first-person vs third person view

[Miroslav Dobsicek]

In the September'09 issue of The Reasoner

http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(9).pdf

Fonseca and Gartner present an argument for a difference between the
first and third person point of view. In the October issue,

http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(10).pdf

the argument is being criticized by Erich Rast. I don't find the
argument very convincing since their notion of simulation is too vague.
However, I don't follow the criticism. Could someone help a little bit?

Cheers,
 mirek




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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/10/1 Miroslav Dobsicek <m.dobsicek@...>:

>
> In the September'09 issue of The Reasoner
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(9).pdf
>
> Fonseca and Gartner present an argument for a difference between the
> first and third person point of view. In the October issue,
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(10).pdf
>
> the argument is being criticized by Erich Rast. I don't find the
> argument very convincing since their notion of simulation is too vague.
> However, I don't follow the criticism. Could someone help a little bit?

In the articles, there are two persons, P1 and P2, where P2 is an
exact physical clone of P1 created by an external observer P3. P1 has
the self S1, comprising a set of beliefs and attitudes, including the
knowledge k* that this experiment is occurring and the belief bel* "I
am P1". P2 has the self S2, which by definition contains the same set
of beliefs and attitudes, so S1=S2. The first article suggests that
bel* lacks a truth value from the POV of P1 or P2, but does have a
truth value from the POV of P3. This is claimed to be "somewhat
paradoxical", since it means S1=S2 in one case but not in the other.
However, the second article makes the point that knowledge (true
belief) depends on external reality and cannot be relative to a
simulation, and claims that this invalidates the first article's
conclusions that you can never know if you are the clone or the
original and that the identity of the self is relative to the POV.

It appears that "person" in these articles is used to mean physical
instantiation while "self" is used to mean consciousness. I don't see
why it is claimed in the first article that S1=/S2 from P3's POV,
since S refers only to subjective content, and therefore I don't see
the relevance of the second article's assertion that knowledge depends
on external reality. I agree that it is impossible to know if you are
the clone or the original but the claim that identity of the self is
relative to the POV seems to me to be meaningless.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[John Mikes]

Excellent points, Stathis.

What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of a knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding about it. 

The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that both are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and so evolve differently. 

I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not 'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our 'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are (anybody knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought to add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the "physical". 

(What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know about some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by the brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow"). 

 

 

On Sun, Oct 4, 2009 at 12:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:

2009/10/1 Miroslav Dobsicek <m.dobsicek@...>:
>
> In the September'09 issue of The Reasoner
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(9).pdf
>
> Fonseca and Gartner present an argument for a difference between the
> first and third person point of view. In the October issue,
>
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(10).pdf
>
> the argument is being criticized by Erich Rast. I don't find the
> argument very convincing since their notion of simulation is too vague.
> However, I don't follow the criticism. Could someone help a little bit?

In the articles, there are two persons, P1 and P2, where P2 is an
exact physical clone of P1 created by an external observer P3. P1 has
the self S1, comprising a set of beliefs and attitudes, including the
knowledge k* that this experiment is occurring and the belief bel* "I
am P1". P2 has the self S2, which by definition contains the same set
of beliefs and attitudes, so S1=S2. The first article suggests that
bel* lacks a truth value from the POV of P1 or P2, but does have a
truth value from the POV of P3. This is claimed to be "somewhat
paradoxical", since it means S1=S2 in one case but not in the other.
However, the second article makes the point that knowledge (true
belief) depends on external reality and cannot be relative to a
simulation, and claims that this invalidates the first article's
conclusions that you can never know if you are the clone or the
original and that the identity of the self is relative to the POV.

It appears that "person" in these articles is used to mean physical
instantiation while "self" is used to mean consciousness. I don't see
why it is claimed in the first article that S1=/S2 from P3's POV,
since S refers only to subjective content, and therefore I don't see
the relevance of the second article's assertion that knowledge depends
on external reality. I agree that it is impossible to know if you are
the clone or the original but the claim that identity of the self is
relative to the POV seems to me to be meaningless.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/10/5 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:
> Excellent points, Stathis.
> What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of a
> knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding about
> it.

This is true, but there is a distinction between the private and the
public. What I am able to observe, record and share about you has a
lot in common with what billions of other people could observe, record
and share about you, given the opportunity, even if there are
individual differences. But what you experience yourself is - somehow
- qualitatively different.

> The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that both
> are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and so
> evolve differently.

I think it is assumed for the purpose of the experiment that the
relevant environments are controlled so that the two instantiations
remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times. Of course, in practice if
you made an exact copy of yourself and released it into the
environment within fractions of a second it will start to
differentiate from you.

> I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not
> 'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our
> 'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are (anybody
> knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought to
> add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the
> "physical".
> (What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know about
> some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by the
> brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow").

We start off assuming a physicalist comp (for want of a better term)
where the mental supervenes on the physical, which is what Bruno is
getting at (as a first step) when he asks if you will say "yes" to the
doctor if offered a new digital brain. But then, following this
assumption to its conclusion, it turns out that physicalist comp is
quite difficult to maintain.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[John Mikes]

Good morning, Stathis,

 thanks for the friendly early-bird detailed reply - I like almost all of it.

Just to keep the tradition of the list:

 

"...billions of other people could observe, record and share about you, given the opportunity, even if there are individual differences..."

 

this is like a 'democratic voting' (what I deny) where everybody has different interests, yet vote for one (the best liar) - just to have a consensus. Those "individual differences" may be devastating beyond the boundaries we usually limit our opinios to. Show me ONE instant where the personal input of adjustment does not enter - even public - understanding of any 'opinion'. And thanks for the 1st par. last sentence's "somehow" - a landmark for me<G>.
*

If the experiment keeps the instantiations so that they

 

"...remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times..."

 

then I reject the reality of those experimental conditions. A clone is different from it's original even at a most careful identity measure, if not otherwise by some different (spatial? etc.) (co)-ordinates for environmental impacts.

Such instrumental differences also arise from (sub?)molecular built of structure, the origin of atoms (if I condone such physicalistic figments at all).

 I stand corrected: No clone can be "identical", not  even at the instantiation level. (My fundamental objection to any 'teleportational' replication as well).

*

"We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."

 

Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist ideas are at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would say "NO" to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new brain would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but not digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha ha) mind.

 

Have a good week

 

John Mikes

 

On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 5:58 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@...> wrote:

2009/10/5 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Excellent points, Stathis.
> What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of a
> knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding about
> it.

This is true, but there is a distinction between the private and the
public. What I am able to observe, record and share about you has a
lot in common with what billions of other people could observe, record
and share about you, given the opportunity, even if there are
individual differences. But what you experience yourself is - somehow
- qualitatively different.

> The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that both
> are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and so
> evolve differently.

I think it is assumed for the purpose of the experiment that the
relevant environments are controlled so that the two instantiations
remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times. Of course, in practice if
you made an exact copy of yourself and released it into the
environment within fractions of a second it will start to
differentiate from you.

> I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not
> 'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our
> 'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are (anybody
> knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought to
> add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the
> "physical".
> (What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know about
> some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by the
> brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow").

We start off assuming a physicalist comp (for want of a better term)
where the mental supervenes on the physical, which is what Bruno is
getting at (as a first step) when he asks if you will say "yes" to the
doctor if offered a new digital brain. But then, following this
assumption to its conclusion, it turns out that physicalist comp is
quite difficult to maintain.


--

Stathis Papaioannou
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[Stathis Papaioannou-2]

2009/10/6 John Mikes <jamikes@...>:

> Good morning, Stathis,
>  thanks for the friendly early-bird detailed reply - I like almost all of
> it.
> Just to keep the tradition of the list:
>
> "...billions of other people could observe, record and share about you,
> given the opportunity, even if there are individual differences..."
>
> this is like a 'democratic voting' (what I deny) where everybody has
> different interests, yet vote for one (the best liar) - just to have a
> consensus. Those "individual differences" may be devastating beyond the
> boundaries we usually limit our opinios to. Show me ONE instant where the
> personal input of adjustment does not enter - even public - understanding of
> any 'opinion'. And thanks for the 1st par. last sentence's "somehow" - a
> landmark for me<G>.

The billions of observers would agree on such things as your height,
weight, colour of your jacket, frequency spectrum of sound emitted by
your vocal cords, and so on. These things are public and there could
be unanimous agreement on them, even if the observers were aliens who
have never seen a human before. On the other hand, guesses as to your
subjective experience would remain guesses, and moreover would be
guesses based on the possible subjective experience of the individual
observer.

> If the experiment keeps the instantiations so that they
>
> "...remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times..."
>
> then I reject the reality of those experimental conditions. A clone is
> different from it's original even at a most careful identity measure, if not
> otherwise by some different (spatial? etc.) (co)-ordinates for environmental
> impacts.
> Such instrumental differences also arise from (sub?)molecular built of
> structure, the origin of atoms (if I condone such physicalistic figments at
> all).
>  I stand corrected: No clone can be "identical", not  even at the
> instantiation level. (My fundamental objection to any 'teleportational'
> replication as well).

A digital clone would be exactly identical. We rely on this fact when
we run computer software: the software should behave in exactly the
same way whatever hardware it is running on, given the same inputs. If
the brain is Turing emulable, the same should apply to minds; if not,
then perhaps not.

> "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."
>
> Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist ideas are
> at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would say "NO"
> to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new brain
> would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but not
> digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha ha) mind.

So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with
computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking
computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are
clear that this is the case.



--
Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruno Marchal]

John, Stathis, Mirek, Peter,

On 06 Oct 2009, at 13:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote to John,:

>>
>> "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."
>>
>> Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist  
>> ideas are
>> at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would  
>> say "NO"
>> to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new  
>> brain
>> would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but  
>> not
>> digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha  
>> ha) mind.
>
> So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with
> computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking
> computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are
> clear that this is the case.

John, I appreciate Stathis' answer. The goal has never been to  
convinced anybody that comp is true.
Actuallyy, I have the feeling that *too much* scientist believes in  
comp, and this without realizing the consequences.

On the contrary,  the goal here is to show how much "crazy" comp is,  
once we dare to take it as literally true. Notably to show that comp  
leads to the first person indeterminacies, and eventually to the  
reversal of the current Aristotelian theology (shared by many atheists  
and christians alike) which relies on a 'religious belief/dogma" on  
the primary character of matter.

Actually comp *is*, strictly speaking, unbelievable. With some natural  
definition it can be shown provably unbelievable by (correct) machines  
(assuming their consistency), and that is why I insist that comp is  
directly akin to an act of faith, and that saying yes to the doctor is  
a theological act.

Personally, I doubt comp, but this is a bit diabolical, because  
(correct) machine have to doubt comp for remaining consistent. So my  
doubt confirms comp. Of course a confirmation is not a proof, so I can  
doubt comp and remain consistent!

Mirek, I agree with Stathis about his comment on the papers you  
refered too.
Note that it is very difficult to define completely what a first  
person is, but, for the matter of reasoning partial definitions can  
work very well, and note that those definitions used in UDA and AUDA  
do refer only to sharable third person notions. (In science we cannot  
invoke as argument first person truth, but of course we can tackle the  
first person notion itself.  Through assumptions and definitions, the  
notion of first person is partially amenable to third person notions.

In the UDA the first person discourse are defined by the memory, or  
the personal diary of the one who enter the teleporting (or  
duplicating) devices. So it is the memory of the one who is  
annihilated and reconstituted. The 3 person is just the usual  
discourse of an external (with respect to the teleporting device)  
observer. This works very well for a (artifiicial) machine. It is  
obvious that a program cannot measure the delay where it is not  
executed, for example, so the difference between first and third  
person is made obvious (self-duplication made it even observable in  
some sense).

In the AUDA, it is more difficult, and I have been stuck on this  
during many years. But then I realized that the oldest definition of a  
"knower", the one which define 'knowing' by believing a truth, works  
very well in that context, and so I defined, in arithmetic, the first  
person by the arithmetical knower, following Boolos and Goldblat. To  
know that 1+1=2 is Beweisbar(godel number of '1+1=2') & 1+1 = 2.

Such a definition of knowledge is well debated since a long time by  
philosophers. It appears in very old Indian and Chinese texts, and in  
the Theaetetus of Plato. In fine, you can see that those who object to  
such a definition are those who believe that they can distinguish  
reality and dream, or, in our context, reality and digital simulation  
of it, and this instantaneously. Again, this would contradict comp  
(our working hypothesis). I refer you to the second paper you have  
mentioned as an example.

Another example treated in detail in "conscience et mécanisme" are  
works by Malcolm. In a book on 'dreaming' Malcolm argues that we are  
not conscious during a dream, and in papers he argues against comp.  
The logical structure of the argument are identicals.

Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our  
discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of  
"ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your  
private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel  
that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1-
I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable.  
I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably  
between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?

Soon, but not so soon, hopefully this or next week, some more  
explanation on diagonalization.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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[david.nyman]

2009/10/7 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>

> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel
> that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1-
> I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable.
> I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
> between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?

For me, RITSIAR refers to 1-I.  I think the disagreement over ontology
has been largely about whether theoretical schemas, based on AR or PM,
must be treated as RITSIAR in a directly identified 3-I sense.  I
think rather that the union between theoretical entities and 1-RITSIAR
can only be approached asymptotically.  This seems to me to stem
directly from the 1-p "undoubtable" /3-p "doubtable" distinction - the
gap can never be completely eliminated. This means we should have
strong reservations about taking any combination of 3-p and 1-p
"literally" - especially given the very incomplete state of our
current knowledge; the issues are rather those of explanatory and
predictive fruitfulness.  This seems to me to be quite a different
issue from the one of distinguishing fiction from fact within a given
schema, which is a matter of internal reference.

David

>
> John, Stathis, Mirek, Peter,
>
> On 06 Oct 2009, at 13:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote to John,:
>
> >>
> >> "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."
> >>
> >> Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist
> >> ideas are
> >> at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would
> >> say "NO"
> >> to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new
> >> brain
> >> would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but
> >> not
> >> digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha
> >> ha) mind.
> >
> > So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with
> > computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking
> > computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are
> > clear that this is the case.
>
>
>
> John, I appreciate Stathis' answer. The goal has never been to
> convinced anybody that comp is true.
> Actuallyy, I have the feeling that *too much* scientist believes in
> comp, and this without realizing the consequences.
>
> On the contrary,  the goal here is to show how much "crazy" comp is,
> once we dare to take it as literally true. Notably to show that comp
> leads to the first person indeterminacies, and eventually to the
> reversal of the current Aristotelian theology (shared by many atheists
> and christians alike) which relies on a 'religious belief/dogma" on
> the primary character of matter.
>
> Actually comp *is*, strictly speaking, unbelievable. With some natural
> definition it can be shown provably unbelievable by (correct) machines
> (assuming their consistency), and that is why I insist that comp is
> directly akin to an act of faith, and that saying yes to the doctor is
> a theological act.
>
> Personally, I doubt comp, but this is a bit diabolical, because
> (correct) machine have to doubt comp for remaining consistent. So my
> doubt confirms comp. Of course a confirmation is not a proof, so I can
> doubt comp and remain consistent!
>
> Mirek, I agree with Stathis about his comment on the papers you
> refered too.
> Note that it is very difficult to define completely what a first
> person is, but, for the matter of reasoning partial definitions can
> work very well, and note that those definitions used in UDA and AUDA
> do refer only to sharable third person notions. (In science we cannot
> invoke as argument first person truth, but of course we can tackle the
> first person notion itself.  Through assumptions and definitions, the
> notion of first person is partially amenable to third person notions.
>
> In the UDA the first person discourse are defined by the memory, or
> the personal diary of the one who enter the teleporting (or
> duplicating) devices. So it is the memory of the one who is
> annihilated and reconstituted. The 3 person is just the usual
> discourse of an external (with respect to the teleporting device)
> observer. This works very well for a (artifiicial) machine. It is
> obvious that a program cannot measure the delay where it is not
> executed, for example, so the difference between first and third
> person is made obvious (self-duplication made it even observable in
> some sense).
>
> In the AUDA, it is more difficult, and I have been stuck on this
> during many years. But then I realized that the oldest definition of a
> "knower", the one which define 'knowing' by believing a truth, works
> very well in that context, and so I defined, in arithmetic, the first
> person by the arithmetical knower, following Boolos and Goldblat. To
> know that 1+1=2 is Beweisbar(godel number of '1+1=2') & 1+1 = 2.
>
> Such a definition of knowledge is well debated since a long time by
> philosophers. It appears in very old Indian and Chinese texts, and in
> the Theaetetus of Plato. In fine, you can see that those who object to
> such a definition are those who believe that they can distinguish
> reality and dream, or, in our context, reality and digital simulation
> of it, and this instantaneously. Again, this would contradict comp
> (our working hypothesis). I refer you to the second paper you have
> mentioned as an example.
>
> Another example treated in detail in "conscience et mécanisme" are
> works by Malcolm. In a book on 'dreaming' Malcolm argues that we are
> not conscious during a dream, and in papers he argues against comp.
> The logical structure of the argument are identicals.
>
> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel
> that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1-
> I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable.
> I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
> between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?
>
> Soon, but not so soon, hopefully this or next week, some more
> explanation on diagonalization.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Oct 2009, at 03:46, David Nyman wrote:

>
> 2009/10/7 Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>
>
>> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
>> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
>> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
>> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you  
>> feel
>> that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of  
>> the 1-
>> I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are  
>> doubtable.
>> I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
>> between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?
>
> For me, RITSIAR refers to 1-I.

That is what I thought.



>  I think the disagreement over ontology
> has been largely about whether theoretical schemas, based on AR or PM,
> must be treated as RITSIAR in a directly identified 3-I sense.  I
> think rather that the union between theoretical entities and 1-RITSIAR
> can only be approached asymptotically.

Agreed.



> This seems to me to stem
> directly from the 1-p "undoubtable" /3-p "doubtable" distinction - the
> gap can never be completely eliminated. This means we should have
> strong reservations about taking any combination of 3-p and 1-p
> "literally" - especially given the very incomplete state of our
> current knowledge; the issues are rather those of explanatory and
> predictive fruitfulness.  This seems to me to be quite a different
> issue from the one of distinguishing fiction from fact within a given
> schema, which is a matter of internal reference.


I think so. Note that the "interview of the universal machine" does  
already predict a gap between some of the possible point sof view of  
the arithmetically correct machines.

This seemss impossible given that it leads to a scientific (pure 3-
communicable) 'theology' who's first fundamental theorem asserts that  
'theology' cannot be scientific.

The paradox vanishes when you see that a machine can only study the  
(correct) theology of a correct machine, and then just pray she is  
herself correct. A correct machine, by Gödel and Tarski, can never  
known, nor even express its own correctness. Yet a machine can already  
study the complete theology of much simpler machine than herself. And  
the machine can prove that the theology is invariant for all  
machine ... as far as they remain correct, which, from an indexical  
perspective (be it the 1-I or 3-I) is necessarily on the order of  
faith or bet.
Yet the theology of machine does contain its physics, and this makes  
the machine theology and the whole comp hypothesis refutable  
empirically, or confirmable. At that point it is very important to  
understand that a empirical confirmation is never a proof.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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