extending host-meta beyond IETF extensions; ws-security policy like rules

View: New views
3 Messages — Rating Filter:   Alert me  

extending host-meta beyond IETF extensions; ws-security policy like rules

by Peter Williams :: Rate this Message:

Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message

if one buys into host-meta, using scopes to indentity for which URI (user) identifies this host is authoritative (particularly in  world where cloud providers on 1  domain supports app-domains on other domains) I can see more scope rules being required.

On an app-domain basis, and then a per-user basis, each overriding the cloud providers scope, host-meta scopre for "authoritative sreg attributes" might be added to the app-domain's host-meta file.

The RP might want to know which attibutes the app-domain has "verified", and speaks for (above and beyond the cloud provider merely forwarding the values from the users profile).

Despite having outsourced to google discovery and per-user profile management for my app domain on my domain's URI, I app domain assert that I legallty represent the value of sreg.website to be in compliance with my posted policy (also hanging off of my app domains host-meta).

In all likelihood, this day and age, the policy would be an RDFa document, so its readable by hiumans amd the machie-readable elements can express rules in an algerab not dissimialr to ws-securitypocliy (controlling which claims are required at which RPs, and which an IDP (i.e. app-domain, not cloud provider) is itself will to vouch for, legally.

Re: extending host-meta beyond IETF extensions; ws-security policy like rules

by Santosh Rajan :: Rate this Message:

Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message

The more I look at it, the more I can see that this whole "Scope" story is a can (truckload?) of worms waiting to be opened.

For this the original objectives of XRD and host-meta have been changed somewhere down the line. After the "acct:" scheme came up.
1) XRD from "descriptor" to "markup language"
2) host-meta from "simple mapper" to "extending DNS".

My suggestion is that we stick to the original objectives for "Version 1.0" of XRD and host-meta spec, and use only the "http(s) scheme, and get this whole thing working in the first place (acct: can be used to describe an email like identifier in the Subject). Adding "Scope" and extending DNS etc can be done in a later Version of the spec.

And this is not my idea. On the webfinger list, somebody from (IETF I think) has suggested the same thing. That they develop a simple Version 1 to start with.

Unfortunately these guys don't seem to be in a great mood to listen to reason.


On Fri, Oct 30, 2009 at 11:51 PM, Peter Williams <home_pw@...> wrote:

if one buys into host-meta, using scopes to indentity for which URI (user)
identifies this host is authoritative (particularly in  world where cloud
providers on 1  domain supports app-domains on other domains) I can see more
scope rules being required.

On an app-domain basis, and then a per-user basis, each overriding the cloud
providers scope, host-meta scopre for "authoritative sreg attributes" might
be added to the app-domain's host-meta file.

The RP might want to know which attibutes the app-domain has "verified", and
speaks for (above and beyond the cloud provider merely forwarding the values
from the users profile).

Despite having outsourced to google discovery and per-user profile
management for my app domain on my domain's URI, I app domain assert that I
legallty represent the value of sreg.website to be in compliance with my
posted policy (also hanging off of my app domains host-meta).

In all likelihood, this day and age, the policy would be an RDFa document,
so its readable by hiumans amd the machie-readable elements can express
rules in an algerab not dissimialr to ws-securitypocliy (controlling which
claims are required at which RPs, and which an IDP (i.e. app-domain, not
cloud provider) is itself will to vouch for, legally.
--
View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/extending-host-meta-beyond-IETF-extensions--ws-security-policy-like-rules-tp26134827p26134827.html
Sent from the OpenID - General mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

_______________________________________________
general mailing list
general@...
http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-general



--
http://hi.im/santosh



_______________________________________________
general mailing list
general@...
http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-general

Re: extending host-meta beyond IETF extensions; ws-security policy like rules

by Peter Williams :: Rate this Message:

Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message

Some parts of this message have been removed. Learn more about Nabble's security policy.

Yes, the first draft of the I-D needs a good rewrite. The writing style is hurting its mission, particularly in IETF where the technical writing is itself a premium marker of what might make it to internet standards status (one day). But, it’s only draft #1 - to be fair to the author!

 

This got rather long. Speed read, and don’t waste more than 2 minutes on it.

 

 

I also went through a moment when I thought: hmm, if one is really going to focus on domains (and domain-names), does it really make sense to put the metadata in a file (rather than add RRs to DNS)? The answer was yes, on the merits (and given the successful takeup of .crt file for certs, stored on webservers).

 

-          Adding RRs to DNS will probably take a decade of work. What sensible business community would want to wait that long?

-          Putting a file on a host, written in XML and located by domain-name, is easy and scales to the size that  DNS scale to

-          Any admin can write a file on a web server on a well  known URI, as can simple wizards that provision an app-domain by default (similar to how ISP’s auto-provision web farm tenants, located by host-header)

-          What admins do today in HTML to stuff 5 meta links with link attributes in the HTML header, they can do  in XML (in an largely equivalent markup). Yes, one has to ask: why not use RDFa for that? The answer is probably: compatibility in spirit with openid legacy and easier upgradability of existing libs at RPs - that don’t need a full RDFa parser

-          What openid has already done with meta links in HTML and meta links in XRD file for OP providers and their users’ XRDs evidently works, and worked for openid adoption this far. Don’t fix what aint broken.

-          It’s all, quite properly, a standardization of what myopenid did already using various adhoc mechanisms, in their “for domains” rollout model. Now everyone benefits from the standardization of techniques. This is openness for all to see.

 

The thing that has really happened is innovation around the  “google apps for domains” delegation, in which one domain can speak for another – enabling a cloud provider to deliver OP or RP services in the name of its app-domain.

 

Beyond merely expressing the delegation between names in two administrative regions, one then has the issue of: how does the RP know its authoritative? We could wax lyrical how X.500 1993 standard solved this classical identifier/domains properly in DN space (allowing for the likes of ou group policy and federated trusts between transitive or mapped domains in Active Directory), but that all irrelevant. Here its all motivated by the topics of directed identity and law #4 semantics, which introduces locator and identifier semantics that simply require more involved validation logics than simple meta link resolution offers.

 

As the nature of being an OP means typically serving per user XRDs, one has the issue of pointing at the URI where as cloud provider one serves up the user XRDS “in the name of any one of 10 million app-domains”; ensuring the RP can tell which user XRDs authoritatively belong to which one of the 10 million hosted app domains.

 

I don’t think one can pull out the user XRD locator from the app-domain scoping, or pull out the cloud outsourcing of app-domains from the user XRD locating, or the attributed linking from the design of the markup.  They all go together, to address the above. Standards are about standardization, and that’s what its clearly doing.

 

As much as folks want to say the XRD1.0 is fundamentally different from the XRD we all used in the YADIS period, it isn’t. It is simply being unbunded from http and XRI identifiers, and the SEP-style markup updated to now align in markup concept with http meta links (learning from atom).

 

Calling an XRD a descriptor does not worry me. that’s just of bit of standard abstract metadata-speak. It’s a magic word, consistent with using conventions in English when talking in and about metamodels. Using formal Spanish would do better than using English for this - since one has the latinate structure to make internal lots of references within long 200 word, multi-clause sentences. But, its being written in English, which uses conventions, instead. Once you get used to the magic words, its short and snappy. Pick your evil: extended latin grammar like Newton used for the laws of physics in the 1670s , or subtle conventions for the laws of identity, in 2010.

 

Yes I sometimes wish the metamodel was as consistent as it was in the XRI days ( a descriptor is metadata about an identifier), but it’s not; so there. In the case of host-meta, I find myself believing (though it only partly says it): its “about” an domain-name – obviously an identifier. If the author could just say what he means, rather than be so abstract!

 

Is one “extending DNS” by referring to a file on a web server located having used DNS to resolve the authority component of a URI scheme when it treated as and infact IS a domain name? No. One does the same thing in X.509 .crt files stored on web servers, whose DNs are indexes in a directory. IETF already standardized the latter, in some PKI RFC whose number changes every few years. The world of NATO directories with its 300 page standard for domain delegation within the DN-centric DIT and multi-schema metadata distribution within “autonomous policy regions” in a  DIB …didn’t collapse, and infact didn’t even blink. The internet just went around ISO, in 3 paragraphs, and stuffed an X.509 cert in a file on a webserver, where the file is located by domain in a http URL. Ditto for crl files, trust anchors, and trust chains.

 

If one failed to put a subject DN in an X.509 cert persisted to a .crt file locatable on a well known http URI on some domain’s webservers, and one then put 5 subject alt names in that structure each using the URI name form (now playing the role of 5 links in an XRD and even a URI “template”) would the missing subject DN matter to the semantics of X.509? No.

 

Does a cert in a .crt file already have a “scheme mapping” notion? Yes. Its called the “alt names” construct for subjects (and issuers). No patent claims there. Though, its clearer in the host-meta conception (I think).

 

Does a cert in a .crt file already have the notion that URI scheme “authorities” have jurisdictions, and can be tied of “domains” – that “govern” _authorities_. Yes. It’s called the cn=<domain> field (circa 1995) and  the more modern conventions that place a list of domain names in an subject alt name. No patent claims there; the cert as metadata (stuffed in a file with a well-known file extension, stored on a webserver locatable by http URL) already did it. No patent or PhD originality claim for that non-invention.

 

If  one buys into all this (and one  views signed XRD much as a modern signed cert with a change of format from ASN.1 to XML), then one might as well work within its framework. Might as well now use its expressions to address, per domain (on a “host” basis) and for each app-domain: how to enable sreg and ax attributes to be  described using additional metadata - hanging off the host-meta links. Then one gets to make meta-statements about sreg and ax attributes, when treating them as “claims”, that in turn drive claim-based identity systems.

 

And there is the rub. This is all a web2.0 style way of doing what VeriSIgn/IBM/Microsoft already did with ws-security following in the OSI styles and traditions of ECMA’s ROS and related security standards (and web3.0 folks are now starting doing with secured and trusted semweb metadata built using RESTful style).

 

So what’s new….? There are multiple standards to choose from, each doing the same thing! Little has changed in 25+ years, except that its all now real (vs paper) and only getting bigger and bigger. As one scale up, the engineering has to re-scale with it. Lots of standards politics will be present, as each group tries to win. As always , folks will apply rhetoric and argumentation, to help make their case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Santosh Rajan [mailto:santrajan@...]
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2009 8:45 PM
To: Peter Williams
Cc: general@...
Subject: Re: [OpenID] extending host-meta beyond IETF extensions; ws-security policy like rules

 

The more I look at it, the more I can see that this whole "Scope" story is a can (truckload?) of worms waiting to be opened.

 

For this the original objectives of XRD and host-meta have been changed somewhere down the line. After the "acct:" scheme came up.

1) XRD from "descriptor" to "markup language"

2) host-meta from "simple mapper" to "extending DNS".

 

My suggestion is that we stick to the original objectives for "Version 1.0" of XRD and host-meta spec, and use only the "http(s) scheme, and get this whole thing working in the first place (acct: can be used to describe an email like identifier in the Subject). Adding "Scope" and extending DNS etc can be done in a later Version of the spec.

 

And this is not my idea. On the webfinger list, somebody from (IETF I think) has suggested the same thing. That they develop a simple Version 1 to start with.

 

Unfortunately these guys don't seem to be in a great mood to listen to reason.

 

On Fri, Oct 30, 2009 at 11:51 PM, Peter Williams <home_pw@...> wrote:


if one buys into host-meta, using scopes to indentity for which URI (user)
identifies this host is authoritative (particularly in  world where cloud
providers on 1  domain supports app-domains on other domains) I can see more
scope rules being required.

On an app-domain basis, and then a per-user basis, each overriding the cloud
providers scope, host-meta scopre for "authoritative sreg attributes" might
be added to the app-domain's host-meta file.

The RP might want to know which attibutes the app-domain has "verified", and
speaks for (above and beyond the cloud provider merely forwarding the values
from the users profile).

Despite having outsourced to google discovery and per-user profile
management for my app domain on my domain's URI, I app domain assert that I
legallty represent the value of sreg.website to be in compliance with my
posted policy (also hanging off of my app domains host-meta).

In all likelihood, this day and age, the policy would be an RDFa document,
so its readable by hiumans amd the machie-readable elements can express
rules in an algerab not dissimialr to ws-securitypocliy (controlling which
claims are required at which RPs, and which an IDP (i.e. app-domain, not
cloud provider) is itself will to vouch for, legally.
--
View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/extending-host-meta-beyond-IETF-extensions--ws-security-policy-like-rules-tp26134827p26134827.html
Sent from the OpenID - General mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

_______________________________________________
general mailing list
general@...
http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-general




--
http://hi.im/santosh


_______________________________________________
general mailing list
general@...
http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-general