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logging file names with sftp
by Agile Aspect
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message Hi - I' m trying to log file names of the files which are transferred
(basically in the same manner as vsftp, proftpd, etc.) but regardless of how high I turn on debugging, the file name won't show up! I'm running openssh-5.2p1. Any help would be greatly appreciated. -- Agile -- "We are drowning in information and starving for knowledge." -- Rutherford D. Roger |
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Re: logging file names with sftp
by Darren Tucker
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message Agile Aspect wrote:
> Hi - I' m trying to log file names of the files which are transferred > (basically in the same manner as vsftp, proftpd, etc.) but regardless > of how high I turn on debugging, the file name won't show up! How did you try configuring it? Basically you just need to add the -l and -f options to the sftp-server line in sshd_config to specify the appropriate syslog level and facility and restart sshd to pick up the changes. See sftp-server(8) man page for details. syslog will also need to be configured appropriately. -- Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au) GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4 37C9 C982 80C7 8FF4 FA69 Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience usually comes from bad judgement. |
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Re: logging file names with sftp
by Agile Aspect
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message Hi Darren - thanks for the reply!
The so-called "normal" logging is working - the problem is it's tragically incomplete. We store IP information on the server. In addition, it's not possible to have security without accountability. I was able to modify sftp-server.c to our needs, i.e., basically log every sftp command issued - including the names of the files transferred - tagged with user name and stored in a seperate log file. If anyone is interested in what I did I would more than happy to share it - otherwise I won't bore you to death. In short, I solved the my problem and thanks! -- Cinaed On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:27 PM, Darren Tucker<dtucker@...> wrote: > Agile Aspect wrote: >> >> Hi - I' m trying to log file names of the files which are transferred >> (basically in the same manner as vsftp, proftpd, etc.) but regardless >> of how high I turn on debugging, the file name won't show up! > > How did you try configuring it? > > Basically you just need to add the -l and -f options to the sftp-server line > in sshd_config to specify the appropriate syslog level and facility and > restart sshd to pick up the changes. See sftp-server(8) man page for > details. syslog will also need to be configured appropriately. > > -- > Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au) > GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4 37C9 C982 80C7 8FF4 FA69 > Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience > usually comes from bad judgement. > -- "We are drowning in information and starving for knowledge." -- Rutherford D. Roger |
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Re: logging file names with sftp
by Derek Martin
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message On Wed, Sep 02, 2009 at 10:34:18PM -0700, Agile Aspect wrote:
> The so-called "normal" logging is working - the problem is it's > tragically incomplete. > > We store IP information on the server. In addition, it's not > possible to have security without accountability. The logging of individual file transfers arguably buys you very little though, because the users are legitimate users who are authenticated. This is generally quite a different situation from FTP installations, where often the users are anonymous, and tracking downloads of files may be interesting from a purely statistical point of view (e.g. how many downloads of a particular game, application, etc., to determine its popularity). An individual FTP site may not fall into this category, but FTP software generally needs to cope with this very common usage. With sftp sites, the users are (in some sense) people that you know, and access to data can and should be carefully regulated via file system permissions. Users should not be physically able to access anything they shouldn't have access to, and logging file transfers of files they legitimately should have access to is in most cases little more than spying on them. If your site is *especially* security sensitive, this may be called for (though, if that's the case, you might also want to re-evaluate whether you really should be providing file access this way), but most of the time it probably isn't warranted, and may be considered by some as an unnecessary invasion of privacy. -- Derek D. Martin http://www.pizzashack.org/ GPG Key ID: 0x81CFE75D |
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Re: logging file names with sftp
by Darren Tucker
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message Agile Aspect wrote:
> Hi Darren - thanks for the reply! > > The so-called "normal" logging is working - the problem is it's tragically > incomplete. > > We store IP information on the server. In addition, it's not possible to have > security without accountability. > > I was able to modify sftp-server.c to our needs, i.e., basically log every > sftp command issued - including the names of the files transferred - tagged > with user name and stored in a seperate log file. > > If anyone is interested in what I did I would more than happy to share it - > otherwise I won't bore you to death. I'm curious about what you needed that wasn't provided out of the box. sftp-server(8) says about loglevel: "INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client", and setting this in sshd_config: Subsystem sftp /usr/local/libexec/sftp-server -f LOCAL7 -l INFO gives: 2009-09-04T11:07:35.660499+10:00 gate sftp-server[24692]: session opened for local user dtucker from [127.0.0.1] 2009-09-04T11:07:39.723595+10:00 gate sftp-server[24692]: open "/home/dtucker/foo" flags READ mode 0666 2009-09-04T11:07:39.725142+10:00 gate sftp-server[24692]: close "/home/dtucker/foo" bytes read 4763 written 0 2009-09-04T11:07:41.100064+10:00 gate sftp-server[24692]: session closed for local user dtucker from [127.0.0.1] Everything you mentioned (user, source IP address, files accessed) is all there. What did you find missing? > In short, I solved the my problem and thanks! -- Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au) GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4 37C9 C982 80C7 8FF4 FA69 Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience usually comes from bad judgement. |
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Re: logging file names with sftp
by Greg Wooledge
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message On Thu, Sep 03, 2009 at 11:26:57AM -0500, Derek Martin wrote:
> The logging of individual file transfers arguably buys you very little > though, because the users are legitimate users who are authenticated. > This is generally quite a different situation from FTP installations, > where often the users are anonymous If I understand correctly, many people run an sftp service which is essentially an encrypted, NAT-capable version of anonymous FTP. They offer files (or file hosting space) to a large group of barely-trusted people, and want to limit or track abuse of the service. The encryption may be used to prevent spying upon the traffic by people outside the group. The ability of sftp to sit behind a NAT firewall (which FTP cannot do -- not with a straight NAT without special hacks) may be essential to many sites. |
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RE: logging file names with sftp
by Dennis Taylor-2
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message > -----Original Message----- > From: listbounce@... > [mailto:listbounce@...] On Behalf Of Greg Wooledge > Sent: Friday, September 04, 2009 12:13 PM > To: secureshell@... > Subject: Re: logging file names with sftp > > On Thu, Sep 03, 2009 at 11:26:57AM -0500, Derek Martin wrote: > > The logging of individual file transfers arguably buys you > very little > > though, because the users are legitimate users who are > authenticated. > > This is generally quite a different situation from FTP > installations, > > where often the users are anonymous > > If I understand correctly, many people run an sftp service which is > essentially an encrypted, NAT-capable version of anonymous FTP. They > offer files (or file hosting space) to a large group of barely-trusted > people, and want to limit or track abuse of the service. > > The encryption may be used to prevent spying upon the traffic by > people outside the group. > > The ability of sftp to sit behind a NAT firewall (which FTP > cannot do -- > not with a straight NAT without special hacks) may be essential to > many sites. > embedded systems in the field, we have no reasonable expectation of privacy. All sensitive data on the system belongs to someone else. We need to be trusted, but also accountable. We have gone to great lengths to make it impractical for even an authorized user to steal others' information. Having logs that we cannot tamper with is one more layer of security, mostly to help track who compromised the system if they do find away around the other layers. It is also an industry requirement, and our products are audited by independent firms to verify that we do in fact log accesses. I have not yet enabled SFTP, but most likely will in the future, with logging of all file accesses turned on. |
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Re: logging file names with sftp
by Derek Martin
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message On Fri, Sep 04, 2009 at 12:12:33PM -0400, Greg Wooledge wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 03, 2009 at 11:26:57AM -0500, Derek Martin wrote: > > The logging of individual file transfers arguably buys you very little > > though, because the users are legitimate users who are authenticated. > > This is generally quite a different situation from FTP installations, > > where often the users are anonymous > > If I understand correctly, many people run an sftp service which is > essentially an encrypted, NAT-capable version of anonymous FTP. They > offer files (or file hosting space) to a large group of barely-trusted > people, and want to limit or track abuse of the service. exist cases where the logging is more useful than in others. When the OP posted, he did not describe his intended purpose; all we knew was that he wanted to log the file names. I was simply trying to point out that, depending on his use case, this may be unnecessary, unwarranted, and un-useful. I would also point out that even in the case you describe, the situation is different from an actual anonymous FTP server, and I think that it's worth pointing out what is available without tracking individual file transfers. In general with OpenSSH, for determining abuse, without logging file names, one already knows the identity of the user, where they logged in from, and how long they were connected. If the user uses up the available space on the storage device, you know who they are, and you can find the files. If you enable system accounting (if the server has those facilities -- devices based on any of the free unix kernels generally at least have the possibility) then you can identify when the user downloads more data then they should be allowed to. All without logging individual file names. Though admittedly, logging file names may more efficient in terms of space consumed, and it's easier to count log lines than process the system accounting file. But you could certainly build a tool that processes the accounting for you, and if this is a product, include that as part of your management tools. On Fri, Sep 04, 2009 at 06:10:37PM -0400, Dennis Taylor wrote: > When one of our technicians or engineers accesses one of our > embedded systems in the field, we have no reasonable expectation of > privacy. Clearly this is for support purposes, and in that case such a policy makes sense; you don't own the data, and are not an agent of the person who owns the data -- you have no right to it. But in general I'm philosophically opposed to the idea of "no reasonable expectation of privacy." As you might have guessed. ;-) It's become the modus operandi of the day, but I think that's wrong, from both a moral and practical standpoint. People tend to feel somewhat stifled if they know they are being watched. And we have a variety of laws against watching people without their knowledge not without reason, though of late they have been lessened and weakened, sadly. Honestly, what I personally would like to see is more software with logic that automatically starts logging but only when a behavior surpasses some configured notion of what's acceptable. This has multiple benefits (including reducing disk usage of logs). I like my privacy, and I think we should all generally have more of it than we typically do today, at the hands of technology. > We need to be trusted, but also accountable. Above, I'm trying to point out that not logging individual file transfers does not necessarily prevent accountability. In many cases, all it does is provide additional detail that's not strictly necessary or even especially useful. In your case, it may be particularly useful, or even required. > We have gone to great lengths to make it impractical for even an > authorized user to steal others' information. Having logs that we > cannot tamper with is one more layer of security, mostly to help > track who compromised the system if they do find away around the > other layers. Sure. Of course, if they find a way around the other layers, most likely they've managed to escalate their privileges, in which case your logging is suspect (unless it's to some sort of write-only media). > It is also an industry requirement, and our products are audited by > independent firms to verify that we do in fact log accesses. You can log *access* without necessarily logging individual file transfers. Though again, in your case it may be appropriate or required. To be clear, I'm not trying to suggest that one should never log file transfers, or that it is never useful. I'm simply saying that it is not always clear that it is necessary, and it is clear that it is not always necessary. :) Just because you can do something, doesn't mean you should. I think all of us as technologists should take the time to consider if what we are doing is ethical and necessary. From a purely philosophical point of view, I think it is better not to log individual file transfers unless you can determine that you have a justifiable need for the data so obtained that you can not obtain another way. A legal requirement would certainly qualify as a justifiable need... And (obviously), I think we should apply this philosophy everywhere, not just to file transfers. Of course, if you have a bonifide need for a high level of security, then you do what you have to do. But you ought to at least make sure that the parties involved have appropriate notice. If you're going to log transfers of legitimate users, you should notify the users that you do so. Just my $.00002 -- Derek D. Martin http://www.pizzashack.org/ GPG Key ID: 0x81CFE75D |
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RE: logging file names with sftp
by Dennis Taylor-2
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Reply (Restricted by the Administrator) | Reply to Author | View Threaded | Show Only this Message > -----Original Message----- > From: listbounce@... > [mailto:listbounce@...] On Behalf Of Derek Martin > Sent: Friday, September 04, 2009 9:25 PM > To: secureshell@... > Subject: Re: logging file names with sftp > > On Fri, Sep 04, 2009 at 12:12:33PM -0400, Greg Wooledge wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 03, 2009 at 11:26:57AM -0500, Derek Martin wrote: > > > The logging of individual file transfers arguably buys > you very little > > > though, because the users are legitimate users who are > authenticated. > > > This is generally quite a different situation from FTP > installations, > > > where often the users are anonymous > > > > If I understand correctly, many people run an sftp service which is > > essentially an encrypted, NAT-capable version of anonymous > FTP. They > > offer files (or file hosting space) to a large group of > barely-trusted > > people, and want to limit or track abuse of the service. > > Absolutely; of course I was generalizing, and acknowledged that there > exist cases where the logging is more useful than in others. When the > OP posted, he did not describe his intended purpose; all we knew was > that he wanted to log the file names. I was simply trying to point > out that, depending on his use case, this may be unnecessary, > unwarranted, and un-useful. Agreed. > > I would also point out that even in the case you describe, the > situation is different from an actual anonymous FTP server, and I > think that it's worth pointing out what is available without tracking > individual file transfers. > > In general with OpenSSH, for determining abuse, without logging file > names, one already knows the identity of the user, where they logged > in from, and how long they were connected. If the user uses up the > available space on the storage device, you know who they are, and you > can find the files. If you enable system accounting (if the server > has those facilities -- devices based on any of the free unix kernels > generally at least have the possibility) then you can identify when > the user downloads more data then they should be allowed to. All > without logging individual file names. Though admittedly, logging > file names may more efficient in terms of space consumed, and it's > easier to count log lines than process the system accounting file. > But you could certainly build a tool that processes the accounting for > you, and if this is a product, include that as part of your management > tools. > > On Fri, Sep 04, 2009 at 06:10:37PM -0400, Dennis Taylor wrote: > > When one of our technicians or engineers accesses one of our > > embedded systems in the field, we have no reasonable expectation of > > privacy. > > Clearly this is for support purposes, and in that case such a policy > makes sense; you don't own the data, and are not an agent of the > person who owns the data -- you have no right to it. But in general > I'm philosophically opposed to the idea of "no reasonable expectation > of privacy." As you might have guessed. ;-) It's become the modus > operandi of the day, but I think that's wrong, from both a moral and > practical standpoint. People tend to feel somewhat stifled if they The people being monitored usually are downloading files requested by the developers. It's really not an issue here. Obviously, I cannot speak for the original poster. > know they are being watched. And we have a variety of laws against > watching people without their knowledge not without reason, though of > late they have been lessened and weakened, sadly. > I agree in principle, but in this specific case it may be your credit card number (albeit encrypted) that I am accessing. That certainly is none of our business. The auditors want to be able to forensically determine if those files were accessed by any means, with records kept at least a year. In a perfect world, we would not ever need to look at the files. To be clear, we do NOT decrypt the sensitive data, and the keys are not accessible to even authenticated users. > Honestly, what I personally would like to see is more software with > logic that automatically starts logging but only when a behavior > surpasses some configured notion of what's acceptable. This has > multiple benefits (including reducing disk usage of logs). I like my > privacy, and I think we should all generally have more of it than we > typically do today, at the hands of technology. I like the idea of selective logging. It is just difficult to do and be sure we do not miss something we should have included. Eventually, I may have a way to realiably implement that. > > > We need to be trusted, but also accountable. > > Above, I'm trying to point out that not logging individual file > transfers does not necessarily prevent accountability. In many cases, > all it does is provide additional detail that's not strictly > necessary or even especially useful. In your case, it may be > particularly useful, or even required. > Yes, required. > > We have gone to great lengths to make it impractical for even an > > authorized user to steal others' information. Having logs that we > > cannot tamper with is one more layer of security, mostly to help > > track who compromised the system if they do find away around the > > other layers. > > Sure. Of course, if they find a way around the other layers, most > likely they've managed to escalate their privileges, in which case > your logging is suspect (unless it's to some sort of write-only > media). > We enable sending log files to a host that we do not have access to tamper with. The folks with access to that host do not have access to our equipment. When they log in using a shell, commands are logged as well. They have the privileges necessary to stop the logging if they know how, but the last thing logged will be them stopping the logging. > > It is also an industry requirement, and our products are audited by > > independent firms to verify that we do in fact log accesses. > > You can log *access* without necessarily logging individual file > transfers. Though again, in your case it may be appropriate or > required. > Definitely required by outside forces. (Card Information Security Program, Payment Card Industry Data Storage Standards, and so on.) Under the best of circumstances, all we need to download is the debug logs for the developers to study over to see what is wrong. Sometimes we need more. > To be clear, I'm not trying to suggest that one should never log file > transfers, or that it is never useful. I'm simply saying that it is > not always clear that it is necessary, and it is clear that it is not > always necessary. :) Just because you can do something, doesn't mean > you should. I think all of us as technologists should take the time > to consider if what we are doing is ethical and necessary. From a > purely philosophical point of view, I think it is better not to log > individual file transfers unless you can determine that you have a > justifiable need for the data so obtained that you can not obtain > another way. A legal requirement would certainly qualify as a > justifiable need... And (obviously), I think we should apply this > philosophy everywhere, not just to file transfers. > > Of course, if you have a bonifide need for a high level of security, > then you do what you have to do. But you ought to at least make sure > that the parties involved have appropriate notice. If you're going to > log transfers of legitimate users, you should notify the users that > you do so. > All dozen or so are aware of why we recently made significant changes to their access methods. > Just my $.00002 > > -- > Derek D. Martin > http://www.pizzashack.org/ > GPG Key ID: 0x81CFE75D > > |
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