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Re: Time
by A. Wolf
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> What is time? About 7pm EDT, here. (Sorry...haven't had the time to read my flagged posts yet and offer real responses.) Anna --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by Brent Meeker-2
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Abram Demski wrote: > [Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly > the first time.] > > Bruno, everyone, > > I've decided that it will be more productive/entertaining to post my > various concerns as a new topic. > > What is time? > Time is what you read on a clock. > I'm going to ask a bunch of questions; for the sake of brevity, I'm > going to skip my arguments (which would mostly be reasons why > particular answers don't work). I'll argue once someone replies. > > If all possible universes exist, does that mean every possible moment, > What do you mean by "possible"? Do you mean nomologically possible - which might be very restrictive but we don't know? Or do you mean logically possible - just not instantiating a contradiction "X and not-X"? Or something inbetween? > or every possible timeline of moments? If "moments" is the answer, > then how are the moments connected? If time is a real variable (which QM assumes), moments automatically inherit the topology of the reals. > How would it matter, since the > moments already are what they are? If "timeline" is the answer, then > there is a similar question of how it matters. > > If there is a physical universe, then is there some sort of basic > physical connection behind time? > > If the universe is mathematical in nature, then what is the > mathematical connection between moments? What sort of mathematical > connection counts as time? > > If (as was recently suggested, in connection with relativity) time > cannot really be divided into individual moments, then what is it? > In physics, it's a variable in the equations that determines the causal topology. > Why do we experience time passing? > > Is it legitimate to think as if the next moment we experience will be > chosen randomly in some sense? Does probability or randomness have a > role to play in the flow of time? > Randomness would seem to give a sense to the direction of time. That's why physicist who are loathe to give up time-symmetry in their equations tend to favor Everett's interpretation of QM. > In connection with UDA: what is the meaning of a first-person > probability due to uncertainty of the future? Is there any sense in > which such estimates can be more or less accurate if all possible next > moments do in fact occur? > Good question. It's the same as asking how the Born rule arises in Everett's interpretation of QM. Brent > Hope that sparks some thought... > > -- > Abram Demski > Public address: abram-demski@... > Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski > Private address: abramdemski@... > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by Abram Demski
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Brent, I'm not sure how the comment about real numbers effects my basic argument. One interesting objection I got from someone not on this list was that time isn't composed of moments at all, only intervals-- a "moment" is an imaginary thing that we get by considering arbitrarily small intervals. Mathematically, though, a real-values time variable doesn't eliminate moments, it just makes an infinite number of them between any other two, with a particular mathematical structure. So the question of what makes them "stick together" remains. Obviously, one reason I think that I am traveling through time is because I remember the past (but can only guess at the future). But "remembering the past" is an experience that takes time, spanning many moments, making this a little tangled. The multiverse complicates things further: even supposing that only the possible worlds implied by quantum mechanics exist (that is, no alternative physics, just all possible quantum states) it is quite possible for me to remember the future. It's merely improbable. But if all possible alternatives actually occur, I don't know what probability means. (Even if there are literally more alternatives down the probable paths, does this make it more probable that I experience the more probable result? What would that mean?) --Abram On Thu, Dec 18, 2008 at 7:21 PM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote: > > Abram Demski wrote: >> [Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly >> the first time.] >> >> Bruno, everyone, >> >> I've decided that it will be more productive/entertaining to post my >> various concerns as a new topic. >> >> What is time? >> > > Time is what you read on a clock. >> I'm going to ask a bunch of questions; for the sake of brevity, I'm >> going to skip my arguments (which would mostly be reasons why >> particular answers don't work). I'll argue once someone replies. >> >> If all possible universes exist, does that mean every possible moment, >> > > What do you mean by "possible"? Do you mean nomologically possible - > which might be very restrictive but we don't know? Or do you mean > logically possible - just not instantiating a contradiction "X and > not-X"? Or something inbetween? > >> or every possible timeline of moments? If "moments" is the answer, >> then how are the moments connected? > If time is a real variable (which QM assumes), moments automatically > inherit the topology of the reals. > >> How would it matter, since the >> moments already are what they are? If "timeline" is the answer, then >> there is a similar question of how it matters. >> >> If there is a physical universe, then is there some sort of basic >> physical connection behind time? >> >> If the universe is mathematical in nature, then what is the >> mathematical connection between moments? What sort of mathematical >> connection counts as time? >> >> If (as was recently suggested, in connection with relativity) time >> cannot really be divided into individual moments, then what is it? >> > > In physics, it's a variable in the equations that determines the causal > topology. >> Why do we experience time passing? >> >> Is it legitimate to think as if the next moment we experience will be >> chosen randomly in some sense? Does probability or randomness have a >> role to play in the flow of time? >> > Randomness would seem to give a sense to the direction of time. That's > why physicist who are loathe to give up time-symmetry in their equations > tend to favor Everett's interpretation of QM. > >> In connection with UDA: what is the meaning of a first-person >> probability due to uncertainty of the future? Is there any sense in >> which such estimates can be more or less accurate if all possible next >> moments do in fact occur? >> > Good question. It's the same as asking how the Born rule arises in > Everett's interpretation of QM. > > Brent > >> Hope that sparks some thought... >> >> -- >> Abram Demski >> Public address: abram-demski@... >> Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski >> Private address: abramdemski@... >> >> > >> >> > > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-demski@... Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdemski@... --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by Bruno Marchal
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Hi Abram,
I agree mostly with Brent's reply. Other precision should appear in my explanation of the UDA to Kim, and in my answer to Ronald (Sunday). I will just add general remarks to Brent's reply. Le 19-déc.-08, à 00:18, Abram Demski a écrit : [Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly the first time.] Bruno, everyone, I've decided that it will be more productive/entertaining to post my various concerns as a new topic. What is time? Third person sharable time could be an illusion. It seems to me that QM + General Relativity could lead to the idea that there is no real "physical time". With MEC this is a direct consequence of the UDA. First person time, or subjective, akin to Bergson notion of "duration" can be explained in the AUDA. It appears that the formal notion of first person leads naturally toward a temporal logic. Like in Plotinus, the "soul" is the creator of time. I'm going to ask a bunch of questions; for the sake of brevity, I'm going to skip my arguments (which would mostly be reasons why particular answers don't work). I'll argue once someone replies. If all possible universes exist, does that mean every possible moment, or every possible timeline of moments? If "moments" is the answer, then how are the moments connected? How would it matter, since the moments already are what they are? If "timeline" is the answer, then there is a similar question of how it matters. What do you mean by "how it matters"? It is a bit like free will. It exists because from our points of view we cannot know the "end of the novel". That ignorance, and thus free will is preserved by the mechanist hypothesis. It is even made intrinsical. If there is a physical universe, then is there some sort of basic physical connection behind time? Open and difficult problem for the physics you can extract from comp. Of course, if there is a primary physical universe, we have to resolve the problem of marrying QM and GR before being able to answer your question. Very difficult question. If the universe is mathematical in nature, then what is the mathematical connection between moments? What sort of mathematical connection counts as time? I would say that it is logic-mathematical connections. With MEC those relations eventually originates with the natural number successor relation. I will say a bit more sunday in my answer to Ronaheld. The problem is that it is hard not being a bit technical here. You have to understand the mathematical concept of computation, and then to understand that those computations exists in arithmetic, and indeed are accessible through proof in a very tiny part of arithmetic: the theorems of Robinson Arithmetic (RA). RA is Peano Arithmetic *without* the induction axioms. PA is the lobian machine. And RA generated all the histories which notably contain all the Lobian machines. RA simulates PA like I can simulate Einstein's brain, or a Chinese brain. This is a subtle point where people do sometimes the Error of Searle with his Chinese Room. If (as was recently suggested, in connection with relativity) time cannot really be divided into individual moments, then what is it? It is an ordering on machine knowledge states, and/or observation states. It is a very complex ordered structure (should be isomorphic to the lattice of open sets in a complex topological space and/or Hilbert Space). I approach the math of those spaces with the modal logic of self-reference and their intensional variants. Why do we experience time passing? Is it legitimate to think as if the next moment we experience will be chosen randomly in some sense? Yes. I believe everyone in this list agree with this, but differ on the distribution law, the relative or absolute nature of the probabilities, and about the nature of the events on which the probability bears on. In the case of comp, I argue (through UDA+AUDA) that our next experience is chosen randomly on the set of all computations going through our actual state which have been generated by the UD, or are "living" in that tiny arithmetic. There are 2^aleph_0 histories. The measure should be non constructive (thus physics cannot be entirely described by a program or machine) Does probability or randomness have a role to play in the flow of time? I would say yes, given that once a universal machine observes itself it separates a growing "past" from a growing "future". There is a sort of self-diffraction: the better a machine observes itself, the bigger is the set of possible futures (consistent continuations of computations) she gets. In connection with UDA: what is the meaning of a first-person probability due to uncertainty of the future? I will explain this soon to Kim. I suggest you ask in the case this remains unclear, or if you have objection. It is not possible to explain this shortly. Is there any sense in which such estimates can be more or less accurate if all possible next moments do in fact occur? All what we have to do consists in finding discrepancies between the theory and the observations. I bet QM is correct, so I tend to bet that the comp estimation of the possible moments will give the same estimation than QM. This would explain where QM comes from. This remains to be seen of course, but formally, preliminary modest results are going in that direction. Bits and Qubits comes from each other. Hope this short answer to difficult questions can help. I will say more to Ronald Sunday, and I invite you to follow the KIM thread where I explain UDA. And perhaps then I can explain AUDA with the amount of technical details demanded. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Quantizing GR and some comments (Was Re: Time)
by Stephen Paul King-2
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Hi Bruno and Friends,
I have some comments and questions
interleaved below.
[SPK]
Is this conclusion following ideas like
those of Julian Barbour? Lee Smolin in several papers thas shown quite
convinsingly that Barbour's theory has some serious problems. For instance
see:
If there is a physical universe, then is there some sort of basic physical connection behind time? [SPK]
How are we sure that GR needs to be
"quantized" at all? We have, with QM, a very good theory covering all notions of
"interactions" in terms of their energy, charge, spin, etc; why is it necessary
to "quantize" geometry? What is geometry is a derivative quantity and not a
primitive? After all, In Bruno's model our observed universe is derived from
NUMBERS...
[SPK]
Here is where I have a serious difficulty
with Bruno's idea (all the while I must admit that I am in awe of its elegance)
it is the fact that all notions of "observable" quantities in QM are coded in
terms of complex numbers ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_number )
as "amplitutes" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amplitude)-
which have no notion of a unique successor relation - until after a particular
notion of a physical world in introduced to allow for the operation of
"reduction of the wavefunction" or what ever equivalent procedure implements the
Born's rule: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Born_Rule
Thus QM tells us that the Universe is
Complex valued and thus we have a severe problem in that there is no
unique and a priori ordering of events from which to derive a first person
notion of time or a "flow of events".
[SPK]
Does not this property of being
" isomorphic to the lattice of open sets in a complex
topological space and/or Hilbert Space" make my point that there does not exist
a unique ordering?! A simple and visualizable proof of this is seen in that a 2
dimensional Euclidian Plane does not have a unique line or subset that
would seperate one portion of the Plane from another; or in English: there does
not exist a unique way to cut a piece of paper into two pieces.
[SPK]
But substituting an Asymetry between events
for 1st person time does nothing to further our questions. Unless there is a
means to derive a notion of a measure or an ordering from primitive arithmatic
(that is not that of Natural numbers!) we are still where we started on this
excursion. :(
[SPK]
Given all of that, does there not still
remain the need for a measure with which to "order" the histories? It almost
seems that the nature of the isomorphism elaborated upon above leadws dirrectly
to a "NoGo" theorem here... Since no unique ordering can exist on a
complex
[SPK]
Does this "self-diffraction" not relie in
some way on some from of measure? If the measure is arbitrary and not derived,
all we have, AFAIK, is an example of a random walk...
[SPK]
I will continue to read the posts.
;)
Kindest regards,
Stephen --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by Abram Demski
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Bruno, From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived? It seems that a coherent theory of the probability of future events is needed (otherwise the passing of time could be white noise), but I do not see where such probabilities could come out of more basic assumptions. To reason about the future, we assume that we are in a randomly chosen computation-- but then we are already using some probability distribution. Evolution is at the root of our ability to predict probabilistically. We use one probability distribution over another because it helps us survive. However, this is not good enough of an answer in the multiverse: every possible form survives anyway. To keep talking about evolution, we would need to talk about which forms are more common in the multiverse. But to count how common forms are, we would need some measure over the multiverse, which could give us a probability distribution in the first place. So every possible argument seems circular. So, I don't need all the details of your derivation of a probability (though I'm interested); but what assumptions can you get a probability distribution from? -Abram On Fri, Dec 19, 2008 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote: > Hi Abram, > > I agree mostly with Brent's reply. Other precision should appear in my > explanation of the UDA to Kim, and in my answer to Ronald (Sunday). > I will just add general remarks to Brent's reply. > > > Le 19-déc.-08, à 00:18, Abram Demski a écrit : > > > [Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly > > the first time.] > > Bruno, everyone, > > I've decided that it will be more productive/entertaining to post my > > various concerns as a new topic. > > What is time? > > Third person sharable time could be an illusion. It seems to me that QM + > General Relativity could lead to the idea that there is no real "physical > time". With MEC this is a direct consequence of the UDA. > First person time, or subjective, akin to Bergson notion of "duration" can > be explained in the AUDA. It appears that the formal notion of first person > leads naturally toward a temporal logic. Like in Plotinus, the "soul" is the > creator of time. > > > > > I'm going to ask a bunch of questions; for the sake of brevity, I'm > > going to skip my arguments (which would mostly be reasons why > > particular answers don't work). I'll argue once someone replies. > > If all possible universes exist, does that mean every possible moment, > > or every possible timeline of moments? If "moments" is the answer, > > then how are the moments connected? How would it matter, since the > > moments already are what they are? If "timeline" is the answer, then > > there is a similar question of how it matters. > > > What do you mean by "how it matters"? It is a bit like free will. It exists > because from our points of view we cannot know the "end of the novel". > That ignorance, and thus free will is preserved by the mechanist hypothesis. > It is even made intrinsical. > > > > If there is a physical universe, then is there some sort of basic > > physical connection behind time? > > Open and difficult problem for the physics you can extract from comp. Of > course, if there is a primary physical universe, we have to resolve the > problem of marrying QM and GR before being able to answer your question. > Very difficult question. > > > > > If the universe is mathematical in nature, then what is the > > mathematical connection between moments? What sort of mathematical > > connection counts as time? > > > > I would say that it is logic-mathematical connections. With MEC those > relations eventually originates with the natural number successor relation. > I will say a bit more sunday in my answer to Ronaheld. The problem is that > it is hard not being a bit technical here. You have to understand the > mathematical concept of computation, and then to understand that those > computations exists in arithmetic, and indeed are accessible through proof > in a very tiny part of arithmetic: the theorems of Robinson Arithmetic (RA). > RA is Peano Arithmetic *without* the induction axioms. > PA is the lobian machine. And RA generated all the histories which notably > contain all the Lobian machines. RA simulates PA like I can simulate > Einstein's brain, or a Chinese brain. This is a subtle point where people do > sometimes the Error of Searle with his Chinese Room. > > > > > If (as was recently suggested, in connection with relativity) time > > cannot really be divided into individual moments, then what is it? > > > It is an ordering on machine knowledge states, and/or observation states. > It is a very complex ordered structure (should be isomorphic to the lattice > of open sets in a complex topological space and/or Hilbert Space). I > approach the math of those spaces with the modal logic of self-reference and > their intensional variants. > > > > Why do we experience time passing? > > > > Each of our knowledge state are relative state generated by "a most probable > computation" (generated by the UD, or living in arithmetic). Mainly by > ignorance, we feel our knowledge being divided into a sort of > past-certainty, and sort of future-uncertainty. Those things can be > described by modal logic. I argue all those modal logic arise from > self-reference in arithmetic. > > > > > Is it legitimate to think as if the next moment we experience will be > > chosen randomly in some sense? > > Yes. I believe everyone in this list agree with this, but differ on the > distribution law, the relative or absolute nature of the probabilities, and > about the nature of the events on which the probability bears on. > In the case of comp, I argue (through UDA+AUDA) that our next experience is > chosen randomly on the set of all computations going through our actual > state which have been generated by the UD, or are "living" in that tiny > arithmetic. > There are 2^aleph_0 histories. The measure should be non constructive (thus > physics cannot be entirely described by a program or machine) > > > Does probability or randomness have a > > role to play in the flow of time? > > > I would say yes, given that once a universal machine observes itself it > separates a growing "past" from a growing "future". > There is a sort of self-diffraction: the better a machine observes itself, > the bigger is the set of possible futures (consistent continuations of > computations) she gets. > > > In connection with UDA: what is the meaning of a first-person > > probability due to uncertainty of the future? > > I will explain this soon to Kim. I suggest you ask in the case this remains > unclear, or if you have objection. It is not possible to explain this > shortly. > > Is there any sense in > > which such estimates can be more or less accurate if all possible next > > moments do in fact occur? > > > All what we have to do consists in finding discrepancies between the theory > and the observations. I bet QM is correct, so I tend to bet that the comp > estimation of the possible moments will give the same estimation than QM. > This would explain where QM comes from. This remains to be seen of course, > but formally, preliminary modest results are going in that direction. Bits > and Qubits comes from each other. > Hope this short answer to difficult questions can help. I will say more to > Ronald Sunday, and I invite you to follow the KIM thread where I explain > UDA. And perhaps then I can explain AUDA with the amount of technical > details demanded. > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-demski@... Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdemski@... --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by Brent Meeker-2
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Abram Demski wrote: > Brent, > > I'm not sure how the comment about real numbers effects my basic > argument. One interesting objection I got from someone not on this > list was that time isn't composed of moments at all, only intervals-- > a "moment" is an imaginary thing that we get by considering > arbitrarily small intervals. > This is the same as assuming reals. Real numbers can be defined in terms of intervals marked by rationals http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/DedekindCuts.html > Mathematically, though, a real-values time variable doesn't eliminate > moments, it just makes an infinite number of them between any other > two, with a particular mathematical structure. So the question of what > makes them "stick together" remains. > They come with a topology which is about the only concept of sticking together I can imagine. > Obviously, one reason I think that I am traveling through time is > because I remember the past (but can only guess at the future). But > "remembering the past" is an experience that takes time, spanning many > moments, making this a little tangled. The multiverse complicates > things further: even supposing that only the possible worlds implied > by quantum mechanics exist (that is, no alternative physics, just all > possible quantum states) it is quite possible for me to remember the > future. It's merely improbable. But if all possible alternatives > actually occur, I don't know what probability means. (Even if there > are literally more alternatives down the probable paths, does this > make it more probable that I experience the more probable result? What > would that mean?) > relative frequency, degree of rational belief, measure, propensity, etc. So you may estimate the propensity of throwing snake eyes by throwing many trials (relative frequency) and then base you bets on the results (degree of rational belief). So in the case of QM you can look at the Born rule as defining a measure and then reinterpret it as a degree of rational belief in order to inform your decisions. The problem is that the Born rule seems to still have to be adopted as a separate axiom, thus reintroducing the problem Everett intended to solve. Brent > --Abram > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2008 at 7:21 PM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote: > >> Abram Demski wrote: >> >>> [Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly >>> the first time.] >>> >>> Bruno, everyone, >>> >>> I've decided that it will be more productive/entertaining to post my >>> various concerns as a new topic. >>> >>> What is time? >>> >>> >> Time is what you read on a clock. >> >>> I'm going to ask a bunch of questions; for the sake of brevity, I'm >>> going to skip my arguments (which would mostly be reasons why >>> particular answers don't work). I'll argue once someone replies. >>> >>> If all possible universes exist, does that mean every possible moment, >>> >>> >> What do you mean by "possible"? Do you mean nomologically possible - >> which might be very restrictive but we don't know? Or do you mean >> logically possible - just not instantiating a contradiction "X and >> not-X"? Or something inbetween? >> >> >>> or every possible timeline of moments? If "moments" is the answer, >>> then how are the moments connected? >>> >> If time is a real variable (which QM assumes), moments automatically >> inherit the topology of the reals. >> >> >>> How would it matter, since the >>> moments already are what they are? If "timeline" is the answer, then >>> there is a similar question of how it matters. >>> >>> If there is a physical universe, then is there some sort of basic >>> physical connection behind time? >>> >>> If the universe is mathematical in nature, then what is the >>> mathematical connection between moments? What sort of mathematical >>> connection counts as time? >>> >>> If (as was recently suggested, in connection with relativity) time >>> cannot really be divided into individual moments, then what is it? >>> >>> >> In physics, it's a variable in the equations that determines the causal >> topology. >> >>> Why do we experience time passing? >>> >>> Is it legitimate to think as if the next moment we experience will be >>> chosen randomly in some sense? Does probability or randomness have a >>> role to play in the flow of time? >>> >>> >> Randomness would seem to give a sense to the direction of time. That's >> why physicist who are loathe to give up time-symmetry in their equations >> tend to favor Everett's interpretation of QM. >> >> >>> In connection with UDA: what is the meaning of a first-person >>> probability due to uncertainty of the future? Is there any sense in >>> which such estimates can be more or less accurate if all possible next >>> moments do in fact occur? >>> >>> >> Good question. It's the same as asking how the Born rule arises in >> Everett's interpretation of QM. >> >> Brent >> >> >>> Hope that sparks some thought... >>> >>> -- >>> Abram Demski >>> Public address: abram-demski@... >>> Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski >>> Private address: abramdemski@... >>> >>> >>> >> > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by Abram Demski
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Brent, It sounds like you are saying that probability is useful because it allows us to predict things-- we convert (past) relative frequencies to (future) subjective beliefs. This cannot be denied. But I don't feel like it answers very much... to understand what t means to "predict", I need to understand time already, which is what is being questioned here... What does it mean for a prediction to be more or less reasonable, if all possible futures in fact occur? How does it help me to take the past experimental frequencies, if I know (or at least believe) that all alternatives will take place? >> Mathematically, though, a real-values time variable doesn't eliminate >> moments, it just makes an infinite number of them between any other >> two, with a particular mathematical structure. So the question of what >> makes them "stick together" remains. >> > They come with a topology which is about the only concept of sticking > together I can imagine. So anything with a topology counts as time?? That doesn't sound right. Or are you saying it is necessary, rather then sufficient? --Abram On Sat, Dec 20, 2008 at 12:54 AM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote: > > Abram Demski wrote: >> Brent, >> >> I'm not sure how the comment about real numbers effects my basic >> argument. One interesting objection I got from someone not on this >> list was that time isn't composed of moments at all, only intervals-- >> a "moment" is an imaginary thing that we get by considering >> arbitrarily small intervals. >> > This is the same as assuming reals. Real numbers can be defined in > terms of intervals marked by rationals > > http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/DedekindCuts.html > >> Mathematically, though, a real-values time variable doesn't eliminate >> moments, it just makes an infinite number of them between any other >> two, with a particular mathematical structure. So the question of what >> makes them "stick together" remains. >> > They come with a topology which is about the only concept of sticking > together I can imagine. > > >> Obviously, one reason I think that I am traveling through time is >> because I remember the past (but can only guess at the future). But >> "remembering the past" is an experience that takes time, spanning many >> moments, making this a little tangled. The multiverse complicates >> things further: even supposing that only the possible worlds implied >> by quantum mechanics exist (that is, no alternative physics, just all >> possible quantum states) it is quite possible for me to remember the >> future. It's merely improbable. But if all possible alternatives >> actually occur, I don't know what probability means. (Even if there >> are literally more alternatives down the probable paths, does this >> make it more probable that I experience the more probable result? What >> would that mean?) >> > I think probability is useful because it has different interpretations, > relative frequency, degree of rational belief, measure, propensity, > etc. So you may estimate the propensity of throwing snake eyes by > throwing many trials (relative frequency) and then base you bets on the > results (degree of rational belief). So in the case of QM you can look > at the Born rule as defining a measure and then reinterpret it as a > degree of rational belief in order to inform your decisions. The > problem is that the Born rule seems to still have to be adopted as a > separate axiom, thus reintroducing the problem Everett intended to solve. > > Brent >> --Abram >> >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2008 at 7:21 PM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote: >> >>> Abram Demski wrote: >>> >>>> [Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly >>>> the first time.] >>>> >>>> Bruno, everyone, >>>> >>>> I've decided that it will be more productive/entertaining to post my >>>> various concerns as a new topic. >>>> >>>> What is time? >>>> >>>> >>> Time is what you read on a clock. >>> >>>> I'm going to ask a bunch of questions; for the sake of brevity, I'm >>>> going to skip my arguments (which would mostly be reasons why >>>> particular answers don't work). I'll argue once someone replies. >>>> >>>> If all possible universes exist, does that mean every possible moment, >>>> >>>> >>> What do you mean by "possible"? Do you mean nomologically possible - >>> which might be very restrictive but we don't know? Or do you mean >>> logically possible - just not instantiating a contradiction "X and >>> not-X"? Or something inbetween? >>> >>> >>>> or every possible timeline of moments? If "moments" is the answer, >>>> then how are the moments connected? >>>> >>> If time is a real variable (which QM assumes), moments automatically >>> inherit the topology of the reals. >>> >>> >>>> How would it matter, since the >>>> moments already are what they are? If "timeline" is the answer, then >>>> there is a similar question of how it matters. >>>> >>>> If there is a physical universe, then is there some sort of basic >>>> physical connection behind time? >>>> >>>> If the universe is mathematical in nature, then what is the >>>> mathematical connection between moments? What sort of mathematical >>>> connection counts as time? >>>> >>>> If (as was recently suggested, in connection with relativity) time >>>> cannot really be divided into individual moments, then what is it? >>>> >>>> >>> In physics, it's a variable in the equations that determines the causal >>> topology. >>> >>>> Why do we experience time passing? >>>> >>>> Is it legitimate to think as if the next moment we experience will be >>>> chosen randomly in some sense? Does probability or randomness have a >>>> role to play in the flow of time? >>>> >>>> >>> Randomness would seem to give a sense to the direction of time. That's >>> why physicist who are loathe to give up time-symmetry in their equations >>> tend to favor Everett's interpretation of QM. >>> >>> >>>> In connection with UDA: what is the meaning of a first-person >>>> probability due to uncertainty of the future? Is there any sense in >>>> which such estimates can be more or less accurate if all possible next >>>> moments do in fact occur? >>>> >>>> >>> Good question. It's the same as asking how the Born rule arises in >>> Everett's interpretation of QM. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>>> Hope that sparks some thought... >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Abram Demski >>>> Public address: abram-demski@... >>>> Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski >>>> Private address: abramdemski@... >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-demski@... Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdemski@... --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... 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Re: Time
by Brent Meeker-2
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Abram Demski wrote: > Brent, > > It sounds like you are saying that probability is useful because it > allows us to predict things-- we convert (past) relative frequencies > to (future) subjective beliefs. This cannot be denied. But I don't > feel like it answers very much... to understand what t means to > "predict", I need to understand time already, which is what is being > questioned here... What does it mean for a prediction to be more or > less reasonable, if all possible futures in fact occur? How does it > help me to take the past experimental frequencies, if I know (or at > least believe) that all alternatives will take place? > > >>> Mathematically, though, a real-values time variable doesn't eliminate >>> moments, it just makes an infinite number of them between any other >>> two, with a particular mathematical structure. So the question of what >>> makes them "stick together" remains. >>> >>> >> They come with a topology which is about the only concept of sticking >> together I can imagine. >> > > So anything with a topology counts as time?? That doesn't sound right. > Or are you saying it is necessary, rather then sufficient? > > --Abram > takes real values and so it has the topology of the real line. That topology is continuous so every "moment" has other moments arbitrarily close to it which are well ordered. When I think about this it seems to capture the idea of "sticking together". If I pick any two times there is a dense set of times joining them. Of course time also includes the idea of direction. Most fundamental theories of physics are time symmetric and the "arrow of time" is tied to expansion of the universe by statistics. Bertrand Russell wrote a paper in 1935, which is reprinted in "Logic and Knowledge" 1956 which considers how instants (i.e. moments) are logically constructed from events (which have non-zero durations). He shows that "...the existence of instants requires hypotheses which there is no reason to suppose true..." It's rather technical, but you might find it interesting. I think Russell is right to regard events (intervals) as fundmental and instants as idealized constructs. Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Quantizing GR and some comments (Was Re: Time)
by Bruno Marchal
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Hi Stephen,
Glad to hear from you. On 20 Dec 2008, at 03:46, Stephen Paul King wrote:
You put the horses at the wrong place. First, if we accept the axiom of choice in set theory, I can well-order the reals and the complex numbers. Of course (for the mathematicians) there is no ordering of the complex numbers which *respects* the usual algebraic structures, but I don't see for what reason this would be a problem. And then, if that was a problem, it should be a problem for those who believes in QM and physics, not for someone who takes as only primitive objects the positive integers with their usual unproblematic order. I remind you, that at some point in the reasoning we abandon the belief that QM is a theory. IF QM remains correct, it will have to be a theorem (a bit like the collapse is a theorem in Everett (ok, this can be debated, I try to give an image)). How are we sure that GR needs to be "quantized" at all? We have, with QM, a very good theory covering all notions of "interactions" in terms of their energy, charge, spin, etc; why is it necessary to "quantize" geometry? What is geometry is a derivative quantity and not a primitive? After all, In Bruno's model our observed universe is derived from NUMBERS... Indeed. Now,a physicist can argue that we have to quantized geometry if we want to marry QM and GR. Why? Because if we want an unification of all forces in QM, we have to quantize the force of gravitation. But with GR gravitation is space curvature, so we have to quantize space curvature, and thus geometry. Superstring theory misses this point, imho. Loop gravity does not. Now, as you say, in the comp reasoning, such talk put the horses at the wrong place.
But we don't decide to put such an asymmetry. We derive it from arithmetic and self-reference. It is not a matter of choice.
What difference are you introducing between "primitive arithmetic" and the natural numbers? Is it the difference between Robinson or Peano Arithmetic and Arithmetical Truth? Also, to be precise, I am not proposing a theory or a model. All my point is that if we say "yes" to the doctor, then we have the obligation (if we want solve the mind-body problem) to extract physics from numbers, and indeed from a (relative) measure on computations. The fact that we don't have such measure means that the problem is open and probably difficult. In case we prove such measure doesn't exist, then we will know that comp is false. Hope this helps a bit, Best regards, Bruno --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by Abram Demski
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Brent, That does sound interesting. But even if we construct real numbers in terms of intervals of rational numbers, we would still be taking rational-valued moments as basic... I suppose it would be possible to define things starting with intervals, though. But what properties define an interval of time? With each moment we can associate a definite physical state. With an interval, we could associate an average... this average could be taken as basic, constraining sub-intervals so that their averages (weighted by length) must equal the total. But that seems quite strange... of course it is not the only possible way of defining things. --Abram On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 12:24 AM, Brent Meeker <meekerdb@...> wrote: > > Abram Demski wrote: >> Brent, >> >> It sounds like you are saying that probability is useful because it >> allows us to predict things-- we convert (past) relative frequencies >> to (future) subjective beliefs. This cannot be denied. But I don't >> feel like it answers very much... to understand what t means to >> "predict", I need to understand time already, which is what is being >> questioned here... What does it mean for a prediction to be more or >> less reasonable, if all possible futures in fact occur? How does it >> help me to take the past experimental frequencies, if I know (or at >> least believe) that all alternatives will take place? >> >> >>>> Mathematically, though, a real-values time variable doesn't eliminate >>>> moments, it just makes an infinite number of them between any other >>>> two, with a particular mathematical structure. So the question of what >>>> makes them "stick together" remains. >>>> >>>> >>> They come with a topology which is about the only concept of sticking >>> together I can imagine. >>> >> >> So anything with a topology counts as time?? That doesn't sound right. >> Or are you saying it is necessary, rather then sufficient? >> >> --Abram >> > No, I'm saying that the time that appears in physics is a variable that > takes real values and so it has the topology of the real line. That > topology is continuous so every "moment" has other moments arbitrarily > close to it which are well ordered. When I think about this it seems to > capture the idea of "sticking together". If I pick any two times there > is a dense set of times joining them. Of course time also includes the > idea of direction. Most fundamental theories of physics are time > symmetric and the "arrow of time" is tied to expansion of the universe > by statistics. > > Bertrand Russell wrote a paper in 1935, which is reprinted in "Logic and > Knowledge" 1956 which considers how instants (i.e. moments) are > logically constructed from events (which have non-zero durations). He > shows that "...the existence of instants requires hypotheses which there > is no reason to suppose true..." It's rather technical, but you might > find it interesting. I think Russell is right to regard events > (intervals) as fundmental and instants as idealized constructs. > > Brent > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-demski@... Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdemski@... --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
by Bruno Marchal
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Hi Abram, Him Kim, Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so you or Abram, or anyone else can answer. Abram, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy, and the definition of (relatively) normal machine. On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote: > > Bruno, > > From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived? From the assumption that when I do an experience or an experiment, I will observe a result. And from the hope I will be able to interpret that result in my or our favorite current theory from which I can *deduce* the probability laws. This is akin to a self-consistency assumption. > It > seems that a coherent theory of the probability of future events is > needed (otherwise the passing of time could be white noise), but I do > not see where such probabilities could come out of more basic > assumptions. UDA is a non constructive proof that in the MEC theory, we have to derive the probabilities from the discourse of the "normal machine", which I will define below (anticipating on the KIM 2 thread). AUDA is a path toward a constructive derivation of the probability laws. The basic idea is simple: let us ask the question directly to the universal machine. In QM, without collapse, Everett (+ Gleason theorem) has convinced me that 1. There is no probabilities in the theory. 2. Quantum and classical probabilities are justified in the "normal" self-observing machines by the SWE only. But there is a "hic". A "little" problem. That derivation assumes MEC (or weakenings). And MEC forces the probabilities to be derived from all type of computations, no way to chose a particular universal machine at the start, any must do. This is really what UDA shows. The good news is that such an extraction can then justify both the quanta and the qualia. Quanta are (should be here) particular case of (sharable) qualia. > To reason about the future, we assume that we are in a > randomly chosen computation-- Right now I don't feel like being on a randomly chosen computation. "I" "belong(s)" on all computations which have reached my actual state(s) (singular for the 1-state, and plural for the 3-states, or the 1-plural states, see below). My next state will be chosen partially randomly among many consistent continuations. > but then we are already using some > probability distribution. At some level it is the Gaussian distribution. See the definition of the "normal machine" below. > > > Evolution is at the root of our ability to predict probabilistically. > We use one probability distribution over another because it helps us > survive. However, this is not good enough of an answer in the > multiverse: every possible form survives anyway. Once you bet on everything you have to accept also, among many realities, those who does not "survive", the cul-de-sac. At the level of reasoning in comp this is equivalent with a "self- consistency" assumption, which is implicit in teleportation experiment. The multiverse idea is not so different from the Darwinian idea of "all the species", of course restricted to the relatively consistent one. Relatively to what? Relatively to their most probable histories/ computation. Below, to define the notion of "normal machine", I will construct a case where in a sense "every possible form survives". despite this fact, the probabilities will emerge clearly once we distinguish the third person discourses from the first person discourses. > To keep talking about > evolution, we would need to talk about which forms are more common in > the multiverse. But to count how common forms are, we would need some > measure over the multiverse, which could give us a probability > distribution in the first place. So every possible argument seems > circular. I don't think so. See below. > > > So, I don't need all the details of your derivation of a probability > (though I'm interested); but what assumptions can you get a > probability distribution from? From the assumption of mechanism. Digital mechanism. The assumption that you survive with a relative probability 1 in case of scanning, annihilation and reconstitution done at some level. Then you are duplicable. I can "cut" you and "paste" you in two identical rooms, except that I have put a "one" in a closed box in one room, and I have put a "zero" in a similar and similarly disposed box, in the other room. Ah! To help for some probable cutting the air argument, I put a cup of delicious coffee near the boxes in the two rooms. All right? (If you don't mind I will of course assume you really want a cup of coffee, at the moment of the experience). Now the third person discourses is the content of a diary (or the memory) of an observer which, typically does not enter the teleportation boxes. The first person discourse(s) is (are) any content of the diary (diaries) of those who does enter the teleportation boxes, and get out of reconstitution boxes. Note that first and third person can develop discourses about third and first person discourses. Here is the protocol of the experiment, which is told to you in advance. You will be scanned, annihilated and reconstituted simultaneously in the two rooms. And I am asking you now some question: Assuming MEC (that is "probability 1" in case of simple teleportation). What is the probability that you will survive this duplication experiment/experience(s) ? What is the probability that you will drink a cup of coffee in that experiment/experience(s) ? What is the probability that you will drink a cup of coffee and think "OK I have survived, that coffee is good, I don't know what number belongs to that box, obviously it cannot be both one and zero!" What is the probability that you will write in your diary "1) I have survived, 2) the coffee is good, 3) the number in the box is zero. I don't want to give a definition of what is a normal machine, just that you feel the point. Let me give you another illustration which exploits the freedom of thought a bit more. Indeed, let me duplicate you, or better, polyplicate you into 2^(16180*10000)*(60*90)*24. I explain. I multiply you by 2^(16180*10000) in front of a (16180*10000) pixels screen, with each possible images (black and white) on it. And I reiterate every 1/24 of a second that multiplication, and this during 90 minutes, that is 90*60 seconds. What do you predict you will feel, as personal, subjective, first person experience. What do you think is more probable, among: I will feel seeing a white screen I will feel seeing a black screen I will feel seeing a movie I will feel seeing a good movie I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" with the subtitle of Caligula I will feel seeing a random-noise-movie (what you see on TV when there is no emission). Of course there is a sense to say: I will see all possible movies, but this means you are talking about yourself at the third person point of view, and here what is asked, is what do you expect to experience or live in your future if you are invited to practice it. By MEC, you survive, and any of your first person experience is unique, on which of the above you would bet? What bet will you do if I tell you that I will accompany you in the multiplication. And send you to hell if your bet is wrong. What bet you will do if you want to optimize the chance of not going to hell? The rest of the UDA reasoning shows that "this" thought experience happens all the time in arithmetic, but the "probabilities", which eventually could be credibilities or other uncertainty measure, are constrained by computer science/number theory. It extends the notion of normality from the protocol above to the whole Universal Deployment (which I will (re)define in KIM 3). Exercise: define the notion of "normal first person experience" for machine in the protocol above. With the UD protocol, things are so much complex that I will interview the Universal Machine directly to provide hints ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: Time
by John M-5
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Brent, 1. are you sure about our conceptualization to fit 'nature(?)'s'? we are impeded by our figments to explain the world(?) as we CAN, material means, physical world, excuse me: Bruno:) numbers, while all we see (and less we understand of it) is a little segment - one primitive universe among the innumerable others (we cannot even 'see' them) in the interpretation of our individual (personalized) mindset, our personal mini-solipsism (Colin) controlled by the tissue-tool (brain) we use. 2. According to 1.: are you sure that in the unrestricted World the 'time' concept is as we can imagine it? Sequence and consequence are human observations HERE. We cannot include the totality into our thinking, not as a background and not as an interefficient relation of them all. So our conclusions are partial and forcible. 3. R. Bertrand was in 1935 obsolete as compared to the views of 'this list' (or: the cognitive inventory accumulated up to date in our epistemic enrichment). His words have to be updated to the present thinking. (More so the ancient savants!). I don't argue with his statements, just mention 'caution'!. 4. I think what Abram said should reflect our dichotomy of 'continuum' vs. the quantized 'discontinua' - no matter in what scale one thinks. Dense?... The only way we can imagine a change in a discontunuum (WE!!!) is to take two arbitrary points and compare the qualia. No explanation (so far) where and how they became different if you do not abide by a fixed scale. I think topology is in this respect underdeveloped (although I don't know topology). And so may be dimensions - thought of as diversely identified, yet possibly with continuous transition from one (named) to the other (named). If the 'existence' is continuous (and we have no sign indeed to the opposite) then we are in deep trouble. John Mikes ----- Original Message ----- From: "Brent Meeker" <meekerdb@...> To: <everything-list@...> Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 12:24 AM Subject: Re: Time > > Abram Demski wrote: >> Brent, ...... No, I'm saying that the time that appears in physics is a variable that takes real values and so it has the topology of the real line. That topology is continuous so every "moment" has other moments arbitrarily close to it which are well ordered. When I think about this it seems to capture the idea of "sticking together". If I pick any two times there is a dense set of times joining them. Of course time also includes the idea of direction. Most fundamental theories of physics are time symmetric and the "arrow of time" is tied to expansion of the universe by statistics. Bertrand Russell wrote a paper in 1935, which is reprinted in "Logic and Knowledge" 1956 which considers how instants (i.e. moments) are logically constructed from events (which have non-zero durations). He shows that "...the existence of instants requires hypotheses which there is no reason to suppose true..." It's rather technical, but you might find it interesting. I think Russell is right to regard events (intervals) as fundamental and instants as idealized constructs. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
by Abram Demski
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Bruno, Interesting thought experiment. My initial reaction (from my "time skeptic" position): --Since my consciousness is relative to a single moment, I can't talk about that same consciousness being carried over to the next moment: the consciousness in the next moment is a different consciousness that remembers the previous one. To suppose otherwise is to invent an imaginary entity that is carried along through time, which effects the world (to the extent that my consciousness alters the world) but does not itself change. --To then ask which copy of me I will have the experience of is to ask which location that imaginary entity will be carried to; in other words, it is a meaningless question. --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the number of my copies that will be so carried. I can and should take this into account; for example, if I am OK with only a few copies surviving so long as those copies get to see the original Dracula movie, then I could "bet" that I will see the original Dracula movie. --This perspective does not prevent me from entering the teleporter or saying yes to the doctor, because I already believe that "I" am a different consciousness each moment. In fairness, the time skeptic cannot really give so complete an answer, since the time skeptic doesn't quite know what it means to make decisions, particularly decisions that choose between potential futures... but let us say that the time skeptic is for now "playing along" with the experiment. Oh, and just to be clear... the time skeptic is asserting that the above solution is the only possible solution, not merely that it is a working one. :) --Abram On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 1:44 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote: > > Hi Abram, Him Kim, > > Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you > can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell > me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so > you or Abram, or anyone else can answer. > > Abram, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA > reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy, > and the definition of (relatively) normal machine. > > > > > On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote: > >> >> Bruno, >> >> From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived? > > > From the assumption that when I do an experience or an experiment, I > will observe a result. > > And from the hope I will be able to interpret that result in my or our > favorite current theory from which I can *deduce* the probability laws. > > This is akin to a self-consistency assumption. > > > > > >> It >> seems that a coherent theory of the probability of future events is >> needed (otherwise the passing of time could be white noise), but I do >> not see where such probabilities could come out of more basic >> assumptions. > > UDA is a non constructive proof that in the MEC theory, we have to > derive the probabilities from the discourse of the "normal machine", > which I will define below (anticipating on the KIM 2 thread). > > AUDA is a path toward a constructive derivation of the probability > laws. The basic idea is simple: let us ask the question directly to > the universal machine. > > In QM, without collapse, Everett (+ Gleason theorem) has convinced me > that > 1. There is no probabilities in the theory. > 2. Quantum and classical probabilities are justified in the "normal" > self-observing machines by the SWE only. > > > But there is a "hic". A "little" problem. > > That derivation assumes MEC (or weakenings). And MEC forces the > probabilities to be derived from all type of computations, no way to > chose a particular universal machine at the start, any must do. This > is really what UDA shows. The good news is that such an extraction can > then justify both the quanta and the qualia. Quanta are (should be > here) particular case of (sharable) qualia. > > > > >> To reason about the future, we assume that we are in a >> randomly chosen computation-- > > > Right now I don't feel like being on a randomly chosen computation. > "I" "belong(s)" on all computations which have reached my actual > state(s) (singular for the 1-state, and plural for the 3-states, or > the 1-plural states, see below). > My next state will be chosen partially randomly among many consistent > continuations. > > > >> but then we are already using some >> probability distribution. > > > At some level it is the Gaussian distribution. See the definition of > the "normal machine" below. > > > >> >> >> Evolution is at the root of our ability to predict probabilistically. >> We use one probability distribution over another because it helps us >> survive. However, this is not good enough of an answer in the >> multiverse: every possible form survives anyway. > > Once you bet on everything you have to accept also, among many > realities, those who does not "survive", the cul-de-sac. > At the level of reasoning in comp this is equivalent with a "self- > consistency" assumption, which is implicit in teleportation experiment. > The multiverse idea is not so different from the Darwinian idea of > "all the species", of course restricted to the relatively consistent > one. > Relatively to what? Relatively to their most probable histories/ > computation. > > Below, to define the notion of "normal machine", I will construct a > case where in a sense "every possible form survives". despite this > fact, the probabilities will emerge clearly once we distinguish the > third person discourses from the first person discourses. > > > > > >> To keep talking about >> evolution, we would need to talk about which forms are more common in >> the multiverse. But to count how common forms are, we would need some >> measure over the multiverse, which could give us a probability >> distribution in the first place. So every possible argument seems >> circular. > > I don't think so. See below. > >> >> >> So, I don't need all the details of your derivation of a probability >> (though I'm interested); but what assumptions can you get a >> probability distribution from? > > > From the assumption of mechanism. Digital mechanism. The assumption > that you survive with a relative probability 1 in case of scanning, > annihilation and reconstitution done at some level. > > Then you are duplicable. I can "cut" you and "paste" you in two > identical rooms, except that I have put a "one" in a closed box in one > room, and I have put a "zero" in a similar and similarly disposed box, > in the other room. Ah! To help for some probable cutting the air > argument, I put a cup of delicious coffee near the boxes in the two > rooms. All right? > > (If you don't mind I will of course assume you really want a cup of > coffee, at the moment of the experience). > > Now the third person discourses is the content of a diary (or the > memory) of an observer which, typically does not enter the > teleportation boxes. The first person discourse(s) is (are) any > content of the diary (diaries) of those who does enter the > teleportation boxes, and get out of reconstitution boxes. Note that > first and third person can develop discourses about third and first > person discourses. > > Here is the protocol of the experiment, which is told to you in > advance. You will be scanned, annihilated and reconstituted > simultaneously in the two rooms. And I am asking you now some question: > > Assuming MEC (that is "probability 1" in case of simple teleportation). > > What is the probability that you will survive this duplication > experiment/experience(s) ? > What is the probability that you will drink a cup of coffee in that > experiment/experience(s) ? > What is the probability that you will drink a cup of coffee and think > "OK I have survived, that coffee is good, I don't know what number > belongs to that box, obviously it cannot be both one and zero!" > What is the probability that you will write in your diary "1) I have > survived, 2) the coffee is good, 3) the number in the box is zero. > > I don't want to give a definition of what is a normal machine, just > that you feel the point. > > Let me give you another illustration which exploits the freedom of > thought a bit more. Indeed, let me duplicate you, or better, > polyplicate you into 2^(16180*10000)*(60*90)*24. > > I explain. I multiply you by 2^(16180*10000) in front of a > (16180*10000) pixels screen, with each possible images (black and > white) on it. > And I reiterate every 1/24 of a second that multiplication, and this > during 90 minutes, that is 90*60 seconds. > > What do you predict you will feel, as personal, subjective, first > person experience. What do you think is more probable, among: > > I will feel seeing a white screen > I will feel seeing a black screen > I will feel seeing a movie > I will feel seeing a good movie > I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" > I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" with the subtitle of Caligula > I will feel seeing a random-noise-movie (what you see on TV when there > is no emission). > > Of course there is a sense to say: I will see all possible movies, but > this means you are talking about yourself at the third person point of > view, and here what is asked, is what do you expect to experience or > live in your future if you are invited to practice it. By MEC, you > survive, and any of your first person experience is unique, on which > of the above you would bet? What bet will you do if I tell you that I > will accompany you in the multiplication. And send you to hell if your > bet is wrong. What bet you will do if you want to optimize the chance > of not going to hell? > > The rest of the UDA reasoning shows that "this" thought experience > happens all the time in arithmetic, but the "probabilities", which > eventually could be credibilities or other uncertainty measure, are > constrained by computer science/number theory. It extends the notion > of normality from the protocol above to the whole Universal Deployment > (which I will (re)define in KIM 3). > > Exercise: define the notion of "normal first person experience" for > machine in the protocol above. With the UD protocol, things are so > much complex that I will interview the Universal Machine directly to > provide hints ... > > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-demski@... Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdemski@... --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
by Bruno Marchal
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Hi Abram, > Interesting thought experiment. My initial reaction (from my "time > skeptic" position): > > --Since my consciousness is relative to a single moment, I take this as a motivation for doing MGA before UDA(1...7), because this does not make sense for me. Consciousness is better attached to a computation or computational history as see from a *point* (or "interval") of view. > I can't talk > about that same consciousness being carried over to the next moment: > the consciousness in the next moment is a different consciousness that > remembers the previous one. I would say that it is the consciousness itself which is invariant, it is the *content* of that consciousness which vary. So the person itself remains the same person but with enriched experiences, more or less defined by the many content of its accessible consciousness (under the form of memories, hope, wishes, ... > To suppose otherwise is to invent an > imaginary entity that is carried along through time, which effects the > world (to the extent that my consciousness alters the world) but does > not itself change. Its life changes, but continuously, or computationally, preserving its personhood. Are you saying that the person is imaginary? Then you will be lead to eliminative materialism. I have no clue why person are imaginary. They are immaterial, but they are no less real than a soccer game, or a nation, or a tree, or whatever stable relatively to an environment. > > --To then ask which copy of me I will have the experience of is to ask > which location that imaginary entity will be carried to; in other > words, it is a meaningless question. I don't see how you will convince any of your polycopies. Some rare will say "I have seen the Space Odyssey movie", much more but still very rare will say "I have seen a good movie"/ Most will say "I have seen white noise". All will accept that the question was retrospectively meaningful. > > --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not > minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the > number of my copies that will be so carried. ? > I can and should take > this into account; for example, if I am OK with only a few copies > surviving so long as those copies get to see the original Dracula > movie, then I could "bet" that I will see the original Dracula movie. I agree. MEC makes choice and decision a suicide with respect to the future we don't want. If I decide to go to Washington, somehow I am killing the "myself" who could have gone to Moscow. Choice is always a form of partial suicide. I am OK with that. It is the base of quantum and comp suicide. > > --This perspective does not prevent me from entering the teleporter or > saying yes to the doctor, because I already believe that "I" am a > different consciousness each moment. You say yes to the doctor because you think you will die anyway. This is not MEC! You could say yes to the doctor who proposes to you an empty brain, then. It is the cheaper one. > > > In fairness, the time skeptic cannot really give so complete an > answer, since the time skeptic doesn't quite know what it means to > make decisions, particularly decisions that choose between potential > futures... Right. And decisions in general concern potential futures I think. > but let us say that the time skeptic is for now "playing > along" with the experiment. It seems to me that the "time skeptic" is a "person skeptic" only. > > > Oh, and just to be clear... the time skeptic is asserting that the > above solution is the only possible solution, not merely that it is a > working one. :) I don't understand. I guess that I miss something here. Bruno > On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 1:44 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> > wrote: >> >> Hi Abram, Him Kim, >> >> Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you >> can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell >> me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so >> you or Abram, or anyone else can answer. >> >> Abram, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA >> reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy, >> and the definition of (relatively) normal machine. >> >> >> >> >> On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote: >> >>> >>> Bruno, >>> >>> From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived? >> >> >> From the assumption that when I do an experience or an experiment, I >> will observe a result. >> >> And from the hope I will be able to interpret that result in my or >> our >> favorite current theory from which I can *deduce* the probability >> laws. >> >> This is akin to a self-consistency assumption. >> >> >> >> >> >>> It >>> seems that a coherent theory of the probability of future events is >>> needed (otherwise the passing of time could be white noise), but I >>> do >>> not see where such probabilities could come out of more basic >>> assumptions. >> >> UDA is a non constructive proof that in the MEC theory, we have to >> derive the probabilities from the discourse of the "normal machine", >> which I will define below (anticipating on the KIM 2 thread). >> >> AUDA is a path toward a constructive derivation of the probability >> laws. The basic idea is simple: let us ask the question directly to >> the universal machine. >> >> In QM, without collapse, Everett (+ Gleason theorem) has convinced >> me >> that >> 1. There is no probabilities in the theory. >> 2. Quantum and classical probabilities are justified in the "normal" >> self-observing machines by the SWE only. >> >> >> But there is a "hic". A "little" problem. >> >> That derivation assumes MEC (or weakenings). And MEC forces the >> probabilities to be derived from all type of computations, no way to >> chose a particular universal machine at the start, any must do. This >> is really what UDA shows. The good news is that such an extraction >> can >> then justify both the quanta and the qualia. Quanta are (should be >> here) particular case of (sharable) qualia. >> >> >> >> >>> To reason about the future, we assume that we are in a >>> randomly chosen computation-- >> >> >> Right now I don't feel like being on a randomly chosen computation. >> "I" "belong(s)" on all computations which have reached my actual >> state(s) (singular for the 1-state, and plural for the 3-states, or >> the 1-plural states, see below). >> My next state will be chosen partially randomly among many consistent >> continuations. >> >> >> >>> but then we are already using some >>> probability distribution. >> >> >> At some level it is the Gaussian distribution. See the definition of >> the "normal machine" below. >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> Evolution is at the root of our ability to predict >>> probabilistically. >>> We use one probability distribution over another because it helps us >>> survive. However, this is not good enough of an answer in the >>> multiverse: every possible form survives anyway. >> >> Once you bet on everything you have to accept also, among many >> realities, those who does not "survive", the cul-de-sac. >> At the level of reasoning in comp this is equivalent with a "self- >> consistency" assumption, which is implicit in teleportation >> experiment. >> The multiverse idea is not so different from the Darwinian idea of >> "all the species", of course restricted to the relatively consistent >> one. >> Relatively to what? Relatively to their most probable histories/ >> computation. >> >> Below, to define the notion of "normal machine", I will construct a >> case where in a sense "every possible form survives". despite this >> fact, the probabilities will emerge clearly once we distinguish the >> third person discourses from the first person discourses. >> >> >> >> >> >>> To keep talking about >>> evolution, we would need to talk about which forms are more common >>> in >>> the multiverse. But to count how common forms are, we would need >>> some >>> measure over the multiverse, which could give us a probability >>> distribution in the first place. So every possible argument seems >>> circular. >> >> I don't think so. See below. >> >>> >>> >>> So, I don't need all the details of your derivation of a probability >>> (though I'm interested); but what assumptions can you get a >>> probability distribution from? >> >> >> From the assumption of mechanism. Digital mechanism. The assumption >> that you survive with a relative probability 1 in case of scanning, >> annihilation and reconstitution done at some level. >> >> Then you are duplicable. I can "cut" you and "paste" you in two >> identical rooms, except that I have put a "one" in a closed box in >> one >> room, and I have put a "zero" in a similar and similarly disposed >> box, >> in the other room. Ah! To help for some probable cutting the air >> argument, I put a cup of delicious coffee near the boxes in the two >> rooms. All right? >> >> (If you don't mind I will of course assume you really want a cup of >> coffee, at the moment of the experience). >> >> Now the third person discourses is the content of a diary (or the >> memory) of an observer which, typically does not enter the >> teleportation boxes. The first person discourse(s) is (are) any >> content of the diary (diaries) of those who does enter the >> teleportation boxes, and get out of reconstitution boxes. Note that >> first and third person can develop discourses about third and first >> person discourses. >> >> Here is the protocol of the experiment, which is told to you in >> advance. You will be scanned, annihilated and reconstituted >> simultaneously in the two rooms. And I am asking you now some >> question: >> >> Assuming MEC (that is "probability 1" in case of simple >> teleportation). >> >> What is the probability that you will survive this duplication >> experiment/experience(s) ? >> What is the probability that you will drink a cup of coffee in that >> experiment/experience(s) ? >> What is the probability that you will drink a cup of coffee and think >> "OK I have survived, that coffee is good, I don't know what number >> belongs to that box, obviously it cannot be both one and zero!" >> What is the probability that you will write in your diary "1) I have >> survived, 2) the coffee is good, 3) the number in the box is zero. >> >> I don't want to give a definition of what is a normal machine, just >> that you feel the point. >> >> Let me give you another illustration which exploits the freedom of >> thought a bit more. Indeed, let me duplicate you, or better, >> polyplicate you into 2^(16180*10000)*(60*90)*24. >> >> I explain. I multiply you by 2^(16180*10000) in front of a >> (16180*10000) pixels screen, with each possible images (black and >> white) on it. >> And I reiterate every 1/24 of a second that multiplication, and this >> during 90 minutes, that is 90*60 seconds. >> >> What do you predict you will feel, as personal, subjective, first >> person experience. What do you think is more probable, among: >> >> I will feel seeing a white screen >> I will feel seeing a black screen >> I will feel seeing a movie >> I will feel seeing a good movie >> I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" >> I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" with the subtitle of Caligula >> I will feel seeing a random-noise-movie (what you see on TV when >> there >> is no emission). >> >> Of course there is a sense to say: I will see all possible movies, >> but >> this means you are talking about yourself at the third person point >> of >> view, and here what is asked, is what do you expect to experience or >> live in your future if you are invited to practice it. By MEC, you >> survive, and any of your first person experience is unique, on which >> of the above you would bet? What bet will you do if I tell you that I >> will accompany you in the multiplication. And send you to hell if >> your >> bet is wrong. What bet you will do if you want to optimize the chance >> of not going to hell? >> >> The rest of the UDA reasoning shows that "this" thought experience >> happens all the time in arithmetic, but the "probabilities", which >> eventually could be credibilities or other uncertainty measure, are >> constrained by computer science/number theory. It extends the notion >> of normality from the protocol above to the whole Universal >> Deployment >> (which I will (re)define in KIM 3). >> >> Exercise: define the notion of "normal first person experience" for >> machine in the protocol above. With the UD protocol, things are so >> much complex that I will interview the Universal Machine directly to >> provide hints ... >> >> >> Bruno >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >>> >> > > > > -- > Abram Demski > Public address: abram-demski@... > Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski > Private address: abramdemski@... > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
by Bruno Marchal
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I wrote: > Abram wrote >> >> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not >> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the >> number of my copies that will be so carried. > > ? OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your sense) you die. Is this what you mean? And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant. And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor because you care by altruism for the copy. With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not). But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about the satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the future. Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.) concerns our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be it by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity. Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink coffee. I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi-tautology that none *feels* dying at each instant. You have to meditate eight hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of what dying could be, according to some. But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the many others descendant to:) It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you did'nt, you are the copy. Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self- multiplication). (I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic"). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
by Abram Demski
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Bruno, I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction. > Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when > you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink > coffee. Maybe "We love coffee, so we will drink coffee" (with "we" referring to many moment-selves). Or, perhaps, "Abram loves coffee, so Abram will drink coffee" (no identification of a self, only of an identity). > It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this > sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you > did'nt, you are the copy. Since all possible moments exist, that old self did not die. My after-reading consciousness can observe that it is not the before-reading consciousness, and the before-reading consciousness could observe that it is not the after-reading consciousness, but that is all. There is no switching from one to the other, since that would require time (which does not exist). :) Of course, that is where I-as-time-skeptic have trouble knowing what it means to choose. I can understand being-in-a-state-of-choosing, but I refuse to accept the cause/effect reasoning that gos along with that state. (In other words, I can understand choosing from the 3rd person perspective, but cannot understand it from the 1st person perspective.) --Abram On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote: > > > I wrote: > > > >> Abram wrote >>> >>> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not >>> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the >>> number of my copies that will be so carried. >> >> ? > > > OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your > sense) you die. > Is this what you mean? > > And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant. > > And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor > because you care by altruism for the copy. > > With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not). > > But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future > as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about the > satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon > the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the future. > > Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any > statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.) concerns > our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is > not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be it > by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity. > > Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when > you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink > coffee. > > I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none > will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi-tautology > that none *feels* dying at each instant. You have to meditate eight > hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something > (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of > what dying could be, according to some. > > But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the > UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the > many others descendant to:) > > It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this > sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you > did'nt, you are the copy. > > Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the > assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in > teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self- > multiplication). > > (I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic"). > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-demski@... Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdemski@... --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
by Bruno Marchal
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Abram, On 23 Dec 2008, at 00:23, Abram Demski wrote: > I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I > am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction. All right. It is a normal tendency for scientist. It is like wanting to see Platonia from outside. It is like deciding to believe only in the third person description view, abstracting away our experiences and subjectivity. Then the "I", free-will, decisions, and eventually "consciousness" are explained ... away. > > >> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when >> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink >> coffee. > > Maybe "We love coffee, so we will drink coffee" (with "we" referring > to many moment-selves). Does your "we" includes my "we" ? > Or, perhaps, "Abram loves coffee, so Abram > will drink coffee" (no identification of a self, only of an identity). Almost like a regression. To hide the first person data, you have to change the language. You are very coherent (as "time-skeptic"). OK. > > >> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this >> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you >> did'nt, you are the copy. > > Since all possible moments exist, that old self did not die. Again, you talk like if you are seeing the whole platonia. But I think that none of you are an observer-moment. You are inextricably linked to time. You are an observer moment embedded in a set of observer moments with a proximity relation among them. > My > after-reading consciousness can observe that it is not the > before-reading consciousness, and the before-reading consciousness > could observe that it is not the after-reading consciousness, but that > is all. There is no switching from one to the other, since that would > require time (which does not exist). :) Nice. You give me the opportunity to (re)define time: it is the switching from one to the other. The switching can be defined eventually by the relation among numbers which captures the universal computational dependency. Time is a creation of the first person. Look at the occidental Brouwer or the oriental Dogen for analysis of consciousness in term of time creation. > > > Of course, that is where I-as-time-skeptic have trouble knowing what > it means to choose. Not a good thing before Christmas ! > I can understand being-in-a-state-of-choosing, but > I refuse to accept the cause/effect reasoning that gos along with that > state. (In other words, I can understand choosing from the 3rd person > perspective, but cannot understand it from the 1st person > perspective.) No machine can. No bodies can know from inside who the chooser really is. That is perhaps why the meditation on the question "who am I" (cf Ramana Maharshi) can lead to the "enlightenment". That is probably why in the eastern "art of the war", people learns to not-decide, yet act. Bruno > > > --Abram > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> > wrote: >> >> >> I wrote: >> >> >> >>> Abram wrote >>>> >>>> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not >>>> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing >>>> the >>>> number of my copies that will be so carried. >>> >>> ? >> >> >> OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your >> sense) you die. >> Is this what you mean? >> >> And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant. >> >> And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor >> because you care by altruism for the copy. >> >> With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not). >> >> But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future >> as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about >> the >> satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon >> the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the >> future. >> >> Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any >> statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.) >> concerns >> our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is >> not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be >> it >> by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity. >> >> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when >> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink >> coffee. >> >> I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none >> will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi- >> tautology >> that none *feels* dying at each instant. You have to meditate eight >> hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something >> (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of >> what dying could be, according to some. >> >> But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the >> UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the >> many others descendant to:) >> >> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this >> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you >> did'nt, you are the copy. >> >> Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the >> assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in >> teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self- >> multiplication). >> >> (I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic"). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >>> >> > > > > -- > Abram Demski > Public address: abram-demski@... > Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski > Private address: abramdemski@... > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
by Kim Jones-2
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Bruno, things are starting to hang together in my new digital brain (bright yellow) you wrote the plan: ------------------- A) UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) 1) I explain that if you are a machine, you are already immaterial. ------------------- Fine. This thought is merely surprising and somewhat (strangely) satisfying. It doesn't affect the way I live my life, but it sure as hell gets me some funny looks from people when I try to explain it to them! Most people think I am identifying the "self" with the "soul" or the "spirit" or some other metaphysical conjecture that they have heard of from religion or from their grandmother. They simply do not buy it when I tell them that all of reality is like this - that the assumption of a primitive, primary material reality is probably a gross "error of perception" albeit quite an understandable one. People are so hoodwinked by appearances, by their senses. Somehow I still think we are *meant* to be fooled by appearances - although this thought may well be self-contradictory. It's a good thing I find most things quite unconvincing - including appearances and reality generally! I am always asking myself "What is really going on here? Why are things THIS way, in particular? Why not some other way? I have always been like this. Some people find me quite annoying in this regard... --------------------- 2) Mechanism entails the existence of a subjective or first person indeterminacy or uncertainty. --------------------- In the sense that I cannot know who or what I am, BEING who or what I am. Correct? I would necessarily have to step outside my existence to do so - manifestly impossible, given the laws of physics (or simply given MEC/COMP). I would have to reboot from a different system; be a different entity in fact. Paradox Alert: Without a first person perspective there could be no third person perspectives anyway, isn't that correct? Why then doesn't some part of the first person uncertainty (ie "my" uncertainty about "me") translate into 3rd person perspectives? Anything I might say or merely perceive about something or someone else is surely contaminated by my uncertainties...so, in the quest to "know myself" how can I trust the veracity of any knowledge that comes to me from outside? All knowledge comes via brains (wet, messy ones) and all of these brains are suffering the same uncertainties about their identity as I. Note, I am not a solipsist. Also, you cannot experience the experience that I experience and vice versa. Which is why I think art and music in particular are important revelations of the first person perspective. Music is an ATTEMPT to overcome first person indeterminacy by "universalising" certain qualia. Tchaikowsky expects you to BECOME Tchaikowsky when you listen to the first movement of his 6th Symphony. You suffer and agonise and die with him. It's a VR experience. Madonna just doesn't do this for me. However, new research has shown that reading the mind is literally possible. We can now assemble an image seen via an optical system transmitted only via the electrical impulses read in a brain system (NewScientist last ed.) Perhaps it is not too far from here to the thought that you and I might "swap instantiations" for a short time? Maybe it would be fun to think, walk, talk and act like Bruno Marchal, if only for 5 minutes. In fact, I would pay a princely sum to have that experience. In an age when some people will spend gazillions on a "space tourist" (virtual) reality experience, I would go for the "Be Bruno for Five Minutes" option long before I would want to see the globe from orbit.... ------------------------- 3) The Universal Machine, the Universal Dovetailer and the reversal physics/bio-psycho-theo-whatever-logy. -------------------------- OK - so Abram has been impatient on this point but I guess I am ready too: On 23/12/2008, at 8:11 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Abram, > > > On 23 Dec 2008, at 00:23, Abram Demski wrote: > >> I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I >> am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction. > > > All right. It is a normal tendency for scientist. It is like wanting > to see Platonia from outside. I always think of the Sydney Opera House as Platonia. You cannot predict how it looks on the outside if you are teleported into the foyer! Also, the Tardis of Doctor Who has a similar asymmetry between outside and inside view. Are you saying Platonia has no outside? The true inside of all outsides - just like the 1st person perspective, in fact. > It is like deciding to believe only in > the third person description view, abstracting away our experiences > and subjectivity. Then the "I", free-will, decisions, and eventually > "consciousness" are explained ... away. Yes - and then, to make matters worse, we turn the whole morass of uncertainty over to the religionists who reify a metaphysical abstraction which just confounds the whole thing further. Kim --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@... To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@... For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~--- |
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