Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

Yablo and Gallois's paper "Is ontology based on a mistake" is quite
relevant to
the question of Platonism, specificall whether true matehmatical
assertions
of existence have to be taken literally.

http://tinyurl.com/ldekg7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What is it?

A paper criticising the Quinean view of ontology. Yablo does so by
introduces a metaphorical/literal distinction as to when it is
reasonable to posit the existence of entities. Thus in order to
determine our ontological commitments we need to be able to extract
all cases in which such entities are posited in a metaphorical way
rather than a literal one. If there is no way to do this, then it is
not possible to develop a Quinean ontology.

Where does it fit in for me?

For the thesis: if correct, it implies that Quine's fundamental
approach to ontology is flawed and this may have negative implications
for the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument.

For the metaphysics paper: possibly details a way in which existence
cannot be held to occur (which would be interesting to look at in
terms of the relations proposed). At the very least it gives an
example of particular existence claims which can then be analysed in a
relational way.

Reference
Yablo, S., Does ontology rest on a mistake?, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. LXXII (1998), 229-261.


The Argument

Carnap on existence
Carnap argued that the realist existence question/assertion was
meaningless. He did this by means of his concept of linguistic
framework. A linguistic framework lays down rules for the use and
meaning of some object term X in a linguistic sense. Thus there are
two ways in which one can question/assert the existence of X: internal
or external to the linguistic framework.

If one questions the existence of X internal to the framework, one is
almost certainly guaranteed a yes answer (thus the statement "there is
an X" can pretty much be viewed as tautological when assessed
internally to a framework involving X). Hence the realist must be
making an external existence assertion. However, in this case the term
X has no meaning, as the framework within which it gains such is not
present. Thus the realist existence question/assertion is either
tautological or impossible to answer/assess.

Quine on Carnap
Quine objected to Carnap's position in three ways: firstly, he held
that his internal/external distinction was reliant on an analytic/
synthetic distinction (because the concept of a linguistic framework
involves the rules inherent in that framework being viewed as
indefeasible (i.e. analytic) within that particular linguistic
practice). As Quine believed that the analytic/synthetic distinction
could not be made, he held that Carnap's internal/external distinction
breaks down: internal assessments are thus not just a matter of
following inviolable linguistic rules, it is indeed possible for these
rules to change in response to experience and thus for internal
practice to change too.

Secondly, Quine argues that the external choice between linguistic
frameworks is much more influenced by observation than Carnap would
have us believe. For Quine, the decision to adopt a rule governing the
appropriate observational conditions under which one may assert the
existence of X is itself in part an assertion that X exists (if such
conditions obtain). He does not believe in making a distinction
between the linguistic truth and the factual truth of a statement.

Finally, Quine objects to the claim that the choice of linguistic
framework existence rule is based on merely practical considerations
to do with efficiency, simplicity, etc with no metaphysical
implications. He does so on the basis that these are exactly the sorts
of things that scientists use to favour one theory (and hence in
Quine's opinion, a view of the world, complete with ontology) over
another.

Yablo on Quine
Yablo argues that each aspect of Quine's critique is flawed. Firstly,
one does not need to hold that rules making up a linguistic framework
are analytic in order to be able to understand the need for a
framework in order to understand the meaning of terms. Not really sure
how this fits in and is related to Quine's second objection stage: One
does not need to render external talk of the objects within a
particular framework meaningless in order to save the internal, rule-
bound meaning. One can just make clear how such external statements
cannot be applied internally.;finally, Yablo points out that Quine
himself accepts the fact that a statement can be asserted purely for
practical advantage without the asserter actually holding that what it
entails metaphysically is actually the case.

Saving the Framework
Yablo goes on to propose a linguistic framework modified in light of
Quine's criticisms in which a framework is adopted as a kind of "game"
where the players assess the truth and falsity of statements within
the framework without any belief in implications for truth and/or
falsity outside of the framework. Thus Yablo argues that there are two
ways in which a statement may be interpreted: literally (external to a
particular game or linguistic framework) or as a metaphor (internal).

The Framework Strikes Back
This distinction regarding the way in which a statement may be
interpreted causes problems for the Quinean ontological regime. Given
that Quine does accept that assertions may be made in a metaphorical
sense, and that when one does so no ontological implications may be
drawn from such assertions, Quine needs to provide a clear demarcation
criterion to distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements.
As this has been much discussed without progress, it seems unlikely
that one will be able to distinguish between metaphorical and literal
usage and thus it is impossible to construct a certain ontology under
Quine's approach.

Indeed, Yablo argues that for the most part when we make statements,
we are unsure as to whether they are strictly literally true or if
they are at least in part to be taken metaphorically. Thus the
Quiniean must argue that in time these metaphorical parts of our
statements will be eroded and eventually only the literal
interpretation will remain. However, this reduces the Quinean position
to the following: one should sympathise with the idea that Xs exist
iff the literal part of theories involve their postulation and one
should count the part of a theory that involves the postulation of Xs
literal iff there turn out to be Xs. Thus there is a circularity.

Argument Outline

    * Carnap proposes a conception of linguistic practice (involving
an internal/external distinction) under which ontological
investigations cannot meaningfully be undertaken.

    * Quine criticises this by linking it to the problems of the
analytic/synthetic distinction.

    * Yablo modifies Carnap's position so that the distinction is made
on metaphorical/literal grounds in instead.

    * This new position requires that the Quinean provide a principle
of demarcation between metaphor and literal truth in order for their
ontology to prevail.

    * No such principle has been provided and so the Quinean
ontological project fails.

http://xeny.net/Yablo.Ontology
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Dear Peter,

the Yablo-Carnac-Gallois-Quine compendium is an interesting reading - except for missing the crux:

You, as a person, with knowledge about the ideas of the bickering philosophers, could do us the politesse of a brief summary about "who is stating what" (very few lines) which may increase the understanding of the innocent by-reader about the generalities mentioned back and forth. I for one looked at the 2 URL-s, long as one of them may be, and found further generalities as in a style of scientifically 'expert' discussions/arguments.  

I did not read so far and did not study these versions, so reading your (and their) papers was frustrating.

I am fundamentally opposed to 'ontology', because I consider it explaining the partial knowledge we have about 'the world' as if it were the total. I am for epistemology, the growing information-staple we absorb.

Most people stand on ontological grounds. I wanted to get a glimps.

Could you help?
John M

On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 1:35 PM, 1Z <peterdjones@...> wrote:

Yablo and Gallois's paper "Is ontology based on a mistake" is quite
relevant to
the question of Platonism, specificall whether true matehmatical
assertions
of existence have to be taken literally.

http://tinyurl.com/ldekg7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What is it?

A paper criticising the Quinean view of ontology. Yablo does so by
introduces a metaphorical/literal distinction as to when it is
reasonable to posit the existence of entities. Thus in order to
determine our ontological commitments we need to be able to extract
all cases in which such entities are posited in a metaphorical way
rather than a literal one. If there is no way to do this, then it is
not possible to develop a Quinean ontology.

Where does it fit in for me?

For the thesis: if correct, it implies that Quine's fundamental
approach to ontology is flawed and this may have negative implications
for the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument.

For the metaphysics paper: possibly details a way in which existence
cannot be held to occur (which would be interesting to look at in
terms of the relations proposed). At the very least it gives an
example of particular existence claims which can then be analysed in a
relational way.

Reference
Yablo, S., Does ontology rest on a mistake?, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. LXXII (1998), 229-261.


The Argument

Carnap on existence
Carnap argued that the realist existence question/assertion was
meaningless. He did this by means of his concept of linguistic
framework. A linguistic framework lays down rules for the use and
meaning of some object term X in a linguistic sense. Thus there are
two ways in which one can question/assert the existence of X: internal
or external to the linguistic framework.

If one questions the existence of X internal to the framework, one is
almost certainly guaranteed a yes answer (thus the statement "there is
an X" can pretty much be viewed as tautological when assessed
internally to a framework involving X). Hence the realist must be
making an external existence assertion. However, in this case the term
X has no meaning, as the framework within which it gains such is not
present. Thus the realist existence question/assertion is either
tautological or impossible to answer/assess.

Quine on Carnap
Quine objected to Carnap's position in three ways: firstly, he held
that his internal/external distinction was reliant on an analytic/
synthetic distinction (because the concept of a linguistic framework
involves the rules inherent in that framework being viewed as
indefeasible (i.e. analytic) within that particular linguistic
practice). As Quine believed that the analytic/synthetic distinction
could not be made, he held that Carnap's internal/external distinction
breaks down: internal assessments are thus not just a matter of
following inviolable linguistic rules, it is indeed possible for these
rules to change in response to experience and thus for internal
practice to change too.

Secondly, Quine argues that the external choice between linguistic
frameworks is much more influenced by observation than Carnap would
have us believe. For Quine, the decision to adopt a rule governing the
appropriate observational conditions under which one may assert the
existence of X is itself in part an assertion that X exists (if such
conditions obtain). He does not believe in making a distinction
between the linguistic truth and the factual truth of a statement.

Finally, Quine objects to the claim that the choice of linguistic
framework existence rule is based on merely practical considerations
to do with efficiency, simplicity, etc with no metaphysical
implications. He does so on the basis that these are exactly the sorts
of things that scientists use to favour one theory (and hence in
Quine's opinion, a view of the world, complete with ontology) over
another.

Yablo on Quine
Yablo argues that each aspect of Quine's critique is flawed. Firstly,
one does not need to hold that rules making up a linguistic framework
are analytic in order to be able to understand the need for a
framework in order to understand the meaning of terms. Not really sure
how this fits in and is related to Quine's second objection stage: One
does not need to render external talk of the objects within a
particular framework meaningless in order to save the internal, rule-
bound meaning. One can just make clear how such external statements
cannot be applied internally.;finally, Yablo points out that Quine
himself accepts the fact that a statement can be asserted purely for
practical advantage without the asserter actually holding that what it
entails metaphysically is actually the case.

Saving the Framework
Yablo goes on to propose a linguistic framework modified in light of
Quine's criticisms in which a framework is adopted as a kind of "game"
where the players assess the truth and falsity of statements within
the framework without any belief in implications for truth and/or
falsity outside of the framework. Thus Yablo argues that there are two
ways in which a statement may be interpreted: literally (external to a
particular game or linguistic framework) or as a metaphor (internal).

The Framework Strikes Back
This distinction regarding the way in which a statement may be
interpreted causes problems for the Quinean ontological regime. Given
that Quine does accept that assertions may be made in a metaphorical
sense, and that when one does so no ontological implications may be
drawn from such assertions, Quine needs to provide a clear demarcation
criterion to distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements.
As this has been much discussed without progress, it seems unlikely
that one will be able to distinguish between metaphorical and literal
usage and thus it is impossible to construct a certain ontology under
Quine's approach.

Indeed, Yablo argues that for the most part when we make statements,
we are unsure as to whether they are strictly literally true or if
they are at least in part to be taken metaphorically. Thus the
Quiniean must argue that in time these metaphorical parts of our
statements will be eroded and eventually only the literal
interpretation will remain. However, this reduces the Quinean position
to the following: one should sympathise with the idea that Xs exist
iff the literal part of theories involve their postulation and one
should count the part of a theory that involves the postulation of Xs
literal iff there turn out to be Xs. Thus there is a circularity.

Argument Outline

   * Carnap proposes a conception of linguistic practice (involving
an internal/external distinction) under which ontological
investigations cannot meaningfully be undertaken.

   * Quine criticises this by linking it to the problems of the
analytic/synthetic distinction.

   * Yablo modifies Carnap's position so that the distinction is made
on metaphorical/literal grounds in instead.

   * This new position requires that the Quinean provide a principle
of demarcation between metaphor and literal truth in order for their
ontology to prevail.

   * No such principle has been provided and so the Quinean
ontological project fails.

http://xeny.net/Yablo.Ontology --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Sep 2009, at 19:35, 1Z wrote:





> Yablo on Quine <...>

> Yablo argues that each aspect of Quine's critique is flawed. Firstly,
> one does not need to hold that rules making up a linguistic framework
> are analytic in order to be able to understand the need for a
> framework in order to understand the meaning of terms. Not really sure
> how this fits in and is related to Quine's second objection stage: One
> does not need to render external talk of the objects within a
> particular framework meaningless in order to save the internal, rule-
> bound meaning. One can just make clear how such external statements
> cannot be applied internally.;finally, Yablo points out that Quine
> himself accepts the fact that a statement can be asserted purely for
> practical advantage without the asserter actually holding that what it
> entails metaphysically is actually the case.
>
> Saving the Framework
> Yablo goes on to propose a linguistic framework modified in light of
> Quine's criticisms in which a framework is adopted as a kind of "game"
> where the players assess the truth and falsity of statements within
> the framework without any belief in implications for truth and/or
> falsity outside of the framework. Thus Yablo argues that there are two
> ways in which a statement may be interpreted: literally (external to a
> particular game or linguistic framework) or as a metaphor (internal).
>
> The Framework Strikes Back
> This distinction regarding the way in which a statement may be
> interpreted causes problems for the Quinean ontological regime. Given
> that Quine does accept that assertions may be made in a metaphorical
> sense, and that when one does so no ontological implications may be
> drawn from such assertions, Quine needs to provide a clear demarcation
> criterion to distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements.
> As this has been much discussed without progress, it seems unlikely
> that one will be able to distinguish between metaphorical and literal
> usage and thus it is impossible to construct a certain ontology under
> Quine's approach.
>
> Indeed, Yablo argues that for the most part when we make statements,
> we are unsure as to whether they are strictly literally true or if
> they are at least in part to be taken metaphorically. Thus the
> Quiniean must argue that in time these metaphorical parts of our
> statements will be eroded and eventually only the literal
> interpretation will remain.

Number theory and computer science, and life,  illustrates that the  
contrary happens.
Quine's view on ontology disallow the modal contexts, that is the  
person views, but as Boolos said provability logics provide a Qiuine-
acceptable view on the modalities/views. By incompleteness, essence  
are unavoidable for the sound machines.

> However, this reduces the Quinean position
> to the following: one should sympathise with the idea that Xs exist
> iff the literal part of theories involve their postulation and one
> should count the part of a theory that involves the postulation of Xs
> literal iff there turn out to be Xs. Thus there is a circularity.
>
> Argument Outline
>
>    * Carnap proposes a conception of linguistic practice (involving
> an internal/external distinction) under which ontological
> investigations cannot meaningfully be undertaken.
>
>    * Quine criticises this by linking it to the problems of the
> analytic/synthetic distinction.
>
>    * Yablo modifies Carnap's position so that the distinction is made
> on metaphorical/literal grounds in instead.
>
>    * This new position requires that the Quinean provide a principle
> of demarcation between metaphor and literal truth in order for their
> ontology to prevail.
>
>    * No such principle has been provided and so the Quinean
> ontological project fails.

CT entails it is easy to provide such a demarcation. The literal truth  
are the true arithmetical sentences (in the Tarski sense.
The metaphor are the arithmetical sentences related to the discourses  
and silence of universal numbers observing themselves, and (in most  
UD-"time", betting on their most probable local universal computations.

There are many other possible demarcations. CT entails the equivalence  
of a large class of such demarcation.

A physicalist demarcation is conceivable too. The literal truth could  
be state of the universal wave function, or state of universal quantum  
object (like Freedman Kitaev functor). The metaphor are given then by  
emerging higher level relative classical (notably) beliefs.

There is already an explanation how bits emerges from qubits, (Everett  
---> Zurek)

Only, if comp is true, the arrow has a reverse: we have to explain how  
qubits emerge from bits (by UDA).  The reverse arrow enriches the  
picture a lot. By the Solovay splitting, we get both the communicable  
quanta and the sensible and incommunicable qualia. At least, for the  
formalist, we get sincere (by construction/restriction) discourses by  
universal machines about themselves, and their possible views. That's  
in the AUDA. This provides a formal  (à-la Plotinus) 'theology'. For  
non-comp, it is at least a 'toy' theology. Apparently valid and  
complete (at the propositional level!) for all the sound axiomatizable  
extensions of Peano Arithmetic, and sound for all the sound extensions  
(don't need to be axiomatizable).

Instead of metaphor I would talk on emerging relative belief states.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Flammarion]

On 3 Sep, 17:12, John Mikes <jami...@...> wrote:
> Dear Peter,
> the Yablo-Carnac-Gallois-Quine compendium is an interesting reading - except
> for missing the crux:
> You, as a person, with knowledge about the ideas of the bickering
> philosophers, could do us the politesse of a brief summary about "who is
> stating what" (very few lines) which may increase the understanding of the
> innocent by-reader about the generalities mentioned back and forth. I for
> one looked at the 2 URL-s, long as one of them may be, and found further
> generalities as in a style of scientifically 'expert' discussions/arguments.

One of my reasons for posting it was to illustrate that there is in
fact
a debate about ontology. Bruno has been arguign that numbers
exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
backwards
and forwards.

> I did not read so far and did not study these versions, so reading your (and
> their) papers was frustrating.
> I am fundamentally opposed to 'ontology', because I consider it explaining
> the partial knowledge we have about 'the world' as if it were the total. I
> am for epistemology, the growing information-staple we absorb.
> Most people stand on ontological grounds. I wanted to get a glimps.
> Could you help?
> John M
>
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 1:35 PM, 1Z <peterdjo...@...> wrote:
>
> > Yablo and Gallois's paper "Is ontology based on a mistake" is quite
> > relevant to
> > the question of Platonism, specificall whether true matehmatical
> > assertions
> > of existence have to be taken literally.
>
> >http://tinyurl.com/ldekg7
>
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > What is it?
>
> > A paper criticising the Quinean view of ontology. Yablo does so by
> > introduces a metaphorical/literal distinction as to when it is
> > reasonable to posit the existence of entities. Thus in order to
> > determine our ontological commitments we need to be able to extract
> > all cases in which such entities are posited in a metaphorical way
> > rather than a literal one. If there is no way to do this, then it is
> > not possible to develop a Quinean ontology.
>
> > Where does it fit in for me?
>
> > For the thesis: if correct, it implies that Quine's fundamental
> > approach to ontology is flawed and this may have negative implications
> > for the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument.
>
> > For the metaphysics paper: possibly details a way in which existence
> > cannot be held to occur (which would be interesting to look at in
> > terms of the relations proposed). At the very least it gives an
> > example of particular existence claims which can then be analysed in a
> > relational way.
>
> > Reference
> > Yablo, S., Does ontology rest on a mistake?, Proceedings of the
> > Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. LXXII (1998), 229-261.
>
> > The Argument
>
> > Carnap on existence
> > Carnap argued that the realist existence question/assertion was
> > meaningless. He did this by means of his concept of linguistic
> > framework. A linguistic framework lays down rules for the use and
> > meaning of some object term X in a linguistic sense. Thus there are
> > two ways in which one can question/assert the existence of X: internal
> > or external to the linguistic framework.
>
> > If one questions the existence of X internal to the framework, one is
> > almost certainly guaranteed a yes answer (thus the statement "there is
> > an X" can pretty much be viewed as tautological when assessed
> > internally to a framework involving X). Hence the realist must be
> > making an external existence assertion. However, in this case the term
> > X has no meaning, as the framework within which it gains such is not
> > present. Thus the realist existence question/assertion is either
> > tautological or impossible to answer/assess.
>
> > Quine on Carnap
> > Quine objected to Carnap's position in three ways: firstly, he held
> > that his internal/external distinction was reliant on an analytic/
> > synthetic distinction (because the concept of a linguistic framework
> > involves the rules inherent in that framework being viewed as
> > indefeasible (i.e. analytic) within that particular linguistic
> > practice). As Quine believed that the analytic/synthetic distinction
> > could not be made, he held that Carnap's internal/external distinction
> > breaks down: internal assessments are thus not just a matter of
> > following inviolable linguistic rules, it is indeed possible for these
> > rules to change in response to experience and thus for internal
> > practice to change too.
>
> > Secondly, Quine argues that the external choice between linguistic
> > frameworks is much more influenced by observation than Carnap would
> > have us believe. For Quine, the decision to adopt a rule governing the
> > appropriate observational conditions under which one may assert the
> > existence of X is itself in part an assertion that X exists (if such
> > conditions obtain). He does not believe in making a distinction
> > between the linguistic truth and the factual truth of a statement.
>
> > Finally, Quine objects to the claim that the choice of linguistic
> > framework existence rule is based on merely practical considerations
> > to do with efficiency, simplicity, etc with no metaphysical
> > implications. He does so on the basis that these are exactly the sorts
> > of things that scientists use to favour one theory (and hence in
> > Quine's opinion, a view of the world, complete with ontology) over
> > another.
>
> > Yablo on Quine
> > Yablo argues that each aspect of Quine's critique is flawed. Firstly,
> > one does not need to hold that rules making up a linguistic framework
> > are analytic in order to be able to understand the need for a
> > framework in order to understand the meaning of terms. Not really sure
> > how this fits in and is related to Quine's second objection stage: One
> > does not need to render external talk of the objects within a
> > particular framework meaningless in order to save the internal, rule-
> > bound meaning. One can just make clear how such external statements
> > cannot be applied internally.;finally, Yablo points out that Quine
> > himself accepts the fact that a statement can be asserted purely for
> > practical advantage without the asserter actually holding that what it
> > entails metaphysically is actually the case.
>
> > Saving the Framework
> > Yablo goes on to propose a linguistic framework modified in light of
> > Quine's criticisms in which a framework is adopted as a kind of "game"
> > where the players assess the truth and falsity of statements within
> > the framework without any belief in implications for truth and/or
> > falsity outside of the framework. Thus Yablo argues that there are two
> > ways in which a statement may be interpreted: literally (external to a
> > particular game or linguistic framework) or as a metaphor (internal).
>
> > The Framework Strikes Back
> > This distinction regarding the way in which a statement may be
> > interpreted causes problems for the Quinean ontological regime. Given
> > that Quine does accept that assertions may be made in a metaphorical
> > sense, and that when one does so no ontological implications may be
> > drawn from such assertions, Quine needs to provide a clear demarcation
> > criterion to distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements.
> > As this has been much discussed without progress, it seems unlikely
> > that one will be able to distinguish between metaphorical and literal
> > usage and thus it is impossible to construct a certain ontology under
> > Quine's approach.
>
> > Indeed, Yablo argues that for the most part when we make statements,
> > we are unsure as to whether they are strictly literally true or if
> > they are at least in part to be taken metaphorically. Thus the
> > Quiniean must argue that in time these metaphorical parts of our
> > statements will be eroded and eventually only the literal
> > interpretation will remain. However, this reduces the Quinean position
> > to the following: one should sympathise with the idea that Xs exist
> > iff the literal part of theories involve their postulation and one
> > should count the part of a theory that involves the postulation of Xs
> > literal iff there turn out to be Xs. Thus there is a circularity.
>
> > Argument Outline
>
> >    * Carnap proposes a conception of linguistic practice (involving
> > an internal/external distinction) under which ontological
> > investigations cannot meaningfully be undertaken.
>
> >    * Quine criticises this by linking it to the problems of the
> > analytic/synthetic distinction.
>
> >    * Yablo modifies Carnap's position so that the distinction is made
> > on metaphorical/literal grounds in instead.
>
> >    * This new position requires that the Quinean provide a principle
> > of demarcation between metaphor and literal truth in order for their
> > ontology to prevail.
>
> >    * No such principle has been provided and so the Quinean
> > ontological project fails.
>
> >http://xeny.net/Yablo.Ontology

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Flammarion]

On 3 Sep, 17:12, John Mikes <jami...@...> wrote:


> I am fundamentally opposed to 'ontology', because I consider it explaining
> the partial knowledge we have about 'the world' as if it were the total.

How much we don't know is somehting we don't know.

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Jesse Mazer]

Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2009 10:21:17 -0700
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
> From: peterdjones@...
> To: everything-list@...
>
>
>
>
> On 3 Sep, 17:12, John Mikes <jami...@...> wrote:
> > Dear Peter,
> > the Yablo-Carnac-Gallois-Quine compendium is an interesting reading - except
> > for missing the crux:
> > You, as a person, with knowledge about the ideas of the bickering
> > philosophers, could do us the politesse of a brief summary about "who is
> > stating what" (very few lines) which may increase the understanding of the
> > innocent by-reader about the generalities mentioned back and forth. I for
> > one looked at the 2 URL-s, long as one of them may be, and found further
> > generalities as in a style of scientifically 'expert' discussions/arguments.
>
> One of my reasons for posting it was to illustrate that there is in
> fact
> a debate about ontology. Bruno has been arguign that numbers
> exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> backwards
> and forwards.

Your summary appears fairly nonsensical. "Existence" is a word humans have invented, as such it means whatever we define it to mean, there is no "truth" about whether numbers exist independent of our arbitrary choices about how to define what the word "exist" actually means. If I choose to define "existence" as the property of walking around on four legs, then it is perfectly correct to say that cats and dogs exist but humans and birds do not exist, according to this definition. I have asked you in several previous posts (such as the one at http://tinyurl.com/muh9a3 ) whether you agree that different philosophers define "existence" differently and there is no single "correct" usage, but you never seem willing to answer this straightforward question.

Philosophers may debate whether various concepts of existence like Quine's are internally coherent, or how well they match up with how we talk about the "existence" of things in everyday speech (these kinds of issues seem to be what Yablo is talking about), but they certainly don't debate about whether a particular definition of existence coincides with what "really exists", as if "existence" has some pure platonic meaning beyond human definitions.

 

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:

> ...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers
> exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> backwards



I have never said that numbers exists because there are true  
mathematical statements asserting their existence.

I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such  
truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary to  
even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a  
universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like with  
the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.

I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are  
part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic  
way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does not  
depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can 'save  
your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA. And you don't need  
really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.

All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But  
fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp. May be very fertile  
one. Like galaxies and brains.

Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate  
basic entities and relations in theories which are always  
hypothetical. I am just honest making explicit my use of the non  
constructive excluded middle in the arithmetical realm.

You get stuck at step zero by a bullet you are ntroducing yourself, I  
'm afraid.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Bruno,

there is a lot of wisdom in your post. Your last sentence, however, may apply to that wisdom as well I am afraid.

 

"...I have to assume that [such] truth are not dependent of me,..." -

nor on anything else we may know of. I stay clear of 'truth' which is applied in whoever's theory - as 'his' truth.

I am in trouble with the "Church Thesis", it seems to be anchored in the math of functions and applied to comp.science. (BTW "recursive functions" pointing back to themselves? a restriction into what has been known (already)?  I may have the wrong idea (if any) about the Ch-Th of course.)

It may be 'fundamental' in - what I consider - a segment of the totality.

 

I can accept the 'universal machine' as not restricted to mathematical comp,

it definitely should not apply those binary-slanted algorithms. I consider it as

some analogue 'think-tank' beyond our present terms. Whatever I would try to characterize it with, is MY restriction to its unlimited capabilites. So I don't.

 

Bruno, is your own restriction  concentrated to 'physics' with 'math' as in:

("All theories in physics use at least that arithmetical fragment....")?

I love your extension of 'metaphors' (bosons) into galaxies and brains. They certainly are, included into our presently valid "perceived reality" of figments.

 

"Scientists do not commit themselves ontologically...."

Most - (especially the conventional ones) do. I find it a restriction of the total into the so far experienced portion - even  to the adjusted format of those - serving as the 'entirety this 'ontology' is based on.  I would love to device an ontology for the 'totality' - that would explain lots of questionmarks we still have in our ignorance (the how-s, why-s, and the other 1000 to be modest).

I am not sure about the 'excluded middle' since that is excluded from a mere segment we consider 'them all' while the entire set may include quite another middle. (My usual objection against statistical conclusions and probabilities of course, that are mere illusions of our human ways of anticipatory thinking). 

 

I intended this reflection to be 'positive' to your ideas, as considered them in more ways than just 'arithmetically based' (numbers?). 

 

John  

 

 

 

On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 5:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:

> ...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers

> exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> backwards

I have never said that numbers exists because there are true

mathematical statements asserting their existence.

I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such
truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary to
even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a
universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like with
the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.

I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are
part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic
way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does not
depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can 'save
your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA. And you don't need
really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.

All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But
fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp. May be very fertile
one. Like galaxies and brains.

Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate
basic entities and relations in theories which are always
hypothetical. I am just honest making explicit my use of the non
constructive excluded middle in the arithmetical realm.

You get stuck at step zero by a bullet you are ntroducing yourself, I
'm afraid.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,

I will answer your post as soon as possible. I am a bit busy those days (september exams, administrative things, ...).

At the same time, the sequel of the "seven step series" should be part of that answer, but this is what I will explain ...

Thanks for letting me know your interest,

Bruno

On 06 Sep 2009, at 18:03, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno,

there is a lot of wisdom in your post. Your last sentence, however, may apply to that wisdom as well I am afraid.

 

"...I have to assume that [such] truth are not dependent of me,..." -

nor on anything else we may know of. I stay clear of 'truth' which is applied in whoever's theory - as 'his' truth.

I am in trouble with the "Church Thesis", it seems to be anchored in the math of functions and applied to comp.science. (BTW "recursive functions" pointing back to themselves? a restriction into what has been known (already)?  I may have the wrong idea (if any) about the Ch-Th of course.)

It may be 'fundamental' in - what I consider - a segment of the totality.

 

I can accept the 'universal machine' as not restricted to mathematical comp,

it definitely should not apply those binary-slanted algorithms. I consider it as

some analogue 'think-tank' beyond our present terms. Whatever I would try to characterize it with, is MY restriction to its unlimited capabilites. So I don't.

 

Bruno, is your own restriction  concentrated to 'physics' with 'math' as in:

("All theories in physics use at least that arithmetical fragment....")?

I love your extension of 'metaphors' (bosons) into galaxies and brains. They certainly are, included into our presently valid "perceived reality" of figments.

 

"Scientists do not commit themselves ontologically...."

Most - (especially the conventional ones) do. I find it a restriction of the total into the so far experienced portion - even  to the adjusted format of those - serving as the 'entirety this 'ontology' is based on.  I would love to device an ontology for the 'totality' - that would explain lots of questionmarks we still have in our ignorance (the how-s, why-s, and the other 1000 to be modest).

I am not sure about the 'excluded middle' since that is excluded from a mere segment we consider 'them all' while the entire set may include quite another middle. (My usual objection against statistical conclusions and probabilities of course, that are mere illusions of our human ways of anticipatory thinking). 

 

I intended this reflection to be 'positive' to your ideas, as considered them in more ways than just 'arithmetically based' (numbers?). 

 

John  

 

 

 

On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 5:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:

> ...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers

> exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> backwards

I have never said that numbers exists because there are true

mathematical statements asserting their existence.

I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such
truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary to
even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a
universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like with
the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.

I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are
part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic
way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does not
depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can 'save
your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA. And you don't need
really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.

All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But
fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp. May be very fertile
one. Like galaxies and brains.

Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate
basic entities and relations in theories which are always
hypothetical. I am just honest making explicit my use of the non
constructive excluded middle in the arithmetical realm.

You get stuck at step zero by a bullet you are ntroducing yourself, I
'm afraid.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,

On 06 Sep 2009, at 18:03, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno,

there is a lot of wisdom in your post. Your last sentence, however, may apply to that wisdom as well I am afraid.

 

"...I have to assume that [such] truth are not dependent of me,..." -

nor on anything else we may know of. I stay clear of 'truth' which is applied in whoever's theory - as 'his' truth.

I think you are perhaps confusing provable (in a theory), and truth (of possible statements assertable in the theory). A theory does not known "his" complete truth.

Being realist on the arithmetical statement is an admission of ignorance in arithmetic. We accept that truth extends the mean of our brains, theories, systems, etc.

I hope I can clarify this later for you. It is weird, and not easy to explain without providing details. 

Reality is beyond fiction and when you make attempt to be just honest (and may be false), then "reality looks crackpot" ...

I am in trouble with the "Church Thesis", it seems to be anchored in the math of functions and applied to comp.science. (BTW "recursive functions" pointing back to themselves? a restriction into what has been known (already)?  I may have the wrong idea (if any) about the Ch-Th of course.)

It may be 'fundamental' in - what I consider - a segment of the totality.

For  mathematical reasons, assuming comp, we will have the choice between a non completely knowable totality, or on some necessarily partial, but complete in their domain, "totality", or sequence of totalities.

Self-extending totalities are akin to the notion of first person. 

With machines incompleteness makes room for the others (the second and third persons)

 

I can accept the 'universal machine' as not restricted to mathematical comp,

This is unclear. Universal machine appears only in that 'apparently restricted digital world'. remember that after Gödel, we can no more be sure that digitality is a restriction. Gödel signed the reductionist conception of numbers. Assuming comp, we know that we are either insane or very limited. And then UDA shows that the physical worlds arise 'logically' from our limitations (where "us" = the Lobian machine/entity, not the humans).

it definitely should not apply those binary-slanted algorithms. I consider it as

some analogue 'think-tank' beyond our present terms.

That is the case for all theory. Science is modest. 

(and in AUDA all 8 hypostases are derivable from the Löb 'modesty' formula B(Bp->p)->Bp, I say this for those who have follows some post, or read Smullyan's or Boolos (or Smorynski) book on the logic of provability/consistency.

Whatever I would try to characterize it with, is MY restriction to its unlimited capabilites. So I don't.

You are a universal machine, John. I can prove it, and I can even show that, as far as you are sound, you are Löbian. This means you can know that your are, at least, a universal machine. And this will be used negatively, in some way. Because Universal machine are very limited. They are under the jug of many limitation theorems.

In the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology. Universal machine corresponds to what Plotinus call "man", 'or reasoner".

 

Bruno, is your own restriction  concentrated to 'physics' with 'math' as in:

("All theories in physics use at least that arithmetical fragment....")?

Not here. I am just making the quasi obvious remark that physicist needs the concept of number, or anything equivalent (like real numbers + trigonometry)  in their theory. 

I love your extension of 'metaphors' (bosons) into galaxies and brains. They certainly are, included into our presently valid "perceived reality" of figments.

Yes. With comp, brains, galaxies, atoms, still exists, but not as first order citizens. This is not obvious, and is the conclusion of UDA. This is so counter-intuitive that I have no problem with those who takes this as a reason to doubt  comp. Without the Everett-QM confirmation, I would have believed that this is close to a refutation of comp.

 

"Scientists do not commit themselves ontologically...."

Most - (especially the conventional ones) do.

This is due to the abandon of theology (the fundamental science) by academy to temporal political power. Atheists and Christians are ally against the reintroduction of non confessional theology in the academy. This explains why there is a still widespread belief that science can do ontological commitment. But then it is no more science but "religion".

I find it a restriction of the total into the so far experienced portion - even  to the adjusted format of those - serving as the 'entirety this 'ontology' is based on.  I would love to device an ontology for the 'totality' - that would explain lots of questionmarks we still have in our ignorance (the how-s, why-s, and the other 1000 to be modest).

Comp provides a vast range of acceptable and equivalent *hypothetical* ontology.

The hypothetical ontology of comp is a subset of all scientific theories today.

This has nothing to do with the fact that comp entails that we can stop speculating on matter. Even if matter exists, it would be an epiphenomenon, or better, an epinoumenon. Almost exactly like invisible horses driving the cars. But this should not be considered as obvious. It is a consequence of comp which needs some reasoning.

I am not sure about the 'excluded middle' since that is excluded from a mere segment we consider 'them all' while the entire set may include quite another middle. (My usual objection against statistical conclusions and probabilities of course, that are mere illusions of our human ways of anticipatory thinking). 

 

I intended this reflection to be 'positive' to your ideas, as considered them in more ways than just 'arithmetically based' (numbers?). 

I will try to reassure you about the idea that "arithmetically based" could be a reductionism, or a restriction. On the contrary, this idea leads to the idea that universal machine should have the right to vote (to put the things in this way). With the discovery of the universal machine, there is a sense to say that now we really have a better view on our ignorance, which appears to be larger than what we could ever have conceived before the work of Cantor, Kleene, etc.

The universal machine is not the solution of our problems. The universal machine *is* our problem.  (Assuming comp/CTM).

I think that I will have to make a little detour into other "impossibility theorem". I can already hear you saying that an impossibility theorem is impossible, because impossible could be a relative notion. But this is not the case, mathematics kicks back, and many things are just impossible, sometimes absolutely impossible, and sometimes we can prove it to ourself (assuming our consistency).

You cannot prove that an impossibility theorem is not possible, because if you prove that, you are proving an impossibility theorem!

Of course we need some faith, that 0 is different from 1, for example, but not much more. I intend to show that the principle of excluded middle can be seen as a tolerance-of-ignorance principle. As I said to Brent a long time ago, the excluded middle principle is more a rule of politeness among persons than a platonic reality. With comp, it reveals, in 'Arithmetica', incredible and innumerous unknown forms of 'living entities', and some incredible mess, too. The Mandelbrot set provides some partial illustration of that phenomenon(*).

Bruno

(*) You may enjoy this interpenetration of two parts of the M set. M invades itself, as you can see when zooming on the border of a little Mandelbrot. As in this "dezoom":

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnJLcyHOUHc&feature=channel_page

 

On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 5:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:

On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:

> ...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers

> exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> backwards

I have never said that numbers exists because there are true

mathematical statements asserting their existence.

I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such
truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary to
even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a
universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like with
the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.

I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are
part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic
way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does not
depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can 'save
your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA. And you don't need
really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.

All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But
fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp. May be very fertile
one. Like galaxies and brains.

Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate
basic entities and relations in theories which are always
hypothetical. I am just honest making explicit my use of the non
constructive excluded middle in the arithmetical realm.

You get stuck at step zero by a bullet you are ntroducing yourself, I
'm afraid.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Flammarion]

On 4 Sep, 22:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > ...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers
> > exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> > existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> > statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> > backwards
>
> I have never said that numbers exists because there are true
> mathematical statements asserting their existence.

> I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such
> truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary to
> even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a
> universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like with
> the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.

There is no usual sense of "exists" as the material I posted
demonstrates.

You have to be assuming that the existence of the UD is literal
and Platonic  since you care concluding that I am beign generated by
it and
my existeince is not merely metaphorical. The arguemnt doesn't go
through
otherwise.

> I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are
> part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic
> way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does not
> depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can 'save
> your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA.

IF formalism is true  there is no UD. It simply doesn't exist
and doesn't genarate anything.

>And you don't need
> really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.

Of course I need a real machine for a real interview.

> All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But
> fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp.

Mathematical existence is metaphorical if mathematical existence is
literal.

Their existence is literal  if mathematical existence is metaphorical.

> May be very fertile
> one. Like galaxies and brains.
>
> Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate
> basic entities and relations in theories which are always
> hypothetical.

False. There is nothing hypothetical about ingeous rock.

> I am just honest making explicit my use of the non
> constructive excluded middle in the arithmetical realm.
>
> You get stuck at step zero by a bullet you are ntroducing yourself, I
> 'm afraid.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:

On 4 Sep, 22:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:

...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers

exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their

existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical

statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued

backwards

I have never said that numbers exists because there are true

mathematical statements asserting their existence.

I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such

truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary to

even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a

universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like with

the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.

There is no usual sense of "exists" as the material I posted
demonstrates.

You have to be assuming that the existence of the UD is literal
and Platonic  since you care concluding that I am beign generated by
it and
my existeince is not merely metaphorical. The arguemnt doesn't go
through
otherwise.

Once you say "yes" to the doctor, there is a clear sense in which "you" (that is your third person relative computational state, the one the doctor digitalizes) exist in arithmetic, or exist arithmetically, and this in infinite exemplars, relatively to an infinity of universal numbers which executes the computation going through that state, and this in the arithmetical sense, which implied a subtle mathematical redundancy.

Then the MGA enforces that all universal machine first person future experience is statistically dependent of a sum on all those computations. 

You may read books by Boolos and Jeffrey, or Epstein & Carnielli, to see this. It is related to the representability of the computable functions in Robinson Arithmetic together with Church thesis.

I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are

part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic

way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does not

depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can 'save

your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA.

IF formalism is true  there is no UD. It simply doesn't exist
and doesn't genarate anything.

If formalism is true, there is no matter, either. 

I am still waiting your formal definition of "primary matter", and of "ontological existence".

I am not sure I understand how you can both believe to be a formalist and believe in *primary* matter. To be honest.

Both in the West and the East we known since the dream argument that *primary* matter is a metaphysical notion. That is the main difference between the Platonist (in my sense) and the Aristotelicians. Atheists and Christians are usually Aristotelicians, and their opposition hides the deeper opposition between (weak) materialist Aristotelician and (neo)-Platonist. 

It is here that the scientific attitude remind us to not commit ontological commitment, and to be agnostic, except on refuted statements.

I am agnostic on both Matter and God. With "B" = believe, "~" = not, "m" = "Matter exists" and "g" ="God exists", taking in mind that I am open for large sense of those words, I am agnostic in the sense that ~Bm & ~B~m & ~Bg & ~B~g. That's why I do research. (Matter with a big "m" = primary matter. In Plotinus the "One" and "Matter" are both beyond being/existence. That fits very well with AUDA.

 I am not agnostic about consciousness, and persons, though. 

And you don't need

really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.

Of course I need a real machine for a real interview.

You should avoid the use of 'real". In our context, this is the notion which we are discussing, or (re)defining. 

I have personally less doubt about my consciousness, and about my believe in the prime numbers than in anything material. Physicists avoid the question, except when interested in the conceptual problems posed by QM.

Bohr was ready to decree sometimes ago that the notion of reality did not apply to the microscopic. Nowadays we apply QM in cosmology, and we accept the price, that is the multiverse, but this still avoid the consciousness/reality relationship problem, when we assume comp. The MGA shows that we have to be a little more radical than Everett if we want to keep the CTM/comp idea.

As I just said on another forum: 'real' is a tricky notion.

All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But

fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp.

Mathematical existence is metaphorical if mathematical existence is
literal.

In your theory. I have no problem with that. I just refer you to an argument showing that such theories are epistemologically incompatible with the comp hypothesis, or CTM. 

Their existence is literal  if mathematical existence is metaphorical.

May be very fertile

one. Like galaxies and brains.

Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate

basic entities and relations in theories which are always

hypothetical.

False. There is nothing hypothetical about ingeous rock.

This is either mere wishful thinking, or you are not a machine. If you are a machine, then you confuse stable hypothesis with truth. "de mémoire de rose, je n'ai jamais vu mourir un jardinier" said the poet Fontenelle (from a rose's memory "I have never seen a gardiner dying". A possible misquote! 

Of course, we can play with words. Comp does provide an explanation of the existence of relatively stable patterns, already similar to quantum mechanics, so there is a sense, in the comp frame, that some rock are not hypothetical relatively to some observer. They are just not composed of little material definite things, they are singular maps on the local accessible probable computational histories. Why this is described by a wave? Probably because things get symmetrical and linear on the border of the universal machine ignorance, as the logic of "sensible" and "intelligible" matter suggests (already, cf AUDA).

With the SWE, you get a phenomenological account of the wave packet reduction through a comp subjective differentiation (that's mainly the work of Everett). But UDA shows that once you do that, you have to pursue the differentiation up to the justification of the SWE itself, from the numbers (or combinators, etc.). 

You are stuck at step 0 (you told me) by irrelevant philosophical considerations, I'm afraid. My point is mainly technical. UDA transforms the mind-body or consciousness/reality problem into a problem in mathematical computer science. If you are formalist, there is a complete formalist reading on what I do, indeed that's AUDA. A strict formalist can read UDA as a motivation for AUDA. But I have to insist that formalists are in general arithmetical realist ... in the formal sense of using the third excluded middle. I don't need more, and I can technically recast the whole thing with less (by using Markov intuitionistic principle).

The consistency of all this eventually resides in subtle aspects of the incompleteness phenomena in theoretical computer science. "Comp" is also for "computer science". Once you accept the excluded middle principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a "universe" full of living things there, developing complex views. 

You can say everything is metaphor but your consciousness: it is up to *your* work to make some things less metaphorical than others. 

We share, "obviously" long histories, and we are deep objects which can explain usual confusions about tokens and types.

And all this leads to a very elegant theory of everything. The ontology is defined by "p is true" if "p" is provable in Robinson Arithmetic. The epistemology is defined by "p is believed" if "p" is provable by Peano Arithmetic, or by any Löbian Machine described by Robinson Arithmetic. It is very concrete and a formalist should appreciate. Perhaps you should forget UDA for a while, and come back later, and study the "formal" AUDA part. It is my modest part in theoretical computer science, relying on key theorems by Gödel, Löb, Solovay, and many others. It is also a sequence of open problems, but the contrary would have been surprising. And there is an heroin there: the (classical) universal machine. And its little brother the (quantum) universal machine plays some key role too. AUDA shed some light on a two way road between those two notions. 

To be sure other part of math shows that, like the relation between braids and quantum computations, or Abramski's combinators algebra. The advantage of the "self-referential" approach, with the (formal) interview of the universal machine which introspects itself is that, by the Solovay G/G* splitting, we get the difference between the true (theological part) and the provable (the 'scientifically communicable' part).

A correct Löbian machine can study correctly (formally) the whole theology (which extends the science here) of a simpler Löbian machine. She cannot lift it correctly to herself, without falling in inconsistencies, but she can lift it in the interrogative and informal way, be it by hope, fear, bets, prayers or whatever. (or she can accept some 'truth' as new axioms and transform herself, but that's necessary risky).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Flammarion]

On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 4 Sep, 22:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
> >> On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> ...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers
> >>> exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> >>> existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> >>> statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> >>> backwards
>
> >> I have never said that numbers exists because there are true
> >> mathematical statements asserting their existence.
>
> >> I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such
> >> truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary  
> >> to
> >> even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a
> >> universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like  
> >> with
> >> the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.
>
> > There is no usual sense of "exists" as the material I posted
> > demonstrates.
>
> > You have to be assuming that the existence of the UD is literal
> > and Platonic  since you care concluding that I am beign generated by
> > it and
> > my existeince is not merely metaphorical. The arguemnt doesn't go
> > through
> > otherwise.
>
> Once you say "yes" to the doctor, there is a clear sense in which  
> "you" (that is your third person relative computational state, the one  
> the doctor digitalizes) exist in arithmetic, or exist arithmetically,  
> and this in infinite exemplars, relatively to an infinity of universal  
> numbers which executes the computation going through that state, and  
> this in the arithmetical sense, which implied a subtle mathematical  
> redundancy.

Not at all. I would only say yes to a material re-incarnation. I
don't believe in infinities of really existing immateial numbers.

> Then the MGA enforces that all universal machine first person future  
> experience is statistically dependent of a sum on all those  
> computations.

They don't exist/

> You may read books by Boolos and Jeffrey, or Epstein & Carnielli, to  
> see this. It is related to the representability of the computable  
> functions in Robinson Arithmetic together with Church thesis.
>
>
>
> >> I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are
> >> part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic
> >> way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does  
> >> not
> >> depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can  
> >> 'save
> >> your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA.
>
> > IF formalism is true  there is no UD. It simply doesn't exist
> > and doesn't genarate anything.
>
> If formalism is true, there is no matter, either.

No,that does not follow.

> I am still waiting your formal definition of "primary matter", and of  
> "ontological existence".

I don't have to give one. Formalism is not the claim
that everything is formal, it is the claim tha mathematics
is a formal game played by material beings, ie mathemaicians.

> I am not sure I understand how you can both believe to be a formalist  
> and believe in *primary* matter. To be honest.

You have misunderstood formalism

> Both in the West and the East we known since the dream argument that  
> *primary* matter is a metaphysical notion.

The existence of anyhting immaterial is a metaphysical notion

> That is the main difference  
> between the Platonist (in my sense) and the Aristotelicians. Atheists  
> and Christians are usually Aristotelicians, and their opposition hides  
> the deeper opposition between (weak) materialist Aristotelician and  
> (neo)-Platonist.
>
> It is here that the scientific attitude remind us to not commit  
> ontological commitment, and to be agnostic, except on refuted  
> statements.
>
> I am agnostic on both Matter and God. With "B" = believe, "~" = not,  
> "m" = "Matter exists" and "g" ="God exists", taking in mind that I am  
> open for large sense of those words, I am agnostic in the sense that  
> ~Bm & ~B~m & ~Bg & ~B~g. That's why I do research. (Matter with a big  
> "m" = primary matter. In Plotinus the "One" and "Matter" are both  
> beyond being/existence. That fits very well with AUDA.
>
>   I am not agnostic about consciousness, and persons, though.
>
>
>
> >> And you don't need
> >> really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.
>
> > Of course I need a real machine for a real interview.
>
> You should avoid the use of 'real". In our context, this is the notion  
> which we are discussing, or (re)defining.

How can I avoid "real" in a discussion of "real"?

> I have personally less doubt about my consciousness, and about my  
> believe in the prime numbers than in anything material. Physicists  
> avoid the question, except when interested in the conceptual problems  
> posed by QM.

You can't validly infer the actual non-existence of matter
from beliefs about numbers. At some stage you have
to argue that the "exists" in mathematical statemetns
is metaphysically loaded and should be interpreted
literally to mean actual existence. And that is precisely
because I cannot deny my own actual existence.

> Bohr was ready to decree sometimes ago that the notion of reality did  
> not apply to the microscopic. Nowadays we apply QM in cosmology, and  
> we accept the price, that is the multiverse, but this still avoid the  
> consciousness/reality relationship problem, when we assume comp. The  
> MGA shows that we have to be a little more radical than Everett if we  
> want to keep the CTM/comp idea.
> As I just said on another forum: 'real' is a tricky notion.
>
>
>
> >> All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But
> >> fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp.
>
> > Mathematical existence is metaphorical if mathematical existence is
> > literal.
>
> In your theory. I have no problem with that. I just refer you to an  
> argument showing that such theories are epistemologically incompatible  
> with the comp hypothesis, or CTM.

They are not incompatible with CTM. They are incompatible
with comp because comp=CTM+Platonism. I can keep CTM and
materialism by rejecting Platonism

> > Their existence is literal  if mathematical existence is metaphorical.
>
> >> May be very fertile
> >> one. Like galaxies and brains.
>
> >> Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate
> >> basic entities and relations in theories which are always
> >> hypothetical.
>
> > False. There is nothing hypothetical about ingeous rock.
>
> This is either mere wishful thinking, or you are not a machine. If you  
> are a machine, then you confuse stable hypothesis with truth. "de  
> mémoire de rose, je n'ai jamais vu mourir un jardinier" said the poet  
> Fontenelle (from a rose's memory "I have never seen a gardiner dying".  
> A possible misquote!

Everybody makes common-sense metaphysical commitments,
and that includes much of science. It only becomes problematical
in abstruse areas of physics. In any case, your argument is not-
metaphysically
non-comital, you are committed to the Platonic existence of numbers.
The difference between my position and yours is that my commitments
are closer to common sense.

> Of course, we can play with words. Comp does provide an explanation of  
> the existence of relatively stable patterns, already similar to  
> quantum mechanics, so there is a sense, in the comp frame, that some  
> rock are not hypothetical relatively to some observer. They are just  
> not composed of little material definite things, they are singular  
> maps on the local accessible probable computational histories. Why  
> this is described by a wave? Probably because things get symmetrical  
> and linear on the border of the universal machine ignorance, as the  
> logic of "sensible" and "intelligible" matter suggests (already, cf  
> AUDA).
>
> With the SWE, you get a phenomenological account of the wave packet  
> reduction through a comp subjective differentiation (that's mainly the  
> work of Everett). But UDA shows that once you do that, you have to  
> pursue the differentiation up to the justification of the SWE itself,  
> from the numbers (or combinators, etc.).
>
> You are stuck at step 0 (you told me) by irrelevant philosophical  
> considerations, I'm afraid. My point is mainly technical. UDA  
> transforms the mind-body or consciousness/reality problem into a  
> problem in mathematical computer science.

There is not UDA if there is no realy existng UD. There is no
really existing UD if Platonism is false.

>If you are formalist, there  
> is a complete formalist reading on what I do, indeed that's AUDA. A  
> strict formalist can read UDA as a motivation for AUDA. But I have to  
> insist that formalists are in general arithmetical realist ...

Only AR qua bivalence. The whole point of formalism
is the rejection of AR qua existence. However truth
alone does nto get you an existing UD, and therefore
does not get my existence inside it.

> in the  
> formal sense of using the third excluded middle. I don't need more,  
> and I can technically recast the whole thing with less (by using  
> Markov intuitionistic principle).
>
> The consistency of all this eventually resides in subtle aspects of  
> the incompleteness phenomena in theoretical computer science. "Comp"  
> is also for "computer science". Once you accept the excluded middle  
> principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a  
> "universe" full of living things there, developing complex views.

Nonsense. The LEM is just a formal rule. There is no inference
from bivalence to Platonism

> You can say everything is metaphor but your consciousness: it is up to  
> *your* work to make some things less metaphorical than others.
> We share, "obviously" long histories, and we are deep objects which  
> can explain usual confusions about tokens and types.
>
> And all this leads to a very elegant theory of everything. The  
> ontology is defined by "p is true" if "p" is provable in Robinson  
> Arithmetic.

That is not ontology. You keep thinkign you can get
ontology for free jsut by proving somehting on a
blackboard.

>The epistemology is defined by "p is believed" if "p" is  
> provable by Peano Arithmetic, or by any Löbian Machine described by  
> Robinson Arithmetic. It is very concrete and a formalist should  
> appreciate. Perhaps you should forget UDA for a while, and come back  
> later, and study the "formal" AUDA part. It is my modest part in  
> theoretical computer science, relying on key theorems by Gödel, Löb,  
> Solovay, and many others. It is also a sequence of open problems, but  
> the contrary would have been surprising. And there is an heroin there:  
> the (classical) universal machine. And its little brother the  
> (quantum) universal machine plays some key role too. AUDA shed some  
> light on a two way road between those two notions.
>
> To be sure other part of math shows that, like the relation between  
> braids and quantum computations, or Abramski's combinators algebra.  
> The advantage of the "self-referential" approach, with the (formal)  
> interview of the universal machine which introspects itself is that,  
> by the Solovay G/G* splitting, we get the difference between the true  
> (theological part) and the provable (the 'scientifically communicable'  
> part).
>
> A correct Löbian machine can study correctly (formally) the whole  
> theology (which extends the science here) of a simpler Löbian machine.  
> She cannot lift it correctly to herself, without falling in  
> inconsistencies, but she can lift it in the interrogative and informal  
> way, be it by hope, fear, bets, prayers or whatever. (or she can  
> accept some 'truth' as new axioms and transform herself, but that's  
> necessary risky).
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[John Mikes]

Bruno,

the more I read here on the "Church thesis" the less I know about it.

Is there a short description in 'non-technical' words about the 'essence' you hold instrumental in the applications you apply?

John M

On Fri, Sep 11, 2009 at 11:45 AM, Flammarion <peterdjones@...> wrote:

On 4 Sep, 22:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:
> On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > ...  Bruno has been arguign that numbers
> > exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> > existence. The counterargument is that "existence" in mathematical
> > statements is merely metaphorical. That is what is being argued
> > backwards
>
> I have never said that numbers exists because there are true
> mathematical statements asserting their existence.

> I am just saying that in the comp theory, I have to assume that such
> truth are not dependent of me, or of anything else. It is necessary to
> even just enunciate Church thesis. A weakening of Church thesis is 'a
> universal machine exists".  In the usual mathematical sense, like with
> the theorem asserting that 'prime numbers exists.

There is no usual sense of "exists" as the material I posted
demonstrates.

You have to be assuming that the existence of the UD is literal
and Platonic  since you care concluding that I am beign generated by
it and
my existeince is not merely metaphorical. The arguemnt doesn't go
through
otherwise.

> I just make explicit that elementary true arithmetical statements are
> part of the theory. You are free to interpret them in a formlaistic
> way, or in some realist way, or metaphorically. The reasoning does not
> depend on the intepretation, except that locally you bet you can 'save
> your relative state' in a digital backup, for UDA.

IF formalism is true  there is no UD. It simply doesn't exist
and doesn't genarate anything.

>And you don't need
> really that for the 'interview' of the universal machine.

Of course I need a real machine for a real interview.

> All theories in physics uses at least that arithmetical fragment. But
> fermions and bosons becomes metaphor, with comp.

Mathematical existence is metaphorical if mathematical existence is
literal.

Their existence is literal  if mathematical existence is metaphorical.

> May be very fertile
> one. Like galaxies and brains.
>
> Scientist does not commit themselves ontologically. They postulate
> basic entities and relations in theories which are always
> hypothetical.

False. There is nothing hypothetical about ingeous rock.

> I am just honest making explicit my use of the non
> constructive excluded middle in the arithmetical realm.
>
> You get stuck at step zero by a bullet you are ntroducing yourself, I
> 'm afraid.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Sep 2009, at 16:42, Flammarion wrote:

On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:

Once you say "yes" to the doctor, there is a clear sense in which  

"you" (that is your third person relative computational state, the one  

the doctor digitalizes) exist in arithmetic, or exist arithmetically,  

and this in infinite exemplars, relatively to an infinity of universal  

numbers which executes the computation going through that state, and  

this in the arithmetical sense, which implied a subtle mathematical  

redundancy.

Not at all.

It follows from saying "yes" to a material re-incarnation. I have no clue why you say so.

I would only say yes to a material re-incarnation.

yes that is comp.

I
don't believe in infinities of really existing immateial numbers.

You don't have to. *That* is the MGA point. Unless you make consciousness and matter into actual infinite, but then you can no more say yes to a *digital* surgeon.

Then the MGA enforces that all universal machine first person future  

experience is statistically dependent of a sum on all those  

computations.

They don't exist/

They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is all what is used.

If formalism is true, there is no matter, either.

No,that does not follow.

You believe in formalism for math, but not for physics. OK. Fair enough.

I was using "formalism" in metaphysics or theology.

The existence of anyhting immaterial is a metaphysical notion

I don't see why. I believe that the truth of a proposition like "It exist prime numbers" is a matter of mathematics, not of metaphysics. You seem to believe we have to do those reification, but the MGA point is that we don't need to do that, at least once we accept the idea that "I" am not "my material" body, as we do when saying yes to a doctor, even for a "material" re-incarnation, given that anything material is substituted by different "tokens". You still dodge the critics of any part of the argument, by using philosophically remark which you don't show the relevance *at the place of the reasoning*. Science does not work like that.

How can I avoid "real" in a discussion of "real"?

By adding "in the math sense" or "in the physical sense', etc. 

But you define "real" by primitively material. OK, but then you are obliged to admit that a movie of a computation does a computation, which is non sense.

I have personally less doubt about my consciousness, and about my  

believe in the prime numbers than in anything material. Physicists  

avoid the question, except when interested in the conceptual problems  

posed by QM.

You can't validly infer the actual non-existence of matter
from beliefs about numbers.

I have never done that. I show that we cannot epistemologically use a notion of matter to explain the first person account of observation.

At some stage you have
to argue that the "exists" in mathematical statemetns
is metaphysically loaded

At which stage, and why? 

and should be interpreted
literally to mean actual existence.

I don't see why. Arithmetical existence is quite enough. You need to reify matter, but MGA shows that such a move contradict the idea that I can survive through a digital substitution. You will save our time by reading the argument.

And that is precisely
because I cannot deny my own actual existence.

Yes, but you can deny your material existence, given that nobody has proved that primitive matter exists. This is already in the old dream argument used in both the west and the east by the (objective, non solipsist) idealist. You are begging the question.

They are not incompatible with CTM. They are incompatible
with comp because comp=CTM+Platonism. I can keep CTM and
materialism by rejecting Platonism

AR = classical logic can be appied in arithmetic (Arithmetical realism)

Platonism = "matter emerge from math"

Comp = CTM, and this include Church thesis, and thus arrithmetical realism.

Theorem: comp => platonism. or CTM => platonism.

You are confusing the hypothesis and the conclusion.

Everybody makes common-sense metaphysical commitments,
and that includes much of science. It only becomes problematical
in abstruse areas of physics. In any case, your argument is not-
metaphysically
non-comital, you are committed to the Platonic existence of numbers.

Given that I am using "Platonic" in the sense of the theologian, and not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind of the reader.

I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's all.

The difference between my position and yours is that my commitments
are closer to common sense.

That may be true, but I am not even sure about that. All we can say is that since the closure of Plato Academy, it is a Aristotelian theological tradition in Churches and in some "materialist" academies to mock Plato-like theologies, you may be right. But it is not common sense, it is Aristotelian habit. Cats believed in Mouse, but not that mouse are *primitively* material.

I believe in matter, you know. But not necessarily in primitive matter. I give you an argument, but you don't read it, so ...

There is not UDA if there is no realy existng UD. There is no
really existing UD if Platonism is false.

If you read UDA, you will see that it is using "physical existence" up to the seventh step, and then the 8th step decharge that assumption. Clearly your problem is with the MGA.

If you are formalist, there  

is a complete formalist reading on what I do, indeed that's AUDA. A  

strict formalist can read UDA as a motivation for AUDA. But I have to  

insist that formalists are in general arithmetical realist ...

Only AR qua bivalence. The whole point of formalism
is the rejection of AR qua existence.

This does not make sense. AUDA works very well with a formal notion of mathematical existence.

However truth
alone does nto get you an existing UD, and therefore
does not get my existence inside it.

You existence in the UD* (execution of the UD in arithmetic) *in the third person* sense is pretty obvious, once you say yes for the "material execution". Your existence of you in the first person sense is a non trivial consequence of the MGA.

The consistency of all this eventually resides in subtle aspects of  

the incompleteness phenomena in theoretical computer science. "Comp"  

is also for "computer science". Once you accept the excluded middle  

principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a  

"universe" full of living things there, developing complex views.

Nonsense. The LEM is just a formal rule. There is no inference
from bivalence to Platonism

Of course. This is provided by the MGA. Here you are using Platonism in my sense (Plato's sense). Good.

And all this leads to a very elegant theory of everything. The  

ontology is defined by "p is true" if "p" is provable in Robinson  

Arithmetic.

That is not ontology. You keep thinkign you can get
ontology for free jsut by proving somehting on a
blackboard.

It just means that something exists if "Ex P(... x ...) is provable in Robinson Arithmetic.

I cannot get a metaphysical existence of primitive matter from that. But this is not a problem.

Also, when I say that RA provides the ontology, this is in the frame where I trust the doctor, so I don't dispute the "metaphysical (if you want)" existence of the first person conscious experience. saying "yes" to a doctor is not part of a proof on a backboard, it is a theological believe in form of material (at first, in step zero) re-incarnation.

I am astonished how much you can discuss an argument without reading it. 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

John,

On 12 Sep 2009, at 17:01, John Mikes wrote:

> Bruno,
> the more I read here on the "Church thesis" the less I know about it.
> Is there a short description in 'non-technical' words about the  
> 'essence' you hold instrumental in the applications you apply?

I will explain in detail Church thesis after the explanation of Cantor  
and Kleene's results. If there are still problems, please ask at that  
moment. Just now would be slightly premature and confusing I think.

In a nutshell, Church thesis is the statement that "lambda calculus",  
or any of the many provably equivalent formal systems,  provides a  
correct and complete description of the notion of computability.
A provably weaker statement of Church thesis is the affirmation of the  
(mathematical) existence of universal machine. The mathematical  
existence of the UD is a direct consequence of CT.

Best,

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[m.a.-2]

Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

Bruno,

           Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.). Many modern schools of philosophy reject the idea. Thanks,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            m.a.

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:02 AM

Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

Given that I am using "Platonic" in the sense of the theologian, and not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind of the reader.

I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's all.

 

Once you accept the excluded middle  

principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a  

"universe" full of living things there, developing complex views.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Bruno Marchal]

Marty,

           Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.).

Without the excluded middle (A or not A), or without classical logic, it is harder to prove non constructive result. In theoretical artificial intelligence, or in computational learning theory, but also in many place in mathematics, it happens that we can prove, when using classical logic, the existence of some objects, for example machines with some interesting property, and this without being able to exhibit them.

In my preceding post on the square root of two, I have illustrated such a non constructive existence proof. The problem consisted in deciding if there exist a couple of irrational  numbers x and y such that x^y is rational. 

And by appying the excluded middle, in this case by admitting that a number is either rational or is not rational, I was able to show that sqrt(2)^sqrt(2) was a solution, OR that (sqrt(2)^sqrt(2))^sqrt(2) was a solution. This, for a realist solves the existence problem, despite we don't know yet which solution it is. Such an OR is called non construcrtive. You know that the suspect is Alfred or Arthur, but you don't know which one. Such information are useful though.

Many modern schools of philosophy reject the idea. Thanks,  

Classical logic is the good idea, imo, for the explorer of the unknown, who is not afraid of its ignorance.

Abandoning the excluded middle is very nice to modelize or analyse the logic of construction, or of self-expansion.

Classical logic can actually help to exhibit the multiple splendors of such logic, even, more so when assuming explicitly Church thesis, or some intuitionist version of Church thesis. It is a very rich subject.

Now there are Billions (actually an infinity) of ways to weaken classical logic. When it is use in context related to "real problem", I have no issue.

When we will arrive to Church thesis (after Cantor theorem), you will see that it needs the excluded middle principe to make sense.

Few scientists doubt it, and virtually none doubt it for arithmetic. It is the idea that a well defined number property applied on a well defined number is either true or false. The property being defined with addition and multiplication symbols.

I hope this help. Soon, you will get new illustration of the importance of the excluded middle.

I could also explain that classical logic is far more easy than non classical logic, where you have no more truth table, and except some philosopher are virtually known by no one, as far as practice is taken into account.

Technically, UDA stands up with many weakening of classical logics, but it makes the math harder, and given that the arithmetical hypostases justifies the points of view by what is technically equivalent weakening of classical logics, it confuses the picture.

To a non mathematician, I would say that classical logic is the most suited for comparing the many non classical internal views of universal machines. I would add it helps to take into account our ignorance. A simpler answer is that without it I have no Church thesis in its usual classical sense.

Bruno

 

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:02 AM

Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

Given that I am using "Platonic" in the sense of the theologian, and not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind of the reader.

I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's all.

 

Once you accept the excluded middle  

principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a  

"universe" full of living things there, developing complex views.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[m.a.-2]

Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

Thanks,

              This does indeed clarify the subject and puts it in a perspective that I feel that I can understand as much as possible without working through the intricacies of the proof.       m.a.

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 1:12 PM

Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

Marty,

           Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.).

Without the excluded middle (A or not A), or without classical logic, it is harder to prove non constructive result. In theoretical artificial intelligence, or in computational learning theory, but also in many place in mathematics, it happens that we can prove, when using classical logic, the existence of some objects, for example machines with some interesting property, and this without being able to exhibit them.

In my preceding post on the square root of two, I have illustrated such a non constructive existence proof. The problem consisted in deciding if there exist a couple of irrational  numbers x and y such that x^y is rational. 

And by appying the excluded middle, in this case by admitting that a number is either rational or is not rational, I was able to show that sqrt(2)^sqrt(2) was a solution, OR that (sqrt(2)^sqrt(2))^sqrt(2) was a solution. This, for a realist solves the existence problem, despite we don't know yet which solution it is. Such an OR is called non construcrtive. You know that the suspect is Alfred or Arthur, but you don't know which one. Such information are useful though.

Many modern schools of philosophy reject the idea. Thanks,  

Classical logic is the good idea, imo, for the explorer of the unknown, who is not afraid of its ignorance.

Abandoning the excluded middle is very nice to modelize or analyse the logic of construction, or of self-expansion.

Classical logic can actually help to exhibit the multiple splendors of such logic, even, more so when assuming explicitly Church thesis, or some intuitionist version of Church thesis. It is a very rich subject.

Now there are Billions (actually an infinity) of ways to weaken classical logic. When it is use in context related to "real problem", I have no issue.

When we will arrive to Church thesis (after Cantor theorem), you will see that it needs the excluded middle principe to make sense.

Few scientists doubt it, and virtually none doubt it for arithmetic. It is the idea that a well defined number property applied on a well defined number is either true or false. The property being defined with addition and multiplication symbols.

I hope this help. Soon, you will get new illustration of the importance of the excluded middle.

I could also explain that classical logic is far more easy than non classical logic, where you have no more truth table, and except some philosopher are virtually known by no one, as far as practice is taken into account.

Technically, UDA stands up with many weakening of classical logics, but it makes the math harder, and given that the arithmetical hypostases justifies the points of view by what is technically equivalent weakening of classical logics, it confuses the picture.

To a non mathematician, I would say that classical logic is the most suited for comparing the many non classical internal views of universal machines. I would add it helps to take into account our ignorance. A simpler answer is that without it I have no Church thesis in its usual classical sense.

Bruno

 

----- Original Message -----

From: marchal@...

To: everything-list@...

Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:02 AM

Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

Given that I am using "Platonic" in the sense of the theologian, and not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind of the reader.

I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's all.

 

Once you accept the excluded middle  

principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a  

"universe" full of living things there, developing complex views.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

[Flammarion]

On 13 Sep, 18:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@...> wrote:

> Marty,
>
> >            Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the
> > principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully
> > without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.).
>
> Without the excluded middle (A or not A), or without classical logic,
> it is harder to prove non constructive result. In theoretical
> artificial intelligence, or in computational learning theory, but also
> in many place in mathematics, it happens that we can prove, when using
> classical logic, the existence of some objects, for example machines
> with some interesting property, and this without being able to exhibit
> them.

What you are proving is only existence in the mathematical sense.
The philosophical quesiton of whether backwards-E should be taken
literally (Platonism) or only metaphorically (formalism) is left
unadresses
by the PEM.

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@...
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@...
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---