UDA Step 7

[Günther Greindl]

Dear Bruno,

I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.

(I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
until I understand step 7 ;-)

The things I am unclear about are:
1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state ->
what are these?

2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you
define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no
contradiction; or differently?)-

3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in
modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational histories?

Cheers,
Günther

--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.greindl@...
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Günther,


Le 25-mars-08, à 13:35, Günther Greindl a écrit :

>
> Dear Bruno,
>
> I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
> paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.
>
> (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
> until I understand step 7 ;-)


Nice. Step eight is the more difficult, but for some people---those who  
have never start to believe in a *primary* physical universal--- it can  
be considered as redundant.


>
> The things I am unclear about are:
> 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state ->
> what are these?


We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can  
be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state  
is accessed an infinity of times by the Universal Dovetailer through an  
infinity of infinite computations. OK? A complete computational history  
is just such an infinite computation. Sometimes I use the word  
"history" to refer to the internal view of some machine whose current  
state has been accessed by the UD. In that case some similarity  
equivalence class is in play. To get the math of those similarity  
classes I proceed in interviewing such machines.



>
> 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you
> define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no
> contradiction; or differently?)-

Just "no contradiction". Now a computation is not per se a theory, so  
the notion of contradiction is not directly applicable. That is why I  
identify a computation with a proof of a Sigma_1 sentence of  
(elementary, Robinsonian) arithmetic. Of course this leads to the white  
rabbit issue, a lot of statement are relatively consistent and false at  
the same time, like the "self-inconsistency statement" (by Godel's  
second theorem the proposition "I am inconsistent" is consistent (when  
asserted by a Robinsonian machine or a Lobian machine).
I recall that a Robinsonian machine is a machine having Turing  
Universal abilities, but without the introspective power to acknowledge  
that. On the contrary Lobian machine are universal and know that they  
are universal.

>
> 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in
> modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational  
> histories?

Thanks for the references out of line. I will read those papers once I  
have the time. At first sight it looks like the cosmologists begin to  
be aware of a (third person) white rabbit problem. It will still take  
time before they realize the first person white rabbit problem. The  
reason is that they have no formation on the "mind-body" problem I  
think.

I hope this can help you a bit.

I take the liberty to put online the references you gave me because I  
think it is of general interest:

http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0611043 (Andrei Linde)
or
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0610079 (Don Page)

The New York Times had a piece about this stuff in January:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/science/15brain.html?
_r=1&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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[Jason Resch-2]

To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
mind?  I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
experience.  Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is
experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication
and accessibility.  If you take a normal brain and cut the link
between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not
the same mind only limited in transfer of information?  What if we
grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could
share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via
communication.  Since all particles in this universe are interacting,
the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe,
or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time.  If
this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a
maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be
perceived.

Jason

On Mar 25, 7:35 am, Günther Greindl <guenther.grei...@...>
wrote:

> Dear Bruno,
>
> I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
> paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.
>
> (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
> until I understand step 7 ;-)
>
> The things I am unclear about are:
> 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state ->
> what are these?
>
> 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you
> define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no
> contradiction; or differently?)-
>
> 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in
> modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational histories?
>
> Cheers,
> Günther
>
> --
> Günther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> guenther.grei...@...://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
>
> Blog:http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
> Site:http://www.complexitystudies.org

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[Michael Rosefield-2]

Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience. This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting (two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity). If we say this is a strict equality then we dilute the meaning of consciousness beyond usefulness. Conscious-space being a subset of computational-space seems more reasonable.

On 28/03/2008, Jason <jasonresch@...> wrote:

To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
mind?  I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
experience.  Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is
experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication
and accessibility.  If you take a normal brain and cut the link
between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not
the same mind only limited in transfer of information?  What if we
grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could
share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via
communication.  Since all particles in this universe are interacting,
the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe,
or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time.  If
this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a
maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be
perceived.

Jason

On Mar 25, 7:35 am, Günther Greindl <guenther.grei...@...>
wrote:

> Dear Bruno,
>
> I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
> paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.
>
> (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
> until I understand step 7 ;-)
>
> The things I am unclear about are:
> 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state ->
> what are these?
>
> 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you
> define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no
> contradiction; or differently?)-
>
> 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in
> modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational histories?
>
> Cheers,
> Günther
>
> --
> Günther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna

> guenther.grei...@...://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

>
> Blog:http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
> Site:http://www.complexitystudies.org

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[russell standish-2]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 05:07:30PM -0700, Jason wrote:

>
> To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
> with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
> would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
> mind?  I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
> experience.  Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is
> experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication
> and accessibility.  If you take a normal brain and cut the link
> between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not
> the same mind only limited in transfer of information?  What if we
> grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could
> share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via
> communication.  Since all particles in this universe are interacting,
> the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe,
> or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time.  If
> this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a
> maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be
> perceived.
>
> Jason

The situation is surely more subtle. To recognise a physical process
as a computation requires an observer to interpret it as such. One of
the key features of conscious is the ability to recognise a certain
process as self, so that (assuming comp) we can objectively say that
some processes are conscious, because they recognise themselves as
computations. Otherwise computation is just in the eye of the
beholder, and so would consciousness be, which is absurd.

I think it unlikely that the entire universe is conscious.

--

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[Jason Resch-2]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Michael Rosefield
<rosyatrandom@...> wrote:
> Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is
> pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience.
> This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting
> (two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity). If
> we say this is a strict equality then we dilute the meaning of consciousness
> beyond usefulness. Conscious-space being a subset of computational-space
> seems more reasonable.
>
>

I think in a certain sense two people holding hands and talking could
be considered one mind.  The differentiation between minds is
certainly not black and white.  Let's call the talking pair A and B.
The activity of A's neurons affect the conscious experience of A, do
you agree?  If we stimulate a certain neuron in A's brain we might
cause A to recall a memory, or see a hallucination.  Neuron
stimulation can directly effect the mind of A.  Does not B through
touch, speech, and visual cues effect the neural activity of A's
brain?  Consider that if a certain neuron in B's brain fires, it could
cause a signal to be sent down the nerve sells to the muscles that
control B's hand, causing B to squeeze A's hand.  This results in the
continued propagation of the nerve signal up A's arm into A's brain.
I think what we typically consider to be independent minds are
actually  _mostly_ closed loops of neural activity with a very high
degree of internal data transfer.  Our minds are only partially
isolated, however.  There are lower throughput channels of information
transfer that can link the state of two minds.  My brain, by sending
nerve inputs through my fingers and typing messages into my computer
is injecting thoughts into your brain as you read this.  Internal
communication with in a brain may be many Terabits per second, but the
computations that implement a brain in a universe like this cannot be
considered in isolation.  An analogy might be a grid computing system
where powerful computers are connected via slow 14.4 Kbps modems.  One
computer can send a computational task to another, data transfer is
slow and difficult, and to predict the future state of the system, all
computers must be considered part of a larger computational process.
Our brains themselves are much like this model, data is processed in
one area, and the result is sent to other parts, yet we consider a
brain to be a single mind.  As Bruno often states, a mind is a
computational history, but if we follow that history backwards in time
it inevitably passes through and includes computations done by other
minds.

My point is that boundaries of where one mind might end and another
begins is fuzzy, and perhaps the only consistent way to define a
computational history of a mind is to consider all the computations
until we reach some point isolation.

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[Jason Resch-2]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Russell Standish <lists@...> wrote:

>
>  The situation is surely more subtle. To recognise a physical process
>  as a computation requires an observer to interpret it as such. One of
>  the key features of conscious is the ability to recognise a certain
>  process as self, so that (assuming comp) we can objectively say that
>  some processes are conscious, because they recognise themselves as
>  computations. Otherwise computation is just in the eye of the
>  beholder, and so would consciousness be, which is absurd.
>
>  I think it unlikely that the entire universe is conscious.
>

I think we agree in some sense with the self-interpretation.  Let me
explain what I believe for the given thought experiment proposed by
John Serle.

From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle#Artificial_intelligence

"Since then, Searle has come up with another argument against strong
AI. Strong AI proponents claim that anything that carries out the same
informational processes as a human is also conscious. Thus, if we
wrote a computer program that was conscious, we could run that
computer program on, say, a system of ping-pong balls and beer cups
and the system would be equally conscious, because it was running the
same information processes.

Searle argues that this is impossible, since consciousness is a
physical property, like digestion or fire. No matter how good a
simulation of digestion you build on the computer, it will not digest
anything; no matter how well you simulate fire, nothing will get
burnt. By contrast, informational processes are observer-relative:
observers pick out certain patterns in the world and consider them
information processes, but information processes are not
things-in-the-world themselves. Since they do not exist at a physical
level, Searle argues, they cannot have causal efficacy and thus cannot
cause consciousness. There is no physical law, Searle insists, that
can see the equivalence between a personal computer, a series of
ping-pong balls and beer cans, and a pipe-and-water system all
implementing the same program."

I am in complete disagreement with Searle's assertion that
consciousness is a physical property.  I further disagree with his
assertion that a computer based on pipes and water or ping pong balls
could not be conscious.  I think you would agree, saying that
observers within those computed realities can interpret the
computations that create their realities.  When something is burned in
a simulation, the heat of the fire and smell of the smoke can be felt
by observers within that simulated reality.  Where you and I might
diverge in opinion is that I think something still burns in a
simulated reality even if there are no observers within that reality
to sense it.  It's the basic "If a tree falls in the woods.." idea.  I
would say the simulation of the tree falling doesn't make a sound
without an observer in the simulation to hear it, but I would say a
tree still falls, in that simulation even without there being an
interpreter at that level of simulation.  I am interested to know your
opinion on this and how if at all it differs from mine.

Regards,

Jason

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[russell standish-2]

On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 12:56:48AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> I am in complete disagreement with Searle's assertion that
> consciousness is a physical property.

I'm with you on this one. Searle's suggestion sound bizarre to me,
without further evidence to back it up.

  Where you and I might
> diverge in opinion is that I think something still burns in a
> simulated reality even if there are no observers within that reality
> to sense it.  It's the basic "If a tree falls in the woods.." idea.  I
> would say the simulation of the tree falling doesn't make a sound
> without an observer in the simulation to hear it, but I would say a
> tree still falls, in that simulation even without there being an
> interpreter at that level of simulation.  I am interested to know your
> opinion on this and how if at all it differs from mine.
>

Whilst I probably do differ from you on this, I also think it is a
question without merit, similar to debating the number of angels on
the head of pin.

> Regards,
>
> Jason
>
>
--

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[mjgeddes]

Hi guys,

Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
COMP.

I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics.  Nevertheless,
the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different
domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and
*abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other.  My
misunderstanding was based on the fact that I couldn't (and still
don't fully) see how they could be the same.  But yes, I'm now
convinced of COMP.

The relationship is subtle, but I'm now think that the *Mathematical*
domain is primary (most general), the *Teleological* domain is less
general, and the *Physical* domain is least general.

So Math is the bedrock, which supercedes Teleology, which in turn
supercedes Physics.

---

As regards the Consciousness discussion, there are three things you
need to remember about it;

(1) It's not a thing, it's a process
(2) It's not just a *physical* process, it's also a *mathematical*
process
(3) It's not just what the process *does* (it's function), it's what
the process *signifies*

I think if you just bear in mind these 3 simple points about
consciousness, you won't go far wrong.

After about 6 years of ganashing my teeth and nearly going insane
thinking about these issues, I have now reached my own tentative (in
principle) answers on most of the big questions, to my own
satisfaction.

---

I don't think *any* of the current scientific or philosophical
persepctives on consciousness are quite right.

Consciousness *is* physical, but it's not *just* physical, it also
extends into the mathematical domain.  So I think that none of the
materialist or dualist positions are correct.  I was fooled by
*functionalism* for a while, but I don't think that's quite right
either.  See point (3) above - it's true that consciousness is a
process, just as the functionalists say. but it's not what the process
*does* (functionalism) that is identical to consciousness, but what
the process *signifies* - consciousness is a *logical representation*
of the meaning of a concept - it is a *language* for representing
concepts - this is NOT the same thing as functionalism.

Cheers all


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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Jason,

Le 28-mars-08, à 01:07, Jason a écrit :

> To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
> with mind states as COMP assumes,


This could be a misleading way to present the thing, especially in
front of a physicalist which most of the time tends to equate a
computational state with a physical state. With comp, by subjective
indeterminacy, we can *associate* a mind state to some computational
state, but the reverse is not correct, the relation is not one-one, we
have to associate an infinity of computational states to a mind state.
For example your current mind state does not depend on the exact
position of some electron in your brain, and more generally your mind
state is associated with all possible relative incarnation/history of
your computational state.




> and if this universe is computable,

Hmmm... I try to insist that, well ... in a nutshell, that IF I am a
machine, THEN the universe is NOT computable. Neither the physical
universe, nor the mathematical universe. The reason is that IF I am a
machine, THEN what I can observe emerges from an infinity of
computations going through my current state of mind. You are perhaps
confusing Schmidhuberian constructive physics with what I take as being
the consequence of indexical comp (there is a level such that *I*
survive a substitution done at that level, and this whatever my first
person (subjective) "I" believe to have as local incarnated third
person "I" (body)).

> would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
> mind?  I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
> experience.  Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is
> experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication
> and accessibility.  If you take a normal brain and cut the link
> between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not
> the same mind only limited in transfer of information?  What if we
> grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could
> share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via
> communication.  Since all particles in this universe are interacting,
> the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe,
> or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time.  If
> this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a
> maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be
> perceived.

I (or just comp if I am correct) agree(s) more with Plotinus ineffable
ONE that with a personalized big whole like in some Christian
reinterpretation of Plotinus neoplatonism. But Plotinus is not always
clearcut on that question, and if you make the substitution level
somehow infinitily low, then there could be a sense we are all the same
person and we are ourselves the big whole. I personally doubt this, but
who knows ... It is too early to draw a definitive conclusion from comp
on this point.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Marc,


Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, marc.geddes@... a écrit :

>
> Hi guys,
>
> Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
> COMP.


OK.



>
> I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics.  Nevertheless,
> the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different
> domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and
> *abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other.


Sure. I would add psychology, theology, sociology, etc.




> My
> misunderstanding was based on the fact that I couldn't (and still
> don't fully) see how they could be the same.


They are not. When I want to be very short about the consequence of
comp (through UDA, say), I say that the "physical reality" is the
border of the mathematical reality, as seen from inside mathematics.
But it is more the border of the "lobian ineluctable ignorance".
The difference with Tegmark, here, is that, although the physical
reality can still be a mathematical (but a priori non computable)
object, such object has to be derived from Turing machine's
psychology/theology.
(and then the interview of the lobian machine gives, thanks to the
nuances brought by the incompleteness phenomenon, all the needed
nuances (the arithmetical hypostases).



> But yes, I'm now
> convinced of COMP.


Be careful. Comp needs some act of faith ... (even an infinitely
reiterated act of faith, coffee can help in the morning, tea too ...).



>
> The relationship is subtle, but I'm now think that the *Mathematical*
> domain is primary (most general), the *Teleological* domain is less
> general, and the *Physical* domain is least general.


I agree.

>
> So Math is the bedrock, which supercedes Teleology, which in turn
> supercedes Physics.
>
> ---
>
> As regards the Consciousness discussion, there are three things you
> need to remember about it;
>
> (1) It's not a thing, it's a process

Hmmm... I am not sure it can even be a process. I would say it is a
mind state, but this not saying much. I would say it is the mind state
of someone believing in a reality, like a cat believing in an invisible
(because hidden) mouse.




> (2) It's not just a *physical* process, it's also a *mathematical*
> process
> (3) It's not just what the process *does* (it's function), it's what
> the process *signifies*


Sure.

>
> I think if you just bear in mind these 3 simple points about
> consciousness, you won't go far wrong.
>
> After about 6 years of ganashing my teeth and nearly going insane
> thinking about these issues, I have now reached my own tentative (in
> principle) answers on most of the big questions, to my own
> satisfaction.
>
> ---
>
> I don't think *any* of the current scientific or philosophical
> persepctives on consciousness are quite right.
>
> Consciousness *is* physical, but it's not *just* physical, it also
> extends into the mathematical domain.

It is highly ambiguous to say that consciousness is physical, imo.



> So I think that none of the
> materialist or dualist positions are correct.

OK.


>  I was fooled by
> *functionalism* for a while, but I don't think that's quite right
> either.  See point (3) above - it's true that consciousness is a
> process, just as the functionalists say. but it's not what the process
> *does* (functionalism) that is identical to consciousness, but what
> the process *signifies* - consciousness is a *logical representation*
> of the meaning of a concept - it is a *language* for representing
> concepts - this is NOT the same thing as functionalism.


OK.

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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[mjgeddes]

On Mar 28, 11:08 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> Hi Marc,
>
> Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, marc.ged...@... a écrit :
>
>
>
> > Hi guys,
>
> > Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
> > COMP.
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> > I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics.  Nevertheless,
> > the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different
> > domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and
> > *abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other.
>
> Sure. I would add psychology, theology, sociology, etc.

Well, perform a top-level decomposition of knowledge domains from the
most to the least general, and you can actuallly catch math in the act
of dividing into different knowledge domains.   It's true that any
such classification of reality is a mental construct, but this does
not mean that all classification schemes are equal...some are far more
useful than others and a careful decomposition of knowledge domains
results in a single unified scheme 'dropping out'.... mathematical
categories start to *decompose*, or *crystallize* into the reality we
experience.

Here's the beginning of my proposed decomposition (most abstract
first, moving down through the list you move down through the
knowledge hierarchy - so for example, Category Theory is most general,
it 'eats' Algebra, which in turn 'eats' Discrete Math and so on down
the list)

PLATONIC (MULTIVERSE LEVEL)

Category Theory - Calculus, Analysis, Number Theory, Peano Axioms, ZF-
Set Theory
Algebra-  Field, Group, Ring
Discrete Math - Algorithm, Cellular automation, Church-Turing,
Combinatoraics, Computability, Godel, Lob, Graph Theory, Iteration,
Recurison
 Aesthetics - Beauty, Sublimity
Morality - Ethics, Social Contract, Utilarianism, Consequentalism
Virtue - Archetype, Virtue Ethics
Field Physics - Geometry, Standard Model, Trigonometry, Relativity
Mechanics - Classical Mechanics, Hamiltonian Models, Lagrangian
Mechanics
Digital Physics - Computational Complexity, P=NP, Kolmogorov
Complexity

>>>>

COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL (REALITY AS SEEN BY AN OBSERVER)

Reflective Reasoning - Analogy formation, Prototyping, Consciousness
Probability Theory - Bayes, Inductive Reasoning, Bayesian Networks
Symbolic Logic - Boolean Algebra, First-Order Logic, Predicate Logic,
Modal Logic
Communication - Emotion, Linguistics, Semantics, Semiotics
Decision Theory - Economics, Pareto Efficientcy, Game Theory, Utility
Psychology -  Developmental, Evolutionary, Social
Data Communications - Information Theory, Information Integration,
Global WorkSpace
Thermodynamics - Memory-Prediction Model, Memory, Neural Network,
0th-3rd Laws
Chemistry - Chemical Kinematics

>>>>

OBJECT LEVEL (ARTIFACTS - BY PRODUCTS OF COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL)

Data Modeling / High Level - Ontology, Relational Databases, Semantic
Web, Lisp, Ruby
Software Architectures/ Mid Level  - Design Pattern, Object Oriented,
Java
Operating Systems/Low Level  - Linux, Windows, DOS, C Programming
Language
Sociology - Group, Role
Politics - Democracy, Humanism, Socialism, Libertarianism
Narrative Art - Fantasy, Science Fiction, Computer Games
Virtual Reality - HTML, XML, World Wide Web, Human-Computer
Interaction, GUI
Mechanical Engineering - Computer Engineering, Internet,
Telecommunications, Robotics
Solid State Physics - Chemical Engineering, Nanotechnology, Electrical
Engineering, Circuits

--

Do you see how the original mathematical categories decompose and how
there's a neat knowledge hierarcy emerging?  All of these fields have
in some sense *emerged* purely from *mathematical categories*, and
each fits neatly in its rightful place.

As of 2008, only the people on the everything-list start to see
all ;)

"Here we are.born to be kings.
Were the princes of the universe.
Here we belong.fighting to survive.
In a world with the darkest powers.
And here we are.were the princes of the universe.
Here we belong.fighting for survival.
Weve come to be the rulers of your world.
I am immortal.i have inside me blood of kings.
I have no rival.no man can be my equal.
Take me to the future of your world.
Born to be kings.princes of the universe.
Fighting and free.got your world in my hand.
Im here for your love and Ill make my stand.
We were born to be princes of the universe.
No man could understand.my power is in my own hand.
Ooh.ooh.ooh.ooh.people talk about you.
People say youve had your day.
Im a man that will go far.
Fly the moon and reach for the stars.
With my sword and head held high.
Got to pass the test first time - yeah.
I know that people talk about me I hear it every day.
But I can prove you wrong cos Im right first time.
Yeah.yeah.alright.watch this man fly.
Bring on the girls.
Here we are.born to be kings.were the princes of
The universe.here we belong.born to be kings.
Princes of the universe.fighting and free.
Got the world in my hands.Im here for your love.
And Ill make my stand.
We were born to be princes of the universe."

- Queen, "Princes of the Universe"



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[Günther Greindl]

Dear Bruno,

>> The things I am unclear about are:
>> 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state ->
>> what are these?
> We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can  
> be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state  
> is accessed an infinity of times by the Universal Dovetailer through an  
> infinity of infinite computations. OK? A complete computational history  
> is just such an infinite computation. Sometimes I use the word  
> "history" to refer to the internal view of some machine whose current  
> state has been accessed by the UD. In that case some similarity  
> equivalence class is in play. To get the math of those similarity  
> classes I proceed in interviewing such machines.

Ah OK, I understand. The equivalence class found in the interview - do
you have results already?

>> 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you
>> define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no
>> contradiction; or differently?)-
> Just "no contradiction". Now a computation is not per se a theory, so  
> the notion of contradiction is not directly applicable. That is why I  
> identify a computation with a proof of a Sigma_1 sentence of  
> (elementary, Robinsonian) arithmetic. Of course this leads to the white  
> rabbit issue, a lot of statement are relatively consistent and false at  
> the same time, like the "self-inconsistency statement" (by Godel's  
> second theorem the proposition "I am inconsistent" is consistent (when  
> asserted by a Robinsonian machine or a Lobian machine).
> I recall that a Robinsonian machine is a machine having Turing  
> Universal abilities, but without the introspective power to acknowledge  
> that. On the contrary Lobian machine are universal and know that they  
> are universal.

Ok, this is also clearer now. What my problem is that these restrictions
  seem somewhat arbitrary to me (only sigma_1 sentences etc)

It seems very much like picking out some well-behaved classes of
mathematical "objects" so that one get's nice resultes, compatible with
observable universe.

But why should the Plenitude restrict itself to such theories? Or is
your view just that the others do not give rise to observers?

> Thanks for the references out of line. I will read those papers once I  
> have the time. At first sight it looks like the cosmologists begin to  
> be aware of a (third person) white rabbit problem. It will still take  
> time before they realize the first person white rabbit problem. The  
> reason is that they have no formation on the "mind-body" problem I  
> think.

The 3rd person white rabbit would be the many universes; but I think
they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the
Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which just
oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum".

The central problem in all approaches seems (as the many discussions on
this topic on the everything list also show) the _measure_ on the
universes/OMs whatever.

Maybe on should adopt some a priori "rational" principles to constrict
possible universes (in line of symmetry, invariance, closure etc)

(Of course, closure is one of these principles in your adopting Church
Thesis as a vantage point for selecting from all math. objects; which
contradicts my objection above ;-))

Cheers,
Günther


--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.greindl@...
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org

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[Bruno Marchal]

Gear Günther,


Le 31-mars-08, à 19:01, Günther Greindl a écrit :

>
> Dear Bruno,
>
>>> The things I am unclear about are:
>>> 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state
>>> ->
>>> what are these?
>> We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can
>> be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state
>> is accessed an infinity of times by the Universal Dovetailer through
>> an
>> infinity of infinite computations. OK? A complete computational
>> history
>> is just such an infinite computation. Sometimes I use the word
>> "history" to refer to the internal view of some machine whose current
>> state has been accessed by the UD. In that case some similarity
>> equivalence class is in play. To get the math of those similarity
>> classes I proceed in interviewing such machines.
>
> Ah OK, I understand. The equivalence class found in the interview - do
> you have results already?

Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic
corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation
rule.
The significance of this remains to be seen of course.

>
>>> 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you
>>> define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no
>>> contradiction; or differently?)-
>> Just "no contradiction". Now a computation is not per se a theory, so
>> the notion of contradiction is not directly applicable. That is why I
>> identify a computation with a proof of a Sigma_1 sentence of
>> (elementary, Robinsonian) arithmetic. Of course this leads to the
>> white
>> rabbit issue, a lot of statement are relatively consistent and false
>> at
>> the same time, like the "self-inconsistency statement" (by Godel's
>> second theorem the proposition "I am inconsistent" is consistent (when
>> asserted by a Robinsonian machine or a Lobian machine).
>> I recall that a Robinsonian machine is a machine having Turing
>> Universal abilities, but without the introspective power to
>> acknowledge
>> that. On the contrary Lobian machine are universal and know that they
>> are universal.
>
> Ok, this is also clearer now. What my problem is that these
> restrictions
>   seem somewhat arbitrary to me (only sigma_1 sentences etc)

OK. This is part of what I intended to explain to David, Barry, Mirek
and some others.
In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the
translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine.
Why?
Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the
fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing
Universality can be defined by the modal formula p -> []p, for p
sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but "knows" that she
is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p -> []p for p
Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p -> []p to the logic G, gives the
self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The
Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1 sentences
together with their many proofs.
This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some
amount of knowledge of recursion theory.



>
> It seems very much like picking out some well-behaved classes of
> mathematical "objects" so that one get's nice resultes, compatible with
> observable universe.

Not at all. Everything comes from the mathematical description of what
is a Universal dovetailer (and motivated by UDA which is itself based
on the first person indeterminacy, and its invariance for some
transformation).


>
> But why should the Plenitude restrict itself to such theories?


Necessity follows from the informal UDA, and then the precise math is
given by the formal (arithmetical) UDA. Remember that we postulate comp
at the start. (After, the results go trough with very strong weakening
of the comp hyp).


> Or is
> your view just that the others do not give rise to observers?


The others give rise to observer, but use principle which I think
should be justified.



>
>> Thanks for the references out of line. I will read those papers once I
>> have the time. At first sight it looks like the cosmologists begin to
>> be aware of a (third person) white rabbit problem. It will still take
>> time before they realize the first person white rabbit problem. The
>> reason is that they have no formation on the "mind-body" problem I
>> think.
>
> The 3rd person white rabbit would be the many universes;

Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are
too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with too
much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying "too
late, too late ..."?




> but I think
> they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the
> Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which
> just
> oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum".


I don't understand. (In general the first person is forgotten or
assimilated to third person constructs like brain through some identity
thesis, this cannot work by the Movie Graph argument or by Maudlin's
Olympia: we have discuss this).


>
> The central problem in all approaches seems (as the many discussions on
> this topic on the everything list also show) the _measure_ on the
> universes/OMs whatever.


Yes.



>
> Maybe on should adopt some a priori "rational" principles to constrict
> possible universes (in line of symmetry, invariance, closure etc)
>
> (Of course, closure is one of these principles in your adopting Church
> Thesis as a vantage point for selecting from all math. objects; which
> contradicts my objection above ;-))

Yes :)

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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[Günther Greindl]

Dear Bruno,

> Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic
> corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation
> rule.
> The significance of this remains to be seen of course.

Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one
reading)

> In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the
> translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine.
> Why?
> Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the
> fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing
> Universality can be defined by the modal formula p -> []p, for p
> sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but "knows" that she
> is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p -> []p for p
> Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p -> []p to the logic G, gives the
> self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The
> Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1 sentences
> together with their many proofs.
> This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some
> amount of knowledge of recursion theory.

Ah OK; I am going to do some recursion theory this semester. (the Rogers
book :-)
Could you recommend something on modal logic?


> Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are
> too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with too
> much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying "too
> late, too late ..."?

Yes that is what I meant.

>> but I think
>> they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the
>> Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which
>> just
>> oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum".
>
>
> I don't understand. (In general the first person is forgotten or
> assimilated to third person constructs like brain through some identity
> thesis, this cannot work by the Movie Graph argument or by Maudlin's
> Olympia: we have discuss this).

Now I don't understand; I am aware of Maudlin's Olympia, though not of
your movie graph argument.

How do you mean the first person is forgotten?


Best,
Günther

--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.greindl@...
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org

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[Günther Greindl]

Dear List,

I searched through the archive, this paper does not seem to have been
discussed.

Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness

If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically
distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what
happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this
question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer)
number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for
what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia
thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, 2006, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185-200]


http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf

It raises some issues the UDA is concerned with.
What do you think of it?

Best Regards,
Günther


--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.greindl@...
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org

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[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Günther,


Le 02-avr.-08, à 20:16, Günther Greindl a écrit :

>
> Dear Bruno,
>
>> Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic
>> corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation
>> rule.
>> The significance of this remains to be seen of course.
>
> Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one
> reading)

I am aware. Sorry. I will perhaps explain a bit more the
"methodological problem" is an answer to a post by Tom.
Soon or later.

>
>> In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the
>> translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine.
>> Why?
>> Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the
>> fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing
>> Universality can be defined by the modal formula p -> []p, for p
>> sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but "knows" that she
>> is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p -> []p for p
>> Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p -> []p to the logic G, gives the
>> self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The
>> Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1
>> sentences
>> together with their many proofs.
>> This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some
>> amount of knowledge of recursion theory.
>
> Ah OK; I am going to do some recursion theory this semester. (the
> Rogers
> book :-)

It is the best.


> Could you recommend something on modal logic?


I would recommend the following one:

Chellas, 1980
  Chellas, B. F. (1980). Modal Logic, an introduction. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.

>
>
>> Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are
>> too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with
>> too
>> much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying
>> "too
>> late, too late ..."?
>
> Yes that is what I meant.
>
>>> but I think
>>> they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the
>>> Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which
>>> just
>>> oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum".
>>
>>
>> I don't understand. (In general the first person is forgotten or
>> assimilated to third person constructs like brain through some
>> identity
>> thesis, this cannot work by the Movie Graph argument or by Maudlin's
>> Olympia: we have discuss this).
>
> Now I don't understand; I am aware of Maudlin's Olympia, though not of
> your movie graph argument.
>
> How do you mean the first person is forgotten?

A bit like the way of the so called Eliminative Materialist" (cf the
Churchland). The (hard) problem of consciousness and/or the mind
problem is(are) so difficult that somme people hide it into a pure
language problem or a problem referring to things which would not be
existing, like if consciousness would be an illusion. I think that in
this list people generally agree that consciousness or mind exists.
Epiphenomenalism, the idea that consciousness exists but has no role or
no function, is also a manner to make the person, and its will,
disappear.
Of course I do think that once we assume seriously the computationalist
hypothesis in the cognitive sciences, we have to "eliminate" the
substantial primary matter idea, but this goes against many years
(centuries) of naive aristotelianism, itself a product of millions
years of "Darwinian Evolution": the cat is better not doubting the
reality of the mouse if he want to survive ...
Do you agree that consciousness cannot be an illusion unlike everything
else? To be illusional, you have to be conscious of something. But
everything else can be doubted: body, matter, universe(s), etc.

Have a good day,

Bruno

PS thanks to the reference to Bostrom's paper. I have put it on my USB
key, and I will read it at home tonight.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[daddycaylor]

On Apr 3, 3:12 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> Dear Günther,
>
> Le 02-avr.-08, à 20:16, Günther Greindl a écrit :
>
>
>
> > Dear Bruno,
>
> >> Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic
> >> corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation
> >> rule.
> >> The significance of this remains to be seen of course.
>
> > Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one
> > reading)
>
> I am aware. Sorry. I will perhaps explain a bit more the
> "methodological problem" is an answer to a post by Tom.
> Soon or later.
>

Bruno,
I think you might be referring to me.  In either case, I apologize for
not participating in a while.  I have been busy with other priorities,
even other pass times.  I have a two-fold interest in your UDA, and in
the Everything List in general.  One is the math, having a M.S. in
math and doing it everyday on my job.  The other interest is in
philosophy and theology.  So I am especially interested in the
intersection of the two.  It has been a while since I've picked up
Cutland's introductory book on Recursion Theory.  I have to be honest
and say that my motivation in studying your UDA is (I'll probably word
this wrong in my haste) either to reconfirm in another instance that
trying to figure out everything in a reductionistic sense based on
math and logic (the most accurate tools of reductionism) leads to
futility (no conclusion), or it shows that there must be a
transcendent basis for everything, or both.  Another point connected
to this that I have argued is that the inescability of the mind-body
problem points to the transcendent basis having a personal (mind)
aspect at the core.

Just an administrative note: To see my oldest posts, from 2006, you
have to search for daddycaylor@... because I changed email
addresses and re-registered as daddycaylor@... (Tom Caylor) after
that.

By the way, near the end of one of our discussions on Plonitus'
hypostases, you said that what I was saying was the same thing as
Augustine.  I just wanted to let you know that I didn't get it from
Augustine, I somehow thought it up myself.  Smells a little like
truth, it seems to be able to be seen independently from different
perspectives (invariance).  There's something mystical going on
here. ;)

Tom

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[russell standish-2]

Not the paper, but certainly the thought experiment has been
discussed on this list, and its impact on the notion of measure. I
vaguely recall it was Hal Finney and Wei Dai and perhaps some others -
given that they are acknowledged by Bostrom at the end of his paper,
perhaps they can comment further.

I had a quick read of the paper last night, and my first impressions
is being a bit underwhelmed by Bostrom's analysis.

The first thing I take objection to is the possibility that two brains
can be kept in lockstep after the links between them are removed. Real
brains have synaptic noise, and I beleive this noise is essential to
conscious function.

In the thought experiment, after the brains are prepared in an
identical state, they can only be kept in an identical state by
maintaining a one-to-one link between the neurons of each brain. Once
even one neuron is decouple from its counterpart, the brains' physical
states will diverge. Once sufficient neurons are decoupled, the
brains' mental states will also diverge. With fully decoupled brains,
divergence is rapid, at least on the timescale of seconds, if not
faster (quantum decoherence time).

Plus we must consider the implications of this picture in a block
Multiverse - every conscious configuration exists somewhere in the
Multiverse, moreover it must exist infinitely often. Duplicating a
brain does not increase its measure, and after a very brief period of
time, it is the brain of a different person (albeit sharing a name and
memories).

So this would put me in Bostrom's Unification camp, AFAICT, and I
fail to see the validity of his reasoning for accpeting the
Duplication position.

As for Chalmers' fading qualia, no fading qualia will be experienced. This
is a direct consequence of quantum immortality. Either one experiences
full consciousness as one's brain is slowly turned into silicon, or
one experiences the evil scientist giving up for some reason while you
brain is still mostly carbon-based. In a sense, this becomes a
subjective experimental test of functionalism, in the same sense that
Tegmark's suicide experiment is a test of the many worlds.

On Wed, Apr 02, 2008 at 08:20:41PM +0200, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Dear List,
>
> I searched through the archive, this paper does not seem to have been
> discussed.
>
> Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness
>
> If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically
> distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what
> happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this
> question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer)
> number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for
> what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia
> thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, 2006, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185-200]
>
>
> http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf
>
> It raises some issues the UDA is concerned with.
> What do you think of it?
>
> Best Regards,
> Günther
>
>
> --
> Günther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> guenther.greindl@...
> http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
>
> Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
> Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org
>
>

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone [phone] (mobile)
Mathematics                        
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                 hpcoder@...
Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

On 03/04/2008, Günther Greindl <guenther.greindl@...> wrote:

>
>  Dear List,
>
>  I searched through the archive, this paper does not seem to have been
>  discussed.
>
>  Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness
>
>  If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically
>  distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what
>  happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this
>  question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer)
>  number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for
>  what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia
>  thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, 2006, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185-200]
>
>
>  http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf

The paper argues that a conscious program implemented on a computer
built with probabilistic components would have fractional experiences.
I think this is quite implausible. Firstly, there seems no good reason
to claim that if all the components just happened to function normally
on a particular run that this implementation would be phenomenally
different to an implementation on a computer with normal components.
Secondly, what could a fractional experience possibly be like? Bostrom
makes it clear that this would not be equivalent to a less intense
experience, but something quite different, that would not actually be
noticed by the subject as a change from normal. This raises the
possibility that my quantity of experience was decreased through some
brain illness that afflicted me last night. But since I feel just the
same today as I did yesterday, why should I care?




--
Stathis Papaioannou

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