XML firewalls (WAF)

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XML firewalls (WAF)

by Chris Hughes-9 :: Rate this Message:

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After a reply to a previous post I was clued in on XML vulnerabilities with web applications.  Off I went to do more reading when I discovered WAF.  >From what I read, the type of protection afforded by a WAF will address some portion of the XML vulnerabilities for both internal as well as externally facing web applications.  Now I’m left wondering which web based applications actually use XML or other mechanisms (SOAP) that are at risk.  I have a big MS SharePoint implementation that I’m particularly concerned about.

 

Is there a way short of calling the vendors to see if they present the risk that WAF’s allegedly help protect against?

 

Thanks


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Parent Message unknown Re: XML firewalls (WAF)

by Paul Melson-2 :: Rate this Message:

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> After a reply to a previous post I was clued in on XML vulnerabilities
> with web applications.  Off I went to do more reading when I
> discovered WAF.  >From what I read, the type of protection afforded by
> a WAF will address some portion of the XML vulnerabilities for both
> internal as well as externally facing web applications.  Now I'm left
> wondering which web based applications actually use XML or other
> mechanisms (SOAP) that are at risk.  I have a big MS SharePoint
implementation that I'm particularly concerned about.
>
> Is there a way short of calling the vendors to see if they present the
> risk that WAF's allegedly help protect against?

There's a great paper and slide deck on selecting a WAF for your application
at webappsec.org:

http://www.webappsec.org/projects/wafec/

If I were looking for a way to protect SOAP services, I would start by
implementing WS-Security for mutual authentication.  If I were going to
serve a large B2B partner count, or my services were going to be part of
Internet-facing web applications, I would look at implementing a positive
security model WAF that could parse XML.  SOAP is easy enough to do with a
positive model because it should be small, similarly formatted requests and
responses using known tags and input formats.  That is, the rules your WAF
will need to enforce are already part of the service's design.

PaulM


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Re: XML firewalls (WAF)

by david@lang.hm :: Rate this Message:

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On Thu, 7 May 2009, Chris Hughes wrote:

> After a reply to a previous post I was clued in on XML vulnerabilities with
> web applications.  Off I went to do more reading when I discovered WAF.
>> From what I read, the type of protection afforded by a WAF will address some
> portion of the XML vulnerabilities for both internal as well as externally
> facing web applications.  Now I'm left wondering which web based
> applications actually use XML or other mechanisms (SOAP) that are at risk.
> I have a big MS SharePoint implementation that I'm particularly concerned
> about.
>
>
>
> Is there a way short of calling the vendors to see if they present the risk
> that WAF's allegedly help protect against?

this is similar to asking what applications have vunerabbilities that
regular firewalls could protect against.

most of the time if the application people knew they would fix the flaws

the problem is that http is being used as a network layer, so just like
you would not want to allow TCP everywhere without restriction you really
shouldn't allow http everywhere without restriction.

for some reason many people have trouble understanding this concept, but
what it really boils down to is that when you implement tunneling, you
turn the layer that you are using for tunneling into your transport layer,
and every piece of protection that you would normally put above the
transport layer needs to be implemented again above the tunneling.

so even if you have a top-notch firewall that does application layer
checks of the HTTP traffic, as soon as you start tunneling your
application over it you need to treat it as no better than a packet
filtering firewall (controlling the source and destination)



different WAF devices do different things, and on top of the device
capabilities, how good they can possibly be depends on how well you can
define (or understand) the legitimate traffic that you want to have go
through it.

if you have documentation of exactly what all your legitimate requests
look like, you can gain a lot of protection by having the WAF enforce
these restrictions (in theory this will add zero security because the
application already did a perfect job of checking it's input. however in
the real world this can be a significant win)

however, if you can't identify what legitimate traffic looks like, you
will have serious problems getting much benifit from a WAF. it doesn't
mean that you can't get any benifit, there are WAFs that try to watch the
traffic and guess what's 'normal' to configure themselves, but don't fall
for the trap of assuming that such devices aren't going to require
understanding the application (and tweaking the configuration) to get much
use out of them.

David Lang
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Parent Message unknown Re: XML firewalls (WAF)

by Chris Hughes-9 :: Rate this Message:

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Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

> After a reply to a previous post I was clued in on XML vulnerabilities

> with web applications.  Off I went to do more reading when I discovered WAF.

>> From what I read, the type of protection afforded by a WAF will

>> address some

> portion of the XML vulnerabilities for both internal as well as

> externally facing web applications.  Now I'm left wondering which web

> based applications actually use XML or other mechanisms (SOAP) that are at risk.

> I have a big MS SharePoint implementation that I'm particularly

> concerned about.

> 

> 

> 

> Is there a way short of calling the vendors to see if they present the

> risk that WAF's allegedly help protect against?

 

this is similar to asking what applications have vunerabbilities that regular firewalls could protect against.

 

most of the time if the application people knew they would fix the flaws

 

the problem is that http is being used as a network layer, so just like you would not want to allow TCP everywhere without restriction you really shouldn't allow http everywhere without restriction.

 

for some reason many people have trouble understanding this concept, but what it really boils down to is that when you implement tunneling, you turn the layer that you are using for tunneling into your transport layer, and every piece of protection that you would normally put above the transport layer needs to be implemented again above the tunneling.

 

so even if you have a top-notch firewall that does application layer checks of the HTTP traffic, as soon as you start tunneling your application over it you need to treat it as no better than a packet filtering firewall (controlling the source and destination)

 

 

 

different WAF devices do different things, and on top of the device capabilities, how good they can possibly be depends on how well you can define (or understand) the legitimate traffic that you want to have go through it.

 

if you have documentation of exactly what all your legitimate requests look like, you can gain a lot of protection by having the WAF enforce these restrictions (in theory this will add zero security because the application already did a perfect job of checking it's input. however in the real world this can be a significant win)

 

however, if you can't identify what legitimate traffic looks like, you will have serious problems getting much benifit from a WAF. it doesn't mean that you can't get any benifit, there are WAFs that try to watch the traffic and guess what's 'normal' to configure themselves, but don't fall for the trap of assuming that such devices aren't going to require understanding the application (and tweaking the configuration) to get much use out of them.

 

David Lang

 

 

------------------------------

 

Sounds like to implement a WAF, I’ll need someone who really understands the xml calls between web hosts.  On top of that I can see where development of new applications will need central involvement of this same person.  I don’t possess the knowledge of xml required for this so I’ll have to look to one of the programmers.  This will be a tough sell.  On the face of it, adding a layer of security sounds good, but in these lean, understaffed times, it will be hard to fill this order….

 

We are development heavy in integrated web apps.  Securing this environment burned me once before.  Implementing HIDS on Webserver worked well, however, the developers did not, even though they were instructed to, consult me when making changes.  The result was that they encountered problems and tried for days to figure them out instead of calling me.  Management freaked and ordered all of the HIDS withdrawn from servers.  I can see where a WAF will require discipline that failed before.

 

 

 

 


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