordinals, as  
such "other" infinite, transfinite number are called.

We will need only omega. Computability theory need even much higher  
ordinal than epsilon zero, but don't worry now about that. But natural  
numbers are like that, they behave so weirdly that you have to  
introduce many kind of "other numbers" to help to figure out what  
they, the natural numbers, are capable of.

It is good to met the ordinals at least once.
Do you think is is possible to comprehend *all* ordinal numbers? To  
get a picture of the whole universe of number and ordinals? (subject  
of reflexion).

Thanks for your work Kim and Russell,

Best regards to John and the others for they kindness,

Bruno

PS I will take the opportunity of JOUAL, and our conversations, to try  
sum up UDA (and AUDA?) in a short paper, and I have already accepted  
to participate to a mini-colloquium (by psychologists which are kind  
with me) this month in Brussels, so I have to write two papers, and  
this to say that I am a bit busy this month, so:  it is hollyday Kim!  
No more math until april! Take all your time for swallowing those  
ordinals, and don't be afraid to ask question (perhaps online so other  
can learn something too). Next lesson, in April: I say a bit more on  
those other numbers.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno, this is my reply to your "SeventhStep-2" post.

Still not clear; Axiom 1 says I is 'a' number, - OK.
Axiom 2 sais "x" which I understand is general for "any" number.  So xI is not different from II. The example: (say) I is 2, x=3, xI=32 and your 'II' is not 'a' number, but two numbers (definitely NOT by axiom 2, rather by axiom 1)
I did not see 'axiom 3' acording to which III or IIII would be 'a' number (any). They would be e.g.
593 or 4983 (or even 666 and 2222).
I am still missing the definitions of the digits. Not enough intuition?
*
My question to the von Neumann (an older school- mate from my highschool) notation:
"The generation of the universe of numbers proceed in stages, beginning with an empty universe..."
WHO generates? and HOW? especially an EMPTY one (whatever an empty universe may be? does 'it' have borders? (nonexitent ones, because it is empty), or volume? measures? space? that all in emptiness?{}
((your didactic epic is impressive).
Why do you have a zero within the 1? To make it '2',
 {{ },{{ }}} if 2 equals {0, 1} still empty sets? Or now you substitute for the inside unexplained digits? 
Your #3 is indeed {0,1,2} (took some reconsidering) and I really appreciate that you did not go all the way of the 7 days of Creation). Thanks. However I plead guilty not to have gone through all the 'omegas'.
I guess that (*) means multiplication and (^) power. These have no explained meaning in the preceeding sets.
Epsilon is noted generally as something tiny, e.g. Paul Erdos called little children 'little epsilons', (it became an accepted entry in Webster's dictionary).

Where did 'ordinals' come from? 
Still no connection with 'a' universe. Where did THIS enter? besides in my 'narrative' (not theory) there are innumerable and quite different 'universes' as being 'fulgurated' (appear and vanish) from the Plenitude. We know only about THIS one.
I gave a 'way' for their appearance and demise, no unexplained 'behavior' or 'activity' involved.

*

One final adition: I have the feeling that 'your' universe is still an empty set what jibes well with the illusionary 'physical world' with matter imagined, that in the final analysis does not contain anything 'matterly' (why QM calls the partitioned 'energy' (also a meaningless name) as "particles"). All the rest is figment, base it on fictional numbers or else. And indeed, 'computation' requires a factor that computes.

So far I still have my questions. Sorry.

John M

On Fri, Mar 6, 2009 at 2:03 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

Hi Kim, hi John, hi People,

Kim provided me with an excellent answer to my preceding post (out-of-
line though). And John told me he was impatient to see "my definition"
of the natural numbers (and some other numbers) in term of sets. So I
make a try. Nothing is important here for the sequel, but it can help
too.

This is in line with our future goal to figure out what a computation
is, and what is the difference between a computation and a description
of a computation. This plays a probably subtle role in the seventh
step of UDA, and also in the eight step. So just another example of a
well standard set theoretic representation of the natural numbers (and
the transfinite ordinals which extends them) can be useful, if only as
a reservoir of examples of structures later.

John has perhaps believed I was trying to define the numbers, (by
which I always mean "natural numbers", that is 0, 1, 2, 3, ...), but I
don't try to do that. I try just to help people with different view of
those numbers with an emphasis on what they are, as opposed to how to
represent them.

I have already mentioned the notation I, II, III, IIII, ...

We could capture this number's representation by axioms (and implicit
rule), like

Axiom 1: I is a number
Axiom 2: if x is a number, then xI is a number.

So I is a number (by axiom 1), so II is a number (by axiom 2), so III
is a number (by axiom 3), so IIII is a number (by axiom 3).

Is IIIIIIIIIIII.... a number? To avoid it we should need a rule saying
that we can apply axiom 2 only a finite number of time. But "finite
number" is what we were trying to define, so, well, we can't define
them, and I will rely on your intuition.

* * *

So, let me give you a nice representation of the natural numbers in
terms of sets. This material will not been used in the sequel, so take
it easy. it is a glimpse of "beyond infinity". This is due mainly to
to von Neumann. He showed that we can generate "the universe of
numbers" (actually of ordinals) from "nothing", or from an empty
universe, by using two powerful principles: the principle of set
comprehension, and the principle of set reflexion. I have tested
successfully this idea with young people.

The generation of the universe of numbers proceed in stages, beginning
with an empty universe. At each state we try 1) to comprehend the
whole universe, and 2) (it is the rule of the game) to put what we
have comprehend in the universe. 1) and 2) are the comprehension rule
and the reflexion rule.

Well, we still need a notation to describe the result of the
comprehension. On a board a use circles or ellipses, but here I will
use the more standard accolades. For example I comprehend John and
Kim, means I conceive the set {John, Kim}.

Let us go: (please do it yourself alongside, with {} a circle, { { } }
a circle with a little circle inside, it is easier to read, more cute,
and you will see the growing fractal:


Day 0: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe is
empty. Nothing. My comprehension of the universe at this stage is
represented by the empty set { }. It is my model of the universe at
that stage. And, well I will define or represent the number 0 by { }.
It is my conception of the universe at the middle of the day 0. We
have 0 = { }
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put { }
in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 1: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains
{ }. It contains 0. My comprehension of the universe at this stage is
represented by the set containing the empty set {{ }}. And, well I
will define or represent the number 1 by {{ }}.  It is my
comprehension of the universe at the middle of the day 1. We have 1 =
{{ }}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put
{{ }} in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 2: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains
{ } and {{ }}. It contains 0, and 1. My comprehension of the universe
at this stage is represented by the set containing {{ }, {{ }}}. And,
well I will define or represent the number 2 by {{ }, {{ }}}.  It is
my comprehension of the universe at the middle of the day 2. We have 2
= {0, 1}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put {{ }
{{ }}} in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 3: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains
{ } and {{ }} and {{ } {{ }}}. It contains 0, and 1, and 2. My
comprehension of the universe at this stage is represented by the set
{{ },  {{ }},  {{ } {{ }}}}. And, well I will define or represent the
number 3 by {{ },  {{ }},  {{ } {{ }}}.  It is my comprehension of the
universe at the middle of the day 3. We have 3 = {0, 1, 2}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put
{{ },  {{ }},  {{ } {{ }}}} in the universe, and then I go to bed.

Day 4: I wake up and I observe the universe. But the universe contains
{ } and {{ }} and {{ }, {{ }}} and {{ } , {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}. It
contains 0, and 1, and 2, and 3. My comprehension of the universe at
this stage is represented by the set {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}},
{{ } , {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}}. And, well I will define or represent
the number 4 by {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}, {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },
{{ }}}}}.  It is my comprehension of the universe at the middle of the
day 4. We have 4 = {0, 1, 2, 3}
But then I have to obey to the reflection rule, and I have to put
{{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}, {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}} in the
universe, and then I go to bed.

Well, at this stage, or a bit later, some people tell me already "OK,
we have understood, we got the idea". But "to understand" is the
english for the latin "comprehendere" (comprendre, in french). It
seems that now, your conception of the universe is

{   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },
{{ }}}}     ... }

This is day omega. Omega is the first infinite number. It is an Other
number (note). not a natural number. It is the unavoidable infinite
number IIIIIII.....   omega = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. It is the well known
set of all natural numbers.
OK, but if I "comprehend it" I have to put it in the universe by the
reflexion rule. So at the middle of the day omega+1, my conception of
the universe:

{   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },
{{ }}}}     ...  {   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },
{{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ... }}

omega+1 is {0, 1, 2, 3, ... omega}

Ok, but if I comprehend it, I have to put it in the universe, so I get

{   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ },
{{ }}}}     ...  {   { },    {{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },
{{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ... } {   { },    {{ }},    {{ },
{{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ...  {   { },
{{ }},    {{ }, {{ }}},      {{ },  {{ }},  {{ }, {{ }}}}     ... }}}

omega+2

get it? after some infinite time again the universe looks like

{0, 1, 2, ... omega, omega+1, omega+2, omega+3, omega+4, omega+5, ...}

This is omega+omega,
and thus this continues

omega+omega+1, omega+omega+2, omega+omega+3, omega+omega+4, omega+omega
+5, ...

Which leads to omega+omega+omega
omega+omega+omega+1
omega+omega+omega+2
omega+omega+omega+3
...
which leads to
omega+omega+omega+omega
omega+omega+omega+omega+1
omega+omega+omega+omega+2
omega+omega+omega+omega+3
...
which leads to
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+1
...
which leads to
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega+omega
...
...
which leads to

omega*omega
omega*omega+1
omega*omega+2
...
omega*omega+omega

and you can guess (making giant steps):

omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega*omega*omega*omega*omega*omega*omega
... ...
omega^omega

and speeding
omega^omega^omega
...
omega^omega^omega^omega

leading to
omega^omega^omega^omega^...

which is named epsilon zero. It is a star in logic, by playing some
role in proof theory. Epsilon zero is still a very little ordinals, as
such "other" infinite, transfinite number are called.

We will need only omega. Computability theory need even much higher
ordinal than epsilon zero, but don't worry now about that. But natural
numbers are like that, they behave so weirdly that you have to
introduce many kind of "other numbers" to help to figure out what
they, the natural numbers, are capable of.

It is good to met the ordinals at least once.
Do you think is is possible to comprehend *all* ordinal numbers? To
get a picture of the whole universe of number and ordinals? (subject
of reflexion).

Thanks for your work Kim and Russell,

Best regards to John and the others for they kindness,

Bruno

PS I will take the opportunity of JOUAL, and our conversations, to try
sum up UDA (and AUDA?) in a short paper, and I have already accepted
to participate to a mini-colloquium (by psychologists which are kind
with me) this month in Brussels, so I have to write two papers, and
this to say that I am a bit busy this month, so:  it is hollyday Kim!
No more math until april! Take all your time for swallowing those
ordinals, and don't be afraid to ask question (perhaps online so other
can learn something too). Next lesson, in April: I say a bit more on
those other numbers.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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[Wei Dai]

> No.  First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility
> function is or should be.  The real question is whether the measure, M, is
> conserved or whether it decreases.  It's just that a lot of people don't
> understand what that means.

I agree that a lot of people don't understand what that means, and I
certainly appreciate your effort to educate them. But it seems to me that
once someone does understand that issue, it's not assured that they'll fall
into the U=M*Q camp automatically.

> The next point is that while U=M*Q is perfectly well defined, U=Q is not,
> and I don't know what you mean by it.
>
> OK, you might ask "huh?" when I say that.  What I mean is that M*Q is just
> a caricature of a utility function but should obviously be generalized to
> the case of multiple types of observations by using Sum_i M_i Q_i.

U=Q would be generalized to (Sum_i M_i Q_i) / (Sum_i M_i). This seems just
as well defined as Sum_i M_i Q_i. You objected that "personal identity is
not well-defined" but don't you need to define personal identity to compute
Sum_i M_i Q_i as well, in order to determine which i to sum over?

BTW, I note that there seems to be a parallel between this debate, and the
one between average and total utilitarianism.
 


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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/3/7 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

>> I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
>> every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
>> the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.
>
> Which "I"?  Aren't you concerned that you would press the button - and vanish?

No, that's the whole point. If you accept that teleportation isn't
suicide, then you should accept that culling teleportation (to use
Jack Mallah's term) isn't suicide.

There are two copies of me in perfect lockstep, A1 and A2. I'm one of
these copies and not the other (though I don't know which). Suppose
I'm A1 and I decide to teleport 100km away. That means A1 disappears
and a new copy, B, appears 100m away. I'm happy, since I feel I've
traveled 100km with little effort. If I am instead A2, I go through
exactly the same process: A2 disappears, B appears 100km away, and I'm
happy. If I'm A1 the presence or absence of A2 does not make any
difference to me, and if I'm A2 the presence or absence of A1 doesn't
make any difference to me. It doesn't make sense to say that the
presence of the other A copy will diminish my chances of ending up as
B, or diminish my quantity or quality of consciousness once I end up
as B.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Jack Mallah]

--- On Fri, 3/6/09, Wei Dai <weidai@...> wrote:
> > No.  First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility function is or should be.  The real question is whether the measure, M, is conserved or whether it decreases.  It's just that a lot of people don't understand what that means.
>
> I agree that a lot of people don't understand what that means, and I certainly appreciate your effort to educate them. But it seems to me that once someone does understand that issue, it's not assured that they'll fall into the U=M*Q camp automatically.

They might not, but I'm sure most would; maybe not exactly that U, but a lot closer to it.

> U=Q would be generalized to (Sum_i M_i Q_i) / (Sum_i M_i).
> This seems just  as well defined as Sum_i M_i Q_i. You objected that "personal identity is not well-defined" but don't you need to define personal identity to compute Sum_i M_i Q_i as well, in order to determine which i to sum over?

No.  In U = Sum_i M_i Q_i, you sum over all the i's, not just the ones that are similar to you.  Of course your Q_i (which is _your_ utility per unit measure for the observer i) might be highly peaked around those that are similar to you, but there's no need for a precise cutoff in similarity.  And it's even very likely that it will have even higher peaks around people that are not very much like you at all (these are the people that you would sacrifice yourself for).

By contrast, in your proposal for U, you do need a precise cutoff, for which there is no justification.

-- On Fri, 3/6/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:
> > It's not the addition of the other copy that's the problem; it's the loss of it.  Losing people is bad.
>
> How would the addition then loss of the extra copy be bad for the original, or for that matter for the disappearing extra copy, given that neither copy has any greater claim to being resurrected in the morning as B?

It's not the addition then loss that's bad (since you end up with the same measure you started with); it's the loss.

In the culling teleportation, both people are lost, which is doubly bad.  Elsewhere, one new person appears, which is good, but not as good as there being two people.  So it's not a wash; it's a loss.

> I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all.

It's easy to say you don't agree but you haven't given an alternative.  Precisely how would you calculate it?  U = ...




     


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[Günther Greindl]

Stathis, Brent,

> There are two copies of me in perfect lockstep, A1 and A2. I'm one of
> these copies and not the other (though I don't know which). Suppose
> I'm A1 and I decide to teleport 100km away. That means A1 disappears
> and a new copy, B, appears 100m away. I'm happy, since I feel I've
> traveled 100km with little effort. If I am instead A2, I go through
> exactly the same process: A2 disappears, B appears 100km away, and I'm
> happy. If I'm A1 the presence or absence of A2 does not make any
> difference to me, and if I'm A2 the presence or absence of A1 doesn't
> make any difference to me. It doesn't make sense to say that the
> presence of the other A copy will diminish my chances of ending up as
> B, or diminish my quantity or quality of consciousness once I end up
> as B.

I think Brent's "vanishing" is meant to refer to 3rd person perspective.

 From 1POV, Stathis is correct in pressing the button - he will never
experience vanishing.

But if the button _really_ does some work - that is, reduce measure (it
is only a thought experiment of course) that would mean that under
3-Plural-POV there must indeed be "vanishing" or termination or whatever
- else, there is no sense in which one could say measure has been
reduced (if it is neither noticeable in 3-Plural POV nor in 1POV. If one
reduces measure strictly in God's eye viewpoint without it being
3-Plural noticeable, it seems to me that you also have to reduce measure
of all people polyplicated with you - then symmetry would be restored;
but that goes beyond the original proposed thought experiment).


Cheers,
Günther



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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/3/8 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...> wrote:

> It's not the addition then loss that's bad (since you end up with the same measure you started with); it's the loss.
>
> In the culling teleportation, both people are lost, which is doubly bad.  Elsewhere, one new person appears, which is good, but not as good as there being two people.  So it's not a wash; it's a loss.

It's a loss that makes no difference to either of the two people that
vanish, since both will feel that they have survived. This is not to
say that the loss does not matter in any sense; for example, as a
result there will be only half as many hands to chop wood. But the
loss makes no difference to personal survival, which is what we are
discussing here.

>> I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all.
>
> It's easy to say you don't agree but you haven't given an alternative.  Precisely how would you calculate it?  U = ...

U = (Sum_i M_i Q_i) / (Sum_i M_i), as Wei Dai wrote. I don't
understand your objection that this is less well defined than U =
Sum_i M_i Q_i, since the variables are exactly the same in each case.
However, stating a formula is simply another way of stating an
opinion. The crux of the matter is that if neither I nor my copies
will feel any different as a result of being culled, then being culled
does not matter. It could be that my measure is being regularly halved
every Tuesday and Thursday, and I have no way of knowing and no reason
to care as long as it doesn't go to zero.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/3/8 Jack Mallah <jackmallah@...> wrote:
>
>> It's not the addition then loss that's bad (since you end up with the same measure you started with); it's the loss.
>>
>> In the culling teleportation, both people are lost, which is doubly bad.  Elsewhere, one new person appears, which is good, but not as good as there being two people.  So it's not a wash; it's a loss.
>
> It's a loss that makes no difference to either of the two people that
> vanish, since both will feel that they have survived. This is not to
> say that the loss does not matter in any sense; for example, as a
> result there will be only half as many hands to chop wood. But the
> loss makes no difference to personal survival, which is what we are
> discussing here.
>
>>> I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all.
>> It's easy to say you don't agree but you haven't given an alternative.  Precisely how would you calculate it?  U = ...
>
> U = (Sum_i M_i Q_i) / (Sum_i M_i), as Wei Dai wrote. I don't
> understand your objection that this is less well defined than U =
> Sum_i M_i Q_i, since the variables are exactly the same in each case.
> However, stating a formula is simply another way of stating an
> opinion. The crux of the matter is that if neither I nor my copies
> will feel any different as a result of being culled, then being culled
> does not matter. It could be that my measure is being regularly halved
> every Tuesday and Thursday, and I have no way of knowing and no reason
> to care as long as it doesn't go to zero.
>
>

And if it went to zero you certainly wouldn't know and wouldn't care.

Brent

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/3/8 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:

> And if it went to zero you certainly wouldn't know and wouldn't care.

If I died I wouldn't be around to know or care, but I would care in
anticipation of dying, since it would radically alter my future
experiences by eliminating them. On the other hand, 1->1 or many->1
copying would leave my future experiences the same as if the
teleportation hadn't occurred. You might say that this is an illusion
since the original me will actually be dead but the same illusion
occurs in ordinary life, and it is the circumstances under which the
illusion is preserved that interests me when I think about survival.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Brent Meeker-2]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/3/8 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>> And if it went to zero you certainly wouldn't know and wouldn't care.
>
> If I died I wouldn't be around to know or care, but I would care in
> anticipation of dying, since it would radically alter my future
> experiences by eliminating them. On the other hand, 1->1 or many->1
> copying would leave my future experiences the same as if the
> teleportation hadn't occurred.

Only for one of you.  Many-1 of you would have different future experiences
(according to this theory).  Why don't you care about the loss of those experiences?

>You might say that this is an illusion
> since the original me will actually be dead but the same illusion
> occurs in ordinary life, and it is the circumstances under which the
> illusion is preserved that interests me when I think about survival.

I'm not sure what you mean by this.  What illusion of ordinary life do you refer
to?  That "you" are the same as the Stathis of last year?

Brent

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[Quentin Anciaux-2]

2009/3/9 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/3/8 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>
>> And if it went to zero you certainly wouldn't know and wouldn't care.
>
> If I died I wouldn't be around to know or care, but I would care in
> anticipation of dying, since it would radically alter my future
> experiences by eliminating them. On the other hand, 1->1 or many->1
> copying would leave my future experiences the same as if the
> teleportation hadn't occurred.

Only for one of you.  Many-1 of you would have different future experiences
(according to this theory).  Why don't you care about the loss of those experiences?

>You might say that this is an illusion
> since the original me will actually be dead but the same illusion
> occurs in ordinary life, and it is the circumstances under which the
> illusion is preserved that interests me when I think about survival.

I'm not sure what you mean by this.  What illusion of ordinary life do you refer
to?  That "you" are the same as the Stathis of last year?

Brent

I think he means the same thing as what you mean when you say you are you when you wake up the morning and remember going to sleep the previous day... that you remember and assert that you are you...
 

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/3/9 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote:

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/3/8 Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...>:
>>
>>> And if it went to zero you certainly wouldn't know and wouldn't care.
>>
>> If I died I wouldn't be around to know or care, but I would care in
>> anticipation of dying, since it would radically alter my future
>> experiences by eliminating them. On the other hand, 1->1 or many->1
>> copying would leave my future experiences the same as if the
>> teleportation hadn't occurred.
>
> Only for one of you.  Many-1 of you would have different future experiences
> (according to this theory).  Why don't you care about the loss of those experiences?

I meant the case of culling teleportation, where many identical copies
disappear and one copy appears. If 1->1 teleportation is OK for each
individual copy then many->1 should also be OK. In other words, each
of the many copies feels he survives as the one copy, so each of the
many copies is satisfied with the outcome.

>>You might say that this is an illusion
>> since the original me will actually be dead but the same illusion
>> occurs in ordinary life, and it is the circumstances under which the
>> illusion is preserved that interests me when I think about survival.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by this.  What illusion of ordinary life do you refer
> to?  That "you" are the same as the Stathis of last year?

Of last year or last night, as Quentin said.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,

I comment you two last posts. It all begins by a slight  
misunderstanding to end with deep agreement (except perhaps on Plato,  
and the simplicity of the totality "seen from outside", if that makes  
sense).

> Dear Bruno, this is my reply to your "SeventhStep-2" post.
>
> Still not clear; Axiom 1 says I is 'a' number, - OK.
> Axiom 2 sais "x" which I understand is general for "any" number.  So  
> xI is not different from II. The example: (say) I is 2, x=3, xI=32  
> and your 'II' is not 'a' number, but two numbers (definitely NOT by  
> axiom 2, rather by axiom 1)
> I did not see 'axiom 3' acording to which III or IIII would be 'a'  
> number (any). They would be e.g.
> 593 or 4983 (or even 666 and 2222).
> I am still missing the definitions of the digits. Not enough  
> intuition?
>

The goal was to define the following object I II III IIII ..., and  
illustrating the difficulty to define the "...". No digits appear here.

The axiom 2 says that if x is a number, then the result of the  
concatenation of x with I is a number too.
But x, for being used to find or build a new number, needs to be  
already a number. Only axiom 1 gives a number, indeed I, for free at  
the start.

By axiom 1, I is a number. By axiom 2 if x is number, like I, then the  
result of concatenation of x with I, i.e. II, is again a number.
By axiom 2 again, we have that III is a number. Indeed it is the  
concatenation of II, which we have already as number at the preceding  
step, with I.
And thus III is a number.
And then IIII, by axiom 2, again.
And the IIIII, by axiom 2 again.
etc.

The problem now is that the "etc" is fuzzy. In particular should we  
consider the infinite expression IIII... as a number. It follows by a  
*number* of application of the axiom 2. To avoid it we could stipulate  
that the axiom 2 should be applied a finite number of times. But  
"finite number" is what we tried to define with the axioms 1 and 2 to  
begin with. The point is that we cannot define "..."
"..." is already a little god that the mathematician have to invoke  
(under the form of an axiom in a set theory, for example; but this  
will fundamentally described the dynamic of the symbols.





>
> *
> My question to the von Neumann (an older school- mate from my  
> highschool) notation:
> "The generation of the universe of numbers proceed in stages,  
> beginning with an empty universe..."
> WHO generates?
>
You. Or some machine, easy to build, or program. Using the dynamic of  
the machine to implement the "..." in some local way.


> and HOW?
>
That is what I (try) to explain.


> especially an EMPTY one (whatever an empty universe may be? does  
> 'it' have borders? (nonexitent ones, because it is empty), or  
> volume? measures? space? that all in emptiness?{}
>

No. It is just the set having no element. It is mathematical set. In  
modern math, all the notion of border, volume, measure, space are  
defined or represented in term of sets. More modern approach use  
function as primitive, or categories. But set are still used  
implicitly by most mathematicians as a foundation, if only in the  
background.


>
> ((your didactic epic is impressive).
> Why do you have a zero within the 1? To make it '2',
>
That is the cute feature of this set representation of the numbers,  
and indeed of all ordinals. Each number or ordinal *is* the set of all  
those numbers (ordinals) which are little than itself.

0 = { }
1 = {{ }} = {0}
2 = {{ }, {{ }}} = {0, 1}
3 = {{ } {{ }} {{ }, {{ }}}} = {0, 1, 2}
...
omega = {{ }, {{ }}, {{ }, {{ }}}, {{ } {{ }} {{ }, {{ }}}}, ...} =  
{0, 1, 2, 3, ...}
omega+1 = {{ }, {{ }}, {{ }, {{ }}}, {{ } {{ }} {{ }, {{ }}}}, ...
{{ }, {{ }}, {{ }, {{ }}}, {{ } {{ }} {{ }, {{ }}}}, ...}} = {0, 1, 2,  
3, ... omega}
...

>
>  {{ },{{ }}} if 2 equals {0, 1} still empty sets? Or now you  
> substitute for the inside unexplained digits?
> Your #3 is indeed {0,1,2} (took some reconsidering) and I really  
> appreciate that you did not go all the way of the 7 days of  
> Creation). Thanks. However I plead guilty not to have gone through  
> all the 'omegas'.
> I guess that (*) means multiplication and (^) power. These have no  
> explained meaning in the preceeding sets.
> Epsilon is noted generally as something tiny, e.g. Paul Erdos called  
> little children 'little epsilons', (it became an accepted entry in  
> Webster's dictionary).
>
> Where did 'ordinals' come from?

Georg Cantor. The discoverer of the fact that an infinite can hide  
other infinities.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Cantor


>
> Still no connection with 'a' universe. Where did THIS enter? besides  
> in my 'narrative' (not theory) there are innumerable and quite  
> different 'universes' as being 'fulgurated' (appear and vanish) from  
> the Plenitude. We know only about THIS one.


I am not sure I can figure out what you are talking about, here. When  
I talk on the "universe" of numbers, I am using the term "universe" in  
the most vague sense as possible. It could mean {0, 1, 2, 3 ... } as  
it could mean all possible numbers, and even everything, according to  
the context. Sorry if I have not been clear.


>
> I gave a 'way' for their appearance and demise, no unexplained  
> 'behavior' or 'activity' involved.

?


> One final adition: I have the feeling that 'your' universe is still  
> an empty set what jibes well with the illusionary 'physical world'  
> with matter imagined, that in the final analysis does not contain  
> anything 'matterly' (why QM calls the partitioned 'energy' (also a  
> meaningless name) as "particles"). All the rest is figment, base it  
> on fictional numbers or else. And indeed, 'computation' requires a  
> factor that computes.
> So far I still have my questions. Sorry.
>

I was just trying to give you another question: what do we mean by  
"...".  And I was illustrating we just can't do it.

At the same time I was illustrating the notion of recursive  
definition. I did already such a thing on the list when I define the  
combinators (or their syntax).

I said

Axiom 1 K is a combinator
Axiom 2 S is a combinator
Axiom 3, if x is a combinator, and y is a combinator, then (x y) is a  
combinator.

 From this you can already build all combinators: they are K, S, (K  
K), (K S), (S K), (S S), (K (K K)), (K (K S)), (K (S K)), (K (S S)),  
((K K) K), ...

(And then you have already a full "programming language" or "universal  
machine" with two little computation rules, which you can find here,  
in those links to my combinatory posts to the everything list:

http://github.com/raganwald/homoiconic/blob/master/2008-11-12/combinator_chemistry.md


Let me comment your next post here:


John wrote:

> Bruno, - again the bartender...
> *
> Initial remark:
> I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency -  
> which I find not assured in DIFFERENT universes.



Formally, the Löbian machine agrees, perhaps serendipitously, with  
you. It is the godelian consistency of inconsistency. For each Lobian  
machines, there are mathematical universes, making true the axiom of  
arithmetic, or the specification of the machine, in which there exist  
"proofs" that there are inconsistent. I put "proof" in quote, because  
those "proof" are different from the usual one (based on our  
incommunicable intuition of what we mean by "finite", again).





> As I said axioms (2+2=4) are
> in my opinion thought - conditions to make one's theory workable and  
> so they are  conditioned by the circumstances.



"2+2 = 4" is true in all those (quite different) mathematical  
structures. I don't see how "2+2 = 4" could depend on circumstances. I  
guess you are interpreting "2+2 = 4" as something else. You are not  
referring to the natural numbers.





> *
> What I try to add is the 'mind-body' problem. While I have no  
> definition for "mind",



Assuming digital mechanism in cognitive science, there is a simple  
definition of mind: the object study of computer science. You can then  
define theology by the gap between computer science and computer's  
computer science.





> we 'all' think to know what it means: a non-material mentality which  
> encompasses the tool's (brain(function)) genetic built differences -  
> i.e. enhanced  or reduced ease of connectivity-building in select  
> topical domains - plus the sum of previous experience helping one's  
> personal interpretation (and maybe more) including one's faith in a  
> "soul" as well,


OK.




> while the 'body' is the formulation of a figment in the 'physical  
> world' upon phenomena that are (mis/poorly) understood when received  
> and both are parts of the complexity of us.



Nice. OK.





> I cannot figure a 'separation' of substantial parts of a complexity  
> without destruction of the complexity in its entirety, so a  
> "transport" can be only the entire complexity - or none.


I follow that intuition. Lobian machine too, of course proVably only  
in a technical sense.




> Aristotle had it easy with his simple cognitive level of the  
> 'physical world' so there was an easy possibility of thinking  
> separately about the physical body and the rest of it not fitting  
> into such.


It was an ingenious methodological assumption which has made possible  
many discoveries. But it is a metaphysical trap which could lead to  
the elimination of person in theory, if not in practice. OK.




>
> In brief: I se no 'mind-body' problem, only when we try the ancient  
> (I may say: obsolete) ways of separating the 'physical world  
> figment' from the total (complexity).



Plato didn't commit *that* error! nor Plotinus, nor any rationalist  
mystics, from East, or West, or North, or South.
Also the total can be simple (it is the main agreed assumption of the  
"everything" idea), and complexity appears from inside the totality.




> ((you promised an explanatory post to my askings - I am in a hurry  
> to write down these remarks, because MAYBE after your explanations  
> these would not make sense<G>))



Too late :)

Best regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[Saibal Mitra]

http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825

I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a
different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now I've
made the argument more rigorous.


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[Wei Dai]

Jack Mallah wrote:
> They might not, but I'm sure most would; maybe not exactly that U, but a
> lot closer to it.

Can you explain why you believe that?

> No.  In U = Sum_i M_i Q_i, you sum over all the i's, not just the ones
> that are similar to you.  Of course your Q_i (which is _your_ utility per
> unit measure for the observer i) might be highly peaked around those that
> are similar to you, but there's no need for a precise cutoff in
> similarity.  And it's even very likely that it will have even higher peaks
> around people that are not very much like you at all (these are the people
> that you would sacrifice yourself for).
>
> By contrast, in your proposal for U, you do need a precise cutoff, for
> which there is no justification.

Ok, I see what you're saying, and it is a good point. But most people
already have a personal identity that is sufficiently well-defined in the
current environment where mind copying is not possible, so in practice
deciding which i's to sum over isn't a serious problem (yet).
 


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